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The Philosophical Basis of Wyclif's Theology
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RELIGION IN JOHN DEWEY'S PHILOSOPHY

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INSTRUMENTALISM as a term of reproach has been applied to the philosophy of Mr. Dewey. We believe, on the contrary, that in whatsoever sense instrumentalism is an evil it is something in our lives which Mr. Dewey has most persistently been striving to correct.

To recognize the fact that men devise instruments and use them to attain desired ends, and must do so in order to live in the human way, cannot be called "instrumentalism" in any invidious sense. That fact is so manifest that every one recognizes it. Instrumentalism as an evil can only be an undue glorification of instruments, giving them an exalted place which is more than their due, or asserting that certain realities are instrumental when they are not. In case of Mr. Dewey his insistence that philosophies, and concepts generally, find their chief importance in serving as instruments is probably chiefly responsible for setting his philosophy before the world as instrumentalism.

Instrumentalism in a bad sense, we have said, is giving undue importance to instruments or attributing instrumentality to matters that are not instruments. But these are just the common evils of life which Mr. Dewey has been most earnestly trying to overcome. Consider some cases of instrumentalism which are seriously pernicious. For example, we find that fire is useful to cook food and keep us warm, and we use it in that way. But in the course of time this instrumental function of fire so focuses our attention upon fire and deepens our interest in it that we place it upon an altar, worship it, and sacrifice human beings by the hundred to express our reverence for it. That is a case of perverting our interest in the fire and our use of it in such a way as to constitute a great evil which might well be called "instrumentalism." It is a perversion of the instrumental function of fire. It is quite probable that the lyric fancy of man, rather than his practical interest in instruments, led him thus to glorify fire. But his fancy would not have fastened on fire if the instrumental function of fire in his life had not drawn his attention to it.

But let us take another case of perverted instrumentalism which is much nearer home. Our economic and industrial system is a gigantic instrument for producing goods to satisfy the wants of men. Our machines, our laboratories and techniques, our finance, our executive organizations, should serve this end. But we are rapidly coming to treat this titanic instrument in very much the same way the primitive man treated fire. Instead of using the economic and industrial system to provide goods for the wants of men, we are using the wants of men to provide consumption so that the machines can be kept going and the system working. Thus we pervert the instrument by glorifying it out of all proportion to its due, and sacrifice men to it in far greater number than the primitive sacrificed his fellows to fire. This is another case of instrumentalism in the evil sense.

But underneath all other perversions of the instrument there is the most fundamental perversion of all. This basic evil, which lies at the root of all the others, is what Mr. Dewey persistently attacks. It may be described in a general way after some such fashion as this. There are certain fascinating, not to say blissful, experiences which come to men as they fulfil the functions of life and devise and use instruments by which the distinctively human way of life is conducted. When the delight to be found in these experiences is clearly recognized, men tend to cultivate the experience for the sake of the enjoyment it yields and in disregard of the bearing it has on the rest of life. They treat it as an end in itself. They wrench it out of its rightful function and make it serve other ends that may be pernicious, or no ends at all.

In other ages, and to a large degree still, men justified this procedure by a kind of rationalization. They construct a myth which makes it appear that this experience has great importance in some other realm beyond the world of observable consequences and physical operations. Since they seek and cherish it as an end in itself, that is, without regard to observable consequences and without regard to anything that can be achieved by physical operations, they feel it necessary to justify this perversion and make it seem not a perversion, by holding that this experience gives them access to a supernatural, or noumenal, or otherwise transcendent, realm. In highly sophisticated ages, however, such as ours is coming to be, these myths and rationalizations are sloughed off and men brazenly, without feeling the need of any justification, seek enjoyments without paying any attention to their instrumental function, that is to say, the contribution which such ways of enjoyment may have for the other interests of human living. This brings on epicureanism, decadence, and the disintegration of that organized system of mutually sustaining activities which is indispensable to the maintenance and furtherance of life. Instrumentalism in the good sense is the cure and prevention of this evil.

In philosophy the delightful experience which is thus wrenched from its rightful function in the conduct of life is the enjoyment found in constructing and contemplating systems of propositions which are perfectly consistent and coherent, so that you can start at the beginning and think through the end of the system with the superb clarity and undeviating accuracy of pure reason. Such systems are wonderful playthings. They stir the lyric fancy of philosophic minds much as fire stirred the fancy of primitive minds. They arouse the ardent enthusiasm of philosophers much as our splendid system of economic production inflames the imagination of engineers, financiers, and executives. Consequently in the past, in more naïve times than ours, philosophers revered such a system of propositions as being God himself or as revealing God or in some way constituting values which were the supreme ends of life—ends in themselves. It was the old adoration of the fire upon the altar. It is the same impulse which leads communistic Russia to revere economic production as a God. Some modern philosophers are too sophisticated for this, but they are guilty of the same perversion. They attribute to these systems of propositions a value similar to the value which the *roué* attributes to sex.

In certain circles of present-day religion the function of life thus perverted is not fire nor economic production nor a system of propositions, but a kind of experience called "religious experience" or "inner experience." This experience is held to be God, or the unique manifestation of God, or somehow the presentation or representation of those values which should be sovereign over all the rest of life. Now there is a kind of experience (which is the experience sometimes meant by the religious, although not always) in which the individual is most blissfully sensitized to the qualitative richness of the world about him. This experience certainly has an important function to fulfil in the conduct of life. But to set it apart as somehow being God or representing God or giving access to God or constituting value as the rest of life cannot, the rest of life being subordinated as mere means to this, while this is means to nothing else, to set it on an altar as the primitive man set fire, the business man sets money, or the engineer sets economic production, or the philosopher a system of propositions, is to be guilty again of the old perversion which gives rise to most of the evils in life which might be avoided. This is the evil which Mr. Dewey opposes in all his work, but especially in his *The Quest for Certainty*.

The kind of certainty which is condemned is that which philosophers have sought by developing a system of propositions by logical and mathematical principles from certain original axioms which are held to be incontrovertible. Mr. Dewey has no objection to such systems, mathematical and logical, provided they are used rightly. Such systems of propositions we must have in order to analyze situations, to observe the conditions and consequences of physical operations, to make inferences from what we have observed, to devise new and better operations. In short, we must have such systems of propositions before we can have anything to investigate or any way of investigating it or any intelligent striving after higher values. Therefore, as long as a deductive system is properly used, it is indispensable for the intelligent conduct of life.

But Mr. Dewey objects when such a deductive system is believed to constitute, or to make known to us, a realm of supreme importance where the highest values can be sought and found by contemplation or ratiocination or intuition or any other method than that of observation and physical operations. The highest values that ever are to be achieved must be achieved by physical operations. The mathematical and logical systems are indispensable tools in this supreme enterprise of human life. But when these systems are set up as objects of supreme devotion in themelves, or as revealers of a realm where greatest values must be sought and found by another method than the only one by which highest values can be attained, then we make the old disastrous blunder that human life is always making.

The deductive system of ideas in which the philosophers have sought their certainty may give aesthetic satisfaction. The completeness, symmetry, and consistency of a system of ideas logically developed from accepted premises may well give exquisite aesthetic delight to men of certain intellectual bent. But to think the aesthetic experience we derive from such propositions is an experience of transcendent beauty shining forth from the realm of ultimate reality is error, he declares. Furthermore, such a system in itself, apart from its instrumental application to the practical problems presented by the physical world, does not solve any problems, although we may use it to give us the feeling that all our problems are solved. Also, such a system does not give us an object which is worthy of any man's devotion, except as an instrument to be used in making observations, physical operations, and inferences. When such a system is revered as an object of greatest value, we have again the old betrayal of the great venture of human living.

Mr. Dewey's instrumentalism, if you want to call it that, consists in the claim that everything should be both instrumental and consummatory. Nothing should be regarded as an end in itself if by that you mean that it should be sought, revered, or enjoyed without regard to what it contributes to the rest of life. On the contrary, everything should be valued in the light of what it contributes to the rest of life. If we enjoy anything, do anything, revere anything, without regard to its effect upon other concerns, we are sure, sooner or later, to interfere with the increase of the good. For anything enjoyed, done, or revered in such a reckless, abandoned manner as that will mess the program by which life can be improved.

Thus far we have considered the negative side of Mr. Dewey's teaching. Let us now turn to the positive side. We are chiefly interested in the kind of religion which Mr. Dewey advocates. For Mr. Dewey does advocate a religion, contrary to the opinion of some, and does so very explicitly and very earnestly. Indeed, we believe his entire philosophy, rightly understood, is an exposition of a religious way of living. In the book of his which we are now chiefly considering, *The Quest for Certainty,* his most explicit statements about this religious way of living are to be found in the last chapter, on pages 303 to end of the book.

This religion which Mr. Dewey advocates consists in giving supreme devotion to the highest possibilities of value which the existing world can yield without knowing specifically what these possibilities are. We do not know them because we do not know, except in a very partial and tentative manner, what is the nature of this existing world which carries the possibilities. All further knowledge must be left to the labor of scientific investigation; and any claim to have knowledge by any other method is an illusion. But religion is passionate devotion to the best there is, even while still it is unknown. Religion must make use of the best knowledge we have. But if it is to retain its rightful function and power it must not identify itself with any form of knowledge, for all knowledge is more or less tentative and subject to constant reconstruction. The essence of religion is immediate realization that there is this unknown best, and passionate devotion to it, regardless of the fallibility of all our knowledge. Religion becomes "invincible" when it (1) lays aside all claim to knowledge other than can be attained by scientific method and (2) gives supreme allegiance of life to the possible best even while it is still unknown. Such a religion does not depend for its vitality and power upon the truth of any specific belief or upon the success of any projected program of action, but forever stings to passionate quest because of its mystic devotion to the best there is or ever can be. We say "mystic devotion" because it is realization without specific knowledge. This driving propulsion of religion should be intelligently directed by scientific method, but the drive will not depend upon the correctness of scientific specifications or upon the success of the scientific program. Thus the function of religion in life is to provide the invincible striving and unquenchable zest; the function of science is to provide the specifications for the guidance of this striving. The function of philosophy is to formulte a theory to guide this total enterprise of human living.

Let us try to develop the fuller meaning of this way of religion, following up implications which, so far as we know, Mr. Dewey has not developed, and reaching conclusions which he might or might not support.

The "possibilities of existence" is a vague expression. We cannot concern ourselves with the totality of existence for several reasons. For one thing, it is altogether too vast and complex. Furthermore, a great part of it is apparently too trivial, negligible or neutral in its bearing upon any interests we may entertain to be of any concern to us. Also, Mr. Dewey would say, it is too pluralistic, multiform, chaotic, and conflicting to be considered a practicable object with which to work for anything.

So the first thing we must do is to isolate or distinguish that particular form or aspect of existence which bears these possibilities for which we want to work. Doubtless the process or processes which carry these possibilities must be brought to light by the method through which anything else is learned about existence, namely, by observing the conditions and consequences of physical operations. But the human race throughout its history has been making such observations and operations in a more or less desultory manner. Above all, the several sciences have been doing it; and physics, most successfully. Out of all this we ought to be able to form some idea of what process or processes going on in existence are the most promising and hence the ones in which we must make our observations and operations in search of greatest values. We say "in which" we are to operate, for any process which carries highest possibilities for us must be one in which we play some part; otherwise we can have no part in the values it may bring forth.

First let us ask, Do these processes in which we must work to seek and to achieve the highest possibilities of value constitute any kind of unity, or are they essentially discrete and plural?

Let us first assume that they are discrete and plural, and let us consider several of them.

Most people would admit that human intelligence is at least one process going on in existence which must play some part in bringing forth whatever highest values existence may have to offer. Certainly human intelligence is the factor about which Mr. Dewey seems to have most to say. But to say that human intelligence always functions in such a way as to bring forth the highest values is to make a statement so flagrantly false as to be absurd. Of course one can arbitrarily define intelligence as that which does bring forth highest values; and then, by definition, the question is settled. But intelligence, as that word is ordinarily understood, is often exercised by scoundrels to tear down and destroy what is most precious. Unquestionably intelligence is one factor in that which brings forth the highest values, but it is intelligence only when intelligence interacts in the right way with innumerable other factors. Therefore what is really important is not so much intelligence as it is this required kind of interaction between intelligence and other elements.

Still again, most people would say that biological evolution is a necessary factor in bringing forth higher values. But to say that biological evolution always, simply because it is evolution, brings forth ever higher values is to make a statement as absurd as was the like claim for intelligence. It is not biological evolution taken by itself as discrete and separate, but only biological evolution interacting in a certain way with many other factors, one of which must be intelligence. Or, if intelligence has not yet come into existence, it can be biological evolution only as it issues in intelligence.

Still again, the biological functioning of the organism with its cells, viscera, and adaptive reaction to the environment, including other organisms, is a factor which all would admit must enter into the process which brings forth highest values. But here again it plainly is not biological organic functioning as such. Just because an organism is functioning does not mean that values are being sustained or promoted. It is only when the functioning of the organism rightly interacts with many other factors, including biological evolution and intelligence, that there is anything of value.

Another indispensable factor in the process promoting value is the smooth working of social institutions. But these do not promote values, no matter how smoothly they work, if this working does not interact in right way with the other factors we have mentioned and with many we have not mentioned.

Still again, the social heritage as it is accumulated generation after generation is a necessary factor. But the mere accumulation of a social heritage does not inevitably bring forth any increase of value. It may, on the contrary, diminish or destroy values so that, as a consequence of this accumulating heritage, values become less and less. Values are promoted by the social heritage only as this accumulating heritage rightly interacts with intelligence, biological evolution, organic functioning, the smooth working of institutions, and much else.

The same is true of science with all its techniques for research and achievement. Science, no matter how rapidly it may develop and powerful it may become, does not increase values unless it interacts in the right way with the other forms of intelligence which cannot be called science, as well as with the other factors mentioned above.

The same is true of earth and sun and air and food and shelter and health and everything else which may be mentioned as indispensable factors in the process of existence yielding value and the increase of value. None of these factors constitutes value, and none of them sustains or promotes value by itself alone. Neither do they constitute, sustain, or promote value when they are taken all together unless they interact on one another in the right way. In fact, it is not these several discrete and separate factors at all which sustain and promote value, but it is a kind of interaction between them all.

What, then, is that process of existence which sustains and promotes values to the maximum? It is one very distinctive sort of interaction going on between intelligence, organic evolution, functioning of the organism, social heritage, social institutions, climate, soil, etc. It is not the total interaction going on between these factors, but only one kind of interaction. Thus we reach the conclusion that if we are to find what it is in existence which sustains and promotes values, and hence what it is in which and with which we must work if we would achieve values to the utmost, we must search for it not as plural, not as consisting of various different things taken separately, but we must search for one single kind of process, a process of interaction between many different factors.

The several different factors that enter into this process of interaction, such as earth, air, social heritage, institutions, the sciences, organic functioning, and so on, have their important function; and we must deal with them. But if we do so in such a way as to promote values, we must always do it with a view to promoting a certain kind of interaction between them. Hence it is this interaction which is the object of our supreme concern. To this process of interaction we must adjust our lives. In it we must play our part, and to it we must give our devotion.

But what is the nature of this interaction to which we have constantly referred? To answer that question we must have some idea of what constitutes value. When we find out what value is, we shall be able to say, in a general way, what is the nature of this distinctive kind of interaction which sustains and promotes value, for this is the process of existence to which we must conform and to which we must give our lives if ever we are to attain the fullest measure of value which existence can yield.

In stating what constitutes value in the view of Mr. Dewey, we shall not follow closely any statement he has made. He has written many scattered articles upon the subject, not always holding exactly the same view. We shall state a theory of the nature of value without trying to say what Mr. Dewey would say or trying to agree with him, but stating a doctrine which we believe is not essentially different from his view.

The raw material out of which value is made consists of enjoyments. But mere enjoyments, taken as so many experiences, do not constitute values. One may derive enjoyment from committing a murder, torturing another human person, singing a song, or writing a poem. But the mere fact that enjoyment is experienced does not mean that there is value. Value is only that particular kind of enjoyment which is derived from my judgment that what I am doing is a sustaining and promoting function within a whole system of mutually sustaining and mutually enhancing enjoyments. In order that an experience constitute genuine value, two things must be true of it: (1) It must be causally efficacious in promoting the most inclusive system of interdependent and mutually enhancing enjoyments. (2) I must have knowledge of this fact and derive my enjoyment of the experience from this knowledge of its function in sustaining or promoting the system.

Thus my enjoyment must be derived from the meaning of what I do, if it is to be a case of value. Value is enjoyment derived from this particular kind of meaning, or, otherwise stated, from this particular kind of judgment. In order that there can be value, the conditions and consequences of enjoyments, both my own diverse enjoyments and the enjoyments of others must interact on one another in such a way as to determine one another. The more pervasive, potent, and complicated is this mutually determining interaction, the greater is the value we can experience providing we search out the ways and means (1) of so adjusting our enjoyments as to make them mutually sustaining and mutually enhancing and (2) of making each individual cognizant of his functional participation in the system as a whole. The latter is a problem of the right kind of education, not to say religious education.

Thus the individual, by shaping his own enjoyment in such a way as to promote and generate a whole system of mutually sustaining and mutually enhancing enjoyments, finds in his own enjoyment not only an immediate experience but a meaning which enables him to participate in the system as a whole. He cannot have all these other enjoyments which enter into the system, as immediate experiences of his own; but he can have the value of them in the sense that he knows they are causally connected with his own immediate experience and hence constitute the meaning of his present experience.

It should be noted that when we have such a system we may find enjoyment in experiences which, without the system, would not be enjoyable at all. These experiences become enjoyable when we experience them as sustaining and promoting a system of enjoyments. They become enjoyable by virtue of their function in this system. Enjoyments do not constitute value when they merely happen to an individual in such a way that he does not recognize any interaction between them and other enjoyments of such sort that they mutually sustain and mutually enhance one another. It is only when we judge that our present experience does enter into such a process of interaction, and when our enjoyment of it is colored by that judgment, that we can be said to experience "value." Thus judgment "enstates value" to use one of Mr. Dewey's own phrases.

As a test case, let us take the feeling of having committed one's self completely to the most important concern that can possibly engage the life of man. This is one of the most satisfying, not to say blissful, experiences which an individual can undergo. It is pre-eminently the religious experience, to use a much abused and misinterpreted word; for religion is precisely reacting to something as though it were worthy of the supreme devotion of all human living. Now this feeling of commitment is a very common experience among the insane. A "sense of mission" is one of the frequent characteristics of insanity. Such an experience may be wholly without value, according to Mr. Dewey, no matter how ecstatic it may be. It becomes a value only when the ecstasy takes on that added quality which arises when the individual sees how the conditions and consequences of what he is doing are causally related to other enjoyments in such a way as to constitute a most inclusive system of mutual support and mutual enhancement. Without intelligent judgment of this sort there is no value, no matter how much ephemeral ecstasy there may be. The same is true of love, friendship, tasty food, and all the rest.

If you wish to call any enjoyment taken as an immediate experience, and without regard to such judgment, a "value," of course you can, says Mr. Dewey. But if by "value" you mean something that can be sought intelligently, something that can be increased indefinitely, something that can be cultivated, controlled, measured, and compared, then you cannot identify value with casual experiences of enjoyment without regard to judgment concerning their conditions and consequences, for without mutual adjustment of the conditions and consequences of our enjoyments there is no way to seek value intelligently, no way to control or cultivate it, no way intentionally to increase it or to judge between enjoyments as to which is better or worse.

Value, then, is any enjoyment which sustains and promotes a system most inclusive of other enjoyments and has that quality of enjoyment which comes from the judgment that it sustains this relationship to other enjoyments. The value of existence is increased by increasing this system of mutual interdependence and support among all enjoyments actual and possible.

The highest possibilities of value which existence can be made to yield are achieved just in so far as five requirements are met.

The first of these five is to modify the physical, physiological, psychological, and social conditions under which we experience our enjoyments in such way that each enjoyment is more causally effective in promoting other enjoyments. In other words, our enjoyments must be bound together so that they enhance one another in ever more subtle, potent, and pervasive ways.

The second requirement is that the system be so designed that wide reaches of experience which would otherwise be dreary or trivial or painful become positively enjoyable because of the knowledge of the important function which they fill in this most inclusive system of mutual enhancement and mutual support.

The third requirement is to make the system inclusive of a greater number of enjoyments, ideally of all enjoyments. The value of existence is increased in proportion as the system becomes inclusive of all enjoyments, past, present, and future. That, of course, would require the exclusion from existence of all enjoyments which cannot be made to fit into any sort of inclusive system of mutual support and mutual enhancement.

If my present experience is enjoyed because of its causal efficacy in promoting other enjoyments, then those other enjoyments are mine to that degree and in that form. The meal another man eats can never give me the gustatory pleasure it gives him. But the immediate gustatory pleasure does not constitute value, as Mr. Dewey is considering it. The value of the meal is experienced by the man only when his enjoyment takes on that modification which ensues from his judgment that it fills a function in a whole system of mutually sustaining and mutually enhancing enjoyments.

Now this kind of value is something which I can share with the man who eats the meal. With this understanding of the nature of value, the distinction between my value and the other man's value breaks down. If my value consists in the experience of doing something to sustain and promote the total system of enjoyments, and if the other man's value also consists in doing something to sustain and promote that same total system, then the distinction between his value and my value ceases to be important.

Therefore, when we say that the third requirement for increasing the value of existence is to multiply the enjoyments which enter into the system we do not have to consider the distinction between his enjoyments and mine.

The fourth requirement for increasing the value of existence is to expand this system of mutual support and mutual enhancement of enjoyments throughout space and time. Time is much more important than space, for it offers greater possibilities for expansion. How much of the past and how much of the future do I take into consideration in judging and so in appreciating the value of my present experience? This scope of time is a fourth element entering in to what we have called the "expansion" of the system.

Last of all, the individual must be so educated and otherwise so equipped and conditioned that he can use the best methods for ascertaining the causal efficacy of what he does when he does anything to sustain and promote the system which constitutes the value. If the individual cannot judge the efficacy of his act in sustaining and promoting the system that constitutes value, then he does not have any experience of value at all, no matter how blissful may be his experience. For value consists precisely in the enjoyment we get not merely from the immediate experience but from our judgment of the part which our experience plays in the system as a whole.

Now it is plain that if the individual is to be so equipped as to share thus intelligently in the system of mutual support and mutual enhancement of enjoyments, he must have a certain amount of food, shelter, culture, social advantages, etc. Here is where the question must be settled concerning distribution of food, shelter, leisure, academic opportunities, and the like. It is not a matter of one person giving up in order that another person may have more, but ideally it is a problem of so distributing these advantages that each individual can contribute the maximum to the development of a system of mutual support and mutual enhancement which each individual can experience in its totality as a system. Thus the value which each individual finds in life will not be measured by the comforts and pleasures he experiences but by the magnitude of the system of mutual support and mutual enhancement which he is able to experience by contributing something to its maintenance and promotion, even though the immediate enjoyments in the form of pleasures and comforts which fall to his lot be only a minute part of the whole.

If this be the nature of value and the way it is increased, we are able to see what must be the nature of that process of interaction going on in existence which carries the highest possibilities of value and hence the one to which we must give our full allegiance if we are to realize to the utmost the possibilities of value which existence can yield.

This process is that which gives rise to communication by way of symbols; and, after communication is achieved, it is the process of increasing mutual understanding by way of communication. For only in such a process can we develop and magnify the kind of system which we have said constitutes value. This process which gives rise to communication goes far back into cosmic time. It is not merely evolution in general, for many lines of evolution do not issue in communication. But it is that particular process of interaction between earth, air, sun, physiological organism, biological evolution, which issues in communication; and it is then that further interaction between all these, together with social heritage, institutions, psychological conditions, scientific techniques, etc., which issues in even deeper and more comprehensive community or mutual understanding between all communicating individuals, or individuals who are capable of communicating.

When we speak of "increase" in communication, we do not mean merely increase in radios, newspapers, and the like, except as these extend and deepen mutual understanding. For it is mutual understanding which magnifies the kind of system which we have said constitutes value. The process which carries highest possibility of value is that interaction between many factors which generates and promotes to the maximum communication and community.

What name shall we give to this process? Shall we call it the "process of progressive integration"? Or shall we give it the name which religion has most frequently given to the object of supreme concern? The name we give it is not very important. But it itself is supremely important if it be the bearer and mediator of the greatest possibilities of value which may ever be brought forth in the world of existence. It is that upon which we are dependent and to which we must commit ourselves completely if the greatest possible values of existence are ever to be realized. There is nothing else equal to it in importance so far as we can discover by the method of observation of, and inference from, the conditions and consequences of physical operations, which is the only legitimate method by which knowledge is ever attained.

Here we have something going on in the world which is observable; upon which and in which we can operate with our bodies, our techniques, our machines; and to which all the resources of science and the whole of human life can be dedicated for the sake of the possibilities of value which it offers. Such dedication of human life is the kind of religion which is implied in Mr. Dewey's philosophy, as we understand it.

But religion does not stand or fall with the correctness of the view just presented concerning the nature of the process which carries highest possibilities of value. Religion must not commit itself, as Mr. Dewey rightly insists, to any belief as though it were final and infallible. To make loyalty to a belief a religious matter is to put a knife to the throat of religion. Religion can be supreme devotion to the highest possibilities and to the process which carries such possibilities, even when our beliefs about them are highly fallible. Beliefs may come and beliefs may go, but the perennial aspiration of human life must go on forever. To limit aspiration to those processes and possibilities which we can clearly specify and surely predict (supposing there are any such) would be to destroy scientific investigation and every other exploration of the unknown, to eliminate artistic activity, to throttle creative group discussion and romantic love, and to set up in the place of religion the social conventions of Main Street. Our religion must be a search and striving to actualize the highest possibilities of value even when these possibilities extend beyond the scope of our knowledge and imagination, and even when the process which carries these possibilities is but dimly or incorrectly discerned by us. To deny that this can be done is to deny the most characteristic fact which distinguishes the human way of living from that of the lower animals.

NATURAL SCIENCE AND THE CHRISTIAN FAITH[1]

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THE subject about which I wish to speak to you is only a question of theory, and questions of practice seem more important to the modern man. Christianity and politics, Christianity and the social order, certainly are matters which are of great interest and deserve thorough investigation; but they all presuppose that Christianity serves as a norm, according to which the political, economic, social, and ethical life should be regulated. But the view that Christianity should play a significant and decisive rôle in our whole civilization is by no means universally held, and the chief ground for such doubts lies in present-day scientific thought. No one can deny that science from the time of Copernicus to the present has developed into a world-power, and this scientific thought was unknown and strange to the Christianity of our reformers and the people of Bible times also. The beginnings of our science were by no means welcomed with joy by the churches. In his *Table Talk* Luther called Copernicus a "fool," and Melanchthon, the great scholar, declared that such audacity should be controlled by a censor. Much worse was the treatment accorded by the Roman Catholic church to the famous physicist Galileo, who was held in custody for years. The famous words, "but the earth *does* move," were not spoken by him; but he gave vent to his anger in comments like these:

> Who doubts that it must result most scandalously if, when one introduces something new, people who know absolutely nothing about a science pass judgment on those who do know something about it, and

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[1] Dr. Titius was visiting professor, University of Chicago, Spring, 1930.

compel the latter to follow their opinion by means of the authority given them by political power.

The justified self-confidence of the new science which appears here with such assurance has gained the victory. The defenders of the old faith have had to surrender one after another the positions which they had too hastily taken with respect to science. It is then no wonder that with so many scientists the view has arisen that faith can last only so long as science is not fully developed, and then must abandon the field to her. Who can be surprised then, if the present rulers of Bolshevik Russia draw the practical conclusions from such thoughts, and give the peasant the choice of whether he wants to have God or science? If he bids farewell to God, he gets the results of science and industry—machines, electric light, etc. If he wants to keep God, everything remains as in the old prescientific days.

Is this conflict between knowledge and faith necessary, or even justified? Is religion only a product of ignorance and the lack of scientific thinking? To this question one of the outstanding mathematicians, Felix Klein, of Göttingen, in his *History of the Mathematico-physical Sciences in France During the Nineteenth Century* has given an answer which is to the point. After investigating the leading scientists of the period and their attitudes toward religion, he finds that first-grade minds have belonged to both classes, that of the religious and that of the religiously neutral. Hence he concludes that the attitude toward religion is determined, not by the degree of intelligence, but rather by the feelings. Psychology and the history of religion have to support this judgment.

But is it really necessary to be in the condition of the philosopher Friedrich Heinrich Jacobi who a century ago complained that in his thinking he was a heathen but in his feelings a Christian? Is such inner contradiction necessary or even normal? Must we be so divided within ourselves, or can we reach the place where we can give science and faith each its

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due, and thereby lead a unified and integrated life and set a unified goal for our lives? In order to answer this question we must try to penetrate still deeper, to submit the essence of knowledge and the essence of faith to an analysis, and then to establish whether a synthesis of both is possible or perhaps even necessary.

First, we call attention to the fact that within the sphere of modern science there is no room for the idea of God. Kant in his famous *Critique of Pure Reason* pointed this out most sharply, and it is after all self-evident that empirical knowledge reaches only as far as the systematization of our sensory experience by the logic of our understanding can reach, and it is also clear that with our senses the deity cannot be perceived. And we can immediately add a second fact. Not only does the deity remain out of consideration in the system of our scientific thought; but our feeling, all our likes and dislikes, are meaningless for scientific research and must be eliminated. The caterpillar is just as worthy an object of biological investigation as the rose. One does not need to suppose that the scientist is therefore feelingless or godless, but his scientific work excludes all that is not pure and unbiased empirical observation and rational deduction. He is, as it were, not a single individual any more, but must so observe and so think that every other person in his place would have to see and conclude in the same way. All personal peculiarities are here purposely left out of consideration, and the person becomes only an organ of the objective and universally valid comprehension of the empirical world.

The procedure of abstraction strikes us much more forcefully when we consider its methods. Certainly it is based on sensory observation, and most of all the sense of sight is raised to the highest limits of achievement by the most delicate technical equipment. With the help of the large telescope of the Mount Wilson Observatory it is possible for the human eye to resolve spiral nebulae into stars which are hundreds of millions of light-years away from us, and with the microscope and still more with the ultra-microscope it is possible for us to look into the tiniest vital processes of single cells. Thus our natural powers of sensory observation have been infinitely increased by our ingenuity, and entirely new areas of reality which were not known to men before are now made accessible to us. Our perceptive faculties offer to our understanding only as it were the springboard to an immeasurably wide view. But also the last remnant of our sensory impression must in science turn into fixed abstract magnitudes. In the final analysis, what we see is only colors and forms. The light which produces them, however, is something entirely different. Our sense of color is only the expression of the fact that our organ of sight is struck by light-waves of different lengths and speeds. The range of these waves extends, as modern physics teaches, beyond the ultra-violet to the invisible X-rays, and reaches beyond the ultra-red rays to the electric and the well-known radio waves. The complete range of these waves is about a hundred times as great as that of the light-waves visible to our eyes. Thus on modern science is constructed a world by which our life and everything we recognize as reality is definitely conditioned, but a world which is far beyond reality as it usually reveals itself to our senses.

However, even our senses of time and space do not satisfy science, but these concepts are to be, as you well know by the Einstein theory and Schrödinger's wave-theory, reduced to purely abstract terms so as to become usable. After all we perceive in things only the impressions which they make on us. Whatever we ascribe to them as substantiality or as properties is always based on their results, on the force with which they manifest themselves. But what is force, what is matter in the final analysis? All these concepts are completely naïve, and modern science must transform them in order to be able to use them. Matter is only the presupposed or fictitious bearer of energy, or better, according to modern physics, compressed energy itself. Forces, or, as we like to say, "energies," are the causes of the measurable dynamic changes. This leads to the last point of our analysis, a most important but most difficult one. Science is founded upon the idea of natural law. That is nothing other than the fixed and unchangeable relationship between cause (that is energy) and its effects, the study of which makes up the content of our science. This concept of natural law, with its unqualified determinism of all events, especially in nature, was sharply analyzed by Kant and seemed to be the final word of science. But today, right in the circle of the physicists, one hears that science should not claim too much even for the concept of cause.

The latest experiments have shown that the physical laws are not, as we used to think, strict rules which hold for every individual event, but only rules of the average or probable procedure. It is essentially impossible to describe the movements of the electrons, atoms, or gas-molecules, so that for every fraction of a second the position of each individual can be accurately calculated. The effects of radio-activity even suggest that there is no cause at all for the decomposition of the particular atoms. Then it is easy to suppose, as is often done nowadays, that a strict causal relationship for the movements within the atom, and so for the total activity of the universe, does not exist. The idea of cause and natural law appears then as a mere idea of the understanding to which the empirical world does not correspond absolutely, but only very closely approximates. Natural law becomes then mere probability of occurrence. As to the actual occurrence, not the law, but the event, decides. On the other hand, the conception of mechanical causality is transcended by the biological experience which postulates a causality, as it were, teleological. But here it is neither feasible nor necessary to analyze organic causality.

The foregoing analysis of science points to a world of extreme abstractness and mere probabilities, but this conception is sufficient to enable us to calculate and control reality as given to us, and supplies us the suitable means, the technique, for this accomplishment. But *insight into the very essence of things, what they really are, what inner meaning they have,* is not given us with all this knowledge; and technique is not life. Who searches for life and meaning has gone over from science to faith. Let us analyze first the essence of this universal faith. We say life is faith in itself; it feels itself strong and of sufficient worth to subordinate all matter to itself, to place all matter in the service of its self-maintenance. The world of feelings, useless in the realm of science, here has its home. The idea of purpose, eliminated as far as possible from science, here holds its sway. Feeling shows, beside the sensuous elements, spiritual components, aesthetic, ethical, religious. He who actually knows himself must have the courage to assert himself with his ideals, his consciousness of calling, his inner worth. He must have reverence for that which lives in himself. He must have faith in himself, and without this faith there is no life, truly worthy of man. He must have also, in spite of all catastrophes and all deaths, faith in the victory of life. If he does not, he becomes powerless, unable to overcome opposition; and he decays.

This life-faith is true faith; for we speak of faith where we lay hold on the unseen, where no external facts guarantee the truth, where we surrender ourselves to an inner conviction. Not that it is impossible for faith to experience also external corroboration—it is experienced by every life which asserts itself victoriously in the struggle—but he only can receive corroboration who has acted in faith. Without such faith *no science* is possible; for how would science be possible without the naïve faith that our senses show us reality, and without the self-evident assumption that, when we think logically and correctly, we grasp reality with our thoughts.

Without faith social life is impossible. The feeling of racial solidarity, public spirit, readiness to recognize the rights of others, willingness to fulfil the duties we assume and to obey those who represent the whole community, are necessary presuppositions of all social life. But they are not demonstrable, they are matters of faith. All finer moral feelings are utterly impossible without faith in the power and worth of the good, without recognition of the incorruptible judge in our own breast, without a sense of duty and love of all goodness. Faith is confidence in things hoped for; true faith is faith in the true life. But what is the true life? All religions of redemption turn against the naïve human view which sees the meaning of life in mere untroubled existence, in eating and drinking, in wooing and being wooed. It is necessary to turn from the perishable with its pleasure and pain, to turn to eternal goals.

But are there eternal goals? Is not the law of all life given in the evolution and destruction which our science observes on earth and in the heavens? Can there be an exception to this? Faith has always seen this exception. Science has no reason to hinder it, but faith is forced by its nature to do so. Even Buddha, who dragged down the gods of popular faith into the cycles of perishableness, even he, who only dared to characterize the goal of man negatively, had faith in an Indestructible; without this One all redemption seemed to him impossible. The religious fantasy has expressed the faith in all sorts of forms of gods, which are often, to our taste, bizarre and do not realize our ideal of life. If mankind still will have faith in God at all, this God will bear the form of the Father of our Lord Jesus Christ. But will mankind still have faith in God? Certainly it will have faith in God as long as it has faith in the power of the true life over death; for it is our God who alone is able to reveal to us this life which is really worthy of living and has assumed in the simple earthly life of Jesus a form which must move everyone who has not hardened himself against it.

So faith is a mighty and dynamic principle, and lives not from human strength and wisdom but from the everlasting life, whose creation it is. But does this mean that science and faith must be permanently independent of each other, each so distinct in nature that it cannot even touch, much less penetrate, the other? The great advance which is made with this insight into the difference of the two must not be lost. They are both basically different, and yet both are necessary for a truly human life—science to assure for us our place in this world; faith to give life its deep meaning and its worth. And besides, each needs the other. Faith, as history shows, would all too easily let itself be forced into the chains of superstition and into a deadening subjection to tradition and human authority if the bright light of objective scientific investigation did not compel it to consider the real sources of its power and to unite a complete devotion to God with frank criticism of everything merely human. Science, however, without the counterpoise of faith degenerates necessarily into destructive criticism and unqualified skepticism. If the idea of God fails, unpredictable and random chance steps into its place. It is quite inconceivable how the high ideals of scientific investigation, the utterly selfless devotion to the object, could have arisen if science had not grown up from the rich soil of religious and ethical culture. In proportion as his religious power dried up would the scientific ideals have lost all too much of their earnestness and their worthiness.

But it is said very often that the results of science make faith in God appear out of date, obsolete. Nothing is more fallacious than this. Let us take the most extreme case. Suppose that Huxley, Darwin, and Haeckel were right in their hypothesis that man descended from the anthropoid apes—I call that the most extreme case because the present investigation is very skeptical about that supposition and tends toward the view that man represents the real pinnacle, the anthropoids being only side-branches, so that the whole evolutionary process from the beginning aims at man—but be that as it may—let us suppose this most extreme case. Even then the real difference between the primitive man and the anthropoid remains without change and remains immense. In the gray matter of the human cerebellum modern microscopic investigation distinguishes two hundred areas which are sharply distinguished from one another and adapted to specific functions. The anthropoid does not have half as many. From earliest times man has made himself weapons and tools. Animals have never produced tools, and never will do it; for their nature does not demand it. The attempt has been made to establish an ape language, and it is doubtless true that apes, like other animals, communicate with each other; however, that is not language in our sense. For among us words serve as conveyors of ideas, but no animal shows any objective interest in an object as such, in and for itself. And just for this reason it necessarily lacks concepts. Companionableness and social impulses are found too in animals; but man alone is qualified for original art, science, culture, morality, and religion. In brief, only man is a spiritual being, and not one of the other creatures on this earth shows even a trace of the faculties which constitute the essence of man. Whether the first man was made from the dust of the earth or whether he evolved from a highly developed animal, by a sudden variation, a mutation, both origins are equally mysterious and incomprehensible.

Therefore I cannot find that our modern science is in a position to threaten our faith in God—not in the present nor in the future—for science can only disclose empirical facts, but faith lives from the Unseen. I do not mean to say merely that we have nothing to fear from true science—I believe further, that in the light of science nature becomes much more mysterious and sublime than it ever was for our forefathers. They founded their faith in the might and wisdom of the Creator on the purposive structure of the human body, the regular course of the seasons, the harmony and rhythm of all nature. But how naïve and childish, how utterly inadequate are their ideas of the wonders of the universe when we compare them with the view which the profound research of today has brought to light. What sheer unfathomable order and purpose every living being shows in its bodily organization and all its functions! But we are confronted more strikingly with the awful immensity of creation, transcending all powers of comprehension, when we contemplate the starry heavens with their multitudinous suns, in whose dances our tiny planet swings. From earliest times the starry heavens were an object of reverent contemplation, but for us the earth too has become a part of this eternal order of the universe. Yes, and still more the dust on which our feet tread shows in its elements the same law and forces, even the same light which distinguishes the stars in the heavens. Plato, like other thinkers, placed in opposition to God, the eternal Chaos as the matter of the world. For our science this Chaos of elemental materials and elemental forces has completely vanished. In spite of all skepticism which might grow up out of the newest theory of causality, the natural system of the chemical elements demonstrates a world whose smallest parts show an unbelievable regularity, orderliness, and harmony. In the beginning not a rebellious Chaos, but Order, Harmony, or in other words, Reason and Wisdom —the divine Logos—was with God. Thus the old religious monotheism is brought to full and final victory by the modern knowledge.

Faith and knowledge are not necessarily opposed to each other, rather knowledge enables us to unlock a depth and a greatness of the world which gives new nourishment to religious devotion and reverence before God. Therefore science and faith must stand together in an intimate union in order to protect and to defend our spiritual culture.

LIBERTINAGE IN FRANCE IN THE SEVENTEENTH CENTURY

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A STUDY of history and society of the different periods in the development of mankind always seeks main currents and general trends whereby each age may be characterized. This sound approach, however, too often causes a disregard for other elements equally important in their way. And so it is that on our first encounter with a period we find it already labeled, often distorted to our eyes by a vicious tendency to overclassification. Nursed, then, on such generalities, we are surprised as we discover one by one the undercurrents, the rebel elements of the society. For there will always be rebels, as surely as there is anything to oppose. Such rebellion to the accepted thing is a shade which contrasts the light and enables us to appreciate it.

When we pause to think, it is not surprising that there should have been in seventeenth-century France, religiously conservative in the main, a low, yet audible murmur of doubt, of "libertinage." This is obviously the place to define just what is referred to by the term "libertinage." Its meaning has of course varied in different periods. As to the seventeenth century, it means essentially indifference to religion, and more specifically religious incredulity; yet we are interested in all the manifestations of doubt and of skepticism—in short, the undercurrents of an otherwise orthodox age.[1]

To trace the antecedents of religious doubt would take us to Italy and to classical antiquity. During the sixteenth century there was a wide diffusion of classical lore, and it is at the end of this period that we may say that the libertinage of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries takes its root. There is the heritage of Stoicism with the doctrine of nature, which is an important element in this current of free thought. Montaigne gathered together in his work a large part of classical and Renaissance writings; and although libertinage does not start with him, he furnishes a great source book which is important in the development of our subject. *Les essais* (1595) is the *livre de chevet* of gentlemen in town and country. There is keen interest in this work, for the official philosophy of the Sorbonne was out of date. With the *Essais* we have the idea of personal subjective thoughts, independent of other people, a sort of *libre examen*. He is the first Pyrrhonist, and the gentle beginning of his *que sais-je* will later become *je ne sais pas*, and then absolute denial. We must remember that his skepticism applies only to mind and to reason, not to religion, for he was a good Catholic. Yet others were not lacking to apply this procedure to religion.

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[1] M. Perrens, *Les libertins en France au XVII^e siècle* (1899). See also the admirable work of M. Fortunat Strowski, *Pascal et son temps* (de Montaigne à Pascal; 1907); Jacques Denis, *Sceptiques ou libertins de la première moitie du XVII^e* (Caen, 1884).

With the turn of the century we find libertinage well started. Conditions seem to have been adapted to it. There had been the religious wars of the past century to start minds wondering. Then with the assassination of Henri IV (1610) we have Marie de Medicis, who, accustomed to Florentine morals and naturally a silly woman, was not shocked at any immorality she might notice, as in the grossly indecent books of which there was a continued production from the beginning of the century until the trial of Théophile de Viau.[2] In 1601 appears *La sagesse* of Charron, a book of epicurean trend.[3] With such mild beginnings of Montaigne and Charron a way is broken for libertinage.

This is the period of the tavern poets. They go farther than skeptics, who merely toy with ideas and are only lukewarm.

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[2] J. Andrieu, *Théophile de Viau* (Paris, 1880).

[3] Lanson, *Histoire de la littérature française* (1896), pp. 335–36.

There is now a group of reckless, wild youths in Paris, who pride themselves on emancipation from all rule, religious and moral. Théophile de Viau and his disciple, Des Barreaux, are characteristic of this youth whose chief thought is pleasure of all sorts. Their idea of entertainment was for the most part indecent. These *moucherons de taverne,* as they have been called, assembled in taverns, engaged in drinking bouts, and rivaled one another in the composition of ribald verse. In their conduct is to be found entertainment for the seeker after pornography, for those who relish intrigue, its complications, and the implication of great names, for instance, the liaison of Des Barreaux and Marie de l'Orme.

Pleasure, then, is the main interest of these young rebels. Théophile is a simple *esprit fort,* not a philosopher. Such spirits have an intelligence too mobile to stop long on metaphysical speculations. While they were definitely incredulous, doubtless they were often prompted to manifestations of disbelief by a strong desire to astonish and scandalize the public.

An interesting figure of this period is the puzzling Vanini. He was a native of Naples, born in 1585, who came to France and was active from 1614 to 1616 as a sort of traveling preacher. Father Garasse speaks of him as "ce pauvre papillon qui, du fond de l'Italie, s'etait venu bruler au feu de Languedoc." Under a frivolous form Vanini spread epicurean doctrines, and above all sowed incredulity. Yet he never came out in the open. His favorite method was, in the character of the honest Christian, to propose some topic of religion, giving both sides of the question. While ostensibly striving to prove the case of Christianity, his criticisms were stronger than his defensive arguments. Subtle, indeed, was his style, for his *Amphithéâtre* (1615) and his *Secrets de la nature reine et déesse* (1616) received ecclesiastical approbation.[4] He was especially successful with young people, who were impressed by his eloquence. By his insinuating and subtle arguments he did much to spread the idea of nature and "good natural law." Catchwords of this sort are important in any antireligious movement, where they have the effect of justifying the rebellious in their mode of life. Gradually he became more careless and aroused more suspicion. Although Lachèvre[5] feels that Vanini's dissolute ways were the cause of his final undoing, it was probably due to his increased boldness. He was finally denounced at Toulouse (1619). When tried there, he proceeded to prove to his judges the existence of God. Thus it is that he is said ignominiously to have recanted. Yet some would have him change again after he was condemned. Lachèvre says that he then denied God and died blaspheming. René Grousset[6] puts these words in Vanini's mouth, "Allons mourir en philosophe," and says that he preached atheism on the way to his punishment. Vanini's tongue was snatched out, and he was burned. Thus in a sense we have a martyr for libertinage. On the whole he is a half-mysterious figure. It is a question what he really thought. Was it perhaps only a dangerous game he delighted in playing? Probably not. Yet he is scarcely a weighty philosopher, and is important as a colorful, quite pitiful figure in the current of antireligion, and as a disseminator of *libertin* ideas. Voltaire rather surprises his reader by denying the atheism of Vanini, instead of boasting his martyrdom; but he himself is as shifty as the "Neapolitan butterfly," for, although an incorrigible opposer of traditional religion in his century, he denies the incredulity of most of the *libertins* of this time.[7]

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[4] The principal works of Vanini were written in Latin.

The death of Vanini was in some measure a check to libertinage, but on the whole this event in the far-away Languedoc was scarcely sufficient to frighten the free-thinkers in Paris. Libertinage is widespread in the nobility, the clergy, and the people. In 1623 Father Mersenne estimates that there are fifty thousand atheists in Paris. This, of course, is when libertinage is at a high point.

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[5] F. Lachèvre, *Libertinage au XVII^e siècle*.

[6] René Grousset, "Œuvres posthumes," article on *Les libertins*.

[7] Voltaire, *Lettres à S. A. Mgr. le Prince de Brunswick sur Rabelais et sur d'autres auteurs accusés d'avoir mal parlé de la religion chrétienne*. See also my article "Voltaire's Political Ideas," *American Political Science Review*, February, 1926.

In 1622 appears a book called the *Quatrains du déiste, ou l'antibigot*. The *déiste* rejects the conception of a just God who rewards good and punishes evil. God is without power and does not intervene in the affairs of this world. The *déiste* practices virtue for the love of it, not in the hope of any recompense. He turns to derision "Christian truths" (Lachèvre). The foundation is really the pantheism which fifty years later Spinoza will present in more lustrous raiment. The *Quatrains* influenced the golden youth of the court of Louis XIII for a while.

This brings us to the question of what opposition there was to libertinage. At this time the University and the Parlement were absorbed in a controversy with the Jesuits, and hence took little account of this growing movement. Alone the complaints of the clergy to the États-Generaux in 1614, demanding the banishment and punishment of atheists, had received some results in the persecution of Vanini five years later. Two men stand out in the fight against libertinage, Father Mersenne and Father Garasse.

Father Mersenne sought to combat the insidious doctrines by the use of arguments. He was more interested in convincing, persuading, and imploring the lost sheep than in persecuting them. The *Quatrains du déiste* evoked Mersenne's opus in 1,340 pages, *L'impiété des déistes, athées, et libertins de ce temps combattue et renversée de point en point par raisons tirées de la philosophie et de la théologie!* (Paris: Bielaine, 1624; 2 vols.). It was dedicated to Cardinal Richelieu. From the nature of his efforts Father Mersenne did not achieve great results.[8]

A more formidable opponent is to be reckoned with in Father Garasse (1585–1631). His method is a more practical one, namely, to terrorize the worldly *libertins* such as Théophile de

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[8] Lanson, *op. cit.*, p. 368, n. 1.

Viau. Garasse is an important figure in one of the high spots in the history of libertinage, the trial of Théophile, for beside his writings[9] he takes an active part in the *procès*.

In 1622, as a culmination of the series of *libertin* and satirical publications which start with *Le muse folastre,* at the beginning of the century, appears the *Parnasse satirique*. It was an abominably indecent book and outraged everyone. In the following year it reappeared, this time with the addition "*par le sieur Théophile*." The book was the composition of a number of the tavern poets, and Théophile's name was affixed no doubt as a speculation by some unscrupulous publisher. Obviously something had to be done about a publication of this nature. Théophile had already been chased out of Paris in 1619 for his unrestrained pen; and it was against him, as well as Berthelot, that the attack was directed.

Garasse was foremost in expressing indignation. He pressed the case, which was tried before the Parlement. As a result of the proceedings, Théophile was condemned to fire and Berthelot to the gibbet. Both fled, and Théophile was burned in effigy in the Place de Greve. He was finally jailed for two years. Here he says he repents, that he finds pleasure only in the works of St. Augustine.

Théophile was really guilty from the point of view of the laws of the time.[10] A debauchee, he ridiculed religion, opposing it with vague epicurean doctrines. His works were fraught with heresy. In passing, it is interesting to note something much to the credit of Théophile. He was superior to his opponents in the moderation and generosity he showed in arguing with them. Despite his relaxed morals and his irreligion, he was quite firm, and did not give vent to torrents of personal abuse as would Voltaire or Diderot of the following century.

Although Théophile escaped punishment, his trial is an important check to libertinage. Public opinion was aroused; Garasse was successful; and libertinage was suppressed in 1625 without costing a life. Through his initiative, together with that of Father Voisin and the *procureur-général* Mathieu Mole, the complete advent of libertinage is delayed a hundred and fifty years.[11] For this alone the trial of Théophile warrants remembrance. Moreover, the moral atmosphere has been cleared, made more wholesome, preparing the way for the heroes and heroines of Corneille a dozen years later. Garasse must not be judged too harshly. We must remember that there was real provocation. Furthermore, he was sincere and thought it better to sacrifice the shepherd and save the flock. He is not "le plus absurde et le plus insolent calomniateur," as Voltaire with characteristic bile styles him.

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[9] *Doctrine curieuse des beaux esprits de ce temps* (1623).

[10] F. Lachèvre, *Le libertinage devant le Parlement de Paris.*

Not all doubters, however, are after the type of Théophile *libertins* and profligates. There are those whose attitude is a result of thought alone and which remains in the realm of the mind. Among these are counted such men as the physician Gui Patin and Gassendi. Gui Patin describes in one of his letters a *débauche philosophique* in which he, Gassendi, and Gabriel Naudé participate. It consists merely in getting together where they can talk freely and scorn popular beliefs.[12]

Gassendi is an interesting figure, an orthodox priest, but a philosophical *libertin*. He is an eclectic philosopher who develops a sort of epicurean materialism. In 1647 he published his *Vie d'Épicure*. He is a follower of the epicureanism of Lucretius and believes that everything proceeds from the senses.[13] Thus he is an opponent of Descartes, who believes everything to proceed from the mind.[14]

Descartes, himself a good Catholic, must be considered in the development of libertinage. We may say there are two sides to his mind: the philosophic and bold, and the religious which is respectful and conservative. By his doctrine of *libre examen* and the rejection of authority he reinforces libertinage. In a sense he unwittingly gives it a philosophy, one which was later developed to include individual thinking on the subject of religion. His system was carried out of the realm of sheer speculation. To a large extent, although certainly original, Descartes is imbued with the ideas floating about in his time. Thus we see in him not only a source for later thinkers but a faint reflection of the libertinage of his day.

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[11] *Ibid.*

[12] J. Denis, *op. cit.*

[13] Lanson, *op. cit.*, p. 397.

[14] C. H. C. Wright, *A History of French Literature*, pp. 321–28. See also Krantz, *Essai sur l'esthétique de Descartes* (Paris, 1882); Bouillier, *Histoire de la philosophie cartésienne* (2 vols.; 1868), and Lanson, *op. cit.*, pp. 391–98.

With the passing of Louis XIII and Richelieu we have the jolly time of the Regency. Here is an outburst of independence in all its forms—in literature, politics, morals, and religion. There are many *libertins* in the Fronde. Libertinage has come out into the open again. This is the time when Corneille's *Polyeucte* failed to please the Hôtel de Rambouillet because of its Christianity. We can trace here the path of independent thought quite well in the person of Ninon de L'Enclos. Toward the end of Louis XIII's reign she opens her salon. Here one is at ease and can discuss subjects freely. But gradually things quiet down in France; there is a reaction after the period of license. About the time when Louis XIV is assuming the sole responsibility of government, libertinage has gone out of style. Now one tries to reconcile pleasure and religion—and succeeds rather well. Now Ninon finds herself alone. But she recoups by giving a more austere tone to her salon. Toward the end of the century she has success, even with women, which is certainly indicative of good standing.

The reaction against independence had the unfortunate result of developing hypocrisy. Hypocrisy and libertinage grow hand in hand. If one's thoughts lie in an independent vein, one must hide them. Unity is making itself felt all over France. Everything is coming gradually under the influence of centralization and regulation. Thus the current of libertinage dwindles to an underground stream. But it does not disappear. It will come out stronger than ever when Louis XIV, symbol of unity, is gone. Then it will develop to its culmination in the Encyclopedists and in the theorists of the Revolution.

Through the course of libertinage it is most interesting to notice reflection of it in the works of orthodox men who are in the main current of their age. Jansenism, for instance, is often considered, because of its doctrines and the austere habits of its members, to have been a violent reaction to skepticism. Pascal proposes to convert the wayward by his *Apologie de la religion chrétienne.*[15] He describes them in his *Pensées,* which also include his famous wager. We see reference to the *incroyants* by preachers like Bossuet, who discusses them in many sermons, for example the *Oraison funèbre d'Anne de Gonzague* (1685); by Fenelon in his *Sermon pour l'Épiphanie* (1685) and later in his *Traité sur l'existence de Dieu* (1712). La Bruyère devotes the last chapter of his *Caractères* to the *esprits forts,* wherein he seeks to convert them. The attacks of Garasse and Mersenne have already been mentioned, as well as the implications in Descartes of tendencies of his time.

Molière furnishes us with considerations on the same score. His *Don Juan* (1665) is a portrait of the *grand seigneur libertin.* To have the type presented on the stage certainly means that it is well known. For some strange reason René Grousset feels that in this play Molière gives the *libertins* a hero. A plausible theory has been put forth concerning *Le Tartuffe.* It is briefly this: that although Molière holds up the religious hypocrite to ridicule, the reasonable characters in the play are all such as could dispense with religion, namely Cléante, Elmire, and the pert Dorine; on the other hand, Orgon and his mother Mme Pernelle, who are infected with religious zeal, are made to appear ridiculous. This idea is not necessarily true, for such a fact might well have been due to chance.

[15] For an excellent treatment of Pascal, see Lanson, *op. cit.,* pp. 440–66. Vinet, *Études sur Pascal* (1848); Droz, *Le scepticisme de Pascal* (1886); Bertrand, *Pascal* (1890); Voltaire, *Remarques sur les pensées de Pascal,* and Brunetière, *Études critiques,* Vols. I and II.

Thus, when we survey the seventeenth century, we find that, although deeply religious on the whole, there was an undercurrent of libertinage. Often this seventeenth-century *libertin* is, like Théophile, primarily a seeker after pleasures, one who has no God but Nature. He often strikes one as an example of the tendency to rationalize afterward according to emotions and to suit natural desires. Many people turn to skepticism because they find morality a nuisance. Yet none the less, the *libertin* is really incredulous. Such a train of thinkers did not first begin in the seventeenth century, of course. A great-uncle of Des Barreaux, Geoffroy Vallée, called *"le beau Vallée,"* was hanged and burned in 1574 for his *Beatitude des Chrestiens ou le Fleo de la Foy*. Neither is libertinage a society of emancipators planning on the ultimate enfranchisement of the human mind. But it is a definite current, contrasting the orthodox manifestations of the age and foretelling the philosophy of the following century.

BEYOND PLATONIC GOOD AND EVIL

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THE statement that Plato has made it more difficult for us to deal with the problem of good and evil will not be convincing to some people, but that assertion is here made. While he helped in some ways, there is an after-tow of his doctrine of ideas, which has done unusual damage to our ability to relate these concepts to social life, and even to the universe. While humanity would be poorer without some of the flashes of his beautiful mind into the nature of the good, and we can by no means blame Plato for our long delay in correcting his errors, yet we may frankly recognize now that we have used the concepts of good and evil in a too Platonic sense, and have allowed ourselves to be drawn along in the wake of the Platonic doctrine of ideas.

We come to speak of good as if it were more than an adjective, and more than an abstract noun. Especially when we speak of good and evil together we harden these adjectives into realities, and then we set ourselves the problem of relating these two discordant things in a universe. It was pleasing for Plato to think of Ideas, especially good and beautiful ones, as having an ethereal or quasi-substantial existence, but does that help us or mislead us today? Since man lives primarily as a social being in the midst of a social situation he may well seek his good and evil in the midst of this process, where he can have whatever experience he is capable of rather than as abstract ultimates.

While the issue may not turn entirely on the fact that our treatment of good and evil is essentially a case of taking adjectives and making them into nouns, yet that point of approach gives us a touch or reality that we need to keep in dealing with the problem. Good is a descriptive term, a characterization. Whether as conceptions or as words, good and evil arose in the course of man's evaluation of his experience. When the distinction between good and evil was arising in earliest human times, the difference between animate and inanimate things was far from clear. In concrete thinking there are good people, things, events, experiences. But there arise very quickly abstractions based on common elements in experience. There is good and evil conduct, there is goodness and badness, there is good and evil. When man thinks socially he has the problem of welfare, individual and social, or better individual-social, and his good and bad are found in welfare.

Let us take the Congo tribesman as an example of primitive thinking about good and evil. He is a matter of fact sort of fellow much of the time, at least, in spite of all that may be said about him. He uses the adjectives good and bad with reference to all sorts of objects, animals, persons, experiences, and even imaginary objects or beings. At the same time he readily turns his adjectives into nouns and speaks of good and evil in a generalized way. If he wants to praise a man he is as likely to throw his expression into abstract form and call the one praised a "person of goodness" as to call him a "good person." (E.g., *mot'o bolamu* for persons of goodness, and *moto molamu* for good person in the Bobangi language of Middle Congo.) In one case he generalizes the idea and applies it as a concept which fits the person, and in the other case he gives his idea the form of an adjective and applies it as a characteristic of the individual. In either case the goodness is relative to the individual in his activities and relationships. It does not exist otherwise. It used to be thought that primitive people spoke only in concrete terms, being unable to use abstractions. If so, the Congo tribesmen are not primitive.

But let us come back to our own thinking and notice that in the treatment of good and evil we have taken over a procedure that is little more than primitive and a little less than modern.

It is essentially poetic and mythological. We go a step farther than the primitive man, who uses ideas of good and evil as abstractions, and we give these ideas a sort of independent existence. Distantly following Plato we think of good and evil not merely as descriptive adjectives, and as generalized ideas that can be related to objects of all sorts, but we then go a step farther and conceive of good and evil in a sort of hypostatized, almost apotheosized form. We give them an existence without reference to the linguistic and other psychic processes in relation to which they arose or to the social process in which they are now found.

When we speak in this way we forget that we have nounalized adjectives, and we ignore the fact that our words are in a system of relativities of language and thought. We set them going by themselves, and finally we try to account for them, forgetting that we have first gone out of our way to set the problem, and then have perplexed ourselves to find the solution.

If we remain in the realm of Platonic ideas we shall always be under the spell of this problem. Good and Evil, like thoughts turned into things, are a part of the furniture of the Platonic house of thought. So also were many queer things parts of the equipment of Alice in Wonderland, and so long as Alice was in Wonderland she had to deal with the problems which Wonderland presented. It is a bit like weeping over the woes of persons dramatized on the radio. When we harden our fancies or our figures of speech into things, and then wonder what we are going to do with the things, it makes a very interesting problem, and has a value as a sort of picture-puzzle in our intellectual playroom, but a playroom problem it is.

Good as a descriptive term is very important to thought, feeling, evaluation, and expression. But good has no more an existence in itself than has, for example, evaluation. The Platonic method of dealing with Ideas could take "evaluation" and make it into an idea existing without further dependence on things evaluated. Let us use it so for a moment and speak of good evaluation and bad evaluation, and then take the good and the bad and the evaluation and float them out into the ether of thought as soap bubbles of the mind. But let us remember that we are in a soap-bubble world. We cannot have evaluation except in relativity to things evaluated, and, of course, also to the one who is doing the evaluating, neither can you have characterization without things characterized. In the use of words, as soon as we pass out of the realm of relativity we pass into the realm of unreality.

Let us have good soap bubbles if we want them, or bad soap bubbles if they come out that way, but let us remember that soap bubbles are soap bubbles, and that "good" used with reference to them is an adjective, a descriptive term used in the adjustment of this experience to the rest of our psychic life. When the soap bubble bursts the "good" of it, alas, is gone too. Memory may keep both the bubble and the "good" and imagination may create new ones, but the doctrine of Ideas gets us into the mental habit that would be comparable to holding that we could let all the bubbles burst and still have something left that we would call the "good" of them.

Professor Ellsworth Faris has emphasized the fact that words are tools of analysis. Such an idea is unpoetic indeed beside the pretty Greek fancy of words with wings flying from one soul to another, or beside such poetic expressions as golden words, silver words, or jeweled words. I like all these figures of speech, and I think furthermore that the poetic approach to reality, in its place, is as valid as that of the philosopher, the scientist, or the practical man. But when we bring poetic conceptions into prose analysis we get into trouble.

So long as we use words as tools of analysis, means of description, or instruments of thinking and interpretation, good and evil and other adjectival qualities remain where they belong, in a system of relativities. But when we float them off objectively, and give them independent existence they get out of control. Good, evil, and other such adjectives go out and dress themselves up as beings, and over these beings two kings rule at opposite poles of evaluation. One is Good and the other is Evil.

Our mistake comes back to us when we try to construct a universe, for we find it very different to bring these two monarchs into any manageable system. Comparably if all human experience were color experience, we might determine upon the primary colors, separate them all from light and from surfaces, and float them out independently. A person then pondering on his universe would become a heptalist, unless he learned that the colors of the rainbow combine into white light. He might be temporarily a monist in the delight of his new discovery, but soon he would have the problem of black and white as irreconcilables. If he were to take the idea of black and the idea of white and consider them without relation to light or surfaces, he would be in the position of the moralist who thinks of good and evil as things in themselves, and he would be a confirmed dualist.

Good and evil are in a system of relativities, and human good and evil are in a system of social relativities, but the dualist makes them into something else. He does his characterizing, then he allows all the things which he has characterized to flow past, and still he has his characterizations as qualities qualifying nothing. The person who sees things in a system of relativities has his universe, with discordant elements to be sure, but whatever dualism there is becomes something quite different.

Good and bad as relativities will give us just the same practical problems as we had before, but they will put us into a more promising position for their solution. We may have good literature and bad literature, good art and bad art, good music and jazz, good behavior and bad behavior, and the good and the bad will be in every case relative to the things characterized. Now literature and art and behavior, and such things, can be brought into a universe of graspable experience, but when we fumble adjectives and pick them up as nouns and then classify them and put them into bins of experience on opposite sides of our intellectual room, we shall forever lack the connecting link that unifies them.

The problem of good and evil as a puzzle in the nature of the universe grows out of the problem of the experience of good and evil in human life, and the good and evil in human existence are not anything else so much as they are ways of saying that a person does something well, or does it badly, or indifferently. So we have good and evil, so far as that act is concerned. Or we find that some sorts of behavior fit into the social process while others do not, or that in some respect or other, or possibly in general, welfare either is achieved or is not achieved. Welfare of some sort, physical, intellectual, social, spiritual, esthetic, or whatever sort of welfare there may be, is achieved, enhanced, jeopardized, marred, lost, or whatever other vicissitudes there may be, in the processes of human experience. If we are to use good and bad as nouns they must be brought into relation to welfare. Right and wrong also will be relative to welfare. Right will be clear in so far as the issues of welfare are clearly perceived. Welfare may be misconceived, ignored, or betrayed in actual cases, but we can never find a clear place for right and wrong, good and evil, except with reference to welfare. We shall not attempt further to define welfare here, only to say that the nature of welfare is to be conceived in terms of the nature of life and the meaning of life. Whatever advances this is right: whatever stays or impedes it is wrong. Activity and experience are well adjusted, indifferently adjusted, or badly adjusted to welfare. There is no good or evil existing independently.

The sociologist who attempts to look at good and evil unmythologically will still find plenty of material to examine, but his good and evil will be socially defined. It will not be a question of attaching a label of good to observance of custom, obedience to commands, or a vague mass of emotional good intention. Good will be the characterizing term for that which builds up the life process, in which there are welfare elements that we see now in the individual case, or again we speak of it in terms of groups. We also recognize that there are aspects of welfare that pertain to particulars, and others that relate to life in more general terms. If two men live on an island together and one kills the other, he may have more land to occupy, and possibly more food and other things for himself. But he will not have companionship. In a mistaken application of the struggle for welfare in a particular matter he will have sacrificed his welfare in a higher human sense. Good will be the characterizing term for that which builds up the life process, and evil will be the term for that which jeopardizes, mars, or destroys the life process.

Thus we have shifted good and evil from a mythological basis to a social basis. The break-up of the older categories which were inadequate will not turn any far-seeing individual out into life to seek his good in chaotic impulse. He will have to find his place in the social process and to find his life in the life of groups. He will have to find his welfare in ways that accord, so far as that may be, with the welfare of others, and never in ways disloyal to the welfare of others. Thus he will be the best individual he can become. He will be a socialized human being.

THE SIGNIFICANCE OF JESUS

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THE significance of which Jesus? Within the Christian movement the name "Jesus" has been used with reference to at least seven different figures. They share a common name, but they are not merely different aspects of a single figure. Partially these figures of Jesus overlap. But the resemblance among these figures is by no means close. They are not all exclusive of each other; yet they are not fully interchangeable. Confusion in contemporary thought about Jesus may be diminished if we analyze the meanings currently associated with the name.

I

There is, first of all, what Robert Keable aptly called the "literary Jesus." This is the Jesus of the four gospels, probably the most familiar of all seven figures. This Jesus was virgin born and a worker of miracles. He made claims for himself beyond all mortal men. This figure has become the sanction for the complex enterprise that took his name. The missionary movement, the Roman Catholic church, separatist and other worldly sects, pacifists and militarists, all find in this literary Jesus the justification for their program and their ideal. This is the Jesus of the unsophisticated Christian, and a glorious and adorable Jesus he is.

Closely related to the literary Jesus is the dogmatic Jesus. "All I need God for," Dr. Coffin reports a convert as saying, "I find in Jesus." This Jesus is God. Him the Christian worships and prays to. Him the Christian trusts and obeys. In his power over the forces of nature and over the unruly human heart the Christian rests his confidence that in time his reign will be established and his kingdom come on earth as it is in heaven.

When the theologian places the literary Jesus within the larger setting of cosmic activity by means of some form of the doctrine of the Trinity, this Jesus becomes the unique revelation of the nature of God. By his expiatory death he satisfies or turns away the anger of God toward human beings. His resurrection is judged to be proof of his victory over the world—a victory which the Christian may hope to share. The thoughts which occupied his mind and the manner in which he conducted himself during his life are of secondary interest. Not what he was in himself, but the effect he has on the attitude of God toward the world and on our understanding of the nature and character of God, is of primary concern.

Next, there is the ecclesiastical Jesus. This Jesus is sequestered within the confines of a particular church. Specific requirements of admission to that church, attendance at certain rites, and, not infrequently, profession of specified doctrines are ordinarily designated as standards which the individual must satisfy if he is to secure the benefits which are claimed to reside in this ecclesiastical Jesus. Whether deliberately so designed or not, these tests are calculated to enhance the importance of the institution.

Another Jesus is the invisible but living comrade, whose companioning presence saves the Christian from the bitterness of loneliness. The invisible playmate of many a childhood is continued into maturity as the mystical, living Christ. Frequently the believer has an almost physical sensation of the presence of this incorporeal being. Jesus "comes transfigured back, secure from change, in [his] high-hearted ways. Beautiful evermore. . . . ." He becomes the best "part of life's unalterable good." Lifted out of the past, Jesus is for many Christians their "most significant contemporary." In regard to the technique of their relationship to him, they may nourish their spirits on him sacramentally in the eucharist. Or they may find in him the mystic lover of their souls. In either case they believe themselves to be living with him in intimate, personal union. He is their guide, their counselor, their friend, the fountainhead of their faith and inspiration. He is one with them, and they with him.

The communal Jesus is a combination and corrective of the ecclesiastical Jesus and the mystical Jesus. Some Christians hold that we cannot make contact with Jesus in the solitariness of mystic, sweet communion. Neither may we expect to enjoy the unmediated, personal influence of the presence of Jesus (Schleiermacher). But where two or three Christians are gathered together, there is this Jesus. That is to say, what is called Jesus is actually that fellowship which a Christian group enjoys by virtue of its common spirit. The individual's connection with Jesus occurs only through fellowship with Christians who have become "little Christs" to each other. It is membership in a group dominated by a particular religious and ethical quality that sets the individual within the sphere of operation of the communal Jesus.

Still another Jesus is the symbolic Jesus. "Would it," inquires Dean Inge, "be going too far to say that in every generation Christian teachers use the figure of the founder as a peg on which to hang their own best thoughts?" One can say that it would only if one forgets the multitude of interpreters of Jesus who read into his thought and life whatever ideal they desire to secure prestige for. Bruce Barton, whose Jesus is the symbol of an ideal business executive, may be mentioned as an egregious example of a practice that is widespread. Even John Baillie's brilliant study of *The Place of Jesus Christ in Modern Christianity* is marred by his interpretation of Jesus primarily in terms of redemptive, suffering love. This instance of thinly disguised symbolic reference has behind it, to be sure, the authority of long years of historic precedent. It is none the less a selection and idealization of one element in the life and teaching of Jesus, and involves a subordination of other elements equally an organic part of his mind. "The mind of this reverent disciple"—to apply to Professor Baillie and to many another, a phrase from Professor Case—"has been made the mind of the Master."

Finally, there is the historic Jesus. The "modernist" interpretation of Jesus, of which Professor Case's book, *Jesus*, may be considered both exemplary and prophetic, takes account of the symbolization of Jesus which had already occurred by the time the records of his life were written down. The modernist feels himself obliged to discard not a little that had been held authentic by the previous generation of "liberal" New Testament scholars. He perceives that Jesus was early made to speak "a message suited to the ear of the later Christian congregation, or designed to stimulate outsiders to ally themselves with the new cause."[1] Christian missionaries, when addressing gentile audiences, could not remain "uninfluenced by the temptation to make Jesus speak in the cadence of a contemporary Greek philosopher." Jesus, in order to be "a thoroughly efficient teacher for the people of a later day, had necessarily to be modernized." Nevertheless, in Professor Case's judgment, the "teachings of Jesus which are appropriate to his own immediate environment" (and so may be assumed to be authentic) are about equal in amount to pronouncements of his upon subjects that came to light only in the latter half of the first century of Christianity's growth (and so may be assumed to be accretions and not attributable to the historic Jesus himself).

Doubtless there will never be complete agreement regarding the details of the picture of that historic preacher and healer named Jesus. It may never be possible for the scholar to avoid reading in or reading out data in accordance with his own predilections. Professor Case himself, who is a pioneer in the application to the New Testament of the new sociological technique of interpretation, is not flawless in this regard. Yet he is probably right in his conclusion that this new technique, taken in conjunction with the long familiar methods of literary and textual criticism, makes it possible to reconstruct a veracious picture of the historical Jesus "with a fair degree of certainty." Contemporary research is in a favorable position to do this because it has no apologetic ax to grind and so may hew close to the line of fact. Having witnessed the rise and fall successively of the church as a sole ark of salvation, and of the Bible as the infallible rule of faith and life, and having observed that the outcome was not as calamitous as had been anticipated by the respective nervous and faint-hearted champions of authority, the "modernist" New Testament scholar feels under no obligation to refrain from tearing off the wrappings of mythology, dogma, and sentimentality with which the figure of Jesus has been mummified and from presenting him as he actually was.

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[1] This and the other references in the paragraph are from: *Jesus*, by Shirley Jackson Case (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1927), pp. 405, 407 f.

II

Of the figure that emerges from this unveiling, the characterization of Albrecht Schweitzer, though written almost a quarter of a century ago, is still pertinent. The historical Jesus is "to our time a stranger and an enigma." What to do with such a figure is not the problem of the New Testament scholar. His task is to get at the facts. Where he leaves off, the theologian begins. He must do something with this historical Jesus. The theologian faces a dilemma. Either he may accept the factual figure of the historical Jesus and undertake to evaluate his significance for contemporary life or he may discard him. If he discards the historical Jesus, he is again confronted by a dilemma. Either he may substitute one of the several other representations of Jesus that have already been referred to in this paper or he may do away with the figure of Jesus altogether. Professor Harry Elmer Barnes is only the latest, though one of the most pungent and vociferous, of those who propose to eliminate Jesus wholly from the religious consciousness of the present. If, unwilling to be so drastic, or compelled by his own loyalty to the historic tradition of Christianity, the theologian determines to substitute one of the other figures of

Jesus, he is still faced by certain perplexities in regard to their usableness.

The literary Jesus is so manifestly a composite figure, a kind of carry-all of heterogeneous, not to say contradictory, behaviors and ideas that he cannot well act as a unifying object for the loyalty either of an individual or of a social group, such as a church. Furthermore, this figure is constantly subject to the disintegrating criticism of research. Despite these drawbacks he may still serve the older generation of Christians. But what will be the reactions of university students, here and around the world, when they become cognizant of the hiatus between the historic Jesus and the embellished, imaginary figure of the literary Jesus? They will become suspicious, to say the least, of a piety which apparently nourishes and can maintain itself only by the continued use of fiction in the place of known fact.

The theological Jesus also seems unsatisfactory because he tends to lose all humanness as he becomes an arbitrary, dialectical instrument for resolving supposititious metaphysical antitheses.

The ecclesiastical Jesus fails to weather the charge of being over-amenable to exploitation on the part of skilful institutionalists.

The mystical Jesus is so easily detachable from the actual Jesus of history as to lay himself open to every kind of visionary reinterpretation. What guaranty is there that the impulses presumed to come from this living Christ have any connection with Jesus? There would seem, however, to be no reason why in the future the historic Jesus may not serve, in a way the literary Jesus could not, as a wholesome control or corrective of the mystic Jesus. In fact, a combination of the mystic Jesus and the historic Jesus is opening up a new area of Christian experience hitherto practically unexplored.

The communal Jesus seems also more serviceable. He has elasticity. This Jesus corresponds for Protestants to the Roman Catholic principle of progress which Cardinal Newman referred to as "development of doctrine." With such a Jesus or with such a principle, Christianity is no longer fettered to its past. It can adjust itself to changing situations without being under the embarrassing necessity of proving it has not modified the original deposit of truth. The communal Jesus is always synonymous with whatever it is that a Christian group thinks or does. This Jesus, however, can scarcely meet the insistent demand both of those outside and of those inside Christian circles, a demand voiced by E. Stanley Jones, for instance, that a distinction be made between Jesus and Christianity. The communal Jesus is Christianity. He is "Christ and his influence," to borrow a phrase from John R. Mott.

If one were attempting to estimate the significance of Jesus in human history, the communal Jesus would certainly be the figure with whom one has to deal. As from a stone cast into the water, there have gone out from Jesus across the surface of human affairs ceaseless waves of spiritual influence. Together with the initial impulse, these constitute the communal Jesus. Objectively considered, no appraisal of the significance, even of the historical Jesus, is adequate that fails to take into account all that Jesus has meant to generations of Christian people. Such a historical judgment relative to the significance of Jesus is highly desirable and illuminating. Yet it can never be a substitute for a judgment of the personal significance of Jesus. The two points of view by no means necessarily coincide. We may, for instance, acknowledge this historical significance of Jesus and yet conclude that he has no personal significance for us. Or we discover for ourselves the personal significance of Jesus without ever having known anything of the wider ranges of his influence. On the other hand, the private appraisal of Jesus, though this is not inevitably the case, may be favorably affected by a knowledge of what Jesus has meant to other people. The interest of this paper, it hardly needs to be added, is not in an objective estimation of the significance of Jesus in history. It seeks to ascertain the personal significance of the historical Jesus for people today. The communal Jesus, by his very nature, is unavailable for such an undertaking. It is impossible to isolate or distinguish him from the Christian fellowship. Therein lies both the tragedy and the glory of the communal Jesus.

The symbolic Jesus is ably championed by Professor A. G. Baker in an article inspired by the Jerusalem meeting of the International Missionary Council, entitled, "Christ and the Missionary Enterprise." He writes,

> Jesus became the originator and center of the [Christian] movement only in so far as his followers created and have continued to recreate out of the Jesus of Judea and of Galilee a spiritual symbol which is both inspiring and satisfying according to the prevailing conceptions of the hour. The Real Christ . . . . is the Christ who exists as an idea and an ideal in the hearts of his people. The spiritual dynamic we feel from him is the allurement of the ideal, the inspiration of a noble heroic soul and the social influence of those who bear his name.

The future of the Christian religion in its relation to other religions, he concludes, depends on whether "the concept of Christ as it has evolved to date within the Christian movement is more alluring and more challenging than the ideal religious figures which have been the product of other religious movements."[2]

We may accept without question this statement that the name Jesus has become for many a frame or symbol for the ideals and ambitions of Christian people. It makes little difference whether the character of a symbol, as symbol, corresponds to the character's reality. There is no necessary relation between a symbol and the object symbolized. In the symbolic use of Jesus, to be sure, there usually is a resemblance between the literary figure and the various religious and ethical ideals of which he has become the symbol. Jesus might be called an intrinsic rather than an extrinsic symbol. Yet it has always been possible to put almost any ideal into the symbolic Jesus without being untrue to the principle of symbolization. The practice is, doubtless, not only unavoidable but desirable. In the realm of ultimate objectives where exact definitions are impossible, a resort to symbolic statements becomes necessary. There is no danger in this practice so long as the Christian recognizes what he is doing. It may be urged that many another figure might have been selected for this purpose. But as a matter of history, Jesus, who was counted Founder or Lord, became and has continued to be the chief personal symbol for the faith, hope, and love of those who call themselves Christians. Professor Barnes's criticism of the use by notable Christian leaders of what he calls the "Jesus stereotype" betrays a complete misunderstanding of this practice of symbolization.

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[2] *Journal of Religion*, January, 1929.

The chief disadvantages of the symbolic Jesus must, however, be recognized. As a symbolic figure he ceases to be an example and ceases to exert cohesive power. In his name each individual or group of Christians does battle for its respective ideals. And then, when, as so often happens, the programs of action or doctrine implicit in these various ideals clash, Christians are likely to quit thinking about the difficult facts and to take refuge from their reflective problems in expressions of mutually-shared loyalty to Jesus. Thus they achieve a specious unity and an appearance of harmony by an emotional appeal to Christ.

There remains for consideration the historical Jesus. This historic Jesus is the original Jesus. He is the foundation on which all subsequent figures of Jesus have been pedestaled. Now that he is becoming known for what he was, Christians no longer find it quite easy to accept any substitutes for the genuine Jesus. But neither are they convinced that they want even the genuine article. It is an open question whether a figure which "refuses to be detached from his own time or suffer himself to be modernized" (Schweitzer, again) can have any significance for our day. Few attempts have been made to explore afresh and without prejudice the merits of the historic Jesus and his meaning for contemporary religion. Such an investigation cannot effectively be carried on by anyone for whom, in Dr. Johnston Ross's unforgettable phrase, "the imperial vein of Christian experience is Christocentric." Such a Christian will at one or another point surreptitiously, and in spite of himself, overlay the historic Jesus with one or another of the other figures of Jesus. Nor can the investigation be conducted profitably by one who assumes what Professor Walter Horton has called "a negative emotional attitude" toward Jesus. So difficult is it to be true to one's ignorance as well as to one's knowledge!

III

Christian people have never been able to reach a unanimous agreement as to the meaning of the life abundant, nor as to the way such a life is to be attained. Its history discloses a wide range of needs which the Christian religion has claimed to meet and an equally wide choice of methods by which it has undertaken to meet these needs. There is no single idea or way of salvation that alone deserves the name of Christian; though particular Christian groups have often been guilty of prescribing a single panacea for a single, if undiagnosed, human ailment. That salvation should be conceived in various ways, a psychological analysis of human nature would indicate to be an a priori probability. Some of the most fruitful psychological research in our generation has focused itself on an attempt to interpret human nature dynamically. Certain students of human nature, notably Freud and Adler, explain all human conduct in terms of a single dominant impulse or urge, though they differ among themselves as to the exact character of that "drive." Such a hypothesis is illuminating and fruitful as well as widely helpful in promoting an understanding of human behavior. Other students of human nature, sacrificing simplicity to clarity, incline to enlarge the list of fundamental impulses. W. I. Thomas, for instance, suggests that the character and personality of any given human being depend on the nature of the organization of his "wishes" or needs. These wishes may be classified under four general heads. They are: (1) the desire for adventure or new experience; (2) the desire for security; (3) the desire for recognition; (4) the desire for response.[3] In each individual, of course, these wishes appear in a kaleidoscopic mixture of concrete forms. If these four so-called "wishes" are adequately satisfied, the individual counts his life good.

This analysis by W. I. Thomas of the raw material of human nature opens up an inviting new approach to the meaning of salvation as well as of saviorhood. It suggests that a man is saved when his needs of adventure, security, recognition, and response are adequately or abundantly met. It suggests that a savior is one who helps a person at these points of his needs. The query presents itself at once, What relation has Jesus to the fulfilment of these fundamental desires? An answer might be given in respect to each of the several figures of Jesus already discussed. But our present concern is solely with the historic Jesus. In the interests of a fresh attempt to explore the significance for us today of the historic Jesus this general dynamic interpretation of human nature in terms of the four wishes may be taken as a point of departure. The exposition which follows is, of course, no more than a sample or example of what might be done in many a parallel though different way. It is frankly an experiment.

The question may be put thus: What contribution to human life with its needs of adventure, security, recognition, and response has the historic Jesus to make? Are these contributions significant enough to warrant the conjecture that the historic Jesus will prove to be an asset rather than a liability to the Christian movement? The answer, it may be said by way of anticipation, is a sturdy affirmation. The reasons for that answer follow. No claim is made that this suggestion of a way of employing the historic Jesus to meet the existing situation is the only way. Yet the appraisal is one that commands the loyal and grateful acquiescence of an increasing number of our fellow-Christians. For all its unfamiliar strangeness, the figure of the historic Jesus, like certain of the other figures of Jesus, is large enough for world-leadership.

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[3] *The Unadjusted Girl*, by W. I. Thomas (Boston: Little, Brown & Co.).

The desire for adventure.—The historic Jesus was a leader of a cause. That cause was, and still is, full of adventure and hazard. Obviously, human beings can find plenty of shivering adventure and novelty in life without ever having heard of Jesus. Nevertheless, it is a fact that his own mind was adventurous as his life was an adventure. He was forever on the move, an itinerant prophet. The field of adventure into which he led his followers is still a field that entices people today. It is the field of the conquest of specific ideals, such as freedom from bondage to the things of the world; alert solicitude for and obligation toward people in trouble; reverence, integrity, and health of mind; poise and purity of motive. Always his adventuring was based on the assumption (which was, for Jesus, a burning conviction) that the world was to be interpreted as the scene of a divinely initiated and controlled program directed toward the realization of these ideals.

From the historic Jesus we receive no suggestions as to how to set about our adventurous quest for these ideals. He was no rule-maker. Our relationship to him is not one of obedience. He had no specific commands to give. He offers no help, as G. Lowes Dickinson critically reminds us, in regard to the problem of ways and means. But it is objected still further that Jesus took little notice of the immediate practical problems of our life. Just what value, it is asked, has a leadership which merely holds before its following a set of admittedly glowing but equally general and impracticable ideals? Are not such statements of principles worse than useless? Do they not tend to elicit a vocal adherence which becomes in turn a complacent substitute for action? Often, no doubt. But on the other hand, there is an "energy of true idealism," of which Dean Sperry reminded us, a decade ago. He says,

> We live in the presence of a moral ideal which seems, for the moment, unattainable. But if we are not disobedient to the heavenly vision we

> waken some morning to find that all the time it has been doing its work in and through us, and we have been drawing nearer to it all the while.[4]

This we cannot afford to give up, whatever the attendant risks. We must deliberately conspire to keep ourselves aspiring, else we shall quench the inner impulse to grow. This needed energy, many have discovered, is latent and available in the historic Jesus.

Still another objection has been raised against the ideals which Jesus formulated, not so much because of their content of glittering generality as because of the conditions under which they were formulated. They are wholly vitiated, it is argued, by the eschatological illusion which attended their conception. They were the product of the expectation of an imminent world-catastrophe. Certainly they were. But it was just this utopian apocalyptic hope that served to purify Jesus' insight. An apt statement on this subject of the *interim ethic* has been made by Professor Lake. I should like to take his words as my own:

> Those who have ever studied photography know that usually they are dealing with plates which are too sensitive to blue and insufficiently sensitive to yellow light, so that difficulties arise if they want to photograph something which contains a great deal of yellow. They therefore use a screen of yellow glass, which cuts out the other rays of light, so that they obtain artificially a world in which there is little except yellow light, and thus overcome the limitations of their plates. From the point of view of this illustration our minds are photographic plates which are too sensitive to certain social values, and not sensitive enough to certain spiritual values; and I believe that the eschatological point of view of the Jews and of Jesus has served as the yellow screen which has enabled us to overcome this lack of proportion.[5]

Again, the historic Jesus takes a position of adventurous leadership because he interpreted life in terms of conflict. No one can think of him without feeling the deep joys of pugnacity stirring within. In his remembered presence it becomes difficult to conceal or evade the moral issues of life or to surrender to easy, short-cut ways of satisfying desire. The memory of him fans to life the resolution to have at the enemies he himself attacked: fickleness, malice, laziness, greed, carelessness, irreverence, cynicism, hypocrisy, and that clinging to the lesser self, which represents the choice of death instead of life.

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[4] *Disciplines of Liberty*, by Willard E. Sperry (New Haven: Yale Press, 1921), p. 95.

[5] *The Stewardship of Faith*, by Kirsopp Lake (New York: Putnam's, 1915), p. 37.

The historic Jesus validates his claim of leadership into fields of new experience by his power to stiffen our morale. He still succeeds in nerving our wills, if we allow him to, at points where staying power, aggressiveness, and spiritual elasticity are all-important. It is partly his example that promotes morale. It is partly the contagious character of his spirit which is not quenched even when transmitted to us by the pages of a book. The secret of the infectiousness of his personality is, perhaps, a rare combination of tenacity of purpose with depths of emotional power. Jesus was an individual who appears to have lived under the strain of great emotional tension. He was not worldly wise, nor coolly calculating in his actions. He was a man of alternating moods, now humble, now self-confident. He felt himself driven by a sense of mission, so overwhelming as to have shaken him loose from his vocational career. It reorganized his life on an altruistic basis. This mission he believed in with all the passion of forthright sincerity. He had no mental reservations as to the importance of his cause. He was wholly absorbed in it. Life was completely concentrated upon its fulfilment. It is no wonder he catches us up in this same cause. By focusing our lives on a single objective, he helps enormously to reduce internal emotional friction. Thereby he increases the moral power for adventure on behalf of his cause.

The desire for security.—Jesus also stimulates morale by his convictions about human destiny and human obligation; convictions we cannot in our turn prove, yet, because we cannot but believe, are likely to spend much time trying to validate. God is holy, and wrathful, i.e., there is a moral order of the universe. Repent, therefore, and stand in awe of him. God is forgiving and does not disown sinners, i.e., by refusing to cast us away from himself God makes it possible for us to endure our failures to attain perfection. Therefore, instead of succumbing to discouragement at the realization of the gap between our attainments and our ideal, and abandoning further attempts in despair and self-condemnation, try again. God is Lord of heaven and earth, i.e., security rests in him and in his power to press his purposes to a successful conclusion. Be not, therefore, faint-hearted, but light-hearted, gay; despair not. God may be trusted. He is the God of Victory. Jesus is pre-eminently a religious leader. As our faith identifies itself with his faith, the desire for security, that ultimate security of the total life, is met.

The desire for recognition.—There would seem to be no realistic way in which the historic Jesus can help us to satisfy our desire for recognition. He cannot single us out for attention. Nevertheless, he had and still has a contribution to make toward this aspect of the salvation of the individual. "I lived with the soul of Mark Twain for a year and I was morally deteriorated thereby," wrote a sensitive American biographer. One cannot live with the soul of the historic Jesus for long without coming to a new realization of one's dignity as a member of the human race. Under the compulsion of his mind, one grows in appreciation of human potentiality and value. Under the same stimulus one finds one's self loath to give up one's own unproved but unsurrenderable conviction of a solicitude on the part of God for individual human beings, his children, and of a *divine* recognition that will enable human beings to endure that isolation which all too often is the lot of those who have set their hearts on the high things to which the social group is not ready to accord recognition.

The desire for response.—The historic Jesus vindicated his power of leadership by the way he touched the springs of affection in his followers both through his sense of humor and through his solicitude for their personal welfare. Now the latter is no longer an element in our relationship to the historic

Jesus. He can have no solicitude for us as individuals today. But there is a vital meaning in friendship with the historic Jesus, even though friendship, or response, is normally a two-way affair, involving both give and take. Being friends with a figure out of a book, however vividly that figure may be imagined, has not the rich potentialities that there are in friendship with living contemporaries in flesh and blood. Such a figure, to mention the most obvious limitation, cannot take the initiative. Yet there are certain worthful experiences of friendship possible even under these difficult conditions. We may take our cue from Emerson: "A friend is a looking glass." A friend is a mirror in which by friendly silences we see our weakness, our conscience, our very self reflected. Such a responsive friend is the historic Jesus, a friend who is at the same time a scathing, condemnatory critic. He is, to change the figure, a lens, through which we read our own mind as it truly is.

These contributions of the historic Jesus to our human needs of adventure, security, recognition, and response have been presented simply as illustrative of the significance of the historic Jesus for our generation. These contributions are partly indirect, partly direct. They seem modest when compared with the claims often made for his saviorhood, and doubtless they might be multiplied. Nevertheless, they are genuine aids to life. They are given by the historic Jesus to those who read the story of his life or carry it meditatively in their memory. They are contributions which no other single individual can make for us in an equally comprehensive way.

The Christian religion goes beyond the historic Jesus in its ideals, in its techniques for achieving its ideals, and in its understanding of the sanctions and destiny of those ideals. It has attained an organized position in the world which has been due to many other influences besides that of the historic figure whose cognomen it proudly and humbly bears. But still, as the core of the Christian religion, the historic Jesus holds for the individual a significant place of corrective, constructive, dynamic, and constraining leadership.

AMERICAN BAPTISTS IN THE AGE OF BIG BUSINESS

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THE latter half of the nineteenth century was marked by the remarkable growth of business enterprise in the United States. A very significant change was taking place in industry in that individual proprietors were being replaced by large factories managed by corporate boards. Before the Civil War there were fifty telegraph companies and 450 operators of coal mines, while the New England cotton mills were in the hands of powerful families.[1] When the era of big business really set in, about the beginning of the seventies, it presaged the end of the individual small manufacturer in any large numbers and made impossible the old system of personal relations between employer and employee. The corporations that bought out the independent operators were in turn merged into trusts.

The development of big business was accompanied by an emphasis on efficiency, system, and organization, involving a delegation of responsibility to committees and boards. The tremendous profits entailed and the prestige accorded the successful attracted the best of the nation's talent. The American business man was idolized, and, more than the politician, he was looked upon as the maker and symbol of modern America.

The Baptist response to the centralization of economic interests and the emphasis on efficiency showed in several new trends of development. There was a demand for the efficient administration of the entire denominational program, local, state, and national. Business men were appointed to important executive positions of the national societies of Baptists, and the administration of the community and local church programs was taken over by laymen. There came to be a definite dependence on large individual gifts for benevolent purposes, and a consolidation of denominational societies and educational institutions was effected in the interests of efficiency. Expenditures for benevolent purposes showed a direct relationship to general financial conditions.

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[1] B. J. Hendrick, *The Age of Big Business*, pp. 5–7.

In 1869 the Executive Board of the Home Mission Society adopted a code of principles that revealed an appreciation of the requirements of the new day:

> In carrying forward the work of the Society, it is the aim of your Board:
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> 1. To practice such scrupulous economy in every department of the service as is to be found consistent with the highest efficiency.
>
> 2. To occupy fields of the very best promise, centers of influence, centers of power; and from these to move aggressively outward, as from a well-assumed military base.
>
> 3. To spend none of the money of the society upon a man simply because he is poor or because he applies for aid, but to employ as laborers, men of known industry, piety, energy, and efficiency. Missionary money is very sacred. It should be made to yield the largest returns possible.
>
> 4. To insist that the pastors and churches aided, shall not merely strive to become self-supporting as soon as possible, but from the very first and always to be contributing churches: on the ground that only such churches are of the New Testament type.
>
> 5. To strike for the best lot in town where a meeting house is to be built: and never to encourage extravagance in building, but on the contrary, economy, commodiousness, durability, and taste.
>
> 6. In making loans from the edifice fund, to encourage churches to borrow in as small sums as possible, and to free themselves from debt at the earliest possible opportunity.[2]

The work of the Home Mission Society was systematized in all departments. District secretaries were appointed and a plan of co-operation worked out with the state associations whereby the Society pledged to each state, through the home mission board of that state, a definite sum, conditioned upon the raising and expenditure upon the field of another specified amount.[3]

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[2] *Proceedings of the American Baptist Home Mission Society* (1869), p. 19.

Baptist business acumen was demonstrated in the solicitation and administration of the Church Edifice Fund, whereby money was to be loaned without interest to struggling western churches to enable them to avoid commercial charges of 25 per cent and more. A campaign to raise $500,000 for this purpose was begun in 1866 and an architect hired to draw plans for standardized churches that could be erected at a minimum cost to meet the needs of each community.[4] The directors pointed with pride to the fact that they had "been enabled to take advantage of special providence to secure, in a growing city or town, church edifices already built by other denominations at nearly one-half their original cost."[5] Gradually the practice of loaning money was abandoned, and, under a Benevolent Fund, outright gifts were made to needy churches. Such churches were bound, under the terms of an ironclad mortgage, to revert to the Home Mission Society in case the congregation should disband, for Baptist leaders had no intention of allowing other denominations to utilize property that had been endowed by a Baptist agency.[6]

In their attitude toward Christian benevolence, Baptists displayed an eagerness to meet the standards of the new age. The need for systematic giving was stressed in the press, at conventions, in the pulpit, and lectures on the methodology of Christian beneficence were given at the leading seminaries.[7] As early as 1869, the Committee on Finance of the American Baptist Missionary Union characterized the current methods of raising funds as hopelessly inadequate, for "the necessity of the hour" was a system that would "reach every church in the working field of the Union at home and abroad."[8] It was further recommended that the Executive Committee appoint a committee of five for each state to organize missionary meetings, inspire enthusiasm, and thus form "the connecting link between the churches in those states and the rooms in Boston."

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[3] J. A. Smith, *History of Baptists in the Western States East of the Mississippi*, pp. 198, 199.

[4] L. Moss, *Baptists and the National Centenary*, pp. 174, 183.

[5] *Ibid.*

[6] H. L. Morehouse, *Baptist Home Missions in America*, p. 171.

[7] "Chicago: Morgan Park," *Standard*, December 27, 1877. Dr. Cheney delivered the second of his previously announced lectures on the "Development of Church Beneficence" in the seminary chapel.

A detailed report of the progress that had been made in educating the denomination to practice systematic beneficence was made to the Home Mission Society in 1877. At that time nearly every church had adopted the "New Testament plan" of weekly giving to meet current and local expenses, the envelope system being widely used. The denominational press was commended for lending its aid to the crusade for systematic giving, and it was announced that several hundred manuscripts had been sent to the Publication Society to compete for a $100 prize for the best essay on the subject.[9]

In 1884 the Home Mission Society appointed a standing committee on systematic benevolence, and several co-operating state organizations took similar action, but it was not until 1896 that a system of national organization, in which all Baptist interests and organizations could have a share, was perfected. The key to the new plan was proportional representation; at the head was a Commission on Systematic Christian Beneficence composed of the representatives of the national societies of Baptists.[10] Newly formed state, district association, and local church commissions were made responsible to the national commission, and standing committees on organization, statistics and literature, plans of giving, and public meetings, and conferences appointed.[11]

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[8] *Proceedings* (1869), pp. 13, 14.

[9] *Proceedings* (1877), p. 12.

[10] A general secretary and two others elected by each of the following organizations: American Baptist Missionary Union, American Baptist Home Mission Society, American Baptist Publication Society, American Baptist Education Society, Baptist Young People's Union of America, together with the corresponding secretaries of the Woman's Baptist Foreign Mission Society, Woman's Baptist Foreign Mission Society of the West, Woman's Baptist Home Mission Society, and Woman's American Baptist Home Mission Society.

Throughout the period there was pressure exerted to apply business methods to the conduct of local church affairs. At the Illinois Christian Convention in 1868, an annual interdenominational gathering at Bloomington, "the great subject of discussion and chief object of prayer was not Christian union but Christian efficiency."[12] Among the more prominent means discussed were children's meetings, systematic visitation, lay preaching, mission Sabbath schools, and general Christian cooperation. The trend toward the delegation of authority gripped the local churches. Business transactions were now carefully worked over by committees, and even applicants for church membership presented themselves to a committee instead of appearing in person before a general church meeting. According to a leading clergyman, the well-organized Baptist church in 1871 had the following twelve departments: the sick and relief of the needy, spiritual affairs and candidates, baptism, Sunday school, tracts and publications, women's devotional meetings, attending to strangers, church and society sociables, music, temperance, church building and property, and finance.[13] The complaint was voiced in 1875 that church business meetings were too complex, and it was urged that all the detail work be done in committees and only the results submitted to open and general meetings.[14]

W. W. Everts, in 1887, charged that business meetings were taking precedence over prayer meetings, and that government by committees completely dominated local church life.[15] He cited a number of examples of modern business methodology applied to the local church: a Baptist church in Boston had a budget and pledge card system; in New York the every-member canvass was in vogue; a New Jersey church circularized its members for important causes; in Connecticut it was the custom to obtain subscriptions for benevolences through notes given at the beginning of the year and involving monthly payments to a treasurer. Professor J. H. Gilmore wrote an article on "Presbyterian Tendencies in Our Baptist Churches." He endeavored to show that committees took care of church business so completely that there was nothing left for the congregational meeting. A correspondent from Cincinnati stated in 1867 that if the Baptist denomination ever died in that city it would be from excess of constitution. There were as many "young people's associations, sewing societies, ladies missionary organizations, organized Bible classes, etc.," as there were "warts on a toad's back." In addition Baptists assembled once a month and formed a society composed of members from all the churches.[16]

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[11] "Systematic Benevolence," *Standard,* August 22, 1896.

[12] "Illinois Christian Convention," *ibid.,* October 29, 1868.

[13] *Ibid.,* July 27, 1871.

[14] "Church Business Meetings," *ibid.,* May 27, 1875.

[15] *Baptist Layman's Book,* pp. 95 ff.

The office of deacon in a Baptist church has greatly changed owing to the pressure to secure men with business ability to serve as church officials. According to New Testament usage, Baptist deacons have always been superintendents of the secular concerns of the church. In the Colonial and early national periods of the nation's history deacons were elected for a life-tenure and were inducted to office by ordination and assigned special seats in the church.[17] In conformity to business efficiency and the trend toward the secularization of church offices, the deaconate has been made elective and the incumbents laymen. J. M. Pendleton deplored the modern tendency to regard the deacon as a mere clerk or trustee subject to annual election, so that of one church it could be said "nearly every male member in it has at some time acted as a deacon."[18] It became the practice to hold stated elections of deacons "in growing communities to make sure of the best gifts."[19]

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[16] "Concerning a Certain Cincinnati Peculiarity," *Standard*, August 1, 1867.

[17] Quirof Harlan, *Changing Customs among American Baptists*, pp. 6–7.

[18] *Church Manual*, p. 35.

[19] W. W. Everts, *op. cit.*, p. 101.

As has already been indicated, laymen assumed further responsibilities and greater authority in Baptist affairs during the period under consideration. In 1860 the Church Edifice Fund Committee expressed the opinion that "the advice given by a man of skill and experience, or a committee of judicious men of business talent and habit, would be worth more to the needy church than a large gift of money without such advice."[20] A few years later the Missouri Baptist State Convention reported it as a fact "full of promise" that almost the entire slate of officers and the Executive Committee were laymen engaged in business.[21] Baptist business men of Iowa held a state convention in 1873 to energize lay workers,[22] and B. F. Jacobs, a Chicago business man and a Baptist, systematized the Sunday-school work of the churches on a national scale following 1867.[23] A man who had made an outstanding success of some business enterprise was often asked to perform his duty to the denomination by acting as treasurer of one of the national societies of Baptists. When the Home Mission Society was faced with an alarming deficit in 1885, a committee of seven business men was appointed to work out a solution.[24] A contributor to the *Standard* stated that 5 per cent of the Baptists, or a total of 75,000, were business men. He urged that they take over the administration of denominational affairs, for who was "so qualified to do business as a business man, and who to spend God's money as his legitimate stewards?"[25]

Business men began to take a leading part in the development of local church programs. The First Baptist Church of Chicago in 1870 put its extension work in the hands of a mission committee of well-known business men, a practice that was followed in other cities.[26] Lay preaching was immensely popular during the first decades after the Civil War, and D. L. Moody, president of the Chicago Young Men's Christian Association, occupied leading Baptist pulpits on numerous occasions. Mr. Moody, after an extensive tour of the Christian conventions in 1868, told how "churches that had been closed against laymen were freely thrown open, pastors taking seats with the listeners, and laymen speaking from pulpits and burning hearts, arousing many to vigorous work for souls."[27]

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[20] *Proceedings Home Mission Society* (1860), p. 51.

[21] "Missouri Convention," *Christian Times and Witness*, October 11, 1866.

[22] "Correspondence from Iowa," *Standard*, September 25, 1873.

[23] J. A. Smith, *op. cit.*, p. 249.

[24] *Proceedings* (1885), p. 6.

[25] "Business Affairs of Christ's Kingdom," *Standard*, March 27, 1873.

[26] "Chicago Items," *Standard*, February 2, 1871.

Laymen's church organizations appeared and grew rapidly in the years following the war, as is exemplified by the Baptist Social unions which were at first confined to the local churches in the larger cities. The movement had its origin in Tremont Temple, Boston, in 1864, and units were soon established in other centers. In October, 1874, the Brooklyn Baptist Social Union voted to issue a call for a convention of delegates from all the Baptist Social unions of the country,[28]

> to be held in Brooklyn December 9 and 10, to take into consideration the place of our laymen in the great denominational movements, their responsibility to the churches, the development of social influence, the education of the ministry, the endowment of our colleges, and the kindred subjects of like interest to the whole denomination.

Reports and addresses delivered at the Brooklyn Convention clearly showed that laymen were determined to have a larger share in the management of denominational enterprises. In his keynote speech, delivered on the opening day of the convention, Martin B. Anderson, president of the University of Rochester, charged the delegates to "bring business common sense to bear upon the professional habits and modes of thought likely to prevail in the clerical body."[29] He further urged that the financial administration of the churches, Christian charities, Sunday schools, and denominational education, all be under the control of laymen. An editorial writer for the *Standard* upheld the barring of clergymen from membership in the social unions on the ground that lay leadership engendered "a business spirit and method too often lacking when the control" was "wholly or mostly ministerial."[30]

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[27] *Ibid.*, April 16, 1868.

[28] "Educational News and Views," *ibid.*, November 5, 1871.

[29] *Convention of Baptist Social Unions* (1874), p. 16.

A successor to the National Social Union was the Baptist Congress, which met annually from 1881 to 1912 and constituted a forum of the ablest minds in the denomination, both clerical and lay. The tremendous momentum generated by the various activities of Christian laymen found expression in the conferences, denominational and interdenominational, that began to be held each summer at such places as Chautauqua, New York, Minnetonka, Minnesota, and Clear Lake, Iowa. Courses of instruction were given for both children and adults; Sunday-school rallies were held, and, in general, the training of lay church workers was stressed.[31] As the only course open to clergymen was to organize to preserve their professional status, the ministers in the larger cities began to hold Monday morning conferences. About the middle of the century, Baptist pastoral unions appeared and became recognized units of the state conventions. At such gatherings papers were read dealing with the problems of the minister and the technique of his work.[32]

As has already been noted, there had come to be a definite dependence on large individual contributions to carry on Baptist extension work. This implied important physical and psychological changes, for it had long been a source of pride to Baptists that they were the poor man's denomination, while the rich, especially in the cities, were Episcopalians and Presbyterians.[33] After the war there was little expression of contempt for wealth. On the contrary, the rich were welcomed, justified, and depended upon for financial aid. The *Christian Times and Witness* announced with pride in 1867 that, although the Baptist church in St. Paul was numerically weak, it was financially strong, "the strongest in point of wealth . . . . in the city."[34] T. G. Jones characterized as unworthy of serious notice the allegation that Baptist churches were composed of the poor of the world:

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[30] "Laymen's Social Union," *Standard,* December 28, 1876.

[31] "Doings at Point Chautauqua," *Standard,* August 22, 1878.

[32] Published with the state convention records of each state.

[33] D. D. Jeter, *Madison Avenue Lectures,* p. 375. The progress of Baptist principles has been mainly among the poor of the world.

> God has so blessed them [the Baptists], temporally, as well as spiritually, that we could demonstrate that the aggregate of wealth among them is far greater than of some ecclesiastical fraternities, whose members not infrequently put on lordly airs and affect to despise the Baptists for their poverty. But to a task like this we are unwilling to descend.[35]

The concept of the "sanctification" or justification of wealth that Siegfried has called such a characteristic of American Protestantism began to be stated by Baptist leaders. Rev. William Elgin, of Indianapolis, Indiana, delivered a sermon on "The Christian Idea of Wealth" in 1869, using as his theme the idea that those who gave money to educational institutions "put it into the way of being transformed at once into a living force."[36] In the course of a highly laudatory editorial in the *Standard,* the statement was made that the man of wealth was a man of talent.[37] Moreover, the various enterprises of benevolence and organization had been benefited to a marked degree by the accession of men of this stamp to their working force, for the man of money stood "side by side with the man of faith." The members of the Indiana Baptist State Convention passed a resolution in 1890 saying that they "thankfully recognized the rich blessing of the Great Head of the Church, in the recent gift of Brother John D. Rockefeller to the Baptist Seminary of Chicago."[38] Two years later, in the course of his address at a great educational rally in the Auditorium Theater, Chicago, Dr. Wayland Hoyt made the following statement:

> Wealth is concentrated power. . . . . What better thing can you do than to join that benignant conspiracy out of which has re-arisen this

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[34] "Minnesota Towns," October 24, 1867.

[35] *The Baptists, A Vindication,* p. 192.

[36] *Standard,* September 16, 1869.

[37] "Men of Money," April 23, 1868.

[38] *Proceedings* (1890), p. 40.

> splendid University with that Christian statesman, John D. Rockefeller, at the head [applause], gathering around him the multitudes of other noble men and women who with him are working for that future.[39]

The institutional program of the Baptists, local, national, and foreign came to be supported mainly through large individual contributions. Although no Baptist churches were destroyed in the Chicago fire of 1871, there was cause for deep lamentation, for in the loss and destruction to "the immense businesses of the city and the consequent cutting off of resources found in the Christian liberality of wealthy and enterprising men," the Baptists "shared fully with the rest."[40] The *Standard* called attention to the fact that the revenue of the national societies came from "the comparatively few in a limited number of churches."[41] In 1878 Gardner Chilson, a New England manufacturer and merchant, gave the Home Mission Society $120,000, and, when the Society was badly in debt five years later, it was not because of a lack of contributions from the churches, for these had "actually and greatly increased, but from a lack of some large individual gifts which were naturally expected."[42] The 1888 report of the Home Mission Society revealed that more than one-half its income was derived from legacies and individual gifts for special objects.[43]

At the Jubilee Convention in 1882 wealthy Baptist benefactors such as Vassar, Bishop, Colgate, Colby, Deane, Bucknell, Crozer, Trevor, Wycoff, Peddie, Constant, Rockefeller, and Pyle were lauded by speakers and in committee reports. During the course of his report, the chairman of the Committee on Work among the Freedmen stated that, as the Baptists had money in abundance, it was their duty to say so and to keep on saying so. He claimed to be able "to name twelve Baptist brethren, in twelve minutes of time, who could give $100,000 each to endow . . . . twelve schools, and have money enough left to ruin twelve children for each of them, if they had so many."[44] The Chicago Baptist Social Union made the confident announcement in 1880 that the time was coming when Chicago would have "a Colby, or a Colgate, or a Bishop to lead in progressive benevolent work."[45]

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[39] "Educational Rally at the Auditorium," *Standard*, April 21, 1892.

[40] "The Lock unto Heaven," *ibid.*, October 26, 1871.

[41] "The Few and the Many," *ibid.*, July 22, 1875.

[42] *Proceedings* (1883), p. 10.

[43] *Ibid.* (1890), p. 18.

Wealthy men were elected to the executive boards of the national societies of Baptists in the hope that they would furnish both the necessary funds and the needed executive ability. Rockefeller, during the time that he was on the Executive Board of the Home Mission Society, not only personally paid the Society's standing deficit of $250,000, but also paid individual workers in needy areas out of his own pocket. Thomas Hoyne resigned as president of the Board of Trustees of the University of Chicago, giving as his reason the fact that he was "not a merchant prince" and urging the selection of a man of wealth as his successor.[46] His resignation was accepted.

Local churches were made the objects of benefactions of men of wealth. The Calvary Baptist Church at Washington, D.C., was erected at a cost of $125,000, of which amount, Amos Kendall, a well-known politician in the days of Jackson and Van Buren, gave $100,000.[47] One lay brother in Philadelphia offered to give $50,000 to the Baptist churches of that city if they would pool their indebtedness.[48] The Home Mission Board announced that large contributors to the removal of debts resting on churches in New York City and the vicinity had required the churches "to secure the amounts thus given to the Society against the possibility of ultimate loss."[49]

The cause of denominational education benefited greatly through the beneficence of men of wealth. George Peabody, who gave away between six and seven million dollars during his own lifetime, headed a list of "great givers" compiled by a Baptist publication.[50] Prominent also were Mathew Vassar, who contributed $800,000 to found a woman's college, and Ezra Cornell, who gave $500,000 to found a university. John P. Crozer donated $230,000 "besides ample buildings, including houses for the professors" to the seminary which bears his name. Madison, Rochester, and Colby universities were indebted to "the messrs. Colgate, John B. Trevor, the late Gardner Colby, James Deane, and messrs. Wyckoff of New York, and others less well known." Then follows this interesting conclusion:

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[44] H. L. Morehouse, *op. cit.*, p. 171.

[45] "The Chicago Social Union," *Standard*, October 21, 1880.

[46] "The University of Chicago," *ibid.*, July 16, 1879.

[47] "Washington Correspondence," *ibid.*, January 2, 1868.

[48] "Our Philadelphia Letter," *ibid.*, October 30, 1879.

[49] Morehouse, *op. cit.*, p. 379.

> These things are a feature of the times now passing. It is cheering to be permitted to regard them as characteristic: as indicative of the degree in which the great idea has taken hold of wealthy men that the very highest office and privilege of wealth is service . . . . an inspiring consciousness of a day to come when the "faithful and wise steward" can meet the master of all, as one at whose feet it will be an infinite joy to lay down the fruits of all his giving and all his doing.

The committee in charge reported to the Home Mission Society that the greater portion of the $450,000 that had been given for work among the freedmen had come from "generous individuals" whose offerings had been designated for the purpose.[51] The outstanding contributor to Baptist educational interests has been John D. Rockefeller. According to Professor A. H. Newman, the Baptist Education Society was formed in 1888, because of the known desire of Mr. Rockefeller for such an agency to administer the funds he was about to bestow.[52]

The Baptist program of expansion was directly responsive to the economic status of the nation, for, when times were hard receipts for home and foreign missions fell off and activities had to be curtailed. The steady growth of the Home Mission Society after 1850 was interrupted in 1856–58, 1861–62, 1874–78, and 1894–98 by intervals of retrogression. These dates roughly correspond to the years of financial panic, or retrenchment in commercial development, in the United States. An attempt to ignore the Panic of 1893 by carrying on a full program of work resulted in the Home Mission Society being plunged badly into debt.[53] The period from 1873 to 1879 was a particularly trying time to finance Baptist activities, so salaries had to be reduced and a general program of retrenchment adopted.[54] Even so the Home Mission Society emerged from the period of depression with a heavy debt, from which it was later freed through the kindness of John D. Rockefeller.

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[50] "The Great Givers," *Standard*, December 30, 1880.

[51] *Proceedings of the Western Baptist Education Commission* (1871), p. 53.

[52] *History of Baptist Churches in the United States*, p. 477.

However, business adversity brought gains as well as losses to religion, for, during the hard times of 1857–58 and 1873–79, there were great religious revivals that more than compensated for financial losses. The *Christian Times* attributed the renewed interest in religion to the fact that the people had more leisure time, and that "the sad experience of the uncertainty of worldly riches . . . . disposed the hearts of many to sigh for the durable riches."[55] The business men of the country took a prominent part in the revival activities in 1857–58 by participating in the daily noon prayer meetings that were held in the principal cities.[56] Only a few weeks after the Panic of 1873 broke, the Brooklyn correspondent of the *Standard* wrote that the feeling pervaded the community that "the suffering incident to the present state of affairs" would "lead thousands to turn from the fleeting things of time to the realities of eternity."[57] The expected religious quickening did not come immediately, but, as the depression in business continued, men turned to religion for solace. The spring and summer of 1874 found the smaller communities of the Middle West in the grip of a revival enthusiasm greater than had ever before been known. Dwight L. Moody, described as the "New Whitefield" who swayed audiences "by dint of direct, plain, earnest, business-like appeal" was remarkably successful in the larger cities.[58] The success achieved by Moody and other lay workers, such as George H. Stuart, of Philadelphia, William E. Dodge, of New York, and Thomas Miller, of Cincinnati, led a Baptist editor to see "a new and august movement on the part of the captain of our salvation, or rather the reorganization of a primitive branch of his service—the philippine corps of lay evangelists."[59]

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[53] "Our Debt," *Proceedings* (1894), p. 18. "For the first time in eight years we are obliged to report a deficit. Our debt at the close of the fiscal year, March 31, was $101,456.66. This was occasioned by the financial panic which gives to 1893 the bad pre-eminence of being the worst year in half a century."

[54] *Ibid.* (1879), p. 43.

[55] "Revivals," January 27, 1858.

[56] *Ibid.*

[57] "A Word from Brooklyn," *ibid.*, November 27, 1873.

As business adversity compelled retrenchment on the part of church agencies, conversely, national prosperity made possible a period of church expansion. The Baptist Association of Southern New York realized this and appointed a special day of prayer in 1877 that the Spirit of God might be poured out on city and country, that business integrity might be restored, and that a recognition of "dependence on God for business prosperity" might be awakened.[60] The resumption of specie payments, January 1, 1879, was hailed by Baptist leaders as meaning economic stability and increased opportunity, and the Home Mission Society's great progress in 1883 was attributed by the Executive Committee to the "revival in business."[61]

In keeping with progress in the business world, there were consolidations and mergers of Baptist organizations, especially in the field of denominational education. During the early period of development in the West, Baptists of each state or section founded academies, colleges, and seminaries without regard to national distribution. The chief agencies of support were city, district, and state education societies; so in 1871 there were twenty independent Baptist education societies in the north. The overlapping of fields and the need for funds to keep pace with the rapid development of public education resulted in a movement for the consolidation of educational units and the providing them with adequate endowment and efficient business administration.

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[58] "The New Whitefield," *ibid.*, April 1, 1875.

[59] "Lay Evangelists," *ibid.*, March 25, 1875.

[60] "The New York Letter," *ibid.*, October 25, 1877.

[61] *Proceedings* (1883), p. 11.

In February, 1867, the representatives of education societies in Illinois, Missouri, and Indiana met at Chicago in an attempt to form one education society for the West. At that meeting the sentiment was voiced that it was a "duty just as sacred as any can be" for those in charge to use the least possible of the denominational money in machinery, and the most possible in the cause for whose benefit it was given.[62] A year later the American Baptist Educational Commission was formed; it functioned through sectional advisory committees and conventions.[63] Although the special field of the Commission was confined to New York and New Jersey, an attempt was made to gather statistics from all Baptist institutions to use as a basis for recommendations for a national educational policy. Another purpose of the Commission was "to serve as a medium of communication between needy institutions of learning, or those engaged in the founding of such institutions, and men of wealth, or others, whose interest it might be thought desirable to enlist in their behalf."[64]

The success of the Educational Commission led to the calling of National Baptist Educational conventions in 1870 and 1872. These conventions attracted delegates from all sections of the country, including the southern states, and strong sentiment was expressed for a permanent education society to have general guidance over the Baptist program. At the first convention Dr. Bright, of New York, ridiculed the old tradition of a "Baptist college in every state," warning his colleagues that, if Baptist institutions were to have adequate endowment and maintain high standards, there must be a unified program. A college and a seminary in every state meant an expenditure of $50,000,000, and there was just as much reason for expecting to get this amount as there was of "building a railroad to the moon at the expense of the Baptists of the United States."[65] According to Dr. Lemuel Moss, the Educational Convention of 1870 included a larger proportion of the leading minds among American Baptists than had been found in one assembly for more than a generation.[66] When, two years later, the "representatives of 18,000 churches and a million and a half of members in communion" were again assembled, one of the ablest addresses was that of Rev. T. G. Jones, of Nashville, Tennessee, on "Limiting the Number of Our Institutions by Our Power To Make Them Strong."[67] Similar ideas were expressed at the Western Baptist Educational Convention which met at Chicago the previous year, for it was declared to be fundamental to growth and development to encourage concentration of gifts to the largest possible extent.[68]

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[62] "One Educational Society for the West," *Standard*, February 21, 1867.

[63] S. S. Cutting, *Baptist Educational Commission*, pp. 23–28.

[64] Smith, *op. cit.*, p. 294.

The first conventions were called and financed by a few men of means who were interested in securing a unified program, and it was not until 1888 that there was a national Baptist educational organization with executive powers that could be respected by the entire denomination. The leading objectives of the American Baptist Education Society, which was founded in that year, were co-operation in the securing of sites, buildings, and equipment, raising endowment funds, the solicitation and holding in trust of funds, the income of which was to be devoted to education, and the compilation and publication annually of the principal facts concerning the condition and progress of educational enterprises of Baptists in North America.[69] The Baptist Educational Union was formed in 1896. The purpose of the latter organization, as expressed in the second article of the constitution, was "to secure a closer fellowship among the educational workers of the denomination, to increase the efficiency and prosperity of the institutions represented, and, in co-operation with other agencies, to promote a more general interest in education thruout the denomination."[70]

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[65] *Proceedings of the Educational Convention* (1870), p. 216.

[66] *Baptists and the National Centenary*, p. 119.

[67] *Proceedings National Baptist Education Convention* (1872), p. 13.

[68] *Proceedings Western Baptist Education Commission*, p. 58.

[69] Newman, *op. cit.*, pp. 476–77.

The idea of the consolidation of administrative units was applied to various phases of denominational effort. Between 1865 and 1875, the independent Baptist state Sunday-school associations became affiliated with the state conventions, and, through the agency of the American Baptist Publication Society, the Sunday-school work was organized on a national basis. The "national anniversaries" of the mission, education, and publication societies became more truly representative, for they were no longer held exclusively in the East, but Chicago, Cincinnati, Denver, St. Louis, and San Francisco were selected as convention centers.[71] When the national societies were formed, provisions were made for life-memberships on the basis of the contribution of a stipulated sum to the treasury of the society. A board of managers living in or near some large eastern center, such as New York, was the executive agency, and there was no provision for proportional representation from individual churches or district associations. Advocates of a more democratic form of representation fought long and hard, but it was not until 1872 that the Missionary Union capitulated by providing for the appointment annually of seven delegates from each state convention and additional delegates to the number of 1 for every 4,000 members of the Baptist churches of any such state.[72]

A further step toward uniformity and equality of representation was taken in 1889. In that year all four of the national societies of Baptists instructed their executive boards to have a portion of the hall in which the sessions were to be held reserved for the delegates and other voting members, and to send to every church a request for delegates, together with a statement of the condition of delegation, and blanks on which to return by a specified date the names of delegates and life-members to be present from that church. The local entertainment committee provided tickets for regularly appointed delegates, and none but ticket-holders were allowed in the reserved sections. The national conventions were now no longer merely "mass meetings," as the delegates were responsible to the local churches or district associations from whence they had come. In churches all over the land, there had "begun to be felt the throb of the whole body."[73]

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[70] *Baptist Educational Union*, p. 3.

[71] In 1867, Chicago; 1878, Cleveland; 1884, Detroit; 1887, Minneapolis; 1891, Cincinnati; 1893, Denver; 1899, San Francisco.

[72] *Proceedings* (1872), p. viii.

The rapid growth of cities that came with the commercial and industrial exploitation of the Middle West forced upon Baptists difficult problems of adjustment in methodology and physical equipment. The trend of the population from the open country to urban centers is an important phase of American development since the Civil War. In 1860, 15 per cent of the national population resided in cities above 10,000 inhabitants, but in 1900, 34 per cent of the population resided in such cities.[74] Nearly every important city in the Middle West, with the exception of Cincinnati, more than doubled in population during the decade 1850–60, and many continued to increase by over 100 per cent in each of the succeeding decades to 1900.[75] Consider the amazing growth of Chicago, which had 29,963 inhabitants in 1850, 109,260 in 1860, 298,977 in 1870, 503,185 in 1880, 1,099,985 in 1890, and 1,698,575 in 1900.

The larger cities of the Middle West grew so quickly that Protestant Christianity was unable to expand its program rapidly enough. A first reaction was the futile effort to stem the tide by calling the trend an unfavorable symptom of the times and pleading that happiness was "far more prevalent in the country than in the town."[76] A Baptist editor went so far as to call cities "partly a punishment of man's sin, and partly a blunder of man's ignorance of what is best for himself," while admitting that they were "in part, a fruit of the necessity of society, trade and government."[77] Baptists soon abandoned this defeatist philosophy and turned to the active conquest of the growing cities.

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[73] "Votes and Seats at the May Meetings," *Standard,* April 3, 1890.

[74] S. A. Reeve, *Modern Economic Tendencies,* p. 362.

[75] *Statistical Abstract of the United States* (1916), pp. 52–53.

Even before the war the stronger individual churches in Chicago, Cincinnati, and St. Louis began to establish mission stations. The Shields Mission was started by the First Baptist Church of Chicago in 1856, and in 1859 the North Star Mission was founded in a German-speaking area by a group of young men from the same church. Within ten years the North Star Mission had a Sunday-school enrolment of 1,000, an industrial school for girls with 200 scholars, a reading-room, a monthly paper, and a full schedule of "sociables" and prayer meetings in the German language.[78] By 1870 work was being done among the Welsh, the Swedes, the Danes, and the Germans, and there were missions at the stock yards, the Union Glass Works, the rolling mills, and the Bridgeport Iron works, all financed and officered by the First Baptist Church. A report of 1869 showed that this church had a total of 3,165 Sunday-school scholars, 1,100 of whom met in the mother-church.[79]

The expansion of the home-mission program in the larger cities would be well worth a detailed study, but there is space here only to note that, as new social forces developed in the cities and came to be understood, programs, both secular and ecclesiastical, were shaped to meet them. By 1884 there were at least five distinct types of city mission, including the "arm" of a well-established church, the independent mission backed by a wealthy individual, the neighborhood church, the social center of the Woman's Christian Temperance Union or the Young Men's Christian Association, and regular denominational missions.[80]

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[76] *Christian Times and Witness*, January 5, 1858.

[77] "City and Country," *Standard*, January 16, 1868.

[78] "Chicago Items," *ibid.*, January 21, 1869.

[79] *Ibid.*, September 22, 1870.

The demands for the development of the denominational program to meet the needs of such a rapidly growing city as Chicago were too immediate and too complex to be solved by individual churches, no matter how powerful. On November 11, 1857, an advisory council of all the Chicago Baptist churches met to take steps toward the founding of a church on the North Side of Chicago, where 25,000 people resided and there was no Baptist church.[81] The movement proved to be premature, however, and it was not until 1872 that the Chicago Baptist Union was formed, and a co-operative home mission program under a paid secretary was inaugurated; ten years later the Baptist City Mission Society took over the work of the Union and further systematized it. A committee of fifteen was appointed whose duty it was to examine needy fields and "take steps to organize missions where the fields appear ready to harvest."[82] In 1889, the Chicago Social Union, an organization of laymen, took over the City Mission Society and gave it a sounder financial backing, and Baptist churches in other western cities pooled their resources to advance the denominational cause. A Union for Church Extension was formed in St. Louis and $15,000 contributed to church growth in a single year.[83] The Baptist churches of Detroit, six in number, including French, German, and colored, held a series of union meetings for three weeks with "most encouraging results."[84]

The Social Union movement, the beginnings of which have already been sketched, brought together Baptist laymen in the large cities and proved a great boon to city missions.

Baptist leaders were conscious that great social changes were taking place in the cities, so sermon topics dealing with the problems of the urban community became increasingly popular during the closing decades of the nineteenth century. W. W. Everts, who held a number of metropolitan pastorates, wrote a series of pamphlets on "Problems of the City" with such suggestive titles as "Temptations of City Life," "Social Position and Influence of Aggregated Populations," "Principles and Frauds of Commerce," and "Responsibilities of Service: or Employees and Employed."

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[80] "A Study of City Missions," *ibid.*, June 5, 1884.

[81] "Chicago Items," *Christian Times and Witness*, November 11, 1857.

[82] "City Evangelization," February 23, 1893.

[83] "St. Louis Letter," *Standard*, March 23, 1871.

[84] "A Precious Work in Detroit," March 16, 1871.

The physical equipment of city churches was adapted to the needs of the new environment. Baptists had come west with fixed ideas as to the proper mode of worship. They were committed to a simple unliturgical New Testament service in an unpretentious church edifice, and baptisms were usually performed in a convenient river. However, such primitive simplicity had to give way to the demands of the new age. Even before the war, Francis Wayland vainly complained that all the city churches had organs and paid singers, and the "performers" were not infrequently the very persons who amused "the theatre on the evenings of the week, and the church of God on the Sabbath."[85] Another charge was that city pastors were ambitious to build up large churches and be known as men of broad, liberal, and catholic views.

City Baptists erected "Gothic temples" such as the First Baptist Church of Chicago, which was built in 1866 at a cost of $175,000. It had an ornate baptistry with separate dressing-rooms for men and women, and, according to a church reporter, the large window in front was glazed with a very rich stained glass, superior to anything yet seen in the city.[86] An editorial writer for the same paper defended the expenditure of $36,000 for a lot and $8,500 for chimes by the Michigan Avenue Baptist Church by pleading that "in a region of wealth and fine houses, you must have a fine church."[87] Baptists in other cities felt the need for physical bigness. The St. Paul Baptist Church, in 1872, purchased a square block of ground for a meeting-house at a cost of $50,000, and the smaller cities in the middle western states erected structures costing from $15,000 to $50,000. There had come to be fundamental differences between urban and rural Christianity, and evangelization efforts were concentrated in the cities under the plea of securing first the important points. The caption of an editorial in the *Standard,* "Thousands for the Cities and Pennies for the Country," was literally true.[88]

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[85] *Notes on Baptist Practices* (1857), p. 151.

[86] "Chicago Items," *Christian Times and Witness*, March 22, 1866.

[87] *Standard*, April 20, 1871.

In attempting to estimate the influence of contemporary trends in business and industry on religion, it must be borne in mind that many changes in Baptist polity were gradual in character, and their beginnings go far back of the period under consideration. Then, too, numerical growth alone would have forced a revision of the technique that served during the Colonial and early national epochs. Even so, there is reason to believe that the Baptist program was affected by the centralization of commercial and industrial units and the emphasis on efficiency of administration that characterized American development in the so-called age of big business that followed the Civil War.

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[88] *Ibid.*, January 27, 1876.

THE PHILOSOPHICAL BASIS OF WYCLIF'S THEOLOGY

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ECCLESIASTICAL history no less than literary history has built up a conception of the personality and work of Wyclif which has, by its mere repetition, become traditional. But the picture thus presented is none the less hardly accurate. His name is continually associated with the first complete translation of the Bible into English, with the doctrine of dominion by grace, and with a determined attack on the Catholic doctrine of transubstantiation. He is regarded as a theologian, as a reformer whose doctrines were more gladly received in Bohemia than in England, and in general as the most important forerunner of the great continental Reformation of a century and a half later. Wyclif was indeed all that, but in a way and with modifications so considerable as to render necessary a readjustment of our ideas of a reformer and a theologian. The intellectual heedlessness of a Luther, who reaches his conclusions by intuition, however deeply grounded in natural truth they may be, and attempts to rationalize them afterward, is an attitude entirely foreign to Wyclif.

Wyclif was, of course, a Schoolman. Furthermore, he was living in the period commonly looked upon as a period of marked decadence in vigor and originality of thought.[1] His methods and vocabulary as well as his whole intellectual background were quite obviously the products of the scholasticism of his age. Some sort of synthesis of Aristotelian philosophy and Christian dogmatics had been effected and accepted by the church after the work of Thomas Aquinas, but real progress beyond that point was rendered almost impossible by the fact that European thought was only beginning to arrive at as wholesome an attitude toward the natural sciences as Greek thought had had from the beginning.[2] The fact that the "schools" were under the control of the church, were in fact the training centers for her hierarchy, and indeed in the case of the University of Paris the semiofficial *vox ecclesiae*, made it obligatory that the subject of study should be the now well-formulated body of church dogma. The separate threads of Aristotelianism, Platonism, neo-Platonism, and Augustinianism out of which this body of doctrine was delicately woven had been so intertwined that they had become almost indistinguishable. The delicacy and balance of the Thomistic system, held in position as it was by the tremendous authority of the church, made speculation in really new directions veritably impossible.

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[1] But historians of medieval thought are beginning to discover that this so-called "decadence" in thought is much less than previously supposed. The publication of texts of the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries is going far toward compelling a complete revision of judgment in this respect. Wyclif has suffered more than most in neglect.

Abortive attempts at speculation and a rational approach to the beliefs of the Christian church had been severely dealt with. The Albigenses had felt the heavy hand of the Roman *curia* descend upon them in punishment for the temerity of doubting the supreme validity of the *dicta* of the see at Rome. Gottschalk, Berengar, Roscellin, Abélard, Gilbert de la Porrée, had all been subjected to summary discipline by the church. Variety was a spice of which the church felt no need.

It was upon this background of censored and limited thought that Wyclif struggled courageously against the fetters of a dialectic which, like a treadmill, was heavy and wearying, but revolved in a circle whose shortened radius was the willingness of Rome to allow variations in any department of mental activity. The grip of the church upon thought and speculation, which at the time of Aquinas had been relatively loose, had immeasurably tightened in the course of the succeeding century. It is a marvel that Wyclif succeeded as well and as soon as he did, when we realize the limitations of the weapons that he had to use. He could not but be, in large measure, the creature of his own training, and that training was essentially constricted. His weapons were those of Catholic scholasticism. He used them in order to be intelligible to those he wanted to reach. The literati of his day thought in scholastic terms, and a new terminology would have meant nothing to them. Wyclif conceived of his task as a rearrangement and a reinterpretation of authorities whose validity and authority was unquestioned at that time. It would not be difficult to prove, for example, that Wyclif was fully alive to the doctrine of justification by faith[3] which meant so much to Luther, but even late in his life he knew perfectly well that such a doctrine would fall on deaf ears. But, whether he felt from the first that the logic of his position would bring upon him the wrath of the Roman *curia* or not, it is sure that the germs of his later revolutionary doctrines are distinctly present in his earliest writings. The use in one of his earliest works, *De logica,* of the expression "Antichristus est homo, Antichristus est Rome"[4] is, in view of his later polemical utterances, significant; his denial of the possibility of annihilation in the *Logice continuacio;*[5] and his reference to the poverty of the apostles in the primitive church as the condition necessary to the clergy for the welfare of Christendom[6]—these all point to some consciousness on the part of the logician of the schools of his ultimate stand as a reformer. In later life he is frank to confess that his youth had been marred by mistakes and wanderings.

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[2] Windelband, *History of Philosophy* (trans. Tufts; New York, 1921), p. 264.

> Scio tamen quod saepe lapsus sum in altitudine maris multa balbutiens quae non valui clare fundare.[7]

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[3] The *Commentarius in Novum Testamentum* (yet unedited) contains evangelical commentaries on Galatians and Romans.

[4] *Op. cit.*, ed. M. H. Dziewicki (London, 1893), I, 69.

[5] *Ibid.*, II, 192.

[6] *Ibid.*, I, 35.

[7] *Trialogus*, ed. Lechler (Oxford, 1869), p. 69; cf. pp. 70, 155.

> . . . . Et sic quando fui iunior involvebam ignoranter universalia sicut forte faciunt multi hodie qui pertinaciter universalia detestantur.[8]

But these very admissions are significant as representing to us that Wyclif thought of himself as having tried to get hold of the truth from his earliest student days. He was confessing and rather excusing minor vagaries in words that show his own sensitiveness to the charge of any alleged inconsistency. It seems reasonable, then, to suppose with Dziewicki that Wyclif felt early in his career[9] that he would eventually come to an attitude toward the necessities of the Christian faith that would be materially divergent from the teachings of the Roman church.

In any case, however, he set out to build up a philosophical system which would be, in the large, consistent throughout, and which did, whether he so planned it or not, lead him to the then radical conclusions by which we know him best.

From the times of Boethius, Isidore of Seville, the Venerable Bede, Alcuin, and the Carolingian Renaissance to the beginning of the fourteenth century philosophy had covered a vast amount of ground in its efforts to define and formulate the relations of faith and reason. Nominalism had made its appearance, had forced a restatement of the prevalent realism, and from the conflict between them there arose the *media via* of conceptualism, a name which, although the doctrine was modified and colored by the Arabians, Aquinas and Duns Scotus, more nearly describes the accepted teaching of Christian philosophy at the beginning of the fourteenth century than the term "moderate realism."[10] But that stimulating freedom of thought which will ever make Abélard so attractive he was unable to pass on to a sufficiently large number of pupils to give it the character of a tradition. It appears that as both nominalism and realism tended to coalesce, and each lost some of its distinctive originality, the resultant philosophy was informed by a growingly popular and comprehensive dialectic. The means may almost be said to have become the end. Truth loses its independent nature and is judged by, instead of passing judgment upon, conformity with untested and uncritically accepted rules of thumb.[11]

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[8] *De universalibus*, MS Univ. Prag., VIII, G. 23, fol. 53*a*.

[9] *Fasc. Ziz.*, "Rolls Series," ed. W. W. Shirley (London, 1858), p. 3: ". . . . Diutinam Wycclyff per annos continuam luctam peregit."

[10] Windelband, *op. cit.*, p. 299.

Both faith and reason, as represented by the theologian and the philosopher, seemed unwilling definitely to part company. These two apparently conflicting elements were mingled in about equal quantities wherever we find them. The medieval mind defined reason (and we must stress the literal meaning of "define") in terms of faith, and then endeavored to support its faith by rational processes. Metaphysics, the study of the action and interaction of the divine and the human, labored in a *circulus vitiosus*. No clearer illustration of this limited outlook could be cited than the Preface of Anselm's *Monologion* and, two hundred and fifty years later, the introductory words of Wyclif's *De logica.* Anselm was primarily a theologian. The incredulous, he said, seek to understand because they do not believe; we seek to understand because we do believe. He who does not believe will never understand.[12] And in the *Monologion* he sets out to build up proofs which have no foundation whatever in sacred scripture or dogma.

> Quidam fratres saepe me studiose precati sunt ut quaedam quae illis de meditanda divinitatis essentia protuleram, sub quodam eis meditationis exemplo describerem . . . . hanc mihi formam praestituerunt quatenus auctoritate scripturae penitus nihil in ea persuaderetur; sed quicquid per singulas investigationes finis assereret, id ita esse, plano stylo et vulgaribus argumentis simplicique disputatione, et rationis necessitas breviter cogeret. Voluerunt etiam, ut nec simplicibus peneque fatuis objectionibus mihi occurentibus obviare contemnerem. . . . .[13]

The effort of a theologian to prove God's existence without recourse to the authority of scripture is not more indicative of the high regard attached to the conclusions attainable by dialectic than the fact that he was urged to this sort of proof by *quidam fratres,* who, it may be inferred, represented the rank and file of those whose interest was primarily in matters of faith.

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[11] F. Picavet, *Esquisse d'une hist., etc., des philosophies médiévales* (Paris, 1907), p. 62.

[12] *Cur Deus Homo,* I, 2.

[13] *Monologion,* Praefatio.

Two and a half centuries later we meet another striking illustration of the same species of mixed interest in the *Proemium* to Wyclif's *De logica.* Written early in his career, probably between 1360 and 1365, it is the product of his distinctly scholastic years. It presents relatively nothing which could not have been said by any one of a hundred lecturers in the schools of Europe in the fourteenth century. For that reason, that it is representative, we find an interesting proof of the continued interpenetration of philosophy and dogmatic theology in the *Proemium.*

> Motus sum per quosdam legis dei amicos certum tractatum ad declarandum logicam sacre scripture compilare . . . . propono ad acuendum mentes fidelium ponere probaciones proposicionum que debent elici ex scripturis.[14]

The impulse in this case is from "certain friends of God's law," who want the logic of the Holy Scriptures expounded by a logician. It is the converse of Anselm's purpose. With Wyclif the theologians have asked him to expound philosophy in its relations to scripture. With Anselm theologians have asked him to employ arguments having no basis whatever in scripture for the proof of Christian verities: "quae illis de meditanda divinitatis essentia protuleram." But, converse as these two approaches are, they illustrate the determined and continued effort to make clear the scope and degree of co-ordinate validity of the hitherto-overlapping fields of theology and philosophy.

In view of this condition of persistent interpenetration, it is easier to understand how the development from a dialectician to a theologian could and did so naturally and gradually take place in Wyclif. That such a development did take place is perfectly clear. Indeed, so clear is it that we can assign approximate dates to the stages of that growth with a fair degree of accuracy. The two and a half decades of his public activity may be conveniently divided into three periods: the first from say 1358 or 1360 to 1372 when he received his degree of D.D. This period may be characterized as the distinctively scholastic period. During this period his lectures at the university (interrupted by pastoral duties) covered the fields of logic, grammar, and metaphysics. So far as we can determine, his *Summa intellectualium,* or *Summa de ente* as it is more properly called (as yet less than half-edited), was the product of these fourteen years. His writing covers all the purely philosophical subjects commonly lectured on by the Schoolmen, and includes philosophical treatises on the incarnation and the Trinity. The second period of his public life may be conveniently called the ecclesiastico-political period, from 1373, before he went to Bruges, until after the beginning of the schism. Wyclif's fame as a teacher and scholar was assured, and his natural independence of spirit revolted at the cynical attitude of the papal party, both as he found it in the course of his stay at Bruges and in his dealings with papal representatives in England. He brought forth at this time his doctrine of dominion by grace,[15] one of the most interesting of medieval political theories. Out of this grew his so-called *Summa theologiae,* which covered only these heads on which he differed from existing and accepted doctrines. There is no reason to suppose that he originally intended his series of tractates to take the form in which we now speak of it, for there is a definitely new departure in the midst of it. By this new departure we fix the third period of his active life, from about 1379 until his death, the last day of 1384. The outstanding features of this period are his unorthodox teaching on the sacrament of the altar, his consequent controversy with the mendicant friars, and his initiation of a program of religious and scriptural education in the vernacular for the common people. We thus have a comprehensible personal development. In his earliest years he was potentially the reformer of his last years. In the last phase of his work he still retained many of the characteristics of a Schoolman. It is, then, to the philosophical utterances of his first years to which we shall turn, in order better to understand the position he so clearly and courageously held in his maturer years on the religious and theological questions of the time.

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[14] *De logica,* I, 1.

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[15] J. Loserth, *Studien zur Kirchenpolitik, etc.* (Vienna, 1897), I, 77 ff. (cf. *Eng. Hist. Rev.*, April, 1896), where disputed points in Wyclif chronology are cleared up.

There were, speaking generally, three schools of philosophy contending for supremacy in the scholastic world in Wyclif's day. The division between the three schools was upon the long-debated and never settled question rather timidly put by Porphyry in the *Isagoge* to the Categories of Aristotle: Do universals exist or are they but deductions for the convenience of the mind? The nominalists, of whom Roscellin[16] was probably the first and William of Ockham the most recent and prominent exponent, held that a general term had value only so long as it was applied to singulars. Singulars alone exist, and we give class terms to various singulars that we find to have some distinct resemblance to one another. This emphasis on the singular as we perceive it makes the epistemological implication of nominalism to be sensualism. There is, then, no validity in any a priori data or in any abstraction in any form. The thinkers of this school sought support in Aristotle,[17] and the fact that they found enough to satisfy them that they were rightly interpreting the Stagirite is attributable to their limited knowledge of his works. Until the middle of the twelfth century there were available in Latin only the *De categoriis* and the *De predicatione*,[18] commonly referred to as *De predicamentis* and *Peri hermenias*, respectively.

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[16] John Scotus Erigena has been put forward as having taught some nominalist doctrines. See Hauréau, *Hist. de la philosophie scolastique* (Paris, 1872–80), I, 148–75; J. S. Bett, *Johannes Scotus Erigena* (Cambridge, 1925), pp. 186 ff.; R. L. Poole, *Illustrations of Medieval Thought* (2d ed., 1920), p. 87. Opinion is divided on this point. Professor Étienne Gilson refuses the term "nominalist" or "realist" to Erigena as an anachronism, yet see his *Philosophie au Moyen Âge* (Collection Payot), I, 29. But most authorities regard Erigena as a realist. Ueberweg-Geyer, *Gesch. d. Phil.* (11th ed., 1928), p. 175: "Eriugena ist durchaus Realist."

[17] Windelband, *op. cit.*, p. 297: "Realism passed current as Platonic, Nominalism as Aristotelian."

Berengar of Tours (d. 1088) applied this sensualism to the doctrine of the Eucharist, and opposed the idea of a transmutation of substance without a corresponding change of accidents. Roscellin (1050–1120) applied this same principle, that is, the absolute validity of reason in matters of faith as well as in matters of science, to the doctrine of the Trinity, and became convinced that the Trinity was but a mental classification, a presumption, as it were, of essential unity of three substances which co-operated in certain functions and aspects. Needless to say, the church opposed such a revolutionary philosophy with all its power. It would make the virtues but classifying words of no essential reality apart from individual agents, and the mysteries of the Christian religion would be subjected to a logical examination whose result would certainly be the undermining of all faith.

The second school of thought is the one usually connected with the name of Peter Abélard (1079–1142) and known as conceptualism. Abélard was, so to speak, a personal reaction to the other two schools, represented by his successive teachers, William of Champeaux and Roscellin. He resented the pantheistic implications of realism, its complacent acceptance of and reliance upon the sanction and support of the church. Nor could he accept the unsatisfactory sensualism of nominalism. He conceived of universals as neither words simply nor external objects simply. They are, he avers, the conceptual predicate, that is, the objective product in the mind of the *conformitas* of essential characteristics; which *conformitas* we can and do apprehend. Abélard uses the word "mind" in an inclusive way. God's mind operates in the same way as the human mind. (It is argued thus from the lower to the higher.) The conceptual predicates which God's mind creates are true universals, that is to say, from our point of view they are *ante rem*. The universals exist *in re* for nature, as observable points of correspondence. They exist *post rem* for human knowledge as concepts necessary to the observing and comparing intelligence.

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[18] Hauréau, *op. cit.*, I, 98 ff. Cf., in general, A. Jourdain, *Traductions Latines d'Aristote* (1843), and M. Grabmann, *Latein. Aristotelesübersetzungen, etc.* (1916).

Nominalism would have rejected categorically the first of these three modes of universal existence as *praeter necessarium*. The second and third would have been combined into one; singulars exist in and of themselves. Reason and sense tell us that; anything more is an exaltation of words into principles, unwarranted by any view we can reasonably take of human intelligence.

The attitude of the church toward Abélard was much the same as it had been toward Roscellin. Bernard of Clairvaux opposed the use of dialectic in any way connected with religion,[19] and Bernard's influence was sufficient to bring about the councils of Soissons and Sens.

The third school, realism, was a Platonic and neo-Platonic heritage. Plato and his works were less well known than Aristotle, but neo-Platonism exercised a powerful sway over the medieval mind through Augustine, Scotus Erigena,[20] and Anselm. Its implied symbolism closely accorded with the desires of the church, and its apparent unscientific and uncritical approach to nature fitted in better with the condition of scientific knowledge of the Middle Ages[21] than did nominalism, an a posteriori philosophy. This school was Wyclif's choice. To Wyclif universals exist *ex parte rei*.[22] Nor was his allegiance to the doctrine of universals *ex parte rei* a half-hearted one. It was the center and core of all his thinking, logical, grammatical, metaphysical, philosophical, theological, and religious. It is the starting-point for the discussion of any subject at all germane to dogma or philosophy. His personal polemics indeed began[23] on this subject and came back to it in his last years.[24] He devotes whole tractates to it: *De universalibus, De ydeis, De materia et forma*, and other tractates forming what we know as his *Summa de ente*. In his other philosophical and theological works he refers to it often at great length as a doctrine fundamental to his whole line of thought, a lack of understanding of which has led otherwise excellent and well-meaning philosophers into grievous errors.[25]

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[19] Fabre, *La pensée chrétienne*, pp. 492 ff.

[20] A. Koyré, *L'idée de Dieu chez S. Anselme* (Paris, 1923), p. 109: Il [Scot Erigène] fut certainement lu et étudié au X^{me} comme au XII^{me} siècle, et nous retrouvons ses idées au fond de toutes les hérésies mystiques du temps."

[21] Poole, *op. cit.*, p. 150.

[22] *Trialogus*, ed. Lechler (Oxford, 1869), p. 85: "certum est quod sunt universalia ex parte rei testificata tam ab Aristotele quam Platone, licet Plato subtilius ascendat in universalibus ydearum."

As Wyclif intimates in several places, he follows Plato's thought as transmitted through Augustine,[26] whose belief in the doctrine of real ideas was so strong that he calls a denial of the archetypal world heresy: "Qui negat ydeas infidelis est."[27] Wyclif's proof for the existence of real universals takes as its starting-point the doctrine of divine ideas, which was so generally accepted among the early theologians and fathers that it had almost become a dogma of the church.[28] And it is noticeable that Wyclif almost uniformly means by the word *ideae* these archetypes in the mind of God. These archetypes, *rationes exemplares*, these patterns, so to say, are the productive intelligibilities by which God knows his creatures: ". . . . Ydea ergo est essentialiter natura divina et formaliter ratio, secundum quam Deus intelligit creaturas,"[29] and more clearly in the opening sentences of the tractate *De ydeis:* "Supponendo . . . . quod ydea significat racionem exemplarem secundum quam deus est productivus rei ad extra."[30] This productive intelligibility of man as man is the aspect *(racio)* under which God creates man as man, that is, common humanity. This intelligibility must have a clear and distinct object, applicable to all men as partaking of it.[31] This object must then be humanity. There necessarily arises a great multitude of these ideas which constitute the divine mind. Each one of these universals has singulars, and between the universal and its singular there is identity. The singular is its universal: "Sor est animal." *Sor,* the individual man, participating in *animalitas,* is an animal. But *animalitas* is universal, and all universals are productive, eternal ideas in God's mind. But we cannot separate God from his intellection, "Imo ipsas ydeas Deus intelligit per se ipsas, cum sint essentialiter ipse Deus,"[32] so that *animalitas* is essentially God. Then *Sor* becomes essentially God, in the natural process of predication. But this is a conclusion that has to be understood. Wyclif's opponents, as we know from his own writings, literally pounced upon this line of argument and accused him of pantheism, saying, "Then every animal is God and God is every creature," which was too blasphemous to be countenanced. It is to this opposition to Wyclif's doctrine of universals as originally enounced that we owe many of his tractates entire and large sections of others. He was put on the defensive, and it was when he was forced to defend his position, to work out a consistent system in detail, that he grew to see and comprehend the possibilities of realism. Without this polemic it is safe to assert that Wyclif would have left the doctrine of transubstantiation strictly alone. His was a mind that grew with conflict and opportunity.

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[23] *Fasciculus Zizaniorum*, ed. Shirley (London, 1858), p. 3.; cf. Loserth, *Die ältesten Streitschriften Wiclifs* (Vienna, 1908), p. 2.

[24] The controversy over the Eucharist turns on "annihilation," which a realist must hold impossible.

[25] Cf., e.g., *De Dominio Divino*, ed. Poole, p. 59; *De benedicta incarnacione*, ed. Harris, pp. 132, 144 f.; *De veritate Sac. Scrip.*, II, 118.

[26] E.g., *Trialogus*, pp. 65, 69.

[27] Augustine quoted in *De ente predicamentali*, ed. Bear (1891), p. 277; *De ydeis*, MS Univ. Prag. 1555, fol. 78*a*.

[28] Weber, *History of Philosophy*, pp. 177, 181–84; Workman, *Christian Thought to the Reformation* (London, 1911), fol. p. 170.

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[29] *Trialogus,* p. 66.

[30] MS Univ. Prag., VIII, F. I, fol. 73*a*.

[31] *De dominio divino,* p. 98.

[32] *Trialogus,* p. 72. Cf. *De ente* ed. Dziewicki (London, 1909), pp. 58–60.

Without withdrawing the statement that an animal is God, for Wyclif had supreme confidence in the truth of his premises and the logic of his conclusion, he set about to show how the conclusion was true. His completed defense may be said to rest on two lines of argument: In the first place, he further defines what he conceives to be the essence and properties of universal ideas. In the second place, he so describes and defines predication as to show that an expression of identity may convey an entirely wrong meaning when the laws of logic and metaphysics are disregarded.

To prove his first point he puts forward provisionally in several places Grosseteste's fivefold classification of the *maneries universalium:*

> . . . . Quod est dare 5 maneries universalium, ut declarat Linconiensis primo *Posteriorum* capitulo septimo: primum sive supremum genus est racio sive idea exemplaris eterna in deo; secundum genus est racio communis creata in causis superioribus ut in intelligenciis et orbibus celestibus; tercium genus universalium est forma communis fundata in singularibus suis et illa, inquit Linconiensis, sunt genera et species de quibus loquitur Aristoteles; quartum genus est forma communis in suis accidentibus apprehensa ab intellectu, infimo est universale; sed quintum modum universalium pro signis vel accidentibus intelligendi dimittit Linconiensis ut sibi impertinens.[33]

The first *maneries* or mode of universalness is the one which, misunderstood, leads to pantheism (a term which, of course, Wyclif never uses), and Wyclif takes great pains to show how it is true and in what sense.

In the first place, the idea is a created thing; God is increate. God is above genus and species,[34] but being, the first of all created things, is analogous to the ten genera: "Esse quidem analogum ad decem genera est prima omnium creaturarum rerum, et ex illo procedunt species et genera ordinate."[35] God is absolutely outside and above the created universe;[36] the creature exists because it is a defective essence produced by God exteriorly out of nothing. But, says Wyclif, the creature is joined *(convenit cum Deo)* to God in pure being only, not in existence (the attribute of a created being) but in intelligible being which is God. Or again, it may be granted that being is common to both God and the creature, the difference being in the way in which they possess it—God infinitely and most perfectly, the creature finitely and imperfectly.[37] Once demonstrated that the highest good, *ens,* is passed down the scale from God to the lowest created thing that can possess being, *gradatim et ordinate,*[38] it is easy to show that lesser goods, ideas in God's mind, are also passed on to individuals, informing them, giving them *existere* at God's will.

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[33] *De universalibus,* MS Univ. Prag., VIII, G. 23, fol. 12*a*; cf. also *De logica,* II, 32 ff.; *De ente pred.,* p. 25.

[34] *De ente in communi,* ed. S. H. Thomson (Oxford, 1930), p. 97: "Deus est extra omne genus."

[35] *Trialogus,* p. 86.

This exposition of the *ens analogum* as coeternal with yet created by God, communicable to creatures, is the framework, so to say, on which Wyclif builds his doctrine of participation by singulars in their universals. The argument is presupposed in all his developments of the matter of predication, such a favorite exercise with Schoolmen. The whole difficulty revolves around the question: What does the verb "to be" mean? How much of an identity is required between the subject and predicate for the proposition to be true? Wyclif's method of solving this difficulty is simple enough, and, in its way, rather effective. He limits the predicate. The stock syllogism—Sor (Socrates) is an animal, an ass is an animal, therefore Sor is an ass—Wyclif would accept as a true syllogism, provided it be understood that predication in the conclusion do not signify identity, but be understood to mean that man, possessing being, is, in so far *(quatenus),* identical with God. Further, the identity of a singular with its universal, however proximate, is limited by the activity of the universal, causative in respect of its individuals, and the passivity of the individual always receptive in respect of its universal. This graduation does suggest the medieval mind, with its fondness for what we may call a "lock system," by which productivity moves in only one direction, downward, through a controlled and gradual descent from the highest to the lowest. And as is also clear in Wyclif's political thought, he is more than a little influenced by this medieval feudal penchant for gradation.

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[36] *De Dominio Divino,* pp. 195 ff.

[37] *Ibid.*

[38] *Trialogus,* p. 86.

The importance attached by Wyclif to this method of proof, that is, limitation of the predicate, is clearly shown by the place he gives it in his most important tractate on this subject, *De universalibus*, where he places it at the very beginning of the first chapter.

> In purgando errores de universalibus sunt tria introductoria prenotanda. Et primo quod triplex est maneries universalium in genere: prima est universale causacione, ut deus est causa universalissima, et post deum res universales create secundum ordinem quo originantur a deo vel originaliter procedunt a deo. Secundum est universale communicacione, ut puta res communicata multis suppositis, ut natura humana et alie nature generales et speciales. Tercium est universale representacione ut signa priorum universalium que equivoce dicuntur [fol. 5*b*] universalia, sicut homo depictus equivoce dicitur homo; nec sunt raciones istorum universalium ex opposito distincte, cum deus distinctissime representat omnia encia. Et sic est esse intelligibile vel ydeale cuiuslibet creature; species eciam et genera sunt obiecta intellectus, causancia in eodem scienciam secundum omnes creaturas singulares.
>
> Secundo premittenda est noticia de quiditate predicacionis, cum commune sit omni universali de pluribus predicari secundum Porphyrium. Est autem predicari ad tria, scilicet ad sermoniciari, quod est exhortancium ad bonum. Et sic fides Christi predicatur in gentibus, ut dicit Apostolus ad Galatas II. Alia est predicacio termini de termino, et illa est famosa modernis, qui putant nullam aliam esse, licet secundum veritatem illa sit extracta a reali predicacione, que est tercium genus predicandi, et est participari vel dici communicative de multis. Et isto modo omne universale in actu predicatur de suis inferioribus in natura. Et sic loquitur communiter Aristoteles de predicacione, que dividitur in predicacionem per se et predicacionem per accidens. Predicacio per se est quando subiectum per se dicit predicatum, ut quilibet homo per se dicit naturam specificatam humanam, que est quiditas cuiuslibet hominis . . . . ut patet de deo cuius verbum vel diccio eterna ad intra est divina essencia. . . . .

> Et predicacio per se subdividitur in predicacionem in quid et in predicacionem in quale. In quid solum predicatur quiditas rei ut genus et species. In quale ut differencia vel passio. . . . . [fol. 6*a*] Alia est predicacio per accidens qua accidens dicitur de subiecto, ut album de homine, et sic de aliis novem generibus accidencium, que dicunt vel denominant sua subiecta concretive, et illa predicacio est inpertinens demonstracioni et noticia huius predicacionis est necessaria ad cognoscendum sensum Aristotelis, Porphyrii et aliorum philosophorum de universalibus loquencium.[39]

He is here repeating a clear and unequivocal statement of the position from which he starts in his endeavor to bring all philosophy and theology into a unified whole, which he has used before,[40] in both cases at the beginning of his tractate.

It is by this clear enunciation of his fundamental principles, calling attention to the nature and kinds of universals, and the kinds of predication, that he shows that his teaching is consistent and that the *doctores signorum* who have attacked him have grievously erred in misunderstanding the laws of grammar and logic, the teaching of Aristotle and Plato, and, not least, the teaching of the Holy Scriptures.

Nor does it seem too much to say that Lechler has failed to understand completely Wyclif's position when he says[41] that Wyclif narrowly escapes pantheism. It is true that Wyclif's words in another man's mouth might be construed as pantheistic in intent, but Wyclif certainly had not the remotest idea of forgetting the distinction between God and his various creatures, beyond saying that some things predicable of God are predicable as well of his creatures, a statement that is tantamount to saying that they are his creatures. But the vast difference between created and uncreated, perfect and imperfect, is indeed one of the cardinal presuppositions of Wyclif's whole system. He certainly had to be on his guard against opponents who, in attacking him, would quote words out of their context.

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[39] *Op. cit.*, MS Univ. Prag., VIII, G. 23, foll. 5*a*–6*a*.

[40] *De logica*, I, 8.

[41] *John Wycliffe and His English Precursors* (trans. Lorimer; London, 1884), p. 254.

But that necessity only makes him insist all the more emphatically that there is a kind of identity between God and his creatures, between a superior and its inferior, between a universal and its singular.

We are not left in doubt as to what determines what sort of identity is to be thought of in any given case.

> Sed notandum quod quadruplex est identitas: scilicet analogica, generalis, specialis et numeralis. Identitas analogica est inter primam causam et causatum, est inter substanciam et accidens, quia quamvis Deus, substancia et accidens non communicant in aliquo genere, tamen conveniunt in ente transcendente et analogo, quia omnia que sunt sunt encia analogice; et sic omnia sunt idem in identitate. Alia est identitas generalis sicut inter hominem et angelum et inter asinum et leonem, et inter lapidem et arborem; nam homo et angelus sunt idem in *substancia,* que est genus generatum; et asinus et leo sunt idem in hoc genere animal, et lapis et arbor sunt idem in hoc genere corpus. Alia est identitas specifica, sicut inter Sor et Platonem et inter unum angelum et alium, quia Sor et Plato sunt idem in specie humana, et duo angeli sunt idem in specie angelica, et sic de ceteris. Alia identitas numeralis, sicut est de Christo et humanitate eiusdem, et de anima hominis et persona eiusdem; nam eadem persona in numero est Christus et eius humanitas, et eadem persona numero est iste homo et anima eiusdem, et sic racio, voluntas et memoria sunt eadem anima in numero.[42]

Wyclif fell into an almost unavoidable difficulty by insisting on using the verb "to be," all the while admitting that identity is a term that must be understood according to the circumstances. His opponents evidently reproached him with not saying what he meant. He said, "Man is God," when he meant, and wanted to be understood as meaning, "Man is similar to God, in that he has being, God's essential attribute."

To sum up briefly his doctrine of real universals, then, we may say that distinct productive archetypes *(ydee, raciones exemplares)* make up the divine mind. They are created by, coeternal with, yet inferior to God. They partake of his being. They therefore are real. They can and do communicate their content, which is being modified, to God's other and different creatures. These creatures then possess being in varying and diminishing degrees.[43] In so far as they possess being we call them identical with God, always remembering their temporal, individual nature.

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[42] *De logica,* I, 10.

But Wyclif was not content with a statement of his doctrine based on logic and an interpretation of accepted philosophical authorities, as Aristotle, Plato, and Augustine. He has a proof for the absolute necessity of real universals which is to him absolutely incontrovertible: the Christian dogmas of the Trinity and the incarnation. These dogmas are incomprehensible, says Wyclif, unless we posit universals *ex parte rei.* To each of them he devotes a treatise,[44] showing in each case how his doctrine explains satisfactorily and consistently these great mysteries. It is perhaps unnecessary to point out that Wyclif accepted these two dogmas as beyond question: ". . . . Deum esse trinum sicut oportet fideles, quibus solus est nobis sermo concedere."[45]

God is three, yet he is one. That which the Son is, the Holy Spirit is and the Father is. Yet these three realities *(res)* are different from one another and from all other things.[46] In the same way the doctrine of the incarnation as formulated by Anselm, supposing Christ as God and man at the same time, proves the possibility of the coexistence of two realities in one substance. If two or three, why not more? Nor does Christ's deity lose its divinity by that coexistence; nor does his humanity cease to be humanity. But it is obvious that there was a degree of identity between deity as in Christ, and humanity, as in Christ, because they come together in one person. So it is with singulars and universals. They too have identity, yet retain their distinct universality or singularity.

These two analogies Wyclif regarded as proving his doctrine of real universals beyond any reasonable doubt. He was convinced that the Holy Scriptures taught realism in the same way that they taught the dogma of the incarnation. But, conclusive as that proof seemed to him, he was not satisfied to rest his case there. He would make assurance doubly sure by showing that all the reliable philosophers of antiquity, pagan and Christian, all the accepted doctors of the church, taught the same doctrine of real universals. We must admit his earnestness even if his naïve comprehensiveness does cause us to smile.

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[43] *Trialogus*, p. 86.

[44] *De trinitate*, in course of preparation for the press by the present writer; *De benedicta incarnacione*, ed. Ed. Harris (1886).

[45] *De trinitate*, MS Pal. Vindo. 4316, fol. 1a.

[46] *De dom. div.*, 93-94; *De ben. incar.*, 19, 81-82; *De mat. et forma*, 171–76.

His knowledge of Plato was practically limited to what Augustine had passed on. But the tone of that little was such that Wyclif felt that here Plato saw deeper than Aristotle.[47] It is perhaps necessary to notice that Augustine had raised God from the category of an idea, where Plato had put him, separate and objective like the other ideas, and had made him the source and determinant for all ideas as such. Wyclif's construction naturally follows that of Augustine, with whose works he was so familiar. Nor is it surprising that Wyclif mentions Boethius so often in connection with universals, for it was Boethius' Latin translation of Porphyry's *Isagoge* that gave the apparent occasion for the whole controversy. Boethius' translation of the *De categoriis* and the *De interpretatione*, as well as his commentaries upon them, were used as textbooks for the *trivium*.[48] Wyclif is glad to align himself with Anselm, finding his exposition of the two natures in one person a clear and scriptural proof of his (Wyclif's) grammatical distinction between Christ as man and Christ as God. As we have seen above, Wyclif relies very largely upon this sort of distinction to rebut the charge of pantheism: creature as creature is not coeternal with God, but creature as being (the creature's being) is thus eternal. In four places in one work[49] Wyclif brackets Hugo of St. Victor with Augustine as maintaining the dualism of nature in the one person of Christ, thus adding one more link to the chain by which he binds realism to the historical orthodox teaching of the church.

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[47] *Trialogus*, p. 85; *De universalibus*, MS cited, fol. 12*a*.

[48] Windelband, pp. 220–23.

[49] *De bened. incarn.*, pp. 55, 65, 128, 172.

In his references to Thomas Aquinas, Wyclif is conscious that he must treat the teaching of the *doctor angelicus* with great delicacy. Yet by the same sort of interpretation that he employs in the case of Aristotle's apparent denial of universals,[50] he almost succeeds in satisfying himself that Thomas' real intention was to express the same thought as Wyclif himself. When Thomas denies the independent existence of truths and substitutes their creation by our mind (pure conceptualism),[51] we are to understand, according to Wyclif, that he refers to truths as the human mind knows them, for elsewhere he admits a distinction between *intellectum nostrum* and *intellectum divinum,* in the latter of which eternal truths may and do exist.

Wyclif sometimes seeks support for his doctrines in directions that at first occasion surprise. Robert Grosseteste has not generally been thought of as a metaphysician. Even so modern and learned a scholar as Lechler emphasizes his political activities and the high veneration in which he was held as an English churchman throughout the kingdom after his death, and merely mentions in a note the fact that he had written much to which Wyclif evidently had access.[52] Stevenson's biography of Grosseteste,[53] though aspiring to be the standard work on the subject, is singularly innocent of any serious treatment of his philosophical activity. But Wyclif certainly regarded Grosseteste as a philosopher whose *dicta* were to be treated with great respect: ". . . . Ut dicit Averroes; Linconiensis autem qui multum in ista materia laboravit, ponit. . . . ."[54] He quotes Grosseteste along with Augustine and Anselm, Aquinas, and "all others who posit universals *ex parte rei*"; in another place along with Augustine, Pope Leo, and John of Damascus.[55] In a work of his later years, the *Trialogus*, he makes a rather bold classification, following upon a mention of Aristotle's frequent philosophical errors: "Democritus autem, Plato, Augustinus, Linconiensis, qui ita senserunt, sunt longe clariores philosophi, et in multis metaphisicis scientiis plus splendentes."[56] In his *De universalibus*[57] he uses Grosseteste's fivefold classification of universals, not, however, as his own, and in *De logica*,[58] in the course of a discussion of copulative propositions, he adopts this quintuple division to explain the applicability of the doctrine of universals to propositions in general. It would be possible to multiply almost without number Wyclif's references to Grosseteste as an acknowledged authority on theology and philosophy whose views were substantially his own.[59] Nor was his respect for the Bishop of Lincoln lessened because of the fact that he was an Englishman who had definite ideas about the autonomy of the English church.

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[50] *Trial.,* p. 62.

[51] The whole argument is found in *De ente,* pp. 104–11: ". . . . Et videtur sanctum Thomam dicere in libro suo *De Veritate* et alibi multis locis quod omne verum et falsum dependent ab anima sicut videtur Aristoteles dicere 3° *De Anima* 21, et 6° *Metaphysice* 8^{vo}. Set patet attendendo dicta superius quod non est realis repugnancia inter illos" (pp. 104–5). He goes on to show that truth may be understood in four different ways: "Nam veritas aut falsitas aliquando accipitur pro forma positiva qua signum est verum vel falsum formaliter, que est adequacio signi significantis ad veritatem significatam; et quandoque vocatur ipsum signum; 3° vocatur quodcunque ens extra animam veritas; et 4° aggregatum ex veritate reali et actu anime. Veritas autem primo modo et quarto modo dicta dependent ab anima, sicut vult sanctus Thomas" (p. 107). "In omnibus his dictis, patet quod veritas quecunque creata dicit comparacionem ad intellectum primum . . . . quod exponit sanctus Thomas . . . . hiis verbis: Dicendum quod Augustinus loquitur de veritate rei, et excludit a racione huiusmodi veritatis comparacione ad intellectum nostrum, non autem ad intellectum divinum" (p. 110). Wyclif, quoting Thomas again: "Unde, cum solus intellectus divinus sit eternus, patet quod in ipso solo veritas eternitatem habet" (p. 111). "Et sic futuriciones rerum, ut dicit, erant eterne in deo, in quo eternaliter fuit quod ipsa erunt futura" *(ibid).*

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[52] *John Wycliffe*, pp. 20–40.

[53] R. S. Stevenson, *Robert Grosseteste* (London, 1899). The work of Ludwig Baur, *Die Philosophie des Robert Grosseteste* (Münster, 1917), is a tardy acknowledgment of Grosseteste's place in medieval thought. For further modern literature see Ueberweg-Geyer, *op. cit.*, pp. 731–32.

[54] *Trial.*, p. 125.

[55] *De ente*, p. 104; *Trial.*, p. 97; *De bened. incarn.*, p. 88.

[56] *Trial.*, p. 84.

[57] MS cited, fol. 12*a*.

[58] II, 32.

[59] Wyclif was also familiar with his scientific works. *De ydeis*, MS Univ. Prag. 1555, fol. 76*b*: "Ut ostendit Linconiensis in tractatu suo de luce."

The reformer treats the Arabian philosophers as mere interpreters of Aristotle,[60] and as not always felicitous in their interpretation. He goes to some pains in one treatise to point out Averroes' misconstruction of the philosopher's doctrine of form and substance[61] as well as in his treatment of universals:

> Comentator 10 Metaphisice comento 6to, exponendo dictum Aristotelis dicentis: commune aut secundum predicacionem solum, ubi Comentator dicit, quod impossibile sit, quod aliquid sit commune pluribus, nisi ut est in anima tantum. Et talia verba habet in multis locis que obcecaverunt me et averterunt a via probabili et multos mihi similes.[62]

Although he nowhere expresses a lack of regard for them simply because they were Mohammedan, yet that might easily have been the reason. Plato and Aristotle were excusable inasmuch as they had only *lumen naturale*, but the Arabians were living in the Christian Era. He respects their learning and is undoubtedly indebted to them, but it is possible to feel a degree of reserve in his treatment of them.

In Wyclif's extensive and sympathetic use of Anselm we find nothing striking or unexpected. It was generally known and accepted that Anselm's realism was a renewal of Augustine's neo-Platonism. Many are the places where Augustine and Anselm are referred to together, as thinking alike on given matters, and one sometimes wonders if Wyclif always remembers the difference of centuries that separated their epochs. Yet it seems as probable that he meant thus to emphasize the real continuity of Christian thought in all ages until the loosing of Satan.

Wyclif uses Gilbert de la Porrée as an interpreter of Aristotle, or, at the most, as an authority on logic and metaphysics.

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[60] *Misc. phil.*, I, 177–80 *(De mat. et forma)*; *De comp. hominis*, p. 55; *De bened. incarn.*, p. 140: "dictum Averrois non debet esse alicui philosopho et minus theologo testis auctenticans."

[61] *Misc. phil.*, I, 180–81 *(De mat. et forma)*.

[62] *De universalibus*, MS Univ. Prag., VIII, G. 23, fol. 13*a*.

Most of his references to Gilbert are merely for the purpose of clearing up the meaning of phrases whose meaning is obscure or whose context renders an understanding of them difficult.

> Maior patet ex diffinicione *quid nominis* accionis, quam ponit auctor sex principiorum, dicens quod descriptive accio est forma.[63]
>
> . . . . Ut patet ex sentencia Aristotelis de tempore et per auctorem Sex Principiorum, cap. 'De Quando.' . . . .[64]

But in his most important as well as most original works, *De universalibus* and *De ydeis,* Gilbert is never mentioned. Wyclif can get along with Aristotle, Averroes, Augustine, Anselm, Linconiensis, and the Scriptures.

It is worthy of more than passing notice that Wyclif makes so few specific references in his strictly philosophical works to William of Ockham, the outstanding figure in English philosophy in the early part of the century. In one of his earliest works[65] he cites *unus magnus logicus* as denying the necessity of a predication that holds both for past and future. The editor, Dziewicki, surmises that the reference is to Ockham, and it is quite probable that it is. In his later philosophical and theological works when he is more sure of his ground and his convictions have matured, Wyclif is not so hesitant to oppose the nominalistic position in the person of its great English leader, and that in no uncertain terms. Yet even here it is perfectly evident that Wyclif felt profound respect for the Venerable Inceptor, and that he was convinced that the difference between them was only on subjects connected with metaphysics:[66]

> . . . . Et sic universalitas et veritas metaphysica non dependet ab intellectu creato, cum precedit ipsum, sed dependet ab intellectu increato. . . . . Et ignorancia huius sensus fecit Ockam et multos alios doctores signorum ex infirmitate intellectus declinare ab universali reali. Si enim attendissent quomodo philosophi dicunt tempus non habere . . . . tunc assurgerent ad sensum philosophorum concedendum.[67]

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[63] *Misc. phil.*, I, 2 *(De actibus anime)*; cf. also pp. 35, 39.

[64] *De ente pred.*, p. 182.

[65] *De logica,* I, 112.

[66] *Polemical Works,* pp. 91–95.

[67] *De universalibus,* MS Univ. Prag., VIII, G. 23, fol. 13*b*.

Toward another English logician, however, Wyclif felt more attracted—Walter Burleigh. Of this vigorous thinker we know much less than we should desire. From his printed works we know what his position on universals *ex parte rei* was, and his attacks against the *moderni doctores* who make every singular an end of its existence, "Si nihil sit substancia nisi substancia singularis, sequitur quod nulla est sciencia de substancia, et sic destrueretur metaphysica,"[68] would certainly strike a responsive chord in Wyclif. The references of the latter to Burleigh would lead us to think that Burleigh was fairly well known as a logician and Platonist metaphysician, though hardly the founder or leader of a school:

> Ille autem qui sciret fundare quod veritas ex parte rei, quam deus componit ex subiecto et predicato sit realis proposicio, ut ponit Magister Walterus Burlei, negaret minorem argumenti, sed de hoc non contendo. Sed scio quod grammatici et loyci sic loquuntur de predicacione. Unde Januensis in suo kathologon dicit quod *predicare* componitur ex *pre* et *dicare*.[69]

This mention of Januensis (John of Jandun), an Averroist, is, so far as our knowledge goes, indicative of Wyclif's opinion of him. He regarded John as a grammarian or lexicographer,[70] and seems not to have used his works on Aristotle, or at least not to have regarded them highly enough to be worth incorporating into his own work. But an early contemporary of Jandun was a favorite with Wyclif—Henricus Gandavensis or Henry of Ghent, known as *doctor solemnis*. His Augustinian Platonism was quite in line with Wyclif's own thought and, although he hesitates to accept expressions on dogma from doctors of the church after the time of Berengarius, yet he feels in substantial accord with the *doctor solemnis* on questions of metaphysics and philosophy:

> Et patet quod Aristoteles verum dicit quod esse existere singularis et sua essencia vel quiditas communis distinguuntur, quod eciam ego credo

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[68] Prantl, *Gesch. d. Logik im Abendlande*, III (1855–67), 297 ff.; cf. Ueberweg-Geyer, *op. cit.*, pp. 621 f., 788.

[69] *De universalibus*, MS cited, fol. 6*a*.

[70] Cf. *De veritate sacre Scripture*, I, 74, again a case of the definition of a term.

> esse verum de angelis. Sed difficultas est utrum essencia singularis et suum existere distinguuntur, et videtur doctorem solempnem dicere quod sic, sicut lux et lucere distinguuntur abinvicem, quamvis hec ambo et fervor quem Linconiensis vocat quietacionem in suo actu essenciali sunt omnes tres eadem lucis essencia, cum sint vestigia trinitatis. Et ista sentencia videtur habere magnum colorem.[71]

The foregoing recital of the writers whose works Wyclif used, either in building the structure of his realist philosophy or in adorning and finishing it, is by no means exhaustive. He drew on virtually all the philosophers known to the scholastics for their contributions, quoting even the Latin classical authors (doubtless through Augustine) as believing in real universals, as, for example, "Seneca epistola 66^a ponit ydeas expresse, dicens quod ydea est exemplar ad quod artifex aspiciens id quod destinavit efficit."[72]

In his energetic championing of the doctrine of real universals, then, Wyclif seeks his starting-point in Augustine's acceptance of Platonic idealism, with which he attempts to reconcile Aristotelian "abstraction," and aligns himself with Boethius, Anselm, Hugo of St. Victor, and Grosseteste. On the other hand, he gently but firmly and consistently insists that Aristotle, with his followers and interpreters, had not seen the whole truth, that Thomas Aquinas, in so far as he holds universals to be such only by virtue of an act of abstraction, had missed the mark. Of more recent philosophers (except perhaps Egidius Colonna, continually referred to in the *De universalibus* and the *De ydeis*), such as Bradwardine and Fitzralph, to whom Wyclif makes no reference in this connection,[73] the emphasis had been upon other and, to Wyclif at this stage of his career, less interesting matters.

Closely connected in many ways with his doctrine of real universals was Wyclif's doctrine of the possibles. An exposition of it which would be at all satisfactory is rendered difficult by the fact that his views underwent change and development during his career as a philosopher. But his later convictions seem to be clear. For something to be possible it must have existed, it must now exist, or it will exist at some time in the future, *in tempore suo*.

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[71] *De universalibus*, MS cited, fol. 30*a*.

[72] *De ydeis*, MS Univ. Prag., VIII, F. 1, fol. 76*d*.

[73] Cf., however, a brief reference in *De universalibus* concerning Fitzralph's idea of annihilation: "Et istam sentenciam tenet dominus Ardmachanus, dicens, libro primo de pauperie quod anichilacio non foret accio sed conservacionis desinicio, quod repugnat vero domino," MS Pal. Vindo. 4307, fol. 106*a*.

> Omnes enim creaturas, quantumlibet remotas, preteritas vel futuras, deus intuetur, quia sunt in tempore suo: et solum deus intuetur. Alias autem possibiles, que non existunt in tempore suo, cognoscit noticia simplicis apprehensionis, de quando cognoscit ista habere esse intelligibile et posse existere.[74]

The logical deductions from this doctrine (not necessarily chronological, for Wyclif was usually reluctant to break sharply with the accepted doctrines of the church) are many and important. If everything to be possible has to be really possible, and have a real existence in God's mind, God's mind is then the present and permanent measure of all things, singular and universal. What is apparently infinite to our minds, therefore, is finite to God's,[75] to whom nothing is infinite, in number, space, or time, not even his own power or existence.[76] The number of realities becomes thus fixed, for it is the sum of all realities which God knows that he has created or will create.

The metaphysical implicates of this doctrine are clear enough. A reality is real by virtue of existence in God's thought. Intelligibility is synonymous with possibility.[77] Put in another way, the principles of being and intellection are identical.[78] What is capable of being thought in a real sense is possible. It cannot be annihilated because its annihilation would involve that of God.[79] Increase or decrease in the magnitude of the universe is likewise unthinkable, for whatever has being already exists in God's thought,[80] and God is, though infinite to us, finite and unchangeable within himself. That is to say, that whatever is known to God has reality, and the smallest possible unit of space or time, the point or the instant, becomes quite real. The significance of Wyclif's atomism will come out more clearly in the position that he takes in his later years with regard to transubstantiation. Suffice it to say here that his denial of annihilation, a principle enounced in his earliest works, and his formulation of an atomistic theory of matter led him into open conflict with the church's teaching concerning this sacrament apparently only after some years of hesitation.

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[74] *Misc. phil.*, I, 234–35 (*De mat. et forma*).

[75] *De logica*, III, 37.

[76] *Ibid.*, pp. 87–89; III, 36.

[77] *De ente*, pp. 62–63.

[78] *De ente in communi*, ed. S. H. Thomson (Oxford, 1930), p. 2.

[79] *De ente*, pp. 291–92; *De bened. incarn.*, p. 76.

His atomism is, it seems clear, the logical issue of his doctrine of the possibles. According to Wyclif, what is infinity to us is definite and measurable to God, to whom possibility and reality are, so to speak, synonyms. In consequence, the universe is fixed and unchangeable in content.[81] As what is measurable is divisible and as there is a maximum, or the whole, there must be a minimum, the smallest possible division of space and time, the punctal atom and the instant, respectively. Space is completely filled with points, which, really distinct, do not coincide but touch one another.[82] Two such points begin to make a line;[83] three, not in line, to make a surface; and four, the fourth not in line with the other three, begin to make a volume. The so-called intersection of two lines or two planes never causes two punctal atoms to coincide or to occupy the same place. This holds true for points in time (instants).[84] The last instant of life is not the first of non-life. If, then, points do not coincide, how can continuous movement, either temporal or spatial, take place? Wyclif insists that there is no continuous movement, it is only apparently continuous.[85] The sources of motion, alteration, growth, decrease, etc., are all reduced to the one first motor, God. And the motion of atoms is interrupted by periods of rest of varying lengths. The fastest possible rate of movement is that at which one punctal substance, the atom, moves one point of space in one instant of time.[86] The atom as it moves from one point of space to another is instantly followed by another atom which occupies the point thus vacated.[87] The most rapid movement described can take place only at the equator of the universe. At the other latitudes, to use our term, motion is proportionately slower. That is to say, the periods of rest between "jumps" are greater.[88] As has already been suggested, this atomistic theory admits of no such disappearance of a substance as was demanded by the church doctrine of transubstantiation.[89]

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[80] *De logica*, III, 1, 2.

[81] *Ibid.*, p. 1: "Notandum mundum componi ex certis athomis et nec posset maiorari nec minorare nec moveri recte localiter."

[82] *Ibid.*, p. 42. The yet unpublished treatise, *De tempore*, is an expansion of this theory.

[83] *Ibid.*, pp. 30–31, 37.

[84] *Ibid.*, p. 32.

There is another doctrine, the holding of which brought Wyclif difficulties with the ecclesiastical authorities—his doctrine of necessity. But it must be made clear that his construction of what we may call determinism follows clearly and logically from his doctrine of real universals and the possibles. If the possible includes that which has been, that which is, and that which shall be, the *encia* of these three categories being equally real in God's mind, then it follows that everything which is to take place is already known to God, and as God's knowledge and his action are one and the same, all things that are possible, in the sense above mentioned, are already, so to speak, decreed;[90] they are necessary. To make his argument more simple, Wyclif distinguished between contingent and absolute necessity, a standard scholastic distinction borrowed from Aristotle, through Thomas Aquinas,[91] albeit somewhat simplified.[92] An absolute necessity is "either a first truth or a created truth without which God cannot exist,"[93] as, e.g., that 2 and 3 are 5, or that the diagonal of a square is not commensurate with its side. In this sort of statement there are no intermediate steps between the elements of the statement and a primary truth—the ideas existing in God's mind. The square or the numbers do not have to exist in time or space for the statements to be universally true. Hypothetical (contingent) truth is, so to speak, mediate. The necessity for the truth of such a statement is dependent upon an antecedent reality or truth, as, for me to run follows from God's willing me to run, or, translated into modern terminology, if God wills me to run, I run. The second statement is necessary if we grant the first; but there is no necessity inherent in God's nature that compels him to will thus. This is Wyclif's effort to avoid the extremes to which Bradwardine and Fitzralph went in the matter of necessity and free will, or rather, if possible to reconcile them.[94] To Bradwardine, zealous champion of predestination, everything rests on an unchangeable antecedent necessity. To Fitzralph the necessity is never more than contingent. Reconciliation of these two views is effected by Wyclif through an explanation that necessity may be predicated of an event as absolute in one sense, or contingent in another. This distinction is illustrated in the action of the human will; it is always free to choose between alternatives, but God necessitates the act of choosing.[95] As will, it is free; as an absolute organism, it is not free at all times not to act. Free will to Wyclif meant choice.[96] Where the difficulty lay in this, his early conception, was in the fact that the words used in dealing with it were nothing but so many *flatus vocis*, as Ockham would have said in another connection. For the will to choose between an impossible and a possible, while God's knowledge, productive and determinative in itself, knew what the choice would be, hardly connotes freedom. God's very knowledge determined the act, and the human will was but a marionette. Whether we can attach ulterior motives to this strenuous effort on his part to maintain the dogma of free will in words, at least, is beyond the question in hand, but there is a significant statement in Part II of the *Opus evangelicum*. He has just mentioned Bradwardine as holding that God was the author of sin, and Wyclif adds: ". . . . ego, cum sim magis suspectus de heresi, non audeo ita loqui, sed concedo quod peccatum diaboli incepit in mundi exordio. . . . ."[97] Is there a vein of humor discernible in these words of a man who, nearing the end of his life, was already committed to doctrines openly pronounced heretical seven years previously? It seems rather more likely that a man of his devoutness, in the age in which he lived, when the religion of Christ was represented by no other body than the Roman church, should unconsciously respect the traditions of which that church was the guardian, and should labor, in so far as he was able, to square his own thought with that of the Fathers whom he studied so carefully and quoted so often. After all, a complete break from the Roman church as the church of Christ was a step which seemed far in the future. Wyclif's philosophy was not more daring or more iconoclastic than that of many less courageous than he. But the *materia* to which his philosophy of realism, with its manifold implications, was to be applied, was more nearly crystallized than it had been in the days of Abélard. With Wyclif the church needed no zealous Bernard to pursue him and hale him before a council and conduct his trial. There were by this time multitudes of churchmen, the majority of whom would have been keen enough to be able to see the grave dangers for the church in the teachings of Wyclif. The systematizing work of the Lombard and Aquinas had given the church a schedule which was as a new coat of armor. Wyclif had taken it upon himself to attack the weak spots in this armor. The church's pride was her most vulnerable point, and there Wyclif's blows were felt most keenly.

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[85] *Ibid.*, p. 40.

[86] *Ibid.*, p. 97.

[87] *Ibid.*, p. 60.

[88] *Ibid.*, p. 97.

[89] *De blasphemia*, p. 24. With other details of Wyclif's cosmology, geocentricity, revolution of the world on its axis every twenty-four hours (*De log.*, III, 221), the sphericity of space, and other related elaborations, it will be unnecessary to deal, as they have little or no bearing on his theological views.

[90] *De logica*, III, 34–35; *De ente*, 52–57.

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[91] *Summa theologica*, I, qu. xix, art. iii, *Respondes*, etc.

[92] *De logica*, III, 179; *De dom. divino*, pp. 115–16; *De actibus anime*, pp. 71–73.

[93] *De logica*, III, 179.

[94] *De dom. divino*, p. 116.

[95] *Ibid.*, p. 117. This is at the beginning of his purely theological literary activity. He later surrenders to the logic of his philosophy in upholding an almost absolute predestination.

[96] *Opus evangelicum*, II, 451.

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[97] *Ibid.*, p. 446.

Without his philosophical training, and this relatively coherent and consistent body of doctrine, Wyclif would never have come to those theological beliefs in the spreading of which he incurred the wrath of the Roman hierarchy. It has been said that "with Wyclif Scholasticism became played out."[98] It is a question if it was not played out before Wyclif, at least as a thing of initiative and force. But the mental training it afforded suited the age in which it lived, and equipped John Wyclif for the work to which he felt called of God.

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[98] H. B. Workman, *John Wyclif*, I, 142.

CRITICAL REVIEWS

ORPHISM REINTERPRETED

In this new edition of *Zagreus*[1] the author has brought together all of his earlier studies on Orphism that he considers worthy to survive. It is divided into three parts: archeological, mystical, and historical, but it also contains a valuable supplement dealing with the history of critical research on Orphism, the reconstruction of the theological discourse of Heraclitus and the history of Christianity and Orphism. This research is truly prodigious, and it is remarkable both for its familiarity with the classical sources and critical material and also for its effective use of the results of modern anthropology in the study of primitive cultures.

The archeological section is a study of the Orpheum in the Villa of the Mysteries near the Herculaneum gate of Pompeii which was buried by Vesuvius in A.D. 79 and excavated in 1909. This private shrine was constructed early in the first century and operated secretly because the Orphic cult had been outlawed since 186 B.C. The shrine occupied only one wing of the villa which was originally built for normal use but was transformed for the purposes of the cult. The suite of rooms was equipped for the lustral feasts and banquets and for the mystic ceremony of initiation into the divine society. Of most interest to us is the room which contained on three of its walls a series of frescoes setting forth a complete liturgy of the Dionysiac initiation. The pictures indicate that this particular Orphic group was composed entirely of women. Macchioro gives a careful analysis of the frescoes and shows by exhaustive illustrations the place and function of each feature, such as the plinth, double plinth, linen, caps, masks, convex mirror, etc., in the religious art of Greece. In this way he identifies the Dionysiac liturgy of initiation.

There are seven of the pictures, consisting of two sets of three each, with one as the climax of all. In the first series, the actors are human beings; in the second, they are divine; but the series are bound together by the young woman who appears successively in all the scenes, as she performs and submits to the entire ritual of initiation. The scenes are as follows: (1) *taking the veil* to become a mystic bride; (2) the *catechesis,* in which she hears the rules of the initiation; (3) the *agape,* the lustral meal celebrated at a sacrificial table; (4) the *communion,* in which the kid as a symbol of Dionysus receives milk from a virgin satyr, to the accompaniment of entrancing music produced by a silenus and a satyr; (5) the *annunciation,* in which the mystic death is foretold by means of a convex mirror and a mask; (6) the *passion* or *flagellation,* in which the initiate is scourged in the presence of Dionysus and Kore as a symbol of death, after having viewed the phallus as a symbol of the sacred marriage; (7) the *resurrection,* in which the initiate filled with the new Dionysiac life rises to revel in the bacchic dance.

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[1] *Zagreus, Studi Intorno all'Orfismo*. By Vittorio Macchioro. Florence: Vallechi, 1930. 626 pages. L. 35.

The liturgy derived from Agra where similar rites existed and was performed in the presence of Dionysus and Kore as invisible spectators. The room in which the liturgy was painted was a basilica.

In his second division, Macchioro treats the sacramental Orphic drama. The mystery was subjective, illusory, and visionary, evoked and sustained by statues, symbols, songs, and predetermined by theology on the basis of collective suggestion. It was a mimic drama in which the god was imitated, his personality substituted for the human, an absolute collective pantomime, producing the divine communion, by means of a Dionysiac monoideism. The mystic received purity in life, blessedness in death, and knowledge of his eternal destiny.

The third part of the research treats of the relation of Orpheus to Paul. Orphism was an ecstatic, eschatological, primitive religion, and it contributed these elements to Greek life in contrast with the earlier pessimism; it also largely shaped the philosophy of Pythagoras, Heraclitus, and Plato. The Olympic state religion, which bore rich fruit in art, was gradually undermined by philosophy, but the people found their satisfaction in Orphic mysticism, which gave a warm religious experience and also inspired philosophical speculation. The Orphic faith lived on in the cults of redemption in the Hellenistic world, so that the Greeks were ready for Christianity. Paul was a product of that type of thought and the religion which he preached was a combination of the Orphic sense of sin, sacramental redemption, and realistic speculation about the religious life with his own Jewish heritage. His great successor in this field was Marcion, in whom the circle was complete.

The sources used are usually carried in the original either in the text or in the footnotes, and the author's thesis seems to be definitely established. A popular statement of his conclusions is contained in his more recent *From Orpheus to Paul* in English, which also contains an excellent photographic facsimile of the frescoes.

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A COMMENTARY OF ECCLESIASTES[1]

The author of this little book, it would appear, was a student of Professor Box of London; if so, he does his teacher no discredit, for whether or not one agrees with his conclusions it cannot be denied that he has done a careful and thoroughgoing piece of scholarly work. He gives us a detailed commentary, and introduction (or "Summary" he prefers to call it) dealing with, the disposition of the book; the composition of the book; relation and affinities; doctrinal and philosophical standpoint; time, place, and aim of the book, and text, versions, and language.

The author's special thesis, which he follows consistently throughout is that the phrase "under the sun" in 1:3 is not descriptive but restrictive: Qohaeleth disparages only this particular kind of conduct, there may be some other that he would approve, indeed our author would say he does so approve. Thus Mr. Odeberg says:

> There is no reality or substantiality and permanence in the results of men's works. . . . . But there is an important qualification: this applies to the works done under the sun. There is nothing said of works done on a different condition. . . . . It will be maintained in the course of the following exposition that this doctrine does not imply that the existence of earthly man *per se* is futile, but on the contrary, that man may live that other life *as* an earthly man and even that this other life may permeate his earthly labors [p. 8].

This theory carried through the book leads the author to the conviction that the book is a unity. The discrepancies of meaning which have given rise to the opposite view are seen largely to be due to the writer's peculiar way of picturing vividly the two different modes of life in their extreme consequences. There are, however, four interpolations: 7:19; 9:17–10:4; 10:8–13 and 11:7–12:7.

One may remark however, that Mr. Odeberg's argument is something less than convincing. The peculiar twist that he gives to 1:3 is altogether too thin. If Qohaeleth had meant that, there was abundant scope for him to say so in unequivocal language.

It is perhaps not out of order, too, to point out that the work as printed is marred by not a few petty errors of spelling. They may be typographical, but they are in any case disagreeable.

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[1] *Qohaeleth* (a commentary on the book of Ecclesiastes). By Hugo Odeberg. Uppsala and Stockholm: Almquist & Wiksells Boktryckeri A-B, 1929. 127 pages. 2.50 Kronor.

SNAPSHOTS OF NEW TESTAMENT RESEARCH

W. K. Lowther Clarke, editorial secretary of the useful S.P.C.K., editor of *Theology,* recognized authority on St. Basil the Great, appears in his most recent volume[1] as an incisive reviewer of recent New Testament literature. The reviews are so well done as to suggest that this is the rôle the author most enjoys playing.

An indispensable subtitle, *Essays—Reviews—Interpretations,* suggests the varied character of the ingredients that make up this scholarly and interesting *Olla Podrida.* Here are essays on such problematic issues as the question of Jesus' messianic consciousness, his relationship to the pharisaic party, and the question of what became of his body after burial. In the main, the book is composed of reviews of recent and really important publications in the New Testament field—such significant volumes as G. F. Moore's great work on Judaism or Eduard Meyer's *Ursprung und Anfänge des Christentums.* Least important of all, yet not wholly unimportant, are brief interpretations of various New Testament passages, Markan, Johannine, and Pauline. The "excepting clause" in Matt. 5:32 and 19:9 and the "kenotic passage" in Phil. 2:6–11 are much-debated sections that are thus singled out for special discussion.

What gives unity to all the varied contents of this compilation is the fact that is emphasized by the main title of the volume; all the sketches deal in one way or another, comprehensively or suggestively, directly or indirectly, with live and forefront New Testament problems of today. These range all the way from the virgin birth and *Formgeschichte* at the beginning to the Mandeans and the religious revival in the early Roman Empire at the end.

It is precisely because Lowther Clarke's notebook thus reviews weighty literature and summarizes capital problems that it deserves the distinction of a "critical review," and not a slighting "brief mention" merely. When literature—good, bad, and indifferent—is as vast as it is in the New Testament field; and when problems are constantly changing and multiplying, fading out and re-emerging in different form with endless and Protean rapidity—it is essential that now and again perspective be given by means of competent reviews. Because of its character as a survey of recent literature, rather than because of its author's point of view or particular views, *New Testament Problems* merits a place as one of the worthwhile books of the year. Such a book is destined by its very type not to live long; but it functions usefully while it does live.

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[1] *New Testament Problems.* By W. K. Lowther Clarke. New York: Macmillan Co., 1929. xii+222 pages. $2.50.

It cannot be said that Lowther Clarke's survey as a whole is either notably systematic or comprehensive. About the only systematization that is observable in his work is the circumstance that problems relative to Jesus are discussed in the first half of the volume and Pauline questions remanded to the last half.

Nor is the survey an inclusive one, for certain important lines of New Testament research are neglected altogether, and many noteworthy books are unmentioned. The reader of these essays will not glimpse the fascinating realism of archaeological and textual studies or become cognizant of the contemporary interest of specialists in the investigation of local types of text. Certainly Lowther Clarke is historically minded; but his mind is undisciplined in the newly developed techniques of the social sciences. German literature he knows well; but he does not reveal a like familiarity with French and Italian literature. He introduces his readers to Reitzenstein and Lohmeyer; but not to Goguel or Couchoud or Macchioro or Buonaiuti. The closely drawn battle line between Hellenist and Aramaist that extends across almost every field of New Testament study is scarcely even noticed by him. Yet, because he does show such consummate skill in defining issues and marshaling arguments pro and con, it is all the more regrettable that his perspective does not include all the varied ramifications of New Testament research instead of certain limited sections only.

Lowther Clarke's work as it stands is characterized by great unevenness. He is at his best in his straightforward book reviews. In his fifteen years of editorial experience, when he has been reading books at the astounding rate of a thousand per year, he has patently developed great skill in "tearing the heart out of a book in a short time." Some of his reviews here reprinted, or printed for the first time, cannot be forgotten by the reader. In his discussion of the "Early History of the Eucharist" he reviews in sequence Wetter's *Altchristliche Liturgien* (1921), Völker's *Mysterium und Agape* (1927), Oesterley's *Jewish Background of the Christian Liturgy* (1925), and Lietzmann's *Messe und Herrenmahl* (1926). Four volumes more pertinent to the subject could scarcely have been selected, or summarized more succinctly. Similarly, the student of Christian origins will be very grateful to the author for his well-ordered review of Eduard Meyer's ill-arranged *Ursprung und Anfänge des Christentums*.

When, however, the author turns to criticism or reconstruction he reveals his weakness. *Formgeschichte* has not yet made the most impressive possible case in its own favor; but it has said far more for itself than Lowther Clarke has said to the contrary. His criticisms of the Proto-Luke hypothesis would be more impressive were they not based on the orthodox presupposition of Lucan authorship. Baffled by the pagan parallels to Christian miracle stories, emphasized by Weinrich and Reitzenstein, our author yet seeks to maintain the uniqueness of the Christian narratives from an ethical point of view. Regarding the disposition of Jesus' body after the entombment, he thinks that someone must have removed it during the night of Saturday-Sunday. Then he asks, in a poetic quotation, if God may not have done so (p. 107).

The instances cited are only too typical. Lowther Clarke's criticisms are never exactly conventional, but almost invariably they are orthodox enough. In the early part of a discussion he may seem to be dangerously rationalistic. But like Euripides the Rationalist he invariably ends by making use of the *deus ex machina*. In the case of the Greek dramatist it is an open question whether the final appeal to the supernatural is a logical *reductio ad absurdum* or an illogical surrender. In the case of the Anglican reviewer there can be no question. It is surrender.

Here is a story that the author tells of himself, hence it may be repeated with propriety. When in 1915 Professor F. J. Foakes-Jackson recommended Lowther Clarke for his present position he wrote to the committee: "Clarke is much more orthodox than he thinks he is." *New Testament Problems* shows that this statement need not be revised.

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THE ETHICS OF PAUL[1]

The ethical teaching of Paul is, as Dr. Enslin points out, a comparatively neglected subject, and there was room for a new treatment of it. He begins his study with a consideration of "forces that contributed to the moral teachings of Paul," and discusses the possible influence of Judaism, Stoicism, and the oriental mystery cults. Here the reader will note, surely with surprise, that Dr. Enslin does not think it necessary to consider whether the teaching of Jesus had any influence upon the formation of the ethical ideals of his greatest apostle. He does, however, deal with the question in a later section of his book, and comes to the conclusion that any such influence was of the slightest. The "essential harmony of thought and expression" in the teachings of Jesus and Paul is due simply to the fact that both were good Jews whose chief aim was to do God's will. The treatments of Stoicism and of the mystery cults are in themselves excellent, but since in each case the conclusion is a negative one the space devoted to them seems disproportionately large. Pauline ethics, then, owe nothing of any real importance to Stoicism, to the mystery cults, or to the teaching of Jesus; they are essentially Jewish ethics. If this is correct—and there is certainly a large measure of truth in it—Dr. Enslin's discussion of Jewish ethics and their influence on the apostle, which occupies only some fifteen pages, is less than adequate, though he himself speaks of having devoted a considerable space to it. Since Dr. Enslin insists, I think rightly, that morality held the central place in the life and thought of Paul, the question at once arises why and how the preaching of this essentially Jewish ethics made the appeal it did to the non-Jewish world of Paul's day. This question is not considered at all.

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[1] *The Ethics of Paul.* By Morton Scott Enslin. New York: Harper & Bros., 1930. xix+335 pages. $4.00.

Dr. Enslin then passes to consider the criteria of conduct in Judaism, in Stoicism, and in Paul. Since he has already shown that Stoicism had no real influence on the apostle it seems scarcely worth while to take so much trouble now to show that Paul makes no use of the Stoic criterion of conformity to "nature." So far as the Jewish criterion of obedience to the law of God is concerned, Dr. Enslin believes that it continued to influence the apostle more than he himself realized. But the real criterion for the Christian was to be found in "the mystical union of the believer with Christ and the resulting union of the brethren in Christ." Now at best it is not easy to show just how a criterion of this kind works in practice, but since Dr. Enslin denies that the life and teaching of Jesus had any important influence on the apostle at all he has to admit that the criterion is a purely formal one, lacking any real content. He does so, frankly; "How," he asks, "could Paul be sure of what was worthy of Christ?" But he does not seem to realize the importance of the problem. He is content to say, "For Paul as for every other moral teacher who has made any real impress, the final authority was the light within. The standards he set were his own standards of conduct. . . . . Can there be a more ultimate authority?" The general question may be left to philosophers, but it is certain that Paul believed there was a more ultimate authority, and Dr. Enslin would have done well to consider how it was that Paul came to make this mistake about his own ultimate standard, instead of dismissing the matter with a bare assertion that he did make it.

The second, and longer, half of the book is given to a consideration of Paul's ethical teaching under four main heads, which are, briefly phrased, purity, steadfastness, love for one's fellow men, and joy—"the four fundamental principles of Paul's ethics." Here, too, Dr. Enslin seems to me to show an unfortunate facility in ignoring, or passing over too lightly, the really important and difficult questions. Let one example suffice. By general admission Christianity worked something like a revolution in sexual morality, and upon nothing does Paul insist more strongly than upon Christian ideals in this sphere. It is surely very important, therefore, to consider the validity of the reasons which he gives for his ideal of chastity, all the more since today that ideal, unchallenged as an ideal for centuries, is being vigorously attacked in many quarters. Dr. Enslin contents himself with a mere restatement of Paul's argument, in spite of the fact that it is open to the charge of being simply a *petitio principi.*

Altogether, I feel that I must agree with a criticism of his work which Dr. Enslin has himself suggested in a Greek sentence which, with disarming modesty, he has prefixed to it; he has discussed at rather needless length some very obvious matters. It is to be hoped that some day he will apply his very manifest ability and learning to the many things in Paul's ethical teaching that are by no means simple and obvious.

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INTERPRETATION OF AN ISOLATED NEW TESTAMENT[1]

The first Protestant work on hermeneutics in fifty years (according to the Preface) outlines the process of interpretation as follows: the interpreter must start with the details of the text, build up a total picture—first, of each separate book, then of the personality of the author, then of the historical situation of which the author is a part, finally of the entire New Testament. But the one principle of fundamental importance is that the New Testament must primarily be interpreted by itself. Thus almost half of the book, by far the best half, deals with language, style, and literary form in relation to interpretation; the other half touches briefly the historical background and surveys the church's use of the dogmatic, allegorical, and "scriptural-analogy" methods of interpretation.

The last method, used with discretion, approaches closely to Professor Torm's practice; for the main use which he makes of the study of the author's personality and of the historical background is to justify traditional positions. For example, Paul's great personality would naturally contain such contradictions as the Pastorals offer to the rest of the Pauline corpus; and the use of the mystery religions, the hermetic writings, and the Mandaean literature as an aid to the interpretation of the New Testament is vigorously denounced because the first two are much later than Christianity and the Mandaean writings offer no real contact in concrete detail.

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[1] *Hermeneutik des Neuen Testaments.* By F. Torm. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1930. vi+253 pages. Bound M. 11, unbound M. 8.50.

Judaism, on the other hand, though it is the basis on which Christianity developed, must be used with caution in the attempt to explain Jesus, Paul, and the writers of the New Testament, for these were original personalities who created much and transformed what they borrowed.

In general this is a reaction against the invasion of the sacred fields of interpretation by a host of aliens: religionsgeschichte, formgeschichte, mystery religions, rabbinic literature, etc. All of these things are useless, in the author's opinion, for the study of a New Testament which is so very original that the interpreter must allow it to interpret itself. It is significant that the opening sentence of the book points out that hermeneutics is derived from a Greek word whose primary meaning is "translation"; for the author, that is the primary task of the interpreter today. If this were so, it would be no loss if New Testament scholarship had to wait another fifty years for the next book on hermeneutics.

Ernest Cadman Colwell

University of Chicago

RECENT WORK IN THE NEW TESTAMENT FIELD

Without question the leading place in the notice of recent publications in the New Testament field must be given Dibelius' *Evangelium und Welt*.[1] This is the second edition, unchanged except for the addition of brief indexes, of the book first published under the title of *Geschichtliche und übergeschichtliche im Christentum*. That a second edition should be so promptly called for is gratifying, for there can be no doubt that the position maintained by the author deserves to have widespread exposition, especially in circles where the Barthian theology is popular. Dibelius' view is easily the strongest opponent which the crisis theology has, and this statement of it places the author as the leader among the younger German New Testament scholars. The work is timely; it constantly exhibits the consciousness of contemporary interests, but it is by no means an expression of the modern position of theology. Its distinction between the historical and the suprahistorical elements in Christianity is soundly based upon all of Dibelius' previous critical study. For example, it is readily apparent that his recent research upon the origin of the gospels has furnished the author with much of his resultant point of view and with many of his data. But of course such a distinction has particular meaning in view of the present theological situation in central Europe. Dibelius embraces this factor, and in his exposition he tellingly makes the point that the distinction between the historical and the suprahistorical demands the rigorous application of scientific study to the historical, and, further, shows the social factors which condition the aspects which are suprahistorical. This consciousness of social forces, rare in a continental scholar, is one of the most heartening features of the book. This generalized study, read in connection with the several particular research volumes of the same author, is of the highest value.

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[1] *Evangelium und Welt*. By Martin Dibelius. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1929. viii+176 pages. M. 6.

The influence of the contemporary situation is even more explicitly shown in Erich Fascher's discussion of the problem of understanding the New Testament.[2] Fascher offers a frank and very interesting discussion of the manner in which the dialectic theology has affected the study of the New Testament, showing its roots in pre-war thought, but admitting that the entire phenomenon is chiefly the result of the war. Perhaps the most telling part of this section of the discussion is the unimpeachable placing of Bultmann with the dialecticians. But doubtless the most significant feature is the evident difference between Fascher's point of view and that of Dibelius. Dibelius' definition of the objective of New Testament study assumes the propriety and the usefulness of historical research, and its distinction of the suprahistorical in no way compromises the historical scholar by the metaphysical aspects of his findings. But Fascher, who has previously distinguished himself as a formidable critic of the school of form criticism, is driven by his despair of the hope of genuinely historical study frankly to embrace the metaphysical aspect, although for him the way out of the dilemma is that of orthodox evangelical theology. His recital of unsolved historical problems is indeed climactic, but it is most instructive to contrast his own pessimistic reaction with the attitude maintained by Dibelius. Fascher is essentially a Biblicist; the implication of his subtitle is substantiated by his entire discussion and is clearly articulated in his conclusion.

The Gospels, A Short Introduction,[3] by Mr. Vincent Taylor, is a statement in popular form of the theory of gospel origins which is current in England, with frequent criticisms of the competing theory which has recently developed in Germany. As might be expected, Mr. Taylor's own theory, previously expressed more technically in *Behind the Third Gospel*, is chiefly expounded, with the assistance of the corroborating elements of Canon Streeter's much more influential work. The main point of disagreement, i.e., Mr. Taylor's hope of salvaging the two-document hypothesis of Synoptic origins, is expounded as persuasively as possible. Mr. Taylor has a gift for compressed statement, and this makes possible a useful summary of many facts and the statement of many theories. But what didactic value his book gains from this ability is canceled by that fault which is so common in books published in England: the book carries so patently an apologetic purpose that great as its author's learning is the scientific value of his work is slight. This aspect is easily observable in a manner which is amusing to American readers when the space given to conservative scholars in quotations is compared with that given those who have the bad taste to disagree with the author. For example, Professor B. S. Easton is quoted with approval, while Professor Case is but once mentioned and then misquoted. It is true that the author shows adequate acquaintance with the work of the contemporary German scholars, but he has no sympathy with their position, which is stated only to be refuted. The documentation includes a number of American scholars, but it is unfortunate that although his name once appears in a footnote the work of the late President Burton is not adequately recognized.

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[2] *Vom Verstehen des Neuen Testamentes, ein Beitrag zur Grundlegung einer zeitgemässen Hermeneutik.* By Erich Fascher. Giessen: Alfred Töpelmann, 1930. vi+149 pages. Bound, M. 5.60, unbound, M. 4.25.

[3] *The Gospels, A Short Introduction.* By Vincent Taylor. London: Epworth Press, 1930. 128 pages. 2/6 net.

Professor Bethune-Baker, Lady Margaret's Professor of Divinity in Cambridge, also attempts in popular vein to set forth the salient features of the gospels and their major contents.[4] He offers a perfect example of the "liberal" theology which is by no means modern in outlook. Upon occasion there is a courageous frankness in making admissions, but as a whole the book attempts to restate in terms of credibility what it is thought that a layman ought to believe. The documentation is limited to books which it is supposed that such a public might be able to read. Is it possible that the Lady Margaret's professorship has come to this?

As is natural, much attention is given to Jesus in recent New Testament work. Robert Keable's romance[5] has had a recent printing. Doubtless this is due to the literary excellence of the book; certainly it is no measure of its scientific worth, which is slight. But as the readable vehicle of a frankly liberal attitude the book is of undoubted propaganda value. Of another reprinted book on Jesus it must be said that it is an occasion for joy that the reissue is demanded. Klausner's study of Jesus[6] is not only without question the ablest Jewish life of Jesus yet written, it is without

[4] *Early Traditions about Jesus.* By J. E. Bethune-Baker. New York: Macmillan, 1930. 205 pages. $1.50.

[5] *The Great Galilean.* By Robert Keable. Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1929. xi+212 pages.

[6] *Jesus of Nazareth.* By Joseph Klausner. New York: Macmillan Co., 1929. 434 pages. $2.50.

qualification one of the most valuable contributions to the literature on Jesus written in recent years. It is extremely gratifying from many points of view that this highly instructive work is steadily circulating. This printing is without change from the original translation. Gustaf Dalman's *Jesus-Jeshua*[7] now appears in English translation. Doubtless it will obtain, as it deserves, a wider reading in translation. It may be well to mention that this book does not, as its title might suggest, treat Jesus in any systematic manner; it consists of slightly related discussions of such topics as the languages of Palestine in Jesus' day, the contemporary synagogue customs, aspects of the Sermon on the Mount, problems of the gospel narratives of the Passover, and remarks about the traditional words from the cross. The value of these is their bringing into convenient compass the author's amazing linguistic and rabbinical knowledge. It is to be hoped that much use will be made of the translated volume. The amount of the linguistic apparatus is considerable, but not forbidding; the Semitic terms are transliterated, and the equipment of notes and symbols is generous.

Without doubt the brilliant impression made by Ernst Lohmeyer's commentary on Philippians will arouse great expectations as his edition of Colossians[8] in the Meyer Commentary is circulated. It must be admitted, however, that the promise of the earlier volume is hardly realized in this. Perhaps the subject matter does not permit the freshness which was the major characteristic of the earlier volume, but whatever is the reason, the commentary on Colossians barely escapes conventionality. The letter is regarded as genuinely Pauline, probably written from Paul's imprisonment in Caesarea, with such impersonal character as should be expected in a letter written to a group unknown to the apostle. Naturally the greatest attention in the study is paid to the Colossian "philosophy." Here is where an original contribution might have been expected from so fertile a mind as Lohmeyer's, but it is exactly here that one's expectation of this commentary is not realized. Lohmeyer is, as would appear from his work on Philippians, prepared to find a high christology at this early date. He is likewise prepared to find thus early a sort of gnostic thought. Thus the religion which Paul attempts in this letter to control is a syncretistic gnostic redemption religion which, while gentile, has a Jewish background. The elements of the world represent a hierarchy of heavenly beings in such scale that God in his fulness is among them.

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[7] *Jesus-Jeshua.* By Gustaf Dalman. Authorized translation by the Rev. Paul P. Levertoff. New York: Macmillan Co., 1929. xiv+256 pages. $4.50.

[8] *Die Briefe an die Kolosser und an Philemon.* By Ernst Lohmeyer. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1930. iv+201 pages. M. 22.50.

The religion as a whole is therefore supplemental to the pagan, Jewish, or Christian affiliation which its adherents might have. As in his other work Lohmeyer makes abundant use of the martyr motif in elucidating the outline of Colossians. The translation is new and fresh. The mechanics of the volume are as usual, with detailed comment highly compressed in footnotes.

Windisch's contribution to the Lietzmann *Handbuch zum Neuen Testament* is a highly creditable as it is a thoroughgoing revision of his original work.[9] It takes full note of important literature which has appeared since the 1911 edition. In an interesting and valuable manner attention is directed on the one hand to the data set forth in Strack-Billerbeck and on the other to the movements of thought articulated by the apostolic fathers. The Catholic Epistles are placed in the stream of evolving Christian thought and practice. Of particular distinction is the treatment of the Epistle of James; in a highly advanced manner Windisch discusses this as a specimen of Christian paranetic adaptation of Jewish sources. First Peter also receives distinctive treatment; the mysteries and gnostic cults are utilized to explain much of this source. On the whole Windisch's new edition is a valuable contribution to a neglected field of New Testament research.

DONALD W. RIDDLE

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THE ROMAN CRISIS OF 1870

The crisis in the modern history of the papacy lies in the Vatican Council of 1870, and while the story of the Council has often been written, fresh light is still being shed upon it. Two new works, written from widely divergent viewpoints, should be read by those who seek an objective judgment of the issue. The more extensive of these[1] is by Dom Cuthbert Butler of Downside Abbey, whose work as a historian of monasticism is well known. It is based upon a source never before fully utilized, the letters of Dr. Ullathorne, Roman Catholic Bishop of Birmingham. Much material from the *Acta* of the Council, the publication of which was completed in 1927 (Mansi, *Collectio*, Tomes 49–53), has also been employed, while other sources, and the fundamental histories of the Council, have been freely consulted.

The author claims to write "with such objectivity and impartiality as may be possible to one who has clear and strong convictions." The "convictions" which thus limit the "objectivity" of the work include a belief, stated at the close, that:

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[9] *Die Katholischen Briefe*. By Hans Windisch. 2d (revised) edition. Tübingen: Mohr, 1930. viii+144 pages. Unbound M. 6.30, bound M. 7.80.

[1] *The Vatican Council*. By Dom Cuthbert Butler. Vol. I, II. New York: Longmans, Green & Co., 1930. xix+300 pages; vii+309 pages. $10.50 both volumes.

> The defining of the position of the Pope as successor and heir of St. Peter, according to the mind of the Catholic Church, and the setting forth, in unmistakable terms, the implications of his primacy and infallible teaching authority, was surely a right act: in that it shuts out the possibility of anyone seeking union with the Catholic Apostolic Roman Church . . . . doing so under misapprehension of what is involved.

At the same time it is made clear that the decisions of the council narrowed the range of outlook permitted to those already within the Roman church. This is evident from Dr. Butler's statement:

> Since the Vatican Council there is no room for the term "Ultramontanism," because that doctrine of the Papacy has, for all in communion with the Holy See, been stamped as Catholicism. . . . . But up to the Council, strictly speaking it was not so; for the Gallican position was still permissible within the pale of the Catholic Church [I, 38].

The exclusion, then, of non-infallibilist candidates for admission to the church, and the destruction of Gallicanism within it, were the outstanding achievements which commend the Council to our esteem. Although these give Dr. Butler the greatest satisfaction, he is not too insistent that every reader shall applaud.

Ullathorne's letters are of use especially for what they record of the reactions of his peace-loving, patient nature to the partisan conflicts that were waged about him in the period preceding and during the Council. He was about equally repelled by extreme opponents, and by ardent proponents of infallibility, and seems to have had no confidence in Manning. Seeing the advance of the cause of infallibility, he advocated "a calm and moderate definition" so limited as to avoid fanatical interpretations, and accompanied by provisions that would "strengthen the authority of the episcopate." He finally, of course, voted with the majority.

The book contains an analysis of the debates, with attention to certain dramatic crises, including the "scene" in which the courageous Strossmeyer was angrily cried down for demanding a charitable attitude to Protestants. Pius IX seldom enters the stage and although it is stated that he "kept to himself the complete mastery" of the Council, we are not, as in some works on the subject, made constantly aware of his dictation. Instead the impression is created that the Council expressed the demand of the church. In his interpretation of the infallibility decree, Butler supports the modest statements of Ullathorne and Fessler against Manning's aggressive extension of its scope. He suggests that the Council suffered through the mistaken attempt at secrecy, the outcome of which was "neither secrecy nor publicity, but an atmosphere of rumor and suspicion."

The other work consists of a volume of lectures by Professor J. B. Bury,[2] delivered in 1908 and left in manuscript at his death in 1927. Two of the lectures are on the "Syllabus of Errors" of 1854; the remaining five deal with the events of 1870. The dignity and distinction of the historian of the *Later Roman Empire* and of the *Idea of Progress* are exhibited afresh. Pope Pius is a real actor in the drama, and we are made familiar with his superstition, his ambition, and his skill in manipulating the bishops. Some facts not found in Butler's volumes are included here, and the detailed treatment of certain incidents often differs materially. Perhaps the most direct conflict between the two writers appears in the interpretation of the decree. Bury rejects Fessler's view of its modest scope and intention by an acute argument on its application to the *Unam Sanctam* of Boniface VIII. A useful sixty-page memoir of Professor Bury, the work of his pupil and friend R. H. Murray, precedes the text.

JOHN T. MCNEILL

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THE SOCIAL CAUSES OF DENOMINATIONALISM

This significant book[1] has come out of the conviction, on the part of the author—who is the dean of a theological seminary, of a denomination in which the doctrinal emphasis has always been strong—that denominational differences cannot be satisfactorily explained solely on the basis of doctrine but that there must be a full understanding of all the social and economical factors involved. Nor, he thinks, can the problem of church unity be approached from a purely theological point of view, if any degree of success is to be obtained. This recognition of social and economic influences, in the history of the church, is a long step forward and is encouraging to those of us who have felt that the doctrinal emphasis has held too long not only the center of the stage, but in many instances the entire stage itself.

The first chapter, on the "Ethical Failure of the Divided Church," closes with these striking statements: "Almost always and everywhere in modern times the churches have represented the ethics of classes and nations rather than a common and Christian morality." The denominations, the author says, are sociological groups, and are "emblems, therefore, of the victory of the world over the church." Thus, to his mind, denominationalism represents the moral failure of Christianity. And, he thinks, before these fatal and un-Christian divisions can hope to be overcome, the church must recognize and acknowledge the peculiar character of these divisions.

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[2] *History of the Papacy in the 19th Century*. By J. B. Bury. Chicago: Macmillan Co., 1930. lxi+175 pages. $3.75.

[1] *The Social Sources of Denominationalism*. By H. Richard Niebuhr. New York: Henry Holt & Co., 1929. 304 pages. $2.50.

In the next eight chapters the author sets forth convincingly the facts in the case. In discussing the "Churches of the Disinherited" (chaps. ii and iii), he follows Troeltsch and Weber especially, in pointing out that the lower strata of society furnish the creative church-forming movements, as illustrated by the beginnings of Christianity itself, and later by Lollardism, Waldensianism, the Anabaptist groups, the sects of the English Commonwealth period, and to a large degree by the Quaker movement and Methodism. Many of these sects, it is true, springing up in the lower strata of society, tend in time to become middle-class churches, for the simple reason that "godliness is conducive to economic success." Thus the Quakers and the Methodists soon came to be middle-class churches, though Methodism from its beginning was not typically lower class in its social ethics. Middle-class religion is characterized as "rather intensely personal in character," while the conception of God prevailing in this group is that of "dynamic will." The Calvinist bodies, the author states, are the best representatives of middle-class churches, his discussion of these churches following largely the generalization of Weber and Tawney.

The author's thesis is especially well illustrated in the influence of nationalism on Christianity, an influence which goes back to Constantine and has been exerted through the centuries until now. The names alone of many American denominations reveal the importance of ethnic and national factors in dividing and redividing the Christian church. In America especially, sectionalism has played a large part in creating schisms. The division of Baptists, Methodists, and Presbyterians into northern and southern bodies reflects the divisive influences exerted by slavery, while peculiar frontier conditions created such churches as the Cumberland Presbyterians and the Disciples bodies. Perhaps the chief exception to the author's thesis is that presented by the three large frontier churches: the Baptists, Disciples, and the Methodists. It is extremely difficult, and to my mind impossible, to discern any social or economic reason why in any given frontier community one family should unite with the Methodists while their neighbors become Disciples or Baptists. Still another fruitful cause of division in America is the differing ways in which immigrant churches have responded to the peculiar American influences.

Revivalism and the language question especially have had their part in dividing these transplanted churches. The author concludes his case by the presentation of the divisions created by the color line. The general acceptance of the dogma of negro inferiority resulted in the refusal of ecclesiastical equality to the negro, and in the formation of the negro churches, though differences in the cultural levels of the two races undoubtedly exerted a large influence in this separation.

Altogether it is a discouraging picture. There have been so many more divisive influences at work from the beginning than we have imagined; differences in economic and cultural status, nationalism, sectionalism, language, and race have been creating schisms and divisions throughout the Christian centuries. Can these influences be overcome? Is there any way to unity? "The history of schisms has been a history of Christianity's defeat." Is there a way to victory? The only church which can transcend divisions and which can adjust itself to the common interests of mankind, the author holds, is a church founded squarely on the Christianity of Christ and the Gospels. This road to unity requires, among other things, "that Christians learn to look upon their separate establishments and exclusive creeds with contrition rather than with pride." It is the road of sacrifice, which asks of the churches that they be willing to lose their lives in order to find "the fulfillment of their better selves."

William W. Sweet

University of Chicago

PRAYER IN MODERNISM[1]

Mr. Allen has done us a real favor in making accessible to English readers this work of the great Italian modernist. The book reflects a keen, widely read, and deeply spiritual author, rational in his recognition of the various approaches to the study of prayer, but a foe of rationalistic explanations. Under the tutelage of the German theologian Brentano he came under the influence of the ideas of James Martineau, whose intuitionist idealism is here embraced.

One of the outstanding characteristics of the book is its classifying tendency; and on this account it serves as a useful guide to an enormous range of literature. Such chapters as those on "Current Views on the Question of Prayer," "The Methods of Prayer," "Types of Prayer," introduce the beginner to the range of modern discussions, and include invaluable anthologies of first-hand materials.

[1] *Prayer*. By Mario Puglisi (translated by Bernard M. Allen). New York: Macmillan, 1929. viii+296 pages. $2.50.

Protesting against the tendency to regard prayer as seeking objective results, the author stresses the function of prayer as that whereby "the whole soul stretches like a shining arc between the finite and the infinite." Accordingly, much of recent investigation in this field is severely criticized because of its dependence on overt behavior for its data; a difficulty which has vitiated even some philosophies of prayer. "We must, in fact, raise ourselves gradually from the plane of verification and description of real facts to the wider plane of knowledge of that human nature which gives rise to them and thence to the universal process of reality" (p. 35).

Finding prayer to be universal in its response to man's craving for freedom from the limitations of human life, Signor Puglisi sees in it both irrational and rational elements. If, in the course of history, the gestures associated with such prayer of yearning become potent on their own account, magic appears, to be superseded (as it was always preceded) by an attitude independent of all words or signs, and of collective, institutional liturgies.

Four methods of prayer (concentration, meditation, contemplation and adoration) generally recognized, are, however, to be regarded, says the author, only as preparatory for prayer which "is essentially a living communion of the human with the divine" (p. 143). The function of prayer as a striving for freedom and divine communion is then set forth in an analysis of four kinds of prayer. Eudaemonistic prayer seeks material welfare; aesthetic prayer adores the beautiful and finds in it an impetus to realize the full joy of life; noetic prayer seeks intuitive understanding of the absolute truth, "the fair and fragrant blossoms of reasoned thought"; and ethical prayer raises the soul above its toils of pain through redemptive love, through identification of one's will with the Ethical Law, to "heroic exaltation and a winning of life's values."

Prayer, then, may be evaluated according to the needs out of which it arises or by "the end at which it aims"; and Signor Puglisi chooses the latter basis as sounder. Here man bursts his bonds in exalted triumph over the obstacles of his own frailties. Such prayer, he tells us in his final chapter on "Prayer in the Religious Life of Today," is best achieved not by liturgical remodeling, nor by pagan resurrections of the cult of natural beauty, nor by uniform definition of its concepts, nor by renewed subordination of the individual to an ecclesiastical system. Rather, men must find new power in prayer by "looking to the fresh living springs of its own nature for the inner sense of its working." "If praying means creating and maintaining in the heart those high desires which enable man to live apart from wickedness and from all that estranges from the life of the spirit; if praying means a full consciousness of his own nature and his own destiny, a mounting-up, an ineffable fusion of the human life in the Divine—then there should be no doubt that the metaphysical problem of prayer finds its full solution in that moral action which, while seeking to make the human will one with the Divine, also asks that it may, as reason bids, be made one with the laws of Nature" (p. 255). This sentence gives the message of the book, a message at once reasonable and sublime. In such a view prayer rises above the well-worn controversy over subjective-objective dualisms, for man's own spiritual triumph is an objective effect in Nature.

EDWIN EWART AUBREY

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A PLEA FOR SUPERNATURALISM[1]

Miracles have been largely abandoned in recent Christian apologetics, under stress of the confident insistence of scientists upon the ubiquity of natural law. This insistence Mr. Wright is not disposed to deny in principle; but he takes exception to any claim that all phenomena must be validated by what we *now* know of natural laws. Accordingly the book is a protest against dogmatism in science, and a plea for the recognition of the truth embodied in the idea of miracle as transcending our known natural laws.

If any argument were needed against prejudgment of the miraculous event as unhistorical, it would only be necessary to point out that Jesus' healing miracles were denied fifty years ago in quarters where they are accepted today in the light of newly acquired knowledge of psychotherapy.

This very fact introduces the first contention of the author: that historical science can only pass upon the evidence for the alleged event; it cannot decide whether the event was a miracle or not. "Event, not interpretative idea of event, is the domain of historical science" (p. 43). From this follows the second contention: that natural science cannot pass upon the *possibility* of an alleged miraculous event, without lapsing into a priori judgment. For miracle is not intended, as many of its protagonists have assumed, to mean a violation of natural law; it refers, rather, to supernatural processes, i.e., to processes which are part of our cosmos but not yet subsumed under natural laws. The author goes even further: natural laws are merely descriptive, they do not essay ultimate explanation and are hence incompetent to deal with the supernatural.

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[1] *Miracle in History and in Modern Thought*, or *Miracle and Christian Apologetic*. By Charles James Wright. New York: Henry Holt & Co., 1930. ix+433 pages. $6.00.

The rest of the book expands these fundamental theses in relation to the idea of God and the person of Christ. Yet in the elaborate development and illustration of his position, Mr. Wright seems to be unconscious of two obvious objections to his premises. In the first place his distinction between description and interpretation of events is arbitrary. This is important because, once that distinction is conceded, the logic of the book is inexorable. The statement begs the entire question; for what scientific laws seek to formulate is such a relation of events as serves to explain the conditions under which a given event occurs. Recourse may be had to *ultimate* conditions which lie outside the formulas of science; but it should be noted that these theological ultimates are really borrowed from the end-terms of scientific formulas—energy, movement, sensation, etc.—which are then prefixed by a "whence"? When this speculative question is raised, it is supposed to lead inevitably to religious (or supernatural) answers—until a new scientific formula presents a new end-term.

The other query that inevitably arises is whether the contention is gratuitous that the events which science cannot now explain are still possible as miracles. After all, if the credibility of miracles is to rest on their being subject to laws which science will some day learn in its maturer wisdom, is not this giving away the argument? For if historical scrutiny supports the historicity of the event which is alleged to be miraculous, and natural science is to admit the possibility of the event happening according to orderly processes of the cosmos ("nature" seems ambiguous as a term), then all that has been said is that alleged miracles will some day be shown not to contravene the regularity of nature; and the naturalist should go home happy. For the supernatural is part and parcel of a larger nature than science claims *yet* to understand.

Full bibliographical notes make the book a valuable text on this problem.

EDWIN EWART AUBREY

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A STATEMENT OF CHRISTIAN FAITH

This volume[1] is the *Confessio Fidei* of the author. Such personal statements of belief are on the increase because of what Walter Lippmann calls "the dissolution of the ancestral order." When our orthodoxies and institutions are on the march and the old uniformities of belief are broken up theology takes on a pronounced autobiographical coloring. Dr. Nixon in-forms us that this book was written "largely to meet the needs of his own soul." Insofar as the author's mood and temper are typical of the liberal movement in Protestant Christianity his book reflects the growth of a constructive and positive tendency among liberal Christian leaders. It seeks to face unevasively the questions which probe the depths of our Christian faith and to discover what is the valid content of that faith in the world of modern thought. Dr. Nixon has succeeded in rethinking his Christian faith in terms of contemporary thought in a way that is both conserving and constructive. The amiable vagueness of liberal preaching has been succeeded by an effort to state the basic scientific and philosophic assumptions of our day and to point out how these support or modify the "persistent intuitions of Christianity."

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[1] *An Emerging Christian Faith.* By Justin Wroe Nixon. New York: Harper & Bros., 1930. 327 pages. $2.50.

The forces which are producing a new religious outlook, the relevance and validity of religion today, the positive content of a modern Christian faith, and the prospect for religion in a mechanized civilization are discussed in a clear-cut, vigorous, and engaging style. The author is at home in contemporary philosophy, psychology, and sociology, and draws freely and skilfully from his extensive reading in his attempt at an effective restatement of essential Christianity. Although the major portion of the book is devoted to the fate of our traditional beliefs as a result of "the break-up of the great tradition," a more vital problem is declared to confront us in the conflict between the Christian ethic and the economic order which threatens to nullify it.

The accuracy of the title may be questioned. It suggests that a Christian faith is just now making its appearance. The content of the book would suggest the title, *The Re-Emerging Christian Faith.* For when Dr. Nixon has completed his analysis of the impact of modern thought upon the Christian faith, only spurious accretions of the past have been lost while the core of essential Christianity remains. And it not only remains but is discovered to be re-enforced and enhanced by the developments of contemporary thought. The liberals it would seem are beginning to give us a new set of fundamentals.

Ministers who are perplexed about what the Christian message to thinking people of today should consist of will find an admirable and substantial statement of that message in this book. It is true that we do not have here a collection of sermons, but we do have a thoughtful and readily intelligible examination of what is valid theological and ethical content for sermons in this age of science, democracy, and the machine.

R. W. FRANK

PRESBYTERIAN THEOLOGICAL SEMINARY

CHURCH AND STATE IN EDUCATION

Without any doubt one of the most significant developments in religious education during the next decade will be in the direction of its relation to the educational program of the state as carried on in the public schools. As both general education and religious education develop their procedures on the theory that education of whatever sort is in one way or another directly concerned with the current experience of the learner and has for its objective the development of certain types of personality in social relations it becomes increasingly clear that both general and religious education must relate their procedures to those of all other agencies concerned with the child. This is the thesis developed in Professor Tuttle's new book.[1] As a professor of educational sociology, the author approaches education as a total process concerned with the development of the whole child. He reviews and evaluates the character education movement in the public schools. He is convinced that any effective education for character must include religion. He reviews the various approaches to the co-ordination of religion with public education, and concludes that the most promising lead is opened for further experimentation through week-day religious education carried on by the co-operating churches in conjunction with the public schools on released time.

WILLIAM CLAYTON BOWER

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PSYCHOLOGY APPLIED TO RELIGIOUS WORK

There is an increasing stream of literature devoted to the use of psychology and psychiatry in the field of religious practice. Professors Paul V. West and Charles E. Skinner have collaborated in the formulation of a discussion of applied psychology for the use of religious and social workers.[1] The book consists of three parts: a general introduction to psychology, psychology applied to fields of special interest, such as attitudes, imitation, volition, motivation, mental hygiene, and leadership; and applications of psychology in religious and social work. The book is useful as a general orientation discussion to the field of applied psychology in the field of religion and social work. It is quite elementary and can scarcely be said to deal in a thoroughgoing way with the processes by which the religious operation is to be carried on with persons and groups. Its treatment of religious education is particularly disappointing and lacking in insight into the processes that are under way in its modern reconstruction. Psychology in its analysis of the basic functional operations of religion and in its employment of the psychiatric techniques has penetrated much more deeply into religious practice than the present discussion would suggest.

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[1] *Character Education by State and Church.* By Harold S. Tuttle. New York: Abingdon Press. 164 pages. $1.50.

[1] *Psychology for Religious and Social Workers.* Charles E. Skinner and Paul V. West. New York: Century Co., 1930. xiv+528 pages. $3.00.

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THE AIMS OF RELIGIOUS EDUCATION

It is a moment of considerable importance in the development of religious education when an attempt is made to formulate its objectives in a consistent and integrated manner.[1] This Mr. Vieth has attempted to do in the first publication of its kind in this rapidly developing field of religious interest.

Significance is added to Mr. Vieth's publication by the fact that it has arisen out of a practical operation in the conduct of religious education in connection with Mr. Vieth's work as Director of Research of the International Council of Religious Education. In this movement forty-six Evangelical Protestant churches are co-operating in working out curricula and building programs for their constituencies. It is in connection with these operations that the sense of need has arisen for a clear and comprehensive statement of desirable objectives.

Mr. Vieth's method is that of consensus. He asked 213 professors of religious education in seminaries and colleges to list the ten men whom they considered the outstanding leaders in religious education. The writings of the ten men receiving the highest number of votes were analyzed for such statements as they had made concerning objectives. To this original list of religious educators were added the members of the Committee on Curriculum appointed by the National Education Association and reporting in the *Twenty-sixth Yearbook for the Study of Education*, who had in any way dealt with religious education in their writings. The statements of these men were classified under seven heads with minor subheads. This statement was in turn submitted to 434 professional workers in religious education, including teachers, directors, promotional leaders, ministers, college presidents, and leaders in general education, who substantially confirmed by their check lists the original arrangement of the statements regarding objectives.

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[1] *Objectives in Religious Education.* By Paul H. Vieth. New York: Harper and Bros. xiv+341 pages. $2.50.

By this method the author arrives at seven general objectives: (1) to foster in growing persons a consciousness of God as a reality in human experience, and a sense of personal relationship to him; (2) to lead growing persons into an understanding and appreciation of the personality, life, and teachings of Jesus Christ; (3) to foster in growing persons a progressive and continuous development of Christlike character; (4) to develop in growing persons the ability and disposition to participate in and contribute constructively to the building of a social order embodying the ideal of the fatherhood of God and the brotherhood of man; (5) to lead growing persons to build a life philosophy on the basis of a Christian interpretation of life and the universe; (6) to develop in growing persons the ability and disposition to participate in the organized society of Christians—the church ;(7) to effect in growing persons the assimilation of the best religious experience of the race, as effective guidance to present experience. Each of these major objectives is supported by minor items from the writings of the authorities quoted.

The author properly confines the present study and technique to the statement of general objectives, holding, with the more progressive trends in current vital educational theory, that specific objectives must wait upon the facing by persons and groups of specific and concrete life situations involving issues to be resolved in terms of religious choices and patterns of behavior.

The author rightly regards this exploration of opinions currently held as only a first step in the formulation of adequate objectives. As an initial step it is of great value. But there are many steps that will carry investigators far beyond the technique of consensus into the technique of analysis of personal and social experience as well as the operative values of current culture that will need to be taken before religious educators may feel that they have a validated body of objectives by which to judge and direct their operation. It is to be hoped that this initial venture will be followed by other investigations employing the techniques of analysis.

The author's technique is subject to one serious limitation. The opinions of the authorities are dealt with uncritically, being stated and classified without reference to differences of psychological and philosophical viewpoints. The divergencies in fundamental assumptions and approach among these authorities are very great and these should by all means have been taken account of. Mere verbal agreement under inclusive categories tends to obscure these differences, if not to create the illusion of agreement where agreement does not exist.

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EXPERIMENTING WITH NEW TECHNIQUES IN RELIGIOUS EDUCATION

In the fields of character and religious education various attempts are being made to get away from the older methods and to use more vital and effective approaches to the problems involved. Three recent books illustrate what is being done and how the specific work of religious education and the more general work of character education are related. The first[1] described below is from the expanding field of summer camps; the second,[2] from the laboratory school of a theological seminary; the third,[3] from the experience of week-day schools.

The findings of Dimock and Hendry are far more than those arrived at by the manipulation of statistical data gathered from a few paper-and-pencil tests. The study is a thorough one, made by well-trained persons, and is based upon data gathered in five consecutive summers, by the authors who were leaders in the camp described. Their contribution is fourfold: (1) an evaluation of the character-making factors in a summer camp; (2) an analysis of a new type of educational procedures; (3) a supervisory method of training camp leaders; and (4) detailed explanation of the use of observation records and rating scales in measuring results of the enterprise.

Camp Ahmek, where the investigation was made, has been conducted for the past ten years by Taylor Statten, an internationally known leader in boy's work. In this camp carefully selected leaders, ready to co-operate in making records and trying out new plans, make the meaning of this study most significant. The camp is organized for co-operative living and the program is identified with the whole process of living together. The book gives a clear description of the whole set-up of the camp, preparation, determination of objectives, program-building, typical activities, methods of guiding the learning processes, cases of personal adjustment, training and supervising leaders, and appraising results. The value of the book is not limited to camp directors, for both the techniques and the findings are of interest to all workers in the field of character-training.

Exploring Religion with Eight-Year-Olds is a title that challenges attention, for the idea of expecting eight-year-olds to be able or interested in exploring religion is quite novel. The book is for the most part a diary record of actual happenings in a primary group in the Union School of Religion. The last few chapters are the point of view of the authors and their analysis of what was achieved. To quote a few of the chapter headings will suffice to indicate the radical departure that is pictured in this book: "The Children Discuss Frogs and War and Have a Chance To Test Their Theories," "The Children Discuss the Basis on Which Parents Should Expect Obedience," "A Boy Raises the Question, 'Is There Any God?' and the Children Discuss it," "They Wonder What It Is That Lives after We Die and Whether Discovering Scarlet Fever Germs Is Religious," "The Children Prefer the God of Jesus to the God of Abraham. They Discuss also Jacob and Esau." There is no attempt to present any perfect example in the lessons, and questions are raised all through as to what might have been a better procedure in particular parts of the process. The tone of the book is far from that of the ordinary omniscient authority of the old-time text. For instance, a comment on one lesson begins, "The discussion on the conflict between science and religion and on Jesus and immortality left the teacher puzzled and dissatisfied." Reports of this kind make clear where research must be made to aid the practical worker in the field.

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[1] *Camping and Character*. By Hedley S. Dimock and Charles E. Hendry. New York: Association Press, 1929. xv+364 pages. $3.50.

[2] *Exploring Religion with Eight-Year-Olds*. By Helen S. Sweet and Sophia L. Fahs. New York: Henry Holt & Co., 1930. xvi+283 pages. $2.50.

[3] *Seeking the Beautiful in God's World*. By Amy Clowes. New York: Richard R. Smith, Inc., 1930. xxxv+208 pages. $2.00.

The third book, *Seeking the Beautiful in God's World,* is a course in which the experience-centered curriculum method is used with primary children. It was developed by the author when teaching in the Week-Day School of Dayton, Ohio, and was completed during residence at the Hartford School of Religious Education. The book is not organized at all like the ordinary text, and is a good example of what may be expected in the next few years while the newer type of materials and methods is being developed. Instead of a lesson being completed in a day, projects run over several days, and at each step the purpose is to plan for co-operative participation of the children under guidance of a democratically minded teacher. The imperfections in classroom procedure, in suggested materials, and in definition of desired outcomes reveal, as in the case of the preceding record of Mrs. Sweet, some of the places where considerable study and experimentation will have to be made before satisfactory results by the newer method are reached. Wherever the book is used it should be carefully evaluated as a whole and then made use of as a suggestive rather than an exemplary guide.

E. J. CHAVE

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COLLECTION OF ANTHEMS[1]

The new collection of anthems published by the Century Company is a work of first-rate intention and second-rate achievement. The editor has compiled with great catholicity of taste eighteen motets and anthems of the last four centuries. With admirable distaste for the commercial anthem-books published by the dozen each year for an undiscriminating clientèle, he has sought to include in his collection only music which really deserves to be sung. But he has apparently undertaken a task too severe for him, for in both selection and editing the book betrays the hand of the amateur in religious music. The newly translated English texts of the Latin motets are made possible at a sacrifice both of scholarly accuracy in the transcription of the original notes and of the particular expressiveness which results only when the music illustrates in translation the precise sentiment it illustrated in the original text. Furthermore, several of the selections are too involved for the use of any but a thoroughly experienced chorus. The five modern compositions, two of them by the editor himself, and all of distinctly inferior musical quality, do not deserve a place in the collection for two reasons: No choir director will care to use them who adheres to the standard of religious music set in this volume by the works of Palestrina, Vittoria, and Bach; and they are far from representing the best contributions of contemporary composition to the field of sacred music. The collection as a whole represents a commendable, if not wholly successful, effort to provide an antidote for the trivial compilations of "religious music" to be found on every hand.

CECIL MICHENER SMITH

UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO

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[1] *Anthems Old and New.* By Ian Alexander (ed.). New York: Century Co., 1929. 144 pages. $2.50.

RECENT BOOKS

RELIGIONS IN GENERAL

BARTON, GEORGE A. *The Royal Inscriptions of Sumer and Akkad.* New Haven: Yale University Press. 1929. xxii+406 pages. $6.50.

The Royal Inscriptions of Sumer and Akkad, by George A. Barton, appears as Vol. I of the Library of the Ancient Semitic Inscriptions, published for the American Oriental Society by the Yale University Press.

The scope of the work embraces all Sumerian and Akkadian royal inscriptions prior to the First Dynasty of Babylon. It therefore supplements and seeks to bring up to date Thureau Dangin's *Sumerischen und akkadischen Königsinschriften,* published twenty years ago. The volume is accordingly timely and should serve a very useful purpose.

The book contains two hundred and thirty inscriptions covering approximately two hundred pages, and supplies a page for page translation. The work is frankly a compendium of text and translation, referred to directly by footnote. The material is arranged chronologically in so far as this is regarded as feasible by the author.

The volume is provided with a concise Introduction, and includes useful Indices covering deities, temples, buildings, rivers, canals, and personal names.

One misses a Glossary. One cannot, perhaps, complain too much over its absence. There were good earlier precedents for omitting it, but more recently very good ones for its inclusion. The reviewer ventures that it would have added very greatly to the value and usefulness of the book without appreciably lengthening it or requiring undue extra labor of the author. His tabulation of distinctive forms necessary to assure accuracy of translation is unavailable, and every careful reader must now go through and do this for himself. There have been gains in our knowledge of Sumerian during the past twenty years, certainly comparable in importance to the increase in material in the same period. It would have been helpful to have had this also graphically recorded.

The volume is pleasing in appearance and clearly printed. It represents a vast amount of labor on the part of the author and a great labor saving to other scholars, for which they will be grateful. It adds also another important volume to the works of the veteran author, for which he is to be congratulated.

CULLER, ARTHUR J. *Creative Religious Literature.* New York: Macmillan, 1930. xiii+345 pages. $2.50.

Professor Culler has here presented the various types of biblical literature in so attractive a dress that the popular reader will be quite surprised at the virility and lifelike qualities of the books and the characters therein depicted. Having successfully humanized this Jewish-Christian literature, the author proceeds, with much skill and enthusiasm, to show how much other literature there is in the world closely akin to this in purpose and spirit. The clever teacher or parent may easily fit other selections into the scheme of study suggested by Dr. Culler, thus perfecting a study of the world's finest religious literature.

Gunkel, Hermann and Zscharnack, Leopold (eds.). *Die Religion in Geschichte und Gegenwart*. 2. Aufl. Band IV, Bogen 18–53 (77.–88. Lieferung), Cols. 545–1696, M. 21.60. Tübingen: Mohr, 1930.

With remarkable regularity the new parts of this encyclopedia keep appearing. The alphabet has now been covered as far as the letter "r." In the *Bogen* listed above particular attention may be called to a considerable variety of longer and more important articles. There are several timely descriptions of religious conditions in certain geographical areas, like Austria, Norway, Prussia, Poland. Also eastern Christendom is given due consideration under the entries "Oriental National Churches" and "Orthodox Anatolian Church." Interesting biographical matter is to be found under such topics as Origen, Paul (the apostle), and Peter. The student whose special interests are biblical will find here many valuable items, especially the articles on "Psalms," "Prophets," "Priesthood," and "Sacrifice." The two long discussions on "Papacy" and "Protestantism" will prove particularly useful to the church historian, and he will linger with pleasure on the presentation of many other subjects, such for example as pietism and the history of preaching. On speculative problems the materials are notably rich. "Philosophy," "Psychology," "Predestination," "Occultism," "Revelation," "Pantheism," "Orthodoxy" belong in this section of the alphabet and all receive thorough treatment. The practical interests are also duly recognized in such titles as "Pedagogy" and the religious "Press," and a relatively large amount of space is alloted to "Psychiatry," "Psychoanalysis," and "Psychotherapy."

Hebrew Union College Annual, Cincinnati, Ohio, 1930. 356 pages. $2.00.

This volume, while not so bulky as some of its predecessors were, contains eleven papers setting forth materials of interest to a variety of students. One finds here a lengthy exposition of "The Pharisees and their Teachings," consisting of three lectures which Professor Lauterbach delivered in 1928 at the Divinity School of the University of Chicago and at Garrett Biblical Institute. Very interesting sidelights on the early Christian controversy with Marcion are furnished by Professor Marmorstein of London in his paper on "The Background of the Haggadah." President Morgenstern's "The Gates of Righteousness" is a detailed examination of one item in which astral ideas are thought to have influenced the religion of Israel. A significant phase of Christianity's early relation to Judaism is treated by Professor Gavin of the Episcopal theological school in New York under the title "Rabbinic Parallels in Early Church Orders." Two papers, "Arabisch-jüdische Schöpfungstheorieen" and "Studies in History of Mathematics from Hebrew and Arabic Sources," contribute to a better understanding of the place occupied by the Jews in the origins of European culture.

HEBREW LITERATURE AND RELIGION

Brooke, A. E., McLean, N., and Thackeray, H. St.J. (eds.). *The Old Testament in Greek*, Vol. II, Part II: *I & II Kings*. New York: Macmillan, 1930. 188 pages. $7.00.

This latest volume of the Cambridge edition of the Greek Old Testament, which prints the text of codex Vaticanus with an extensive critical apparatus, follows the method employed in Part I. The editors had the use of collations arranged at Göttingen by Professor Rahlfs, and have added half a dozen manuscripts to the list of selected cursive manuscripts quoted for Samuel. The usefulness of this volume (as of the entire series) to those interested in the text of the Greek Old Testament needs no argument.

CHARUE, ANDRÉ. *L'Incrédulité des Juifs dans le Nouveau Testament.* Gembloux, Belgium: Imprimerie J. Duculot. xi+371 pages.

A minutely documented study with a point of view which is surprising since the volume is a dissertation of the Catholic University of Louvain carrying the official imprimatur. It should be of distinct value in spreading the unquestionably correct information of legalistic Judaism in New Testament times. Like many other continental Catholic studies the bibliography is remarkable for its inclusion of English and American work. There is an excellent summary of the characteristics of late Judaism. The explanation of the Jewish disbelief is hardly successful, but even though in its main purpose the study cannot be said to be successful, its value in certain by-products is great.

HIGGER, MICHAEL. *Seven Minor Treatises.* New York: Bloch Publishing Co., 1930. 56 pages.

In the usual Talmud editions seven special treatises, each on a specific subject, are published. They are *Aboth d' Rabbi Nathan, Sopherim, Ebel Rabbathi, Callah, Derech Eretz, Derech Eretz Zuta, Perek Ha-shalom.* In addition to these there are seven similar treatises which were published by Kirchheim (Frankfort on the Main, 1851). These minor treatises are *Sefer Torah, Mezuzah, Tefillin, Zizith, Abadim, Kutim, Gerim.* English translations of the minor tractate "Kutim" are found in Nutt's *Samaritan Targum,* pp. 68–72, and Montgomery's *Samaritans,* pp. 196–203.

The present volume by Dr. Michael Higger gives a good text of these minor treatises based on a manuscript (Adler 2237). The text is provided with variants, a Hebrew and English Introduction, and a full translation.

KORTLEITNER, FRANCISCUS XAV. *I. Babyloniorum auctoritas quantum apud antiquos Israelitas valuerit. Idem: II. De Sumeriis eorumque cum vetere testamento rationibus.* Commentationis biblicae, T. IV et V. Innsbruck, Austria: Felizian Rauch, 1930. xi+116 and viii+94 pages. Each M. 3.

In these two small books the author aims to present the historical, religious, and cultural relations between the Hebrews on one side and Sumerians, Babylonians, and Assyrians on the other. The main objection against this work is the attempt to define separately the influence of the Sumerians and Babylonians on the Hebrews.

It is still very uncertain and in many cases impossible to judge what of cultural patrimony was borrowed by the surrounding peoples from the Sumerians and what from the Semites who occupied later the same territory. How uncertain it is to decide such questions is shown for instance in Volume II, page 80, where the gods Marduk, Sin, Ishtar, Nergal, Rimmon, Sikkut, and Tammuz are called Sumerian gods. In fact, not one of them can be safely called a Sumerian god. The book is in general based on good sources and can be recommended to anybody interested in the relations between these two countries.

W. O. E. OESTERLEY and THEODORE H. ROBINSON. *Hebrew Religion: Its Origin and Development.* New York: Macmillan Co., 1930. xxiv+400 pages. $2.50.

Here is a well-organized work, scholarly enough to intrigue the interest of the specialist in Old Testament, and yet not so technical as to destroy its value for the clergyman and layman. As its title suggests, this is a definitely religious rather than political history, the latter being introduced incidentally when necessary.

Beginning with its nomadic origins, the religion of the Hebrews is traced through the Greek period. A modest hesitancy is evidenced in admitting foreign influences in the pre-exilic religion, the authors being content to note parallelisms. The Kenite hypothesis of the origin of Yahwism, the origin of calf worship at Sinai, the historicity of Josiah's reform, the generally accepted dating and significance of the prophets, and Persian influence in later Hebrew eschatology are among the positions maintained by the authors. The book concludes with a series of effective essays on "Pietism, God and the Individual Soul," "The Problem of Suffering," "The Doctrine of Immortality, Wisdom, Eschatology, and The Law."

There are two general criticisms of the book. The authors have not escaped from the traditional and prevalent approach to Hebrew religion as a subject rather than as a part of life, and there is insufficient recognition of the abiding influences and contributions of the agricultural religious culture of Israel. In spite of this, however, it remains one of the best of recent books on the Hebrew religion.

RANSTON, HARRY. *The Old Testament Wisdom Books and Their Teaching.* London: Epworth Press, 1930. 307 pages. 10 sh.

This is an excellent introduction to the Wisdom Literature of the Old Testament. It takes up in turn the Book of Proverbs, the Book of Job, the Song of Songs, and the Book of Ecclesiastes. The point of view throughout is that of the modern scholar. Each book is analyzed into its component parts, and the date of each section is discussed, as well as its authorship and teachings. The influence of foreign thought upon the content of the books is also carefully discussed. When differing views are held as to the purpose or thought of a book, these are set forth fully and are critically reviewed. It is on the whole the best existing introduction to the Wisdom Books of the Old Testament.

TEDESCHE, SIDNEY S. *A Critical Edition of I Esdras.* New York: Bloch Publishing Co., 1928. 131 pages. $2.00.

Purporting to be a "critical" edition of Esdras, Rabbi Tedesche offers a text to support Professor Torrey's well-known theory which was expressed in outline in his *Ezra Studies.* Naturally this work, which represents the author's doctoral work under the direction of Professor Torrey, meets with his master's approval; Professor Torrey contributes a Preface to the volume. The content is exactly what would be expected by anyone who is acquainted with the Torrey hypothesis. Tedesche repudiates the B text for one manufactured in the interest of his theory. There is unconscious humor in his relegation of Fritzsche's text as "eclectic," while his own is in effect wholly based upon the assumptions of Professor Torrey's conjectures.

NEW TESTAMENT

DALMAN, GUSTAF. *Die Worte Jesu.* 2d ed. Leipzig: Hinrichs, 1930. x+410 pages. Unbound M. 25.00, bound M. 27.50.

Pages 1–280 are a reprint of the first edition in which typographical errors have been corrected. Of the first edition pages 281–309 ("Messianische Texte") have been dropped; and in their place this edition has an eighty-page discussion of the Lord's Prayer, thirty pages of notes containing corrections and additions to the first edition, and two short notes to *Jesus-Jeshua* on the use of bread and wine at the Passover. The notes on the Lord's Prayer are enriched with numerous quotations and parallels from Jewish literature, and the author uses, in his interpretation of the Aramaic prayer which he reconstructs, his wide knowledge of that language.

HIRSCH, EMANUEL. *Jesus Christus der Herr.* Göttingen: Vandenhoeck und Ruprecht, 1929 (2d rev. ed.). 92 pages. M. 3.

A highly theological argument for the deity of Jesus which is basically a polemic against recent German studies of the origin of the gospels. Bultmann is particularly opposed. The author's point of view is that of the traditional evangelical theology.

RICHARD, PAUL. *The Scourge of Christ.* Translated from the French by Linda Richard. New York: Knopf, 1929. 261 pages. $2.50.

Poetic and mystical utterances in response to meditations about various aspects of the story of Jesus. There is much beauty in them; a Foreword testifies to the satisfaction which Rabindranath Tagore derives from constant reading.

ROSS, G. A. JOHNSTON. *Why Preach Christ?* Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1929. viii+114 pages. $1.50.

A scholarly and eloquent presentation of "a plea for the holy ministry," with much fine human passion and with splendid breadth of outlook.

SCHWEITZER, ALBERT. *Die Mystik des Apostels Paulus.* Tübingen: J. C. B. Mohr, 1930. xvi+407 pages. Unbound M. 16, bound M. 19.

In this volume the characteristic theories adumbrated in the concluding chapter of the author's *Geschichte der paulinischen Forschung* are given strong, definite, and extended presentation. The result is a completely eschatological interpretation of that mysticism which was the central item in Paul's religious experience. Mysticism itself is defined by the author in near eschatological terminology as a transcending of the dualism of time and eternity, and the experiencing of eternal existence here and now. Schweitzer avers that for Paul this was no merely personal Christ-mysticism, but rather a literal Messiah-mysticism of a unique Jewish Christian variety. It grew directly out of the intensification of the believer's expectation of personal transformation at the time of Jesus' return as Messiah. The use of the vocabulary of gentile mysticism is granted to Paul; but it is insisted throughout that the apostle's ideas were Jewish and eschatological. Thus Schweitzer counters the hellenistic tendencies of Bousset and Reitzenstein and the hellenistic-Jewish interpretation of Deissmann with a thorough-going Jewish-Christian eschatology. Only in the post-Pauline period is allowance made for a Christian mysticism that was hellenistic in character.

To the student familiar with the rich and varied experiences of gentile mystics in the Graeco-Roman world, Schweitzer's description of Pauline mysticism seems very constricted. The most obvious parallels in contemporary gentile religions are ignored, and an artificial genesis is attributed to a type of religious experience that developed naturally out of the social conditions of the period.

HISTORY OF CHRISTIANITY

Acta Conventus Pragensis pro Studiis Orientalibus anno MCMXXIX celebrati. Olomucii, Salesia, 1930. 260 pages. Kc. 38.

This is a collection of addresses in Latin, Czech, French, Russian, and Ruthenian, delivered at the 1930 meeting of the Prague section of the Apostolate of SS. Cyril and Methodius. This is a Slavic Roman Catholic organization with headquarters at

Velehrad, the historic see of the "apostles of the Slavs" Cyril and Methodius, existing for the purpose of cultivating closer relations with the Eastern Orthodox churches. The addresses deal with various themes related to Orthodox theology and history.

BURY, J. B. *History of the Papacy in the Nineteenth Century.* Edited by R. H. Murray. Chicago: Macmillan, 1930. lxi+175 pages. $3.75.

The seven lectures here contained were delivered in 1908. The author died in 1927, having distinguished himself by work of lasting value in the history of the Roman Empire. The book is provided with a memoir of Professor Bury by Dr. R. H. Murray. The series includes two lectures on the "Syllabus of Errors," three on the "Vatican Council," one on the "Doctrine of Infallibility," and one on the "Fall of the Temporal Power." While necessarily much familiar ground is retraced, the lectures make a definite contribution. They are marked by that full research which gives a distinctive sureness to all Bury's work. Pius IX appears in the light of an absolute and even tyrannical ruler, claiming rights which had not been claimed at Trent, and crushing a bewildered opposition party. Bury is himself impressed by the increased influence of the papacy in an environment hostile to its antiquated ideas.

CLASSEN, WALTHER. *Eintritt des Christentums in die Welt.* Gotha: Leopold Klotz, 1930. 433 pages. M. 12.

In a lucid, abbreviated, comprehensive manner Walther Classen's new volume sketches Christianity's conquest of Graeco-Roman culture from the first to the sixth centuries inclusive. The story begins with the emergence of the religious movements headed by John the Baptist and Jesus in Palestine and it ends with the Benedictines and Monte Cassino. It is a tale vividly told; for the author knows the life of ancient times and the topography of the Mediterranean world. At the end is an invaluable map recording the main ethnographic and physiographic factors involved in the social and religious developments of the period. Intended alike for the specialist and the non-historically educated, the book is better adapted to the latter than to the former.

FRICK, HEINRICH (ed). Marburger Theologische Studien. Heft I: *Zur biblischen Theologie: Sakrament und Ethik bei Paulus* von H. von Soden; *Deus invisibilis* von E. Fascher. Gotha: Klotz, 1930. 77 pages. M. 3.50.

The former of these two essays deals with the literary and theological unity of I Cor., chaps. viii–x. It attacks the old problem of how Paul can have maintained the primacy of ethics in religion when he used language that might seem to make the Eucharist a magically operating sacrament. While von Soden admits that there is a sacramental emphasis in Paul, he thinks it secondary. Heitmüller's statement that if Paul had not found baptism and the Lord's supper existing as sacraments then he would have had to make them such himself, is, in the opinion of von Soden, unjustified. He thinks Paul would never have used this sacramental phraseology had it not been imposed upon him by the gentile community.

Fascher studies the notion of the "invisible God" as it occurs throughout the Old and New Testaments. The essay is carefully documented, and constitutes a useful preliminary investigation for later Christian speculations on the Trinity.

FÜLÖP-MILLER, RENÉ. The Power and Secret of the Jesuits. New York: The Viking Press, 1930. xviii+523 pages. $5.00.

Fülöp-Miller knows the art of writing, and easily maintains the reader's interest throughout a book that must contain more than two hundred thousand words. Indeed the great human story of the Jesuits is here popularized as never before. It is a record of light and shade, but the author inclines to favorable judgments. The fascination of the story lies largely in the depiction of character and in the narratives of the personal careers of men who devoted their lives, whether in evangelism or in intrigue, to the sole end of furthering the cause of the Order. The whole constitutes a forcible lesson in the power of religious discipline to lead and control world affairs. Fülöp-Miller is a modern liberal, and in the light of modern ideas he is more critical of Jesuit philosophy than of Jesuit morality. While principles of the Jesuits that once shocked the moralists have of late come to recognition, the modern mind has departed far from the Thomist Aristotelianism, to which, with few exceptions, Jesuits have clung. The book has an extensive bibliography but no footnotes.

GEYER, BERNHARD and ZELLINGER, JOHANNES (eds.). *Florilegium Patristicum tam veteris quam medii aevi auctores complectens.* Bonn: Peter Hanstein. Fasc. IV: *Quinti Septimii Florentii Tertulliani librum de Praescriptione Haereticorum addito S. Irenaei Adversus Haereses libro III, 3–4 post G. Rauschen iterum recensuit J. Martin* (1930). 47 pages. M. 2. Fasc. VIII: *M. Minucii Felecis Octavius. Recensuit J. Martin* (1930). 86 pages. M. 3.60. Fasc. XXII: *SS. Eusebii Hieronymi et Aurelii Augustini epistulae mutuae. Edidit, prolegomenis et notis instruxit, J. Schmid* (1930). 128 pages. M. 5.60. Fasc. XXIII: *S. Aurelii Augustini Episcopi Hipponensis liber de vivendo Deo seu Epistula 147. Edidit M. Schmaus* (1930). 34 pages. M. 1.50. Fasc. XXIV: *S. Aurelii Augustini Episcopi Hipponensis de doctrina christiana libros quattuor edidit H. J. Vogels* (1930). 103 pages. M. 5.

The very handy series of Patristic texts which began to appear under the editorship of G. Rauschen in 1904 is now notably progressing under the direction of its two new editors who have been guiding the enterprise for the last couple of years. These monographs, which are excellently edited and printed, will prove a boon to students who desire to read the Latin Fathers in the original, but find the present price of the respective volumes of the *Corpus scriptorum ecclesiasticorum latinorum* prohibitive. A similar series for the Greek Fathers would surely find a hearty welcome. Except in Fasciculus I, *Monumenta aevi apostolici* and Fasciculus II, *S. Justini apologiae duae,* and in portions of Fasciculus III, Greek writers have not thus far been included.

Fasciculus IV and Fasciculus VIII are new editions. Each is thoroughly reworked, and presents both new bibliographical materials and additional textual data. In the case of Fasciculus VIII the revision is so thoroughgoing as to be essentially a completely new edition and the name of the original editor (Rauschen) has quite properly been omitted from the title page. In view of the lively discussion that still revolves about Minucius Felix, it is particularly gratifying to have at hand a new edition of the text with a brief but important Introduction and extensive annotations bearing on matters textual, literary, and historical. Fasciculus XXII contains "Prolegomena" of twenty-four pages describing the setting for this interchange of letters between Jerome and Augustine and presenting an analysis of the four most important problems involved in the correspondence, viz., (1) the authority of the Septuagint in relation to the value Jerome's new rendering made from the Hebrew, (2) the interpretation of Gal. 2:11–14, (3) the origin of the human soul, and (4) the correct understanding of James 2:10. It is a great convenience to have this selection of letters—nineteen in all—brought together for the purpose of acquainting one with these outstanding individuals of fifth-century Christianity in discussions on questions of vital importance to that age. Fasciculus XXIII presents another phase of the versatile Augustine's interest. The question of the believer's seeing God raises psychological problems already discussed more in detail by the editor M. Schmaus in his *Die psychologische Trinitätslehre des hl. Augustinus* (Münster, 1927). The text of the *Christian Doctrine* (Fasciculus XXIV) is in the main the Benedictine (Migne, *Patrologia Latina*, XXXIV) without annotations.

HEERING, G. J. *Der Sündenfall des Christentums.* Gotha: Leopold Klotz, 1930. xi+278 pages. Unbound M. 10.00, bound M. 12.00.

Prof. Heering of Leiden is remembered with good will by all who met or heard him in America last year. This volume is a German edition of a Dutch work: an English translation (George Allen and Unwin) is immediately forthcoming. Dr. Heering examines the relation between militarism and Christianity, and sees here the greatest failure of Christianity. With a zeal for the Gospel which makes him "more than a pacifist," the author seeks the complete separation of war-mindedness from Christianity.

HERMELINK, HEINRICH. *Das Marburger Religionsgespräch, 1529–1929.* Gotha: Leopold Klotz, 1930. 87 pages. M. 3.00.

Sermons, lectures, and addresses delivered at the four hundredth anniversary (1929), of the Marburg Colloquy, with a list of the members of the conference, German and foreign.

HUTCHINSON, PAUL. *Men Who Made the Churches.* Nashville: Cokesbury Press. 1930. 212 pages. $1.50.

This collection of eight brief biographies of church founders goes only a little way toward answering the question: Where did the churches come from? Luther, Cromwell, John Knox, John Bunyan, George Fox, John Wycliffe, John Wesley, and Alexander Campbell make up the list of subjects. Indeed the book is little more than portrait sketches, though the author possesses that rare ability of catching the salient points in a great career and setting them forth with a few bold strokes. The book is evidently intended for the general reader who has neither time nor inclination to read the great biographies of this galaxy, but even those who profess scholarly interests might well read through this little volume, not necessarily for new facts, but rather to gain some instruction as to how to make the great men of the past live again.

INMAN, SAMUEL GUY. *Evangelicals at Havana.* New York: Committee on Co-operation in Latin America, 1929. 174 pages. $0.25.

This little volume is devoted to a description of a Congress held in Havana, Cuba, in June, 1929, made up of delegates representing the several Evangelical churches which are conducting educational and mission work in Hispanic America. The countries chiefly represented were those bordering on the Caribbean, though there were representatives from Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Columbia, Peru and Venezuela, and the United States. The author, the Secretary of the Committee on Co-operation in Latin America, is thoroughly familiar with present-day Latin America and discusses the conference under such heads as "Atmosphere," "Preparation," "Processes," and "Significance." The conference resulted in putting into immediate operation a number of practical projects such as establishing a union seminary in each geographical center of the Caribbean; in projecting a course of study in religious education to be written by nationals, and in approving a plan for the formation of a Latin American Federation of Churches. This conference presents an excellent example of the progress being made in practical co-operation in Christian missions among the Evangelical churches.

JUGIE, MARTIN. *Theologia Dogmatica Christianorum Orientalium, tomus III, Theologiae dogmaticae Graeco-Russorum Expositio.* Paris: Letouzey et Ane, 1930. 510 pages.

This is the third volume of an exhaustive treatment of the Eastern Orthodox dogmatic theology, written by a Roman Catholic scholar who is a recognized authority in that field. It deals with the teaching of the Russian church regarding the sacraments. It is an authoritative, well-documented, and fair treatment of the subject.

KOCH, HUGO. *Cathedra Petri.* Giessen: Alfred Töpelmann, 1930. xiii+188 pages. M. 12.

This Roman Catholic modernist, who for two decades has made Cyprian his particular topic of research, now comes to the defense of his earlier work on *Cyprian und der romische Primat* published as XXXV, 1 of "Texte und Untersuchungen" in 1910. The present monograph is directed particularly against the criticisms of Erich Caspar, *Primatus Petri* (Weimar, 1927). The key-passage in Cyprian *(De ecclesiae unitate,* chaps. iv f.), where Matt. 16:18 f. and John 20:21–23 are cited, ought not in the opinion of Koch to be understood as intended to substantiate the later and present-day notion of the primacy of the *Cathedra Petri.* Rather, Cyprian cited Peter in support of the validity and authority of the church in general and of the bishops' office in particular, while the recognition of Roman primacy was a supplementary feature due to the later attendant circumstances and not to any deduction of Cyprian from the Scriptural texts. All that he understood the texts to affirm was the unity of the church and the solidarity of the episcopate—"as a bishop Peter had his successors in all bishops; he was only the first bishop of the church, the primal bishop" (p. 167). Or again, the church of the third century knew only an episcopal office based on Matt. 16:18 f., it did not know a "papacy" (p. 179). The book is a very thoroughgoing piece of research that will need to be read and pondered by every student of the rise of the papacy.

LEUBE, HANS. *Reformation und Humanismus in England.* Leipzig: D. Werner Scholl, 1930. 38 pages. M. 2.

A condensed lecture on religious aspects of English literature in the Reformation period. The footnotes are numerous and bibliographically suggestive.

MÜLLER, KARL. *Aus der akademischen Arbeit. Vorträge und Aufsätze.* Tübingen: Mohr, 1930. 356 pages. M. 15.50.

The venerable author presents in this book a collection of lectures and essays. They cover church-historical interests from the beginnings of Christianity to the present day. The following studies deserve particular attention because they review significant phases of the history of the church under new aspects: The Kingdom of God and the demons in the ancient church; the law of celibacy for all baptized Christians in the ancient church; Constantine and the Christian church; church organization in ancient Christianity; Calvin and the beginnings of the French church of the Huguenots. The autobiography which lends the title to the volume and which describes the development of Müller's work in the field of church history is fascinating. It gives an insight into the mind and the workshop of a diligent, self-denying scholar.

Orient und Occident. Blätter für theologie, ethic und sociologie. Leipzig: Hinrichs, 1930. 96 pages. Each, M. 5.

This new periodical publication aims to bridge over the gulf which separate the Eastern Orthodox and the Western cultures. A fair proportion of the articles is written by outstanding Russian theological and philosophical thinkers such as Bulgakov, Arsenyev, and Berdyaev. As such, it is an important means of acquaintance with the living thought of the leaders of Eastern Orthodoxy. Hitherto, three numbers have been published.

RAUER, MAX (ed.). *Origenes Werke.* Bd. IX: *Die Homilien zu Lukas in der Übersetzung des Hieronymous und die griechischen Reste der Homilien und des Lukas—Kommentars.* Leipzig: Hinrichs, 1930. lxviii+324 pages. Unbound M. 32.50, bound M. 38.50.

This is the thirty-fifth volume of the notable series "Die griechischen Schriftsteller der ersten drei Jahrhunderte." A brief Introduction furnishes information about the occasion, date, and place of writing of Origen's homilies and commentary on Luke. So far as the commentary is concerned, the data prove to be very scanty, and about all that can be known is that it was written later than the great commentary on Matthew which was composed at Caesarea after the year 244. More is known about the homilies. Jerome was acquainted with thirty-five of these, which he translated about the year 390. Yet Jerome's rendering, while literally accurate when he translates the full text, was sometimes only a summary condensation, or even a collection of excerpts. And from Origen's own statements in other connections, there is evidence that there were still more homilies on Luke which Jerome failed altogether to mention. The homilies were actual sermons preached by Origen, but at what time and to what audiences cannot be so satisfactorily determined. They belong in all probability to his first stay at Caesarea about the year 216 or after his settlement there about 231. Jerome's Latin and the surviving fragments of the Greek original are carefully assembled in parallel columns with an extensive critical apparatus. All of this is supplemented by detailed Indices of scriptural passages, Latin and Greek proper names, and a subject Index for both Latin and Greek words which constitutes virtually a concordance for the entire text. Like the other volumes in this series, this is an indispensable tool for all students concerned with research upon Origen.

STEGEMANN, VIKTOR. *Astrologie und Universalgeschichte: Studien und Interpretationen zu den Dionysiaka des Nonnos von Panopolis* (Stoicheia. Heft IX). Mit einer Sternkarte. Leipzig und Berlin: Teubner, 1930. viii+257 pages. M. 18.

Nonnus, the Egyptian Greek poet of the fifth century A.D., is a somewhat lonesome soul. He is not readily accepted into the fellowship of either Christian or pagan writers. While it is conceded that he was a Christian when he composed his rather insipid metrical paraphrase of the Gospel of John, one does not readily admit that Nonnus after his acceptance of Christianity could have devoted even his type of poetic skill to so elaborate an exposition of heathen mythology as is given in his

Dionysiaca. On the other hand, the literary inferiority of this poem does not add to its author's prestige among pagan writers. The present volume is a much needed help toward a better understanding and juster appreciation of Nonnus' work. Following the lead of Franz Boll and R. Reitzenstein, Stegemann employs the astral interests of the fifth century as the key to the interpretation of Nonnus. "Astrological teaching on the one hand, and late Egyptian (Greek?) belief in aeons on the other, meet and fuse in the soul of this last great master of Greek speech." From this point of view Nonnus was no insignificant dilletante simply amusing himself with words, but was genuinely a philosopher whose significance for his age can be understood only when one has properly comprehended the now strange garment in which his thought is clothed. After a very thoroughgoing piece of research, Stegemann concludes that no other ancient author used astrology so fundamentally as did Nonnus to interpret the meaning of world-history. He propounded a philosophy of history in terms of Orphic and Persian cosmology yet he made of the elements a new creation of great significance for his own age. "For the first time we divine from the tendencies and fundamental ideas of this poet something of the religious hopes and expectations contributing toward the final and most substantial, and therefore the most enduring, service rendered by the Roman Empire—the institutes of Justinian" (p. 205). Interpreted thus, Nonnus deserves vastly more attention than has customarily been accorded him by historians.

STEGEMANN, VIKTOR. *Augustins Gottesstaat*. Tübingen: Mohr, 1928. 80 pages. M. 4.40.

The significance of this essay lies in its characterization of Augustine's thought on the "civitas Dei" as determined by his system of Christian metaphysics. The author shows how this system was founded upon a peculiar interpretation of the self-consciousness, an interpretation in which Christian and Platonic elements could be combined. The results of such an approach are not entirely convincing, but they include an interesting discussion of the influences of Ambrose, Origen, and Philo upon Augustine. At any rate, Stegemann has called attention to Philonic elements in Augustine's philosophy of the "city of God" which must be taken into serious consideration in all future attempts to understand the greatest Christian thinker of antiquity.

THOMSON, S. HARRISON. *Johannis Wycliff Summa de Ente (Libri Primi Tractatus Primus et Secundus)*. New York: Clarendon Press, 1930. 119 pages. $3.50.

This book is a scholarly edition of the opening portion of the *Summa de Ente*. The work as a whole consists of two books, each containing six tractates. Four of the twelve tractates have been edited for the Wycliff Society by M. H. Dziewicki, *viz*., Book I, 3 and 4, and Book II, 1 and 3. Dr. Thomson here presents the first two tractates of Book I. His studies of other sections are already well advanced, and he projects the completion of the whole treatise. The book is admirable in appearance. It has a thirty-five-page Introduction, the Latin text, based on two manuscripts of ca. 1400 and 1433 respectively, footnotes indicating variants, and Indices. In the Introduction the manuscripts are described, with criticism of the judgments of Loserth and Dziewicki on them. An English summary of the two tractates is also provided.

VOLLRATH, WILHELM. *Das Augsburger Bekenntnis und seine bedeutung für die gegenwart.* Leipzig. A. Deichertschen Verlagsbuchhandlung, 1930. viii+78 pages. M. 2.50.

A short popular exposition of the Confession of Augsburg issued in connection with the General Evangelical Lutheran Conference, 1930.

WEBER, MAX. *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism.* Translated by Talcott Parsons. New York: Scribners, 1930. xi+292 pages. $3.00.

A long overdue translation of the late Professor Weber's epoch-making study *Die Protestantische Ethik und der Geist des Kapitalismus,* published in 1904–5. The translation is made from the improved German edition of 1920, and is preceded by a useful Foreword by R. H. Tawney.

CHRISTIAN DOCTRINE

COMO, JOHN F. *In the Light of the Supernatural.* Boston: Christopher Publishing House, 1930. 69 pages. $1.25.

The book, far from living up to its sub-title ("Some difficulties in Christian Theology removed"), is merely an exposition of the traditional dualism of carnal and spiritual man, with a slight flavoring of scientific jargon.

DENISON, J. H. *The Enlargement of Personality.* New York: Scribners, 1930. xxii+340 pages. $3.00.

An entertaining exposition of the thesis that the outstanding force in the development of character is a man's picture of himself. Our handicaps are largely the mistakes in this portraiture; religious conversion is the adoption of a new picture from which follows new conduct; and salvation is the domination of one's life by a picture which is consonant with one's interests and abilities.

GIBBS, JESSIE WISEMAN. *Evolution and Christianity.* Privately printed by the author, 319 South Lauderdale Street, Memphis, Tennessee, 1930. vii+222 pages.

A Fundamentalist's tirade against evolution.

JOAD, C. E. M. *The Present and Future of Religion.* New York: Macmillan, 1930. 310 pages. $2.00.

The present decline and future prospects of religion in England constitute the subject matter of this recent book by the young English philosopher and author. In his volume entitled *Matter, Life and Value,* published in 1929, he outlined a metaphysic which might be designated as pluralistic realism. In this later volume he discusses the state of religion in England, analyzes the reasons for its admitted decline and endeavors to indicate the conditions which must be satisfied if it is to revive. His interest in religion is that "neither of a believer nor a sceptic, but of an absorbed spectator." His net conclusion is that "either a new religion will take the field, which, not challenging the modern scientific conception of the universe, is fitted to appeal to the modern educated intelligence, or the Christian Churches must cease to maintain propositions which are in flagrant contradiction with known facts." Written in a witty and lively vein, the book is a criticism of religions and a justification of religion.

PREACHING AND WORSHIP

BETTS, GEORGE H., EISELEN, FREDERICK C., and COE, GEORGE A. *Religion and Conduct*. The report of a conference held at Northwestern University, November 15–16, 1929. New York: Abingdon Press, 1930. 288 pages. $2.00.

The conference is a valuable method for the advancement of knowledge. Various points of view are succinctly set forth; these are subjected to question and criticism; further elucidation is then given by the author. Naturally finality is not reached but processes of thinking are clarified. This is well illustrated when Wieman discusses religion as worshipful problem-solving; Freeman insists on ideas as the directing agencies in conduct; Coe calls for a study of the control of the church by economic motives, Sadler says that the therapeutic value of religion resides in the belief in God and immortality. Bower finds the significance of religion in the revaluaton of values. Artman insists that unsectarian religion may now be taught in all public schools. Rugh denies that the teaching of religion is the business of the schools. Mrs. Charters finds ideals inherent in the universe. Here there is disagreement, psychological, educational, theological. But there is also enthusiastic agreement that the problem must be further studied, that fuller experimentation must be made, and that the meaning of religion in human life must be clarified. This book is a good indication of the present state of thought on the relation of religion to the motivation of conduct.

BOLTON, DOROTHY G., and BURLEIGH, HARRY T. (eds.). *Old Songs Hymnal. Words and Melodies from the State of Georgia*. New York: Century, 1929. 187 pages. $1.50.

This is the first attempt to gather negro spirituals into a hymn-book, but it is doubtful, in the mind of this reviewer, just how valuable such a collection might prove to a worshiping congregation. Both the dialect and the melody are difficult for other than American negroes to render, and the crudity of the religious ideas expressed would seem to make them unfit for the use of others. However, their use by choirs has already become quite common and no doubt a few among them will be used by congregations, and will ultimately find their place among the hymns of the church.

DALY, LOUISE HASKELL. *The Bible in Art*. New York: Scribner's, 1930. xviii +306 pages. $2.00.

This anthology is symptomatic of the ardent interest in scriptural iconography, which is one of the phenomena of the present period in American life. The collection consists of some two hundred Bible stories that have been frequently depicted in art. Most of these are from the canonical narratives of the Old and New Testaments. Too few of them are from the apocrypha. In the Table of Contents only, are the source references given. In the stories themselves considerable liberty is taken in altering the language of the original text. Of this license the scholar cannot approve. There is an adequate Subject Index at the end. The King James version, which to date has been the standard English text for iconographic studies, is employed throughout the canonical renditions.

MUNRO, HARRY C. *The Pastor and Religious Education.* New York: Abingdon Press, 1930. 227 pages. $1.50.

There is a discernible tendency within recent years to center religious education in the total operation of the parish. This appears to be a reaction from an earlier tendency for religious education to be set up on its own account as a relatively separate operation having its own specialized administrative unit, its own personnel, its own curriculum, and its own procedure. As a result there has grown up with the total church a dualism of function represented by the more traditional preaching and worshiping functions on the one hand and the educational function, on the other. It is to this problem that Mr. Munroe addresses his recent book. The author believes that all the enterprises carried on in the local church should be considered as different functions of the total unified parish. He believes that the pastor should be the organizing center of that program, being quite as much concerned with the processes of religious education, which should suffuse the entire parish operation, as with preaching or the conduct of worship or general church administration. He advocates a unified local church program, tending toward gradation in all the functions involved in churchmanship according to age-levels. This discussion is significant as being a clear and convincing statement of what appears to be an emergent movement in the integration of the program of the local church. The discussion is well supported with concrete illustrations.

MISSIONS

BUCK, OSCAR M. *India Looks to Her Future.* 1930. 214 pages. $0.60.

Six studies on India for adult study group.

HARPER, IRENE M. *The Golden Sparrow.* 1930. 150 pages. $0.75.

A course on India for Junior boys and girls. Twelve lessons.

HULBERT, WINIFRED. *West Indian Treasures.* 1930. 161 pages. $0.75.

Ten chapters on the West Indies, for adults.

LABAREE, CLARA G. *Bhaskar and His Friends.* 1930. 110 pages. $0.75.

A course on India for primary children. Twelve lessons.

MCCONNELL, DOROTHY F., and FORSYTH, MARGARET E. *Sugar is Sweet.* 1930. 122 pages. $0.75.

A course on the Caribbean Islands for junior boys and girls. Thirteen lessons.

ROSE, ISABEL B. *The Star of India.* 1930. 192 pages. $0.75.

Twelve chapters prepared for young people.

ST. JOHN, CHARLES W. *Porto Rican Neighbors.* 1930. 98 pages. $1.00.

Six stories for children.

WAGNER, MABEL G. *Children of Sea and Sun.* 1930. 122 pages. $0.75.

A course on the Caribbean Islands, for Primary boys and girls. Ten lessons.

The foregoing eight mission study books are published by the Friendship Press, 150 Fifth Ave., New York.

MISCELLANEOUS

BROOKS, RACHEL GLEASON. *The Artistic Achievement of a Rural Community.* Southold, N. Y.: Long Island Traveler Print, 1930. 78 pages. $0.60.

Tells the story of artistic community activities of the Long Island village of Southold.

CANAVARRO, MARIE DE S. *The Poison Orchid.* Boston: Christopher Publishing House, 1930. 194 pages. $2.00.

Fiction portraying life in the Far East and describing Hindu and Thibetan conditions.

DANIELSON, FRANCES W. *The Practice Story-telling Class.* Boston: Pilgrim Press, 1930. 105 pages. $1.25.

Suggestions through the medium of an imaginary class to assist leaders in meeting typical objections, to illustrate the kind of response to be expected and how this response may guide the class thought.

DATTA, DWIJADAS. *Behold the Man or Keshub and the Sadharan Brahmo Somaj.* Comilla, India: Published by the author, Kandhirparh, 1930. xvii+289 pages. Rs. 1.8.

An attempt to portray in clearer outlines the historical origins and position of the movement in India known as Brahmo Somaj.

FRICK, HEINRICH (ed.). *Marburger theologische Studien,* Heft 3: *Zur systematischen Theologie.* Gotha: Leopold Klotz, 1930. 44 pages, M. 2.40.

Two short essays, one by the editor on "Ideogram, Mythology and the Word," and one by Theodor Siegfried on "Kant and Schleiermacher."

GRAPEWIN, CHARLES. *The Bronze Bull.* Boston: Christopher Publishing House, 1930. 130 pages. $1.75.

The ideal of political reform presented through the medium of fiction.

GRENFELL, SIR WILFRED. *The Fishermen's Saint.* New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1930. ix+56 pages. $1.00.

Address delivered on the occasion of the author's installation as rector of St. Andrews University, November, 1929.

HARNACK, ADOLF VON. *Aus der Werkstatt des Vollendeten.* Giessen: Töpelmann, 1930. 302 pages. Bound M. 11., unbound M. 8.50.

This collection of papers, edited by the son of the late Professor Harnack who died June 10, 1930, constitutes the final number in the seven volumes of "Reden und Aufsätzen." The papers range over a wide field of interest. Some are autobiographical, others are concerned with problems of historical science, others are biographical or congratulatory addresses.

MCLEAN, ROBERT N. *Jumping Beans.* New York: Friendship Press, 1930. 115 pages. $1.00.

Stories depicting the life of the poor Mexican laborer, particularly on the southern border of the United States.

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SOCIAL PATTERNS AND THE IDEA OF GOD

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MANY years ago a Roman philosopher asked, "Do not all the philosophers talk about God?" If he were living today, Epictetus would have to ask, "Does not everybody talk about God?" Scientists, journalists, men of letters, novelists, socialists, mathematicians, not to mention philosophers, ministers, and poets, broadcast their views, convinced that everybody wants to know what sort of being God is, if, indeed, he is a being. Societies are organized to spread atheism, and communists who have gained possession of the police power fight God as one of the supporters of capitalism. To some honest souls the word God has become such a symbol of irrational conceptions as make its use in prayer impossible. Yet there are millions of men and women who are helped by a belief in God that would hardly bear critical analysis. To deprive them of their faith would weaken their morals and dampen the courage with which they face life.

All this ferment must have meaning. We treat other matters at the vanishing point of thought with detached serenity. There is the ether, for example. Physicists have taught us to believe in an ultimate something within which the vortices or undulations we call atoms come into existence. Now we are told by other scientists that the ether does not exist. One would think that we ought to be disturbed. If we are composed of matter, and matter is composed of atoms, and atoms are vortices or undulations in something which does not exist, what has become of us? But we are not disturbed; even the physicists are calm.

Not so with the discussion about God. Men cannot regard the denial of his existence with scientific detachment. The ether was a remote hypothesis. Even if it does not exist, we still have electrons. But if God does not exist, millions of people, by no means only the unintelligent, would be deprived not only of an ultimate in thought, but of an ever present help in time of trouble. To them faith in God includes faith in the personal worth of human beings. It means a morality. If we are living in a mechanistic universe logical consistency would compel us to think of individuals as less than personal. If we are cogs of a cosmic machine our relations with each other must be mechanistic, and such terms as right and wrong must either be given radically new meaning or be discarded. Yet the most determined champion of mechanism has not dared to put his philosophy into actual expression. Even though God may be a support of capitalism, the communist calls for loyalty to his party, and embalms the body of its founder as a substitute for the risen Son of God.

It will be hard to convince those who accept the existence of God as a basic hypothesis for their view of the world that the "acids of modernity" have done anything more than affect the intellectual form of the hypothesis. We no longer believe that fire is caused by phlogiston and that planets move in circles. Yet fire still burns and planets still move. By the same token, are not men still religious? Are not human personality and human society facts that require some better explanation than analogy with a machine?

I

There are at least two approaches to the discussion of the idea of God. One is from the side of metaphysics and the other is from the side of religion. Which of the two shall have priority will be determined by the preference of the thinker. If he happens to be metaphysically minded, he will deal with definitions and abstractions. If, however, he is historically minded, he finds his line of thought already made for him. He will study the idea of God as it has been variously organized in that form of social behavior we call religion. Indeed, he will very likely say that any reality for which the word God stands must include that given it by human experience.

Metaphysics, in the nature of the case, must start with an assumed concept of God. It does not undertake to explain how the concept arose, but what the term stands for. Indeed, it may be all but undefined. But to argue that God exists is to argue that something behind experience corresponding to an already accepted definition exists. The definition may be exceedingly vague—generic rather than specific—but the metaphysician in discussing the existence of God necessarily, though usually unconsciously, employs a term that has already some sort of meaning. To argue that God must exist because as the most perfect being he must have reality or be less perfect than what does exist is either to deal in metaphysical algebra or to presuppose some meaning in the word God. As will appear later, the philosopher has had his place in rationalizing religious behavior and the metaphysician has had his influence upon the theologian. But neither originated the idea of God. They inherited it from some social order. They have helped men to see the larger content of their own term, and they have given us general formulas and world-views in which something cosmic akin to human personality is an essential element, but the aid belongs to the stage of rationalization rather than to that of origination. That is always behavior.

Similarly in the case of the word value. Here again history suggests definition. If there had been no human experience which discovered that for which the word value stands, evidently there would be no meaning in the word. Even though that meaning be very general, without definite content, it presupposes some sort of experience which makes it possible to distinguish between the thought of that which has and that which lacks sufficient significance to become an end of action. To attempt any definition of the word God by the use of the word value is tacitly to assume words that already embody meanings. Just as when one reaches the frontier of primitivity one finds traces of an experience that is still more primitive, so when we reach the frontier of a definition of words used by philosophy we find ourselves confronted by still older usage. Nor, when all content vanishes and thought uses only symbols, as in mathematics, do we find ourselves utterly free from the inherited experiences. If we had not discovered that when one object is placed by the side of another object there is a contemporaneous experience of the two individuals, we should not be likely even to say that $a+x$ has meaning.

Religion as behavior and consequent experience is not to be identified with philosophy any more than the growth of crops is to be identified with agronomy. If we wish to understand religion we must examine the individual and social behavior of men. Then we shall discover that however undeniable is the presence of intellectual elements in the religious life, men have never been content merely to think about superhuman realities; they wish to treat them as persons. Behavior has preceded definition. In consequence there has grown up a great variety of ritual in which the practices of the social group to which the worshiper belongs become the behavior patterns for superhuman relations. But the ritual and its attendant concept are functional ways of expressing a human urge that is as imperative as hunger or sex.

If one inquires as to the origin of religion as a term generalizing an attitude toward the outer world, speculative answers have not been wanting. But most of them seem to fall short of anything like an ultimate statement. To ask why men are religious is a great deal like asking why they are hungry. So far as one can see, the only reply is that they were made that way.

Life possesses a horror of annihilation. On the one side we have that urge for physical continuity from cell to organism and organism to cell which we call sex. In an amoeba its expression consists in the division of itself; in higher forms of life in an organism's dissociation of part of itself as the germ of another organism.

This urge of life to maintain the genus is complemented by the urge of each living organism to protect itself and to answer its own needs by setting up a relation with elements in the outer world from which it can derive material and co-operation.

Human progress can be traced to both these aspects of the urge to continuity which belongs to all living organisms, but especially to the urge of the individual organism to depend upon, to get help from, and to co-operate with that environment upon which it is immediately dependent. This urge is constantly expressing itself in two main types of behavior. One of these undertakes to get help by the establishment of personal relations with the universe, and the other by impersonal. The latter form of behavior is represented by the term science, and the former by the term religion. In its ultimate nature the behavior represented by the word religion can be described as a phase of the life-process which seeks by control or co-operation to get help from those elements of its cosmic environment upon which men feel themselves dependent, by setting up social—that is, personal—relations with them. All men have what Einstein has called a "sense of cosmic dependence." Two indispensable qualities of this sort of behavior are, first, the search for aid from that which, according to the state of culture, is regarded as a conditioning environment; and, second, the establishment of personal relations therewith.

Personal relations are derived from social experience, and religious behavior presupposes some form of social life. The experience gained in society, the ways of setting up help-gaining relationships with one's fellows and superiors are utilized as patterns for the purpose of setting up similar relations with the superhuman elements upon which men feel themselves dependent. For religion is not passivity but a dynamic relationship. Patterns function when they contribute to the establishment of such relationship.

It is within this social process that one discovers what have been the actual ideas of God. Religious literature and philosophical speculation have their value as elements in a total social activity. Philosophy has rationalized but it did not originate the idea of God. That came from the quest for aid and peace and moral control, through personal relation with aspects of the universe, that is, through religion.

II

Religious behavior is by no means merely a matter of group practices, important as they are in social life. Social activity has always inner convictions, group thinking, and group psychology. However one may define public opinion or the social mind, it is undeniable that a given group does have an unconscious mind-set. Its habits involve certain presuppositions, intellectual and otherwise. Reflective thought undertakes to justify, but not to initiate these mind-sets. They spring, as it were, out of the social unconscious, finding expression in activities which give rise to ideas which are accepted as axiomatic. The reason for such acceptance may be the supposed intrinsic truth or practical value of some concept, or it may be simply a generalized habit of thought or action which nobody in a given state of culture questions. Thus, for example, we of the United States would not regard the right to have private property, or for a man to defend himself, as open questions. They are inherited attitudes of the social order into which we are born.

Social progress is reflected in changes in social minds. A social order, for instance, becomes more complicated economically; its population changes through immigration; any one of a thousand other forces may cause such readjustments as to cause tensions that old mind-sets and social presuppositions no longer relieve. Such periods are commonly called "periods of transition," and if the process of adjustment is opposed they are very likely to become periods of revolution. Their most significant characteristic is, however, the fact that the psychological structure of the group is changed. Action often grows tentatively destructive. Confusion as to the relation of social classes will appear in a great variety of forms. In extreme cases anything that belongs to the abandoned social order will be regarded as injurious to the new.

All this historical commonplace has direct bearing on the idea of God. It is the neglect of this fact that vitiates most discussion concerning theism. The term God is not a metaphysical absolute. If human history is capable of interpretation it has varied in its content as man's social experience has varied. It is one of the terms that get their meaning from usage. The most pertinent question regarding it is whether it represents anything more than usage. However defined, is it, like the chimera, a word for an imagined reality to which there is absolutely nothing corresponding, or is it a word which, despite changes in content, really stands for an idea of an element or of elements in the universe which exist whether they are called by the name God or by some other term? It is this question which philosophy attempts to answer.

But why should philosophy be so concerned about the matter? If it does not originate the idea of God but finds it in contemporary use, why not eliminate it and use some other term more satisfactory to itself? Or, if the philosophers so incline, why not abandon altogether the hope of discovering anything except pragmatic reality in the word God? Probably the only answer to such a question is that men do not seem to be able to take such a step. They seek intellectual assurance. The position of the mechanist or humanist in this connection is a great deal like that of those who, in despair of finding anything for which the word democracy as defined in dictionaries actually stands, say that there is such no fact as democracy outside the writings of political sentimentalists. Religious behavior is as much an element of social life as going to the polls is behavior in a democracy which such critics say does not exist. Like any word that connotes social behavior, religion must have a changing content, demanded by the particular tension it would relieve. It must vary wholly apart from the question whether it represents anything more than its usage. To trace its changing content is the task of the social historian and the social psychologist. To vindicate its use is the task of the philosopher. But to argue about the existence of God independently of the history of religion as a form of social behavior is only to increase intellectual confusion.

Social life is more than a background of religion. It furnishes the patterns for religious ideas and teachings. In all forms of thought analogy is the first means of getting intellectual unity. Sometimes these analogies may be extended into a mythology in which the character and interests of the gods are set forth in a scenario net drawn from the drama of human life. A mythology is therefore more than fairy tales. It is an attempt to make real the mystery which life faces by discovering within it similarities with that which is taken as a matter of course. But analogies do not always result in a mythology. Human qualities are instinctively extended to nature, to animals, and to the gods. In such cases the unconscious analogy becomes a pattern and so is treated literally. When this pattern is developed by logical process it is extended into a series of corollaries. This is as true in the field of physical science as in religion. One has only to study the history of an idea, whether it be in astronomy, with its music of the spheres, or in physics where atoms are described as undulations or vortices that presuppose an ether, to see how true it is that any scientific formula has at its base a repeated human experience which furnishes the pattern in which new information gains intellectual unity. Strictly speaking, what we call science is a record of the experience and the rationalization of scientists. The exact nature of its ultimates eludes definition. We know how forces act, but when they themselves are described it is in terms which represent experiences with which we are already familiar. Even in mathematics the axioms with which Euclidean geometry starts are conclusions to which experience discovers no exception. But we really have nothing but experience to argue that a straight line is the shortest distance between two points, or that two parallel lines infinitely projected will never meet. For who ever traced such lines to infinity to discover what happens there? Even the ray of light which experience has led men to feel was absolutely straight is now being tested to discover whether with our experience, supplemented by new speculations and more sensitive instruments, it may not be found to be curved. Indeed, it would not be incorrect to say that our growing scientific knowledge is born of a widening experience which may repeatedly demand new patterns for expression.

In the field of religion such intellectual process is naturally the first step in the rationalization of that vital urge which seeks to get proper adjustment to such elements of the cosmos as are believed to be capable of personal response. The history of religious thought is really the history of patterns by which religious behavior is shown to be rational. Naturally the points of tension in this process vary with the changes of culture and reflective thought. A pattern, let us say, like the sovereignty of God, varies as the sovereignty experience in social life varies. The conception of salvation varies as men come to see more clearly the nature of the evils from which they wish to be delivered and more intelligently formulate the needs which demand satisfaction.

This pattern-making process has conditioned the growth of the idea of God. To trace it one must trace the successive social changes, institutions, and accepted ideas which formed patterns. Whatever may be one's belief as to the existence of forces and realities which lie out beyond our experience, the practical reason—to use Kant's term—legitimatizes religious faith by coordinating it with the creative thought-forms and dominant types of behavior of the non-religious social experience. The pattern is functional; the attitude and behavior are the constant elements of a religion. Thoroughly to understand the various conceptions of God, one must recognize these facts. To trace the succession of these patterns by which men sought to realize and use the personality-producing and personally responsive elements of the universe is an imperative task. But such a study must be historically descriptive rather than philosophically critical.

III

The transformation of behavior into patterns of the idea of God is accomplished in a variety of ways. Sometimes in the simpler social orders it is simply by the performance of identical acts. Men treat some natural object precisely as they treat one another. As social life becomes more developed such naïve acts are less satisfying to men's minds and are replaced by symbolic acts of the same order. Thus the common meal of the early Christians became the sacrament of the Eucharist. As religious practices become burdensome there develops a class of men who are representative of the community and in return for a livelihood may be counted upon to see that the cult is properly maintained. It is natural, therefore, that priests and others who engage in a religious vocation should, on the one hand, be held to a more rigorous observance of the acts which bring the god into the social activities of the group, and, on the other, because of this intimacy, be regarded as possessing certain powers which the people at large do not possess. They conserve the pattern as something sacred. In social orders where there is no marked change in customs, religious classes like the priests have a very considerable authority and are regarded with respect if not with fear. When, however, the social order changes, the social practices which form the pattern for religion are themselves outmoded and religious behavior in consequence no longer reproduces the customs of social life. As social changes proceed, the religious practices are less and less representative and become reminders of social conditions and actions of an abandoned past.

In consequence, both religion and those who represent it lose in popular esteem. They may be regarded with respect and fear but such attitudes are decreasingly derived from the sense of the identity of religious with general group behavior. Religious practices, though venerable, are no longer an extension of those which are unquestioned in the life of the group itself. There is probably no religion which could not be used as an illustration of these processes, but the chasm between religious behavior and general social life is most marked in countries where the social transformation is most pronounced. The most striking illustration is Russia, where a religious organization which had failed to respond to social changes and had become identified with the imperial, capitalistic régime is threatened with extinction by those who are reorganizing the state on the basis of communistic theory.

Religious behavior born of social customs has entered the realm of religious thought in all groups. Everywhere social practices have been treated as patterns of thought. Not only are feasts given in the name of the god, but gods are conceived of as being like chieftains who enjoy feasts. When the feast becomes a sacrament these patterns in which the deity is conceived are unchanged. There grows up an orthodoxy in which they are authoritative. There is a world of divinities which is a transcendentalized social world. The gods are not only in the images of men, but their relations among themselves and with men are the customs of social life.

So long as there is no radical change in the social order, the two realms naturally supplement each other and religious thought in a picture of the habits of actual human society. But when the mind-set of a group is modified, authoritative orthodoxy is, so to speak, left suspended in the heavens. Just as the gods represent outgrown social controls, so the patterns of religious thought no longer represent those of contemporary thinking. New tensions arise. Religious patterns suffer the same fate as religious practices. They may be respected, but they no longer represent actual intellectual life. They have to be defended by appeal to an authority which increasingly fails to represent controlling social experience. Those patterns of the religious thinking which once were identical with those of group thinking become vestigial because of new group practices, and therefore unconnected with the creative forces of the new social conditions. Inevitably, therefore, they fail to minister to intellectual needs and a religion becomes in both practice and thought a sort of ghost of a previous social order. The gods act in ways and their representatives think in patterns which are no longer those of the contemporary social order. Religion inevitably grows ineffective in meeting the needs set by the new social conditions and operations. The god must be either relegated to the unintelligent or the pattern in which he is conceived must be changed. For only as a pattern aids in personal adjustment to forces in the cosmos is it really helpful. Man is no more passive in religion than in any other phase of life.

IV

All these phenomena are most clearly seen in the growth of the idea of God in that highly developed synthetic religion known as Christianity. The conception of God has grown as a social order has evolved a new social psychology.

If one undertakes to study the history of any idea of God as it has been expressed in social patterns, one must study it as a phase of a single social process. We must pass from the consideration of religion to specific religions, each a technique in which religion as a vital urge expresses itself. Now a technique is not to be described in a synthetic way. One cannot understand the development of religious ideas by massing data derived from all sorts of social histories. That there is value in the comparative method is undeniable, but the value needs to be carefully stated in order to be actual. One cannot picture a historical process by massing similar or dissimilar items in independent processes. Such a method may conduce to a philosophy of religion, but it will not necessarily lead to an understanding of any idea of God actually held by some community. As a matter of fact, each social order has evolved and preserved its own religious ideas. The similarity between these ideas is due to the fact that there is a certain social behavior which humanity, wherever it has lived, has found indispensable to its happiness and well-being. But each particular social group has formed from its own experience. Though this group may have for various reasons appropriated and re-expressed ideas and practices of other groups, one can no more understand a religion by generalizing religions than one can understand the Constitution of the United States by generalizing governments. The only universal statement which is really safe is that at the same levels of civilization different streams of social life, though separate geographically and by origin, tend to develop the same type of social practices and in consequence similar religious concepts. People who have the pre-agricultural civilizations have a behavior calculated to gain superhuman aid, but agricultural civilizations have another. Thus the sun-god of the Vedas became the storm-god of Hinduism. When a society becomes commercial and warlike its religious ideas are set in other patterns. When, like modern civilization, it becomes industrial the question as to what form the idea of God will take is still under discussion. Yet it would be incorrect to regard any result of religious development as universal. We can no longer affirm that all religions have identical evolution from fetichism through animism, polytheism, national henotheism, to metaphysical monotheism.

Two facts seem to be indisputable. First, religious practices and patterns are not always abandoned when the social structure from which they sprang has been outgrown and replaced. Their very age makes them sacred, and in religion a group finds sometimes a holy satisfaction in treating itself as composed of contemporary ancestors. In consequence its ideas of God rise but slowly to the level of its best culture. The other fact is that those changes of the social order we call modernity involve our religious heritage as truly as the economic and political. One has only to look about to see illustrations of that. The demand, for instance, that churches today should be organized on business principles, that women should have the right to preach as well as practice goodness, that children should be educated in the field of religion in as intelligent a fashion as in other matters—all these are, so to speak, nucleus points where the shift in social ideals and social practices, in social structure, and, above all, in the habits of social thinking are affecting those aspects of social behavior which we call religion. The more one studies such processes of change historically rather than theologically, especially in highly feverish moments like revolutions, the more one is convinced that the only way to understand an idea of God is to watch its development in a group in which the development is continuous. In such observation we must center attention not on some alleged theological "essence" but on the behavior and the rationalizing patterns of the group itself. For a religion is not some fixed theology or system of truth but group action and belief. A religion is always a phase of the total group life. It cannot be otherwise interpreted.

Yet to study the development of the idea of God in continuous rather than parallel streams of civilization is not to disregard the interplay of civilizations. Every civilization is more or less exogamous. Mutual reactions doubtless exist, even though they are hardly traceable. The ancient world was no more static than the modern. The old departmental ethnography that located peoples and civilizations within impenetrable geographical frontiers has long since given way to the conception of history as a process in which human beings are as restless as ants. Looking down upon the ancient centuries, we can see the expansion of the Aryan eastward and westward, the interplay of Assyrian and Egyptian, the commercial traveler from India forcing his way into Asia Minor and Europe, the Buddhist traveling to Persia and Syria, the Persian and Syrian to the Far

East, the Macedonian Empire leaving its traces from the Balkans to the Ganges, and the Arabian conquest carrying culture eastward and westward almost to the confines of the known world.

Even though it is impossible to trace distinctly the results of such contacts, it is impossible to believe that they did not and do not exist. In the Near East the interpenetration of civilizations has been genetic and traceable, but there does not seem to be any language or civilization in Europe or Asia that is impenetrable or unpenetrating.

Each civilization has its own character and history. It can be studied as a continuous stream of social development. Its ideals and institutions, wherever they originated, have been so digested as to become elements of a distinct civilization with a consistent religion. The development of the Christian doctrine of the Trinity, for example, would have very little except comparative value for a study of the triads of India. There is no discoverable genetic connection between the Confucian and Taoist idea of heaven and the Semitic conception of Jahweh. Each sprang from a different civilization. Functionally they are the same, but in origin and content they are independent. We must study ideas of God distributively, tracing the social origins and the changing patterns of each. Such a study will yield similarities, but their sum total would not be any conception actually held by a group or civilization. In social processes, as in human genealogy, resemblances do not necessarily imply consanguinity. One does not need to be a brother or even a first cousin of a member of another race in order to account for generic human resemblances. One cannot understand humanity simply by massing together the varied characteristics of all human stocks. To insist that one should get an idea of God by the accumulation of details of various religions is a great deal like saying that to have a picture of one's wife one should get a composite photograph of other people's wives. We do not worship a composite God any more than we love a composite photograph. As the civilization, so is the idea of God.

V

Christianity, historically viewed, is not a fixed quantum of behavior and doctrine modified by social change. It is rather the religion of people who regard themselves as Christians. Their reactions to social conditions, their methods of satisfying the economic, moral, and spiritual needs breed true to themselves, and their Christianity is that phase of their total life which expresses loyalty and trust in Jesus Christ as a Savior. It must be viewed as a genetic social and religious movement rather than a system of truth.

Christianity originating in a Semitic culture became the religion of the Aryans. Within a century from the death of its founder it had become a religious movement quite distinct from Judaism. It spread westward on both the northern and the southern coasts of the Mediterranean. It spread north among the Slavs, but in neither Greece, the Balkans, nor Russia did it develop appreciably beyond the stage it had reached in the later days of the Eastern Roman Empire. For civilization itself in these regions was all but static. It was among the sea-trading and conquering peoples of Western Europe that social progress and the growth of the idea of God were greatest. The same boundaries marked the birthplace of Western civilization and Latin Christianity. The same men who produced the one produced the other. The epochs of one were the epochs of the other. Western theology and religious practices differentiated themselves from the Eastern as Western political and economic life differentiated itself. Where there was political growth there was religious readjustment. Where there was religious freedom there was political expansion. The Western movement of the adherents of Christianity carried the different aspects of this religion to the American hemisphere. American colonies on the North Atlantic were almost exclusively Protestant; those on the Gulf of Mexico and the South Atlantic and in the west were Roman Catholic. The reasons for this difference were not only geographical and economic. Two types of social evolution were there. Because of this fact the political development of the American continents has been affected by and reflected in religious institutions and thought. They both are phases of the same social movement.

Such facts as these make it evident that the Christian idea of God is the outcome of a very complicated social process. To treat it as merely a matter of doctrine is utterly to misunderstand it. The Christian religion has had its creeds, its confessions, and its theologies. But it has had also its sacraments, liturgies, priests, councils, universities, moralities. Its members have prayed, gone to the confessional, received absolution, called upon Mary and the saints as well as upon God and Christ. They have attended religious services, partaken of the sacrament, and in greater or less degree undertaken to live in accordance with the Ten Commandments and the Golden Rule. Such acts of religion have been the chief interests of plain Christians. Each of them presupposes some idea of God. These various ideas have had a distinct bearing upon their adherents. Whether or not they understand the terms of the apostles' and Nicene creeds, men acted differently because they held them as infallible formulas of the will of their God.

The Christian movement as a phase of a social process developed its own characteristics. Some of them resembled those of other religions, but as a religion growing into larger symmetry and reflecting and developing a social order, Christianity has been distinct from its contemporaries. It passed through stages which other religions have passed through, but unlike them it has neither been checked by nor been able to check the development of society. It is a phase of a social order that lost rigidity by sea-voyaging and colonization, gained a sense of social structure in feudal hierarchies, imperial unity, and national patriotism; accumulated material capital, refused to hold human beings as capital, substituted the machine for human toil, gained leisure by scientific mastery of nature, and educated boys and girls in the interest of economic efficiency and personal welfare.

It is not difficult to understand why the idea of God should vary with this vast variation of human experience and institutions. This fact is all the more remarkable in view of the fact that other religions, like Confucianism, Hinduism, and Buddhism, have tended to hold human progress at the point where the religion itself was efficiently organized. The same is true in large degree of the Christian movement in Greece, the Balkans, and Russia, where social life and religion alike for centuries have been static or changed only by revolution. It has been in Western Christendom that the idea of God has been most freely criticized and modified.

In these changes in theistic ideas Christianity has illustrated a tendency which the comparative study of religions discloses. In all alike, in more or less prehistoric stages there has been a change from primitive conceptions of the gods to those needed by and more in accord with the new social status. Where an inherited cult and inherited ideas of God have been unadapted to a social order that has become more complicated by virtue of economic, geographic, and other changes, the older ideas of deity have either been expanded to meet the new conditions and needs or they have been supplemented by some conception which sprang from the new conditions. All religions illustrate these changes, but in Christianity they have been carried farther because Western civilization has become so much more complicated than those of China and India, for example. These countries, however, as they have come under the influence of Western civilization, are expressing the same struggle over religion. There, too, the ideas of divinity are either being expanded by patterns drawn from the new social order or replaced by a philosophy held to be more in accord with modern knowledge.

Such changes are, so to speak, biological rather than mechanical. Older conceptions survive as more or less recognized vestiges in a religion which has become a phase of a new stage of social development. Hinduism has its vast host of gods as well as its ultimate impersonal Brahm; the Chinese have their fear of devils along with the respect for the Way of Heaven; Christianity has its survivals of polytheism and magic as well as its monotheistic Trinity. And these illustrations might be indefinitely increased.

It should be evident that in the growth of the idea of God in Christianity we have a history of patterns which have resulted from a religious behavior in a more developed social order than that conditioning other religions. In Christianity, as in no other religion, there has been a unique development of monotheism. Not even in the cult of its founder is Christianity more characteristic than in its development of the idea of one God. The growth of such a supreme religious conception has been due to no single set of forces. It is the coefficient of a still continuing social evolution.

The bearing of these facts on modern religious thought is not hard to discover. It is also easy to see that to understand the idea of God which this religion has expressed it will be necessary to trace its relation to social changes from primitivity into modern life. Only thus can we distinguish between its relative and its permanent values. For we cannot be content with religious patterns. We wish to know why they emerged; what satisfaction they rendered human needs; how they helped men to live more sanely in the midst of social change; and how they helped men get personal aid from their cosmic environment. A religion is more than its patterns.

Such a social approach to the idea of God does not necessarily imply that a religion is passive in a social order or that it may not itself be efficient in furnishing patterns for other aspects of social life such as politics. One has only to remember the origin of the contract theory in government and of declarations of rights to see the influence of religion on politics. Changes in religious conceptions may be both causes and effects of changes in other aspects of social life. But changes in religion are not identical with the growth of the idea of God. They are due in large measure to tensions which arise between inherited concepts and new intellectual situations, when some leader or group of leaders are capable of re-establishing the equilibrium of faith. But in so doing they discover new similarities, analogies, and patterns to set forth their conception of God. Such men we call "prophets" or "philosophers." They use some social practice or creative conception already in the group to which they minister as patterns by which to express and rationalize religious faith. Chief among such patterns are ideas of God.

JESUS IN CONTEMPORARY GERMAN THEOLOGY

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IN GERMANY, as elsewhere, scientific interpretation of Jesus is determined by two considerations. Of first importance is the understanding of the sources, that is, knowledge of the results achieved by modern methods of research in the study of the gospels and other texts bearing on the subject. Then there is also the point of view by which the interpreter himself is motivated in his work. Even though freely admitting the presence of this second interest one does not thereby yield to a "theological presupposition" but merely states a limitation which not only restricts but inspires all scientific knowledge in the historical field. Unquestionably it is one of the scholar's tasks so to interpret the work of a historical person as to make it intelligible. In so doing one must pronounce an opinion regarding it, and this opinion will be one's personal attainment conditioned by one's individuality and the age in which one lives. In a dominant idea of this sort the personality of the individual scholar will appear, even when he has taken the utmost possible care to scrutinize texts in an unbiased manner and with scientific purpose. Otherwise he would remain a mere collector of data and of narrative statistics but never could rise to the plane of historical interpretation.

Moreover, interpretation of Jesus involves also a theological task. Its aim is to exhibit in Jesus the one who became for humanity the Christ, the deliverer, the savior. This is a task which the historian may eschew. Also, it may be performed on the basis of another's historical interpretation but without any distinctively scientific attainments. But when both the historical and the theological quests are undertaken together, it is necessary to distinguish the areas within which each quest can be achieved. One can undertake to show by scientific methods why the movement begun by Jesus did not cease with his death on the cross, but one cannot adduce *scientific* proof for the opinion that through Jesus' coming the final word of God was spoken to mankind. Faith alone discerns and affirms this to be the true significance of that brief temporal incident in the insignificant land of Palestine.

I

Failure to distinguish between the scientific task and the function of faith was just the defect that discredited the method of presenting the life of Jesus still current in Germany even at the beginning of the present century. There were books marked by great sincerity, and of considerable significance, that were doomed to this fate. By reading the treatises about Jesus written by Paul Wilhelm Schmidt (1899), Oskar Holtzmann (1901), Wilhelm Bousset (1904), and Wilhelm Heitmüller (1913), one can obtain a picture of their type. Consciously or unconsciously these writers sought to accomplish two things, namely, to present the life of Jesus the man, and with this presentation to satisfy also the demands of faith. These labors yielded important results in the field of source criticism and historical mindedness. They brought to light again numerous words and deeds of Jesus. But, for the history of theology, perhaps the most important consequences were negative. The work of these scholars established the fact that by the use of a serious historical exposition one cannot do justice to Christianity's claims as a religion of revelation. Proceeding from this conclusion, one may resign one's self to historical research and decisively refrain from all theological inquiry. One may, however, now pass on to this task with new earnestness and, with a new formulation of the problem, deliberately undertake its solution. But a blissful neglect of the distinction between the historical and the theological tasks is no longer in conformity with the new position.

This changed situation was brought about not merely by the new statement of method. Definite developments in research have also contributed to the result. Most German lives of Jesus written since the age of the Enlightenment were dominated by the conviction that they portrayed the life of one who was good and great and precious for humanity. The atmosphere and language of these interpretations were designed to set Jesus among the great leaders of humanity, perhaps among "Religious Educators," as the series is called in which the essay of Arnold Meyer appeared; or among the "Immortals," the title of the series inaugurated by Bultmann's *Jesus*, though it is a book with a quite different purpose. This evaluation of Jesus, as a mighty hero significant for the present, was vitiated by the discovery that the preaching of Jesus is eschatological in character and so is not concerned with the world and its future, but with its end and the Kingdom of God in an age soon to come. This view was sketchily presented as early as 1896 in Johannes Weiss's *Die Predigt Jesu vom Reiche Gottes;* and it was set forth most impressively, as well as most one-sidedly, in Albert Schweitzer's history of study on the life of Jesus, *Von Reimarus zu Wrede* (1906). Thus the significance of Jesus' work for the present was diminished. He had not been concerned with this world and had not realized any human ideals. Therefore his person and work had to be evaluated in terms of some imagery other than that of a hero of human history.

All work on problems connected with the life of Jesus was fundamentally affected by the results of more recent research in the criticism of gospel sources. Two tendencies were in evidence, namely, a growing skepticism regarding the outline of Jesus' career as presented in the gospels, and the formulation of a new principle for research in the history of tradition.

With the working out of the two-source theory at the end of the nineteenth century, the criticism of the sources seemed to have reached a measure of finality. But this confidence was soon lost, immediately one yielded to the temptation to make the oldest gospel, that of Mark, normative, as the earliest and therefore the best biography of Jesus. It was Wilhelm Wrede especially who, in his *Messiasgeheimnis*, proved even the Gospel of Mark to be a product of faith. In his opinion even Mark is dominated by a religious tendency which casts its long shadow over the original reminiscences of the disciples. But most conspicuously is the entire structure, the whole fabric of events, conditioned throughout by the author's point of view rather than by fidelity to reports and reminiscences. These and kindred conclusions furnished the starting-point for the work of the so-called *formgeschichtliche* school, which asked, "How could it have been otherwise? How could one conceive of the rise of the gospels within Christian communities dominated by eschatological notions and expectations of the end of the world unless these communities depicted Jesus in accordance with the necessity of nourishing faith on faith?" If the rise of the oldest tradition is not the result of the interests of faith, then the existence of the tradition becomes wholly problematic.

The "existence of tradition" was in general the slogan that characterized the works of the *formgeschichtliche* school—the writings of Rudolf Bultmann, Karl Schmidt, Martin Albert, and myself. For our concern was with what existed prior to the gospels, not only with their antecedent written sources but with the earliest form of narratives, sayings of Jesus, groups of sayings, parables, as these units of tradition in oral or written form had circulated in the early communities before becoming combined into anything like a book. The form of these units was not determined by the individuality of evangelists but by the unwritten laws effectual for the shaping of popular tradition. The better one understands these laws the more confidently does one make any assertion about the earliest stratum of tradition. Thus the authenticity of a deed or a word of Jesus depends not so much upon the reliability of an evangelist as upon the appropriateness of the passage to that stratum which is proved by its form to have been the oldest. By this means we thought to relieve problems connected with the life of Jesus from that subjectivism which concerned itself primarily with weighing possibilities regarding the historicity of a word or deed of Jesus, and which in fact rendered a final decision in accordance with the experience and judgment of men today.

In accordance with this methodological principle, the aim of research could only be to recover individual sections of tradition, rather than a connected sequence of passages. In the passion story at most might such a continuous narrative be discernible, for here the incidents occur in a developmental sequence; and evidently even the oldest tradition had emphasized a certain continuity underlying such topics as the betrayal, the arrest, the denial, the hearing before the high priest and the procurator, the crucifixion, and the burial. But, in the case of Jesus' activities, the *formgeschichtliche* method of research renounced the attempt to restore the original continuity of incidents, for all connecting links in the gospel narratives were taken to be the work of compilers—of the evangelists or their predecessors. In surrendering the chronological sequence of the gospels, one also abandoned the notion of a psychological development connected with the growth and activity of Jesus. In other words, one renounced the very item which a large number of biographers of Jesus regarded as their chief task. They, by means of a sympathetic and imitative psychology, penetrated into the inmost emotions by which Jesus was swayed, and drew conclusions about what he had thought of himself, what he had expected to accomplish, and what he had hoped his preaching would effect. The representatives of *Formgeschichte* had to admit that we know nothing about these questions, because the oldest recoverable accounts had known nothing of and had not been concerned with these matters. The mosaic character of the traditions, so it was said, makes it impossible for us to discover any consistent sequence and draw any conclusions regarding a development in Jesus.

This conclusion harmonizes readily with the scientific situation. For the scientific temper, at least in the historical field, was characterized by a tendency to abandon the older and highly prized psychology. The extensive and valuable work of German research on the life of Goethe, carried on by the past generation, is known even in foreign lands. This research aimed to obtain an understanding of the career of Goethe from numerous minor observations of a biographical sort, from letters, from expressions and sayings and contemporary reports. This procedure was characteristic of the situation at the turn of the century. The inadequacy of the method is indicated by the criticism of the younger generation, which pointed out that Goethe cannot be adequately understood even by the use of his words. One may grasp the parts while the spiritual entity as a whole escapes. Under the influence of contemporary philosophy, particularly of the so-called phenomenological school,[1] there arose the demand to grasp intuitively a total view of the figure to be exhibited. Thus it was no longer proper to strive to understand a historical person by assembling individual biographical details; but it was declared to be the primary duty of the biographer, assuming these individual items, to give them realistic meaning by means of an objective exhibition ("*Exaktvision*"), and in this way grasp and graphically present historical phenomena. And it was in the study of Goethe, in the work of Friedrich Gundolf, that this method found its most striking and best-known application. By renouncing the use of individual incidental biographical details and the psychological continuity reconstructed therefrom, Gundolf was able to realize a completeness of form in presentation such as the older method of treatment had never attained. On the other hand, the reader of these new books placed himself completely at the disposal of the author and was in no position to test in detail the accuracy of the picture. He was able to pass judgment only on the convincing power of the presentation, not on its agreement with the sources. This fruitful method, which has decisively influenced the entire field of humanistic studies in Germany during the last decade, easily exposes the layman to the danger of ignoring the demand for accuracy. However, this procedure is in large measure justified by appropriately recognizing as we have done above that all knowledge is conditioned by the knower and that the range and accuracy of one's vision are limited to one's own capacities.

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[1] Readers may recall, in this connection, the article by Julius Seelye Bixler, "German Phenomenology and Its Implications for Religion," *Journal of Religion*, IX (1929), 589–606.—EDITOR.

In the field of ancient history especial importance had to be conceded to this new methodology. In studying the life of Goethe, the sources were everywhere so abundant that a procedure calling for omission of biographical details constituted a genuine renunciation. But just because details in the life of an ancient person are so little known to us, one feels it necessary to gain an understanding of an ancient figure from his work and not from such individual facts as one is now able to reconstruct. Thus it is the empirical need that in this case constitutes the virtue of the method. Under such circumstances this new method has been applied also to the interpretation of persons in ancient cultural history. Karl Reinhardt's book, *Poseidonius*, belongs in this class.

This changed type of research, when its theological implications emerged, had especial significance in the interpretation of early Christian persons. The new historical method asked questions about the figure of Paul as a whole—not so much about his malady, his ancestry, or even the circumstances of his conversion—but more especially about his total personality as this was exhibited in the writing of his letters. Nor was this information sought in the accidental and occasional features in the letters, but in the deeper unity of feeling common to all of them. Moreover, the new theology, particularly in the form given it by Karl Barth and his associates, seeks to recover the gospel preached by Paul, and not his biography. Its quest is for the content of the revelation and not for the circumstance under which the revelation occurred. All of these considerations are much more significant in respect to the life of Jesus. Not the outcome of his life, but its content, is essential. Moreover, it is not the succession and connection of events, which we are able to recount from the sources, but his message, that is fundamental. How far specific deeds are connected with the message, and in how far, on the whole, we may venture to reconstruct the story of his activities, can be only an open question.

Thus the progress of scientific criticism, as well as the question raised by the new theology, have necessarily exerted a decisive influence upon the portrait of Jesus in recent German literature. The degree to which this change is manifest naturally depends upon the extent to which the writers of the new books about Jesus show susceptibility for the new trends in research. In most cases authors who write a life of Jesus without a knowledge of the modern scientific debate allow influences from this source to escape them. Their methods are still those of the nineteenth century. Accordingly, German literature of a scientific and semi-scientific character exhibits at present quite varied types of interpretation of Jesus; and this phenomenon confirms again the fact that the personality of the author is no unessential factor in his interpretation of historical movements.

II

During the war two lives of Jesus appeared in German, each having typical significance. The one represents the older school, and the other points in the direction of the new developments. The former, a work of two compact volumes completed at the close of 1918, was written by the late Johannes Lepsius, director of the German Oriental Mission. This theologian, who at one time had been an assistant pastor in Jerusalem and had inherited from that experience an interest in the geography of Palestine, also became well known beyond Germany through his activities on behalf of the Armenian situation. As early as 1897 he had resigned his pastoral office to engage in this work. The other book came from the pen of Professor Paul Wernle, of Basel, who earlier had given an interpretation of Jesus in his *Anfänge unserer Religion* and who in his *Die Quellen des Lebens Jesu* in the series "Religionsgeschichtliche Volksbücher" had presented to a wider circle of readers the critical preparation necessary for any life of Jesus.

Perhaps one may say that Lepsius wrote the last life of Jesus of the older type. That judgment is true, in so far as he employs the method of unrestrained psychological portraiture. But it is not correct if it is taken to mean that his work belongs simply to the older type of writing on the life of Jesus. Lepsius was an original personality who had distinctive views on many different points. His work was based on his own understanding of the sources, which was by no means the usual one. He took account of a primitive Mark and a primitive Matthew, and even also of a kind of primitive John written in Aramaic by the son of Zebedee but translated into Greek and worked over by the "Elder," John of Ephesus. Thus he also relied to a far greater extent than was customary in works of a more or less "critical" character upon the Gospel of John as an authentic source. Its statements were to be used and blended with the presentation furnished by the synoptic gospels. In this way Lepsius arrived at a highly "harmonistic" picture of Jesus' life, and the harmonization was attended by fundamental consequences for the historical reconstruction. In order to be fair to *both* infancy stories, Lepsius had to have Jesus born under respectable circumstances, and he supposes that it is only because the ancient house of David at Bethlehem is not yet ready for her that Mary goes to the stable adjacent to the court of the house to give birth to her child. Also, after feeding the multitude Jesus delivers the Johannine discourse on the heavenly bread, then chastises his opponents with the synoptic saying about the demand for a sign and with the pronouncement of woe on Chorazin and Bethsaida.

Of course this whole succession of incidents is recoverable only because the author everywhere ventures to effect a psychological reconstruction. Indeed, it becomes an instrument of invention. Lepsius draws conclusions about the thinking of Jesus and his opponents, and allows his own fancy so much liberty that his life of Jesus becomes a sort of free romance. Suspense and dramatic climax, features well known to be entirely lacking in the gospel pictures, are especially accentuated in Lepsius' life of Jesus. For example, Jesus is sought by Herod's horsemen, and he learns of their designs from a letter written by Chuza, the royal officer mentioned in the fourth chapter of John. Jesus tears himself away with difficulty from the sick that crowd around him, and escapes in a boat; scarcely has he embarked when the horsemen appear on the shore, where, cursing and raging, they are forced to recognize that they have arrived just a little too late. A stirring scene in which the German reader is reminded of the beginning of Schiller's *Tell!* Then follows immediately, according to Lepsius, the story of the miraculous draft of fishes reported in the twenty-first chapter of John, which is removed from the series of incidents following the resurrection and placed in the period of Jesus' public activity.

The aim of this psychologizing is to make the life of Jesus intelligible. Since the days when the older romantic lives of Jesus resulting from the Enlightenment were produced, German theology has grown especially skeptical of such attempts, and therefore has pursued the psychological portrayal of the subject only in a moderate degree. In this respect Lepsius is more radical than all other theologians of his generation. If, consequently, he is less reproached than his predecessors, it is because he deceives his readers with modern psychology. Where so much is clearly invented, the reader cannot be deceived; for one who has once looked into the gospels cannot believe that the narrative of Johannes Lepsius could be thus deduced even with approximate accuracy from the text of the gospels. Therefore he omits those hypothetical expressions, like "surely," "perhaps," "maybe," and "possibly," that characterized the earlier romantic biographies. As a matter of fact, he does not need to distinguish in any such fashion between supposition and deduction, for the entire interpretation rests on the right to conjecture.

Since, however, intelligibility for the modern reader is the supreme norm in this interpretation, it necessarily follows that the miracle stories be presented in a special way. The resurrection and appearances are, it is true, narrated as realities; but many other miracles are made intelligible in curious ways, and are toned down and rationalized. In this, Lepsius resembles the representatives of the Enlightenment, and that is all the more peculiar since in his ecclesiastical and theological position he himself was anything but a rationalist. But in the story of feeding the five thousand he makes Jesus furnish only a good example of brotherliness, imitation of which results in satisfying the hunger of all; the swine were so frightened by the lunatic that they rushed into the lake; in Cana Jesus dispensed "the wine which God himself had pressed out and caused to flow from all springs for his children"; and the wedding guests agree with him "that a worthy conversation can be pursued to the end with a drink of fresh water."

Thus the conservative theologian arrives at most remarkable results, and transforms Jesus into a teacher of bourgeois humanistic ideals. That this is at all possible in such a book, shows clearly what rôle the general cultural attitude of the author played in his interpretation of Jesus. For only on the basis of humanistic ideals, as taken for granted among humanistically educated people of our day, is it at all conceivable that a scholar could make Jesus so nearly approach a Stoic and impute to him so Greek an ideal as the "worthy conversation" on a drink of water or wine.

A year before the publication of Lepsius' life of Jesus, Wernle's *Jesus* appeared. It is not a life of Jesus but is essentially an interpretation of the gospels on the subjects of faith in God, man and the demands of God, and preaching regarding the coming kingdom of God. These subjects are presented without discussing a single question about the life of Jesus in the usual sense. Only in the last chapter, on "Jesus the Christ," is the problem of the messianic title and the messianic self-consciousness raised. The question is answered by distinguishing most clearly between what was expected of the Messiah in that age and what Jesus himself thought about his mission. This distinction leads to the fruitful recognition that the subject for discussion should be, not the "messianic self-consciousness" of Jesus, but the faith which Jesus entertained when he permitted himself to be called Messiah. Yet while Wernle is so candid—and it is in this section that his book points in the direction of the new methodology—the interpreter's personal concern for the question at issue is not to be obscured. He often emphasizes—in my opinion too often and somewhat too subjectively—that one item is foreign or another is congenial to us. He thereby correctly expresses the conviction that at this point value and meaning, not only of the sources but also of the person of Jesus, are basal to his judgments. And by treating these questions of value in the final chapter, he thus safeguards in welcome fashion the interpretation given in the earlier chapters, where these problems are not introduced.

Certainly even the presentation in the earlier chapters is not without constructive significance. But what he there aspires to is not the knowledge of a specific historical transaction but the understanding of the total phenomenon. In this formulation of purpose Wernle touches problems which fully anticipate the discussion of the following decade. Thus in his interpretation of the demand of God, the problem of the timelessness of the Sermon on the Mount is emphatically involved. The teaching of Jesus is not concerned with the overthrow of the law, but with making life simple, intense, severe, perfect. Jesus did not ask what is the best, most practical, or most ideal ethics, but what is important before God and his judgment, what is the perfect will of God who is supreme in eternity. And this eternal character of Jesus' demand insures for it timelessness.

In what Wernle has to say about the content of Jesus' demand he is not in complete agreement with the treatment of the problem as presented in later theological discussion. When incidentally he mentions as "the most certain characteristic of Jesus' thought a decisive stern religious individualism," the tendency of the demand for specific matters is recognized; but the eschatological framework in which this demand stands is misunderstood. He thinks a community of Jesus' disciples is to be made ready for the coming kingdom—a purpose which lies beyond the horizon of an individualistic inwardness. If the synthesis of Jesus' gospel yields nothing but the old formulas about love of God and one's brother, then it seems to me one overlooks the fact that there is a higher unity above the dualism of love for God and one's brother. It is curious how persistently in such combinations ideas from the Enlightenment continue to reassert themselves. If Jesus' gospel is synthesized about the idea of a community of disciples, then it seems to me one fails to observe that Jesus nowhere ever expresses a demand for brotherly love—that is, a humane charitable requirement—apart from his thought of God, but that a demand was made for love of enemies, readiness to forgive, submissiveness and helpful service for neighbors, as consequences and expressions of one's relation with God.

Wernle's entire book is supported by an unremitting earnestness which shuns no problem. He desires to hide nothing from his readers and to slight nothing. That is especially evident at one point. The last exclamation of Jesus, "My God, my God, why hast thou forsaken me?" is felt by Wernle to be a serious problem. The contrast between this "despair of the crucified one" and his triumphant confession before the Sanhedrin is given prominence, and Wernle questions whether this saying of Jesus signifies a "collapse of his hope for the Kingdom of God." The answer is that it is "rather a physical and mental impossibility" to cling to that hope in the moment of final agony. Thus this final cry signifies that Jesus with his last ounce of strength still pursues the way "to the God whom he no longer understands." Certainly for a scholar with Wernle's heritage from literary criticism and knowledge of the history of religions another interpretation lay near at hand. One might affirm that Mark, had he understood this saying as a cry of despair, would either not have reported it at all or at least not without an explanation. One might have considered whether the later community had not at this point, as so often elsewhere, derived features of the passion story from the Old Testament. The Twenty-second Psalm, which in other details was understood as a passion story, showed in its opening words the meaning of Jesus' last cry on the cross. Or, finally, one might ask whether, admitting the authenticity of the gospel narrative, the language of this Psalm could ever have signified despair on the lips of a pious Jew in the hour of death. Is not the language of this prayer from the Psalms an evidence of resignation, characteristic of psalmist piety, which faces all suffering confidently before God? It is perhaps scientifically a defect that Wernle investigates none of these possibilities, but his discussion of the problem demonstrates the honesty and courage of the author.

III

The books of Lepsius and Wernle represent two types of interpretation, one that of the past and the other that of the future. The characteristic trait of the former is a psychologizing and rationalizing procedure, which results in the usual tendency toward a pronounced modernization. The characteristics of the latter are a restraint in respect to psychology and biographical reconstruction, and a disposition to present exposition and interpretation from the point of view of Jesus' message.

The older type of book seemed actually to be a scientific work, at least as written by Protestant theologians. Outside of theological circles people even yet hold in high esteem the kind of life of Jesus that knows no distinction between history and romance, that professes to rest on study of the sources, and yet—thanks to an imaginative interest nourished in reality from our modern cultural consciousness—knows all sorts of things about the desires and doings of Jesus—matters about which we know nothing. It declares itself to be historical and critical, yet it much deceives the reader regarding the chasm that lies between him and the subject. The past and its setting are visualized with all the devices of realism, but the result consists of impressions rather than actual knowledge. This type of life of Jesus holds too high a place in the affections of a wide circle of readers to permit its disappearance without further consideration from popular scientific literature.

This situation must be kept in mind if one desires to estimate correctly Emil Ludwig's *Der Menschensohn* ("*The Son of Man*") and its commercial success. This German author, who is also well known in foreign lands, is a literary man rather than a poet: he has written three novels and one drama. He owes his fame to his biographies—Goethe, Napoleon, Bismarck, William II. Stylistically they are brilliant works, displaying vast knowledge of the sources and an uncanny power of making real certain situations that stimulate the author. His psychological fancy glows with especial brilliancy in dealing with personal data, like letters, diaries, and memoirs. He always views the past merely in terms of temperament, either the temperament of his subject or his own. When critics praise his biographies on the ground that they read like a drama, or that in them a section of history passes before the eye of the reader as in an ancient drama, these opinions reveal both the strength and the weakness of Emil Ludwig's books. For his exceptionally fruitful historical fancy is always in danger of passing from fact to fiction without making the reader aware of the transition. As a matter of fact, even in his interpretations of the recent past Ludwig has made frequent and copious reconstructions. His best-known example is his judgment about the youth of Emperor William, whose character and fate Ludwig explains as largely the result of that physical defect with which the emperor was afflicted from birth. This was the shortening of his left arm. Ludwig concludes that this was the cause of the emperor's longing to be—or at least to appear—strong, hence his passion for display and also his mother's aversion toward German physicians. Again in the case of the Emperor Frederick's illness, this aversion had prompted her to trust implicitly the judgment of the English physician; and this confidence also had, as is well known, exerted an important influence on German politics in the year 1888. All of this is reconstructed attractively and often with serious arguments, but it is still only a reconstruction and as a whole is not capable of proof. Indeed, in many details it has to be immediately refuted in the light of recently published sources.

I had to give an example of Ludwig's method in handling a modern subject in order to explain two things. The first is the success which such an interpretation enjoys with the public at large. *Der Menschensohn* has now reached a circulation of thirty thousand; and the book on the former emperor, two hundred thousand. And, secondly, I wished to show the dangers to which this method is exposed when it attempts to recover the life of Jesus. For he is a subject regarding whom we have at our disposal no personal confessions, not even psychological data. And one's ability to reproduce psychological realism becomes less powerful and effective the farther removed the subject of interpretation is in time, place, and type from the author.

Ludwig does, indeed, endeavor to narrow this breach. He familiarizes himself and his readers in a very lively manner with the age and the world in which Jesus lived. In this he shows that he knows the sources and their historical interpretation. But he begins his picture with the youth of Jesus, about which one can find nothing in the sources. The method of Ludwig compels him to reconstruct the portrait of the youth from an intuitively perceived picture of the man. Thus the reader of this chapter on "Calling" becomes at the same time acquainted with the interpretation of Jesus which pervades the entire book. It is an idyllic interpretation. This is a Jesus whose face is turned toward the world: he takes part in festivities; he does not forbid marriage; he prefers gushing women like Mary of Bethany; in the presence of the adulteress he forgets his position as messianic judge and shows a particularly tender nature capable of neither rebuke nor anger. The influence of a very well-known and once very famous type of life of Jesus is plainly seen in this portrait. It was Ernest Renan who put into literary circulation this picture of the gentle rabbi, the "pleasantest of men." These are the very traits which both authors, with annoying exaggeration, make prominent in Jesus. One reads in Renan, "He did not flee from pleasure, and he gladly went to marriage festivities"; and Ludwig says of the youthful Jesus, "He does not flee from festivities and women, and he makes merry with the guests."

But all of this is true only of the youthful Jesus. For the difference between this recent interpretation and that of Renan two generations ago is that Emil Ludwig attempts to show how, from this mild and joyously disposed youth, Jesus becomes one whose self-consciousness is to manifest itself in messianic, imperative, high-claiming language. Ludwig has correctly seen that we know only one person who appears to have exerted an effective shaping influence upon the life of Jesus. This is John the Baptist. But Ludwig's method, as already described, now manifests itself again. In the correct observation that the appearance of the Baptist had been of immeasurable significance for Jesus, Ludwig seeks a key to the entire life of Jesus. Thus it appears to Ludwig that every crisis which he imagines in the life of Jesus is caused by the activity and fate of the Baptist. It is the baptism that presents to Jesus the decisive call of God. The imprisonment of the Baptist summons him to take up the arrested work of John, indeed "in a milder tone" but yet in a manner of life which for Jesus is of unwonted severity and rigidity. Thus he goes to the wedding at Cana and displays his new character in the rebuff to his mother. And the Baptist's question addressed to Jesus from the prison becomes for him the suggestion of God which directs him to his proper messianic calling; from afar he feels "the enlightening gleam of assurance coming nearer." And as the Baptist "seemed mysteriously to crown him, he thus pointed out to him the way of suffering." The news of John's death, which Ludwig depicts with all the art of a rich and trained fancy, reveals to Jesus the kind of death for which he is destined. In this picture one is shown clearly the combination of history, which is set forth from the sources, with poetry, which wells up from fancy.

This combination has its undeniable dangers. A reader confronted by anything so fascinating that purports to be derived from the texts may believe that the other items narrated by Ludwig are actually to be found in the sources. But such a work also has its charms. The psychological art of the author makes everything vivid; it is charming; and it seems as if the reconstruction of the poetic author might have been true to reality. For one acquainted with the gospels, it is all the more painful to observe that the total picture of Jesus, from which the individual features are fancifully derived, is so little in accord with the spirit of the message which Jesus actually preached. This is the price paid for exalting the deeds at the cost of the message. For this Jesus, who is more and more subject to external stimuli rather than to impulses from within himself, is not the masterful personality that speaks in the Sermon on the Mount; he is not the relentless critic of the commonplace life; he is not the wrathful prophet of woes against the Pharisees. And, indeed, Ludwig is compelled in such passages to give the text a new meaning. He represents Jesus in these sayings as slipping back into the "rough tone" of the Baptist. In the controversy over purification he who was "formerly so mild and cautious" is "no longer to be restrained." And of Matt. 11:25 Ludwig writes "the tender feeling of the son for the all-loving father has been thus transformed into arrogant ecstasy."

The necessary cleft between the mild visionary of Renan's type and the relentless spokesman of the divine claims becomes all the greater in Ludwig's life of Jesus when the author undertakes a harmonistic treatment of the narratives and sayings in the Gospel of John. This result was to be expected especially in the story of the passion. Here Ludwig not only describes "the very old thin yellow face of Annas, wrinkled and colored like an old scroll of the law"; but also, by means of a new interpretation, he discovers a trait of Pilate's character, when in a respectful moment "before the bearer of the Spirit" Pilate is permitted to say of Jesus in Latin, and hence is understood by his officers only, *ecce homo*. I have the suspicion that Ludwig is guided here less by the Greek text than by the memory of Napoleon's remark about Goethe, *voilà un homme!* The Gospel of John is represented in Ludwig's book also by the discourse on bread, the conversation of the Baptist with the priests, and the story of the miracle at Cana. As a consequence a pronounced lack of harmony is present in this biography, and the author is compelled time and again to assume on Jesus' part either an evolution or a sudden change of mood or a relapse, in order to justify the use of accounts so diverse in character.

Accordingly, it is said that in Cana Jesus assumed "a masterly attitude, foreign to himself." From this imperious gesture arises the suggestion that the water is wine, for there is nothing else that happens at Cana. In this one sees, as in Lepsius' life of Jesus, a kinship with a type of life which we supposed was long ago discredited. Manifestly Ludwig has no thought of taking these marvelous accounts as *stories* of miracles and of considering them to be unhistorical features such as are always found in a certain type of tradition. He uses rationalistic criticism after the manner of the Enlightenment and does not understand the miracles to be simply stories but explains them as occurrences falsely described. The lengthy story of demon exorcism is understood, as is quite possible, to be an instance of healing by suggestion; but the guardian of the herd of swine feeding in the vicinity gazes too intently upon the healing, and so a few of the swine fall from the precipitous rocks into the water! And Jesus' escape from the people of Nazareth can be accomplished in a wholly natural manner, since Jesus is here at home and knows every secret nook on the mountain. This rationalizing interpretation continues even to the end of Jesus' life and issues in a superficial explanation, which is no explanation at all, because it does not enable one to understand the founding of the Christian community. The grave of Jesus is empty—all sorts of rumors regarding a theft of the body by friends or enemies are being whispered about the city. "But the women who loved him believed they saw in wakeful dreams the risen Jesus in bodily form." That is the final sentence of the book. The statement proves to be a denial of critical findings in the study of tradition; it proves also to be a denial of the historical situation. The rise of the Easter faith, which changed men, and not merely dreaming women, from fugitives into apostles, is a historical problem never visualized by Ludwig. Instead of this we are shown the areas of idyllic sentimentality and gentle enthusiasm. It is the world of Renan and not of the New Testament. But any supposition regarding the end of Jesus' life which aims to be taken seriously as a critical hypothesis must enable the reader to understand, or at least to surmise, how from the disgraceful and shameful outcome on Calvary there could arise this new movement, this faith, and this book of faith.

IV

I have designated Wernle's book as typical of future interpretation of Jesus. That this type belongs to the future is shown by the book of Rudolf Bultmann which appeared under the title *Jesus* in 1926. The book is marked by two things: it renounces both the attempt to reproduce the life of Jesus and the effort to fathom psychologically his personality. The former restraint is not, so Bultmann confesses, necessarily forced on him by the fragmentary nature of the sources; it appears to him to have been necessitated much more by the second restraint. He who wishes to understand Jesus today must not reconstruct his mind but must fix attention on his work—not on the work actually achieved in the Christian church but on the work that Jesus "really" had willed; and this can be reproduced only as "an accumulation of sentences, of ideas, in the form of teaching." Bultmann has consciously ruled out all that has been written for nearly a century and a half about the life of Jesus, about his personality, and about his inner development. This constitutes a criticism of the traditional interpretation of the life of Jesus, and the reader of this article knows that I share this doubt. Yet I would raise an objection to Bultmann's complete elimination of the narrative materials.

Bultmann is of the opinion that Jesus did not believe himself to be the Messiah. Bultmann knows how very diverse the views on this subject are, and he concludes that "if we are utterly in the dark on this matter we know practically nothing about his [Jesus'] personality." On reading this statement, one questions whether Bultmann has not simply made a virtue of necessity in refraining from the use of data for a life of Jesus. For apparently it is not a result of his methodology, but his skeptical criticism of the sources, that compels this restraint. Bultmann aims to set forth what Jesus had "actually" desired to effect. And in order to make expressions like the "Kingdom of God" (*Gottesherrschaft*) intelligible, he very properly describes the environing world, giving a picture of Judaism with its hopes and the messianic movements arising therefrom. John the Baptist, whose later influence Bultmann believes to be recognizable in the Mandean sect, is associated with these movements; and Jesus also has the same associations. Then it is impossible to avoid the question of how Jesus related himself personally to the hope of his people. One who sees, not a later creation of the community, but a reproduction of historical conversations in such tradition as the confession of Peter, the question addressed to Jesus by the Baptist, or the request of the sons of Zebedee, is forced to regard these matters as an essential part of the preaching of Jesus. And if the conduct of Jesus displayed in connection with his teaching issues in his final conflict with the Jewish authorities, and if Jesus was executed as a messianic pretender according to the import of the inscription on the cross, then this final outcome of his teaching must be included in one's interpretation of his preaching. But if all of these items are unhistorical, it is still necessary nevertheless to account for the catastrophe. In this respect it seems to me out of place to make a radical renunciation of the events of Jesus' life, at least of such events as are thoroughly in accord with what Jesus had "actually" proposed. Yet in the main I indorse Bultmann's method and approve of his critical attitude toward all psychologizing interpretations.

Thus an exposition of Jesus' message forms the essential content of Bultmann's book. Yet this message is not presented as a system of thought. One is not concerned with statements "which have validity apart from the concrete situation in which the speaker stands." Jesus' preaching does not consist in objectively accurate ideas whose truth, utility, depth, and beauty are capable of universal proof, but in appeals to men in their particular situation in life. With great consistency all of this message is derived from the eschatological aspect of Jesus' preaching. Jesus desires to effect decisions, not to cultivate inward religious attitudes. Thus he does not aim to cultivate all the capacities of men, or to do good for its own sake, or to provide the individual soul with any sort of training at all. But Jesus confronts men with the necessity of decision when he announces the will of God and demands outright obedience. In this situation neutrality is gone, and also any mere obedience to the words of Jesus as though they constituted a law. For the crisis forces from the obedient man a completely new act nowhere prescribed, neither in an ethical system nor in the Sermon on the Mount. All the words of Jesus that have the appearance of statutes are radical imperatives designed to make clear the perfect obedience which everyone has always to realize in the immediate and in every new concrete situation.

Jesus, accordingly, taught no ethics, for he had no theory about man with his possibilities and ideal purposes. Jesus does not have the conception "ethics." He prescribes no standard of conduct for man—even paints no ideal picture of man!—and regards him as too insecure in his existence to be able to decide about possibilities of conduct. The crisis is upon man; it is as if he stood in empty space before God. Therefore Jesus needs no theory about sin, since sin is an essential characteristic of man in the presence of God. "Jesus does not speak *about* men, saying that they are sinners, but he speaks *to* men who are sinners."

In this exposition of Bultmann's one will immediately perceive that it accords with the specific conception of man and God set forth in the theology of Karl Barth. And, in fact, the picture of Jesus sketched by Bultmann is frequently criticized on the ground that it reflects too much the ideas of the present and therefore is—in spite of all protest against psychological modernizing—itself just one more modernization only effected in another way. Bultmann himself knows that a historical interpretation, if it is to be profitable, always depends upon the interpreter's moving from his own situation into that of the person whom he interprets. But that criticism which sees in Bultmann's *Jesus* simply the views of the Barthian theology ought still to ask whether Bultmann has not discovered and expressed essential facts not present in the Barthian theology and not dependent upon it for their validity. Perhaps in this connection I may refer to the fact that I myself expressed the same ideas in my book *Evangelium und Welt*, the first edition of which appeared in 1925 under the title *Geschichtliche und übergeschichtliche Religion*. I expressed the opinion that the gospel contained no ethic; and that the commands of Jesus depict by way of example on exceptional occasions how one has to act, but do not prescribe what everyone has to do in his specifically conditioned situation. Only I—in opposition to Bultmann—thought it possible to exhibit a common basis for all the sayings of Jesus and to designate him as "the new being" before God, since the eschatological message places man in a new situation before God—"in the crisis," says Bultmann. But he and I, even though frequently we have used quite different conceptions, have for the most part been in essential agreement as to what significance this situation should have for men. According to my description of the attitude of Jesus' hearer, what impresses him is "not a new world-view, a new statement of principle, a newly manifested wisdom, but the awakened feeling of the overpowering nearness of God—that is, the nearness of the Kingdom of God in the eschatological sense—a feeling that also reshaped, ennobled and expanded other emotions." That which Jesus sets up in opposition to the thoroughly approved Jewish feeling of hate toward the enemies of God and of his people is not "the special exercise of love for enemies, but the greatness of the feeling of love which has been kindled by the nearness of God and has now become truly absolute, transcending human doubts and calculations. Also enmity among men cannot restrict a love that wells up from a new vital motive. No human limitations at all can be fixed for one seized by this feeling, for this love which emanates from the love of God itself is measured only by its own standards." Similarly, Bultmann says regarding the command to love, "for Jesus' love is thought of neither as a virtue which pertains to man's perfection nor as an aid to the well-being of society, but as the self-conquest of the will in the concrete situation of life where a man is confronted by other men." "Love for neighbor and enemy does not rest upon an agitated and sentimental feeling of sympathy or admiration which still perceives in the most depraved individual the vestiges of divine, noble, and imperishable humanity, but it rests upon the command of God. Thus love is not some especially strong emotion." When I retain the word emotion (*Affekt*), it is chiefly because the fundamental attitude leading to the Christian decision seems to me to be released through an emotion. For the news of the nearness of God's kingdom does not immediately force men into the attitude of obedience, but first into the attitude of self-humiliation, in which one recognizes with horror the distance between God and man.

The agreement between Bultmann's exposition and my own is evident, above all else, in our common effort to guard against a misapprehension. We both oppose the notion that the Sermon on the Mount was meant to be statutory in character and that the Christian life was to be realized by keeping this law. The Sermon on the Mount does not aim to improve this world, or to furnish a program for the world to come; but its imperatives are designed to grip and transform men, and thus to prepare them for the Kingdom of God. That interpretation of the Sermon on the Mount which makes it a law capable of being kept seems to us to be a legalistic perversion of the gospel; and on the other hand, our interpretation is connected by its opponents with certain representatives of modern thinking—with Kierkegaard in the case of Bultmann and with Johannes Müller in my own case. The discussion has been pursued along such lines by Hans Windisch, for example, in his book *Der Sinn der Bergpredigt*. The result has, in my opinion, been a very profitable discussion which does not, however, belong within the range of problems under consideration here.

As to specific questions about the life of Jesus, I believe I can give somewhat more definite answers than Bultmann does. That this is quite possible, even from the point of view here represented, is demonstrated by the interpretation of Jesus' career which appeared last year as the article "Jesus Christ" in the new edition of the large encyclopedia, *Die Religion in Geschichte und Gegenwart*. The author of the article is Karl Ludwig Schmidt, professor at Bonn, but formerly at Giessen and at Jena. Schmidt, like Bultmann and myself, is an adherent of the so-called *formgeschichtliche* method described at the beginning of this article. Accordingly, he refrains from writing a biography of Jesus, because one is unable to discern and describe the course of Jesus' life. But he does not renounce interpretation of Jesus' conduct, as it is made known above all in his acts of healing and in the cleansing of the temple, an act which Schmidt quite properly stresses as typical and decisive. This deed belongs to the work of Jesus, it expresses his summons to repentance, and it demands obedience toward God.

Schmidt presents the teaching of Jesus from a point of view similar to that which was determinative for Bultmann. The influence of the dialectic theology of Karl Barth is recognizable also in Schmidt's work. But his purpose includes more than a mere historical exposition. He also undertakes in his picture of Jesus to provide the basis for assertion of belief about Jesus. The hero-worship into which the liberal type of life of Jesus evaporates seems to Schmidt to be an impoverishment of Christology. But he rejects the analysis of the problem as indicated at the beginning of this article and set forth in my book *Evangelium und Welt*, where I distinguish between historical affirmation, which is never sufficient for faith, and the superhistorical affirmation made by faith but never capable of scientific demonstration. He rejects this distinction because "with such a synthesis, attractive in itself, the facts of the primitive Christian confession presented in the gospels" are not, or are not sufficiently, in accord. I would reply that it is not at all a matter of recovering the primitive Christian confession; but what concerns us is the fact that we, as men who hold scientific views and Christian beliefs, truly affirm both our scientific findings and our beliefs. I would allude in particular to one other matter. Schmidt himself closes his sketch on Christology with the conclusion that he is concerned with "the commission and vocation of Jesus Christ in word and deed derived from the biblical setting and not capable of being classified in universal history." This recognition of the impossibility of classifying the content of an actual Christian Christology in the category of universal history again appears to me to lead to the distinction which I advocated between historical and superhistorical. If one is unwilling to misuse faith by employing it as a makeshift for historical knowledge, then only one conclusion can be drawn. Jesus, as historically known and classified in connection with historical happenings, does not save; and the saving quality of the Christ known to faith cannot be exhibited by means of historical research because it is superhistorical in character, because it permits of no comparison, and belongs to no human category.

V

Thus the present theological controversy about Jesus leads immediately to the problem of Christology. Therefore, in conclusion I shall consider two recent theological publications in German that have treated the Christological problem in perpetual conflict with the representatives of historical research.

The first of these books, like the works of Bultmann and Schmidt, is a product of the dialectical theology of Barth. This is *Der Mittler* ("*The Mediator*") by Emil Brunner, professor in Zurich. I can here neither describe nor criticize the total content of the book, its exposition of revelation, of the divine person of the Messiah, and of reconciliation. What concerns us in this connection is Brunner's discussion of historical questions. Exactly along the lines that I have already sketched he criticizes the older conception of a life of Jesus, ultimately traceable to the Enlightenment, in which it is believed possible to find in the gospel the consummation of an ethical ideal for humanity; and he shows that this conception is refuted by recognizing the eschatological character of Jesus' preaching. From this position, at which research has now arrived, he directs his criticism against the view that there is an antithesis between the historical Jesus and the faith of the community. "Assuming it to be true that Jesus did 'only' and said 'only' what the radical historical critics accept as actually historical, who has the courage to say that this cannot be the Christ in whom the church and in whom Paul and John believe?"

Proceeding from this position, Brunner presents a positive justification of the Christology of the ancient church. The thesis of Ritschl and Harnack, to the effect that developing dogma represents a hellenization of, and therefore a partial deviation from, the gospel, is dismissed by Brunner with the very questionable affirmation: "The modern rationalism of a Ritschl or a Harnack is much more Greek than the teaching of Irenaeus, Athanasius, and Cyril." On the contrary, it is said that trinitarian teaching—the identity of the one who reveals and is revealed—the dogma of the two natures with all its consequence, conforms to the gospel picture. Above all, there is agreement in the view that Christ indeed took on human nature but was not a human person. For, says Brunner, the place where sin has its seat is in the mystery of personality, at the innermost point of our actual existence and of the conscious self. At this point Christ possesses not a sinful human person but a divine Logos person, or rather, he is himself this divine person. Although these considerations are fundamental and actually touch the point at which faith in Christ is distinguished from all man-worship, this reproduction of the teaching of the ancient church also appears to me not to escape the error of most such restatements of ideas. Clearly Brunner is not aware of the fact that he also modernizes. This teaching about the mystery of personality signifies more than a reproduction of ancient teaching. Its connection with the dialectic theology is apparent; and this becomes especially clear in his conception of revelation: "Revelation consists in the fact that God speaks and man is silent. Everything depends on this utterance of God alone. We are unable to respond. Where should we find ground for an affirmative reply? The fact that God answers where we should—that is revelation, that is faith." "Faith—the possibility of belief and not merely the content of belief—is the gift of God, as the bible testifies."

This Christology is now related to the historical life of Jesus in a way that shows acquaintance with all modern criticism. This is the most significant thing for us in the present connection. In his picture of the historical Jesus, Brunner sets in the foreground a threefold "coincidence of opposites": (1) the union of a zeal for judgment with unconditional forgiving love; (2) an interest in immediate human concerns, such as an understanding of children and nature, side by side with indifference toward such human concerns as religious, national, and cultural obligations; and finally (3) the affirmation of religious tradition combined with a threatening attitude toward the whole established order. In these statements truly decisive features in the portrait of Jesus are stressed, and they are accentuated by the fact that Brunner seeks to prove the historicity of Jesus' messianic claims by the use of practically the same texts as are employed by Schmidt and myself. But the manner in which he seeks to deduce from these coincidences his particular Christology seems to me doubtful. He thinks that every unbiased reader of the gospel narratives must recognize incomprehensible features in the portrait of Jesus, and on the strength of the first-noted coincidence even the intelligent secular historian will say that it represents something "unique." In the sense in which Brunner here wishes "unique" to be taken, the historian ought not to use the word at all. At most he can say of a phenomenon that he has not met its like before—that may be due to his own limitations or to the defectiveness of his sources—but he cannot affirm that such a thing has never happened before or that it may never happen again. That conviction is not a matter of historical knowledge. It is just here that one is able to introduce another point of view which is fundamentally different from that of the historian.

In dealing with the question of Jesus' messianic claim, Brunner has indeed stressed the distinction between these two points of view. It appears to him historically credible that Jesus held himself to be the Messiah. In complete agreement with the religio-historical way of thinking, Brunner desires that Jesus' claim shall be understood, not in a transformed sense, but in its complete fantastic form. Hence Jesus means just what he says in the statement, "Blessed is he who is not offended in me." For one who knows by faith that Jesus is the Christ, this historical testimony supports and confirms the belief that he actually is such. If it does no less, it certainly does no more! Therefore it is entirely proper that the question as to whether Jesus thought himself the Messiah should be debatable; "for it is characteristic of the true Messiah that subsequent generations may dispute about him. Similarly, the controversy about the sense in which he held himself to be the Messiah is also not out of place, for how could a unique phenomenon be otherwise expressed than in some ordinary imagery, that is in some sort of historically presentable form?" The controversy over the meaning of the messianic title "goes with the lowly form of the Son of God, the incarnate Word, the Jesus Christ"; hence even the historian is not excluded when it is said "blessed is he who is not offended in me."

Karl Bornhausen, professor at Breslau, and formerly at Marburg, makes it his aim "to interpret the historical content of the Christian faith in accordance with the needs of the educated man in modern European civilization." The first of his books written in pursuit of this purpose is called *Der Erlöser* ("*The Savior*"). If I understand him correctly, it is from the point of view of Wilhelm Hermann that Bornhausen proposes to apprehend and interpret that historical life which stands at the beginning of our religion. "The form of the historical occurrence, being long past, is unessential; significance lies only in the vital meaning which it comes to have for us." But the wealth of historical allusions and generalizations in Bornhausen's book makes it far from easy for the reader to perceive just what the author has chiefly in mind. In connection with a religio-historical exposition of the ancient idea of salvation, Bornhausen briefly designates the historical Savior Jesus as savior of body and soul, the social redeemer, the herald of pure faith. The objection which I must offer to this way of thinking arises from the question of whether here one does not pass all too easily from the past to the present, from the historical Jesus to the evaluation of his message for all time. Bornhausen has not taken into account the fact that Jesus utters his words with the imminent kingdom of God in view, and therefore desires to provide neither healing nor a social ethic for this world. It seems to me to be a modernizing emphasis when, for example, Bornhausen affirms that Jesus stands forth in the tradition of the first century "as the one who is perfectly sound and who just because of that fact heals the infirmities of body and soul." Nothing of this is known in the only tradition that could be authoritative on the subject, namely, the tradition of the New Testament, which is still uninfluenced by ideas derived from the world of culture and the educated classes. And the healings of Jesus are nowhere esteemed as the effects of the health of the healer, but always as the act of God. On the other hand, it is a striking fact—and is entirely as it should be from the point of view of Brunner's book—that we know as little about the health of Jesus as we do about his appearance. And when Bornhausen notes that Christendom attributed to its savior the bodily beauty of the ancient gods' statues, it is possible to assert that this feature in the history of Christian art was inspired much less by an exact knowledge of Jesus than by the ancient humanitarian thought of God as the perfect man. Or, indeed, this result may have been due to the necessity of the artist, who had no other models than the beautiful anthropomorphic gods of tradition known to him. While the figure of Jesus, as Bornhausen properly emphasizes, towers above the limitations of his time and his country, yet this transcendence over time and nationality is due to the eschatological orientation of his message rather than to the totality of the humanity comprehended in him. It is true that the testimony of the ancient church can be cited in support of this pronounced humanistic notion; but, even so, its exponents are often more influenced by ancient tradition than by the message of the gospel.

Again it seems to me to be a similar humanistic reinterpretation of the early Christian testimony when Bornhausen extols "friendship and love manifest in an entirely free and vital form" as a social accomplishment of the historical man Jesus. The social imperative of the gospel does not depend upon ideals which Jesus had prescribed for life in human communities or had exemplified in living with his disciples, but upon the knowledge which overtakes all men in the presence of the kingdom of God. This is a recognition of the fact that all men, rich as well as poor, righteous as well as unrighteous, stand under the same judgment before God and are in need of the same mercy, and that it bodes ill for man to permit distinctions to prevail when God himself invites people from "the by-ways and hedges" to his banquet. The Christology that seeks to obtain a statement about the Christ of faith from the picture of the historical Jesus cannot be substantiated by a humanistic reinterpretation of Jesus, not even though it can cite men of ancient Christendom as witnesses for this interpretation.

I have included these books about Christology along with the works previously considered, because I regard them as typical witnesses to the cultural and theological status in present-day Germany. Yet these citations fall far short of exhausting the literature on Jesus. I have not indicated lines of development emanating from a type of christological thinking already current at the beginning of the century and still to be encountered in modern writings. The great influence exerted by Adolf Schlatter of Tübingen upon generations of theologians emanates also from his book *Die Geschichte des Christus*. Within the younger generation this influence is most clearly traceable in the little book *Jesus Christ* by Emil Hirsch of Göttingen. It attempts to proceed from "given information" in the teaching and story of Jesus Christ to "acquired knowledge" of a Christological sort.

Also, no mention is made here of consciously biased works, like the original but often erroneous interpretation of the gospel which Karl Bornhäuser of Marburg deduces from Jewish materials in his book *Das Wirken des Christus durch Taten und Worte.* Neither have I mentioned the dilettante attempt to squeeze Jesus into some sort of modern mold, as an example of which I mention the book of Hans Blüher, *Die Aristie des Jesus von Nazareth;* nor have I included the interpretations that endeavor immediately to transform Jesus into a modern man, as has been done by Walter Classen and Josef Wittig. Finally, this survey neglects to notice consciously Catholic interpretations, like the *Jesus Christ* of August Reatz. These works are omitted because my task was to exhibit the difficulties of a problem which is solved for a Catholic by the teaching of his church. It knows no problem of a contrast between historical knowledge and the claims of faith.

If the recent German works that I have described show slight agreement in the effort toward a uniform solution of this problem, they certainly attest that the problem is recognized and newly defined, and perhaps defined more sharply than was possible for the past generation. Also it is characteristic of the new situation that the demand for historical knowledge based on a strictly methodical study of the sources and the demand for carefully formulated statements about the significance of Jesus Christ for believing Christians are no longer felt to be mutually hostile interests. Also, one is now required to abandon the attempt to unite these two problems by the use of pious expressions. To state with clearness and sincerity both the demands of history and the claims of faith, in order to do justice to them, at least in a personal if not in a scientific synthesis—that may be designated as the task continually imposed upon us by the problem of historical study in connection with faith in Christ.

FREUD AND THE ILLUSION OF RELIGION

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RELIGION, being one of the most complex phases of human experience, has always provided a fertile soil in which luxuriant perversions have perennially flourished; and before these can be finally uprooted, they must be traced down to their deep and tangled roots. Recent psychology has undeniably vividly illuminated the structure of religious experience, alike in its normal and its abnormal manifestations. This makes it all the more remarkable that Freud's latest analysis of religion, as such, should rest on so fragile a foundation that his criticisms must be ranked among the most puerile that have ever been leveled against their object. But the serious inadequacies of his contention become still more radical when it is extended beyond religion itself, regarded as one main form of culture, to culture in general. This is excellently defined, to begin with, as "all those respects in which human life has raised itself above animal conditions and in which it differs from the life of the beasts."[1] Culture thus becomes inseparable from civilization; but immediately following this definition we find the fundamental error which distorts the entire perspective and vitiates Freud's final conclusions. For culture is next depicted as coercively imposed on the generality of mankind by "a minority that understood how to possess itself of the means of power" (p. 10); while the necessity for this coercion arises from the ineradicable hostility between cultural demands on the one hand and natural human instincts on the other, since the latter are essentially "destructive and anti-social tendencies . . . . the majority is today hostile to culture."[2]

But while these powerful and inimical tendencies are all too painfully obvious, nevertheless Freud's description violates equally the facts of history together with sound psychological principles; and this in two important respects. In the first place, we may agree that all human progress from the animal and savage level has been very largely due to certain small minorities. But to call their influence "coercive" is to verge on the ridiculous; quite plainly, on the contrary, their methods have consisted uniformly in persuasion and example, argument and exhortation, which with parallel and ghastly uniformity have been rewarded by the cup of hemlock, the stake, and the cross. Secondly, those other minorities which actually have resorted to coercion have been the despots and tyrannical autocracies, whose ultimate defeat has always been brought about by that very majority of mankind which Freud accuses of resisting and destroying culture. The fact is that he has totally omitted from his group of "instincts" those which are the most effective and at the same moment the most distinctively human: the instinct for freedom, shared by all animals themselves; for sympathy and co-operation, also found in social animal species; for art and knowledge, as these slowly but nonetheless irresistibly germinate in the crudest savage rites and superstitions. On each of these vitally significant issues, therefore, Freud's account of human nature is as remote from actuality and as purely imaginative as Hobbes' familiar "state of nature." It is superfluous to adopt any idealistic interpretation of the facts just referred to, since a frankly pragmatic criterion proves itself amply sufficient, in the long run, to justify man's preference for culture even when this demands the most rigorous control of his violent impulses and passions. Thus man discovers for himself the stern truth, rigidly imposed by Nature upon even the animal mind, that there is always a limit to indulgence which it is ultimately fatal to transgress.

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[1] *The Future of an Illusion* (London, 1928), p. 8.

[2] *Ibid.*, pp. 11, 15.

Freud begins, then, with so radically perverted a presentation of the facts of history and psychology as to suggest the distorting atmosphere of the consulting room, confined as this inevitably is to abnormal types of mankind. It is not surprising, therefore, that as his argument proceeds it becomes involved in direct self-contradiction. For he concludes by insisting, with perfect truth of course, that "we have no other means of controlling our instincts than our intelligence"; still further, that though "the human intellect is weak in comparison with human instincts, nevertheless it does not rest until it has gained a hearing. Ultimately, after endlessly repeated rebuffs, it succeeds."[3] But it is plainly altogether impossible to attribute culture to the coercion exercised by any minority whatever, and at the same moment to reason. To select either of these is necessarily to exclude the other. For reason is essentially non-coercive in any literal, and not merely metaphorical, sense of this term. On the contrary, reason is from its very nature a matter of individual deliberation followed by wholly voluntary decision, choice, and action. It is quite true that this represents an ideal that is rarely, if indeed ever, attained, just as it is equally undeniable that imitation, example, and pragmatic standards are almost universally operative. But even these are themselves the indirect effects of reason in some form, so that at bottom reason and intellect remain absolutely antithetic to all modes of coercion; Freud's argument therefore, when carried to its conclusion, collapses completely through an inherent self-contradiction. This is in fact implied by the very cases to which he appeals. "Every child," he maintains, "becomes a moral and social being [because] external compulsion is gradually internalized" in such a way that "people, from being the foes of culture, become its supporters [and] dispense with external coercion" (pp. 18, 19). Now this "external compulsion" is said to hold true, of all possible instances, with respect to cannibalism. We are to suppose, therefore, that this originally universal custom has practically entirely ceased because a small minority coerced their blood-thirsty, or even merely famishing, fellows into its abandonment! Surely serious criticism is wasted on so far-fetched a suggestion, particularly in view of the alternative account of the origin of culture which Freud himself proceeds to offer; while it must further be observed that Westermarck asserts the direct contrary as to cannibalistic habits themselves. "It is," he contends, "an illegitimate supposition to regard the cannibalism of modern savages as a survival from the first infancy of mankind, or from a stage through which the whole human race has passed."[4] But to return to Freud, we have just seen that his first theory is that culture is coercively imposed by minorities; his second is that "we united together and created culture" to guard ourselves against the "dangers with which nature threatens us" (p. 26). But it is patent that these two theories are hopelessly irreconcilable, since if mankind "united together and created culture" there can never have existed the asserted minority externally coercing the larger mass. Once again the very basis of Freud's entire standpoint is invalidated by its own internal contradiction; and this difficulty is intensified when he further maintains that our "great common task [is] preservation against the supremacy of nature" (p. 27). We must ask anew, slightly modifying Tennyson's words, "Are men and nature then at strife?" a question which no biologist or psychologist will now answer affirmatively unless he first gives "nature" an altogether too restricted and antiquated a meaning. For in its wider and truer sense, is not man himself an essential part of nature? Is he not "organic to the Universe," as Professor Pringle-Pattison has argued? Here likewise idealism is superfluous; it is amply sufficient to consider the most familiar and even commonplace facts. Are not, then, all human brain-processes as perfectly natural as those of the ape? and with these, their inseparably conjoined mental activities also? Scientifically, at least, the negative answer is clearly inadmissible; but this implies that "mental activities" must include even the rarest and finest cultures, which thus become as much part of "nature" as the thrush's song or even the cannibal's war cry. It is, in short, no longer possible to regard "culture" as antithetic to "nature," as Freud has done here; on the contrary, culture is simply nature herself raised to the highest level.

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[3] *Ibid.*, pp. 83, 93.

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[4] *The Origin of the Moral Ideas*, II, 580.

This indestructible affinity between man and nature must, however, be extended still further. The criticisms of religion, on the ground of its perversions, are closely allied with those based upon its anthropomorphism, which Freud next proceeds to consider. But once more the objection destroys its own foundation. For, as has been pointed out repeatedly, not religious experience alone, but *all* human experience, must remain anthropic. If therefore this is made the ground for calling religion an "illusion," then science and art and ethics at once become equally illusory; so that if, as Freud finally concludes, religion is merely a mirage doomed ultimately to fade away, whatever succeeds it must be as anthropic as itself. On this issue the modern theologian fully agrees with his philosophic predecessors; "man never knows how anthropomorphic he is," observes Dr. Tennant; "knowledge can never soar above human interpretation";[5] and similarly both Kant and Hume, while diametrically opposed in almost every other respect, are at one in recognizing the ineradicably anthropic character of every predicate, without exception, that the human mind can apply to the real Universe. Our sole choice rests therefore, not between anthropomorphism and its absence, but only between its crudest types on the one hand and its most elevated on the other; so that if "science is no illusion" (p. 98), religion need not necessarily be one either.

Curiously enough, this receives indirect recognition as Freud's argument continues. For he insists, and again with complete justification, upon the validity and objectivity of "scientific endeavor" despite (to repeat) its ingrained anthropomorphism; and his reasons are precisely those which I have already emphasized. "Our mental apparatus has been developed in the attempt to explore the outer world; secondly, it itself is a constituent part of that world" (p. 97). But this being the case, it is quite illegitimate to restrict our "mental apparatus" solely to "scientific endeavor," since it functions equally naturally, and for all that Freud has thus far shown, equally validly, throughout aesthetic, moral, and even religious experience. Thus a twofold illogicality vitiates Freud's entire position: first, he sets up an antithesis between man and nature as "sublime, pitiless, inexorable" (p. 27) which is, however, forthwith discarded completely in so far as our "mental apparatus" is concerned; secondly, "mental apparatus" itself is arbitrarily limited to "scientific endeavor" alone, just as though the other main types of experience were totally devoid of such apparatus.

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[5] *Philosophical Theology*, I, 175, 198.

Equally fallacious is Freud's description of those facts of experience from which he affirms the illusion of religion to originate. All cultural ideals, we find, follow upon actual achievements instead of preceding these and, at least to some important degree, determining their character; while such ideals are retained because they yield narcissistic satisfaction (pp. 21,22). Here likewise we are offered a radically inaccurate account of the mental sequences involved; for, though it is true that every practical success immediately suggests further possibilities to the fertile human mind, it is much more vital to remember that both pure thought and imagination always far outrange the actual. The majority of modern appliances, for example, existed first of all in the vivid imagination of their inventors, in precisely the same way that the figures of a fine drama are the offspring of their creator's imagination, no matter how much they may resemble persons in actual life or history. Now what is thus true of mechanisms and art applies equally to economics and statesmanship. In this respect, therefore, it is clear that Freud has quite unscientifically transposed the real order of the phenomena, since the proper function of all ideals and ideas is to provide those more or less definite ground plans, to which later practice conforms. Still further, if narcissistic satisfaction is the sole reason for their retention by social groups, it becomes impossible to explain the transmission of ideals from nation to nation, and the unceasing supersession of ideals which all history records. To select only outstanding modern instances, are we to suppose that ingrained narcissistic satisfaction with their previous attainments can explain the almost revolutionary adoption of occidental habits and institutions by Turkey, China, and Japan?

Similarly remote from the actual facts is the treatment of "the dogmas of religion." According to Freud, these "claim to be believed firstly, because our primal ancestors already believed them; secondly, because we possess proofs, handed down from this very period of antiquity; thirdly, because it is forbidden to raise the question of their authenticity";[6] and these assertions are applied, in the main, to "one phase of development which more or less corresponds to contemporary Christian culture" (p. 34). Who, then, are "our primal ancestors" to whose acceptance the appeal is supposedly addressed? What "proofs" have been received from "this period of antiquity"? If the terms "antiquity" and "primal ancestors" have any definite meaning, they must denote beings not far removed from Eoanthropus. But surely not the most extreme authoritarian would claim quite so venerable a lineage for his tenets as that! As for the third "claim," while there has always been a superabundance of bigotry, still the more enlightened adherents of Christianity have welcomed inquiry even if they have also condemned and (most unhappily) severly punished heresy. But precisely this circumstance has at least the advantage of disproving Freud's own initial contention. For such religious persecution is an outstanding instance of that "external compulsion," not now by a minority but by a majority, to which Freud himself attributes the advance of culture; its patent historical ineffectiveness, therefore, is in itself a complete refutation of his whole theory.

But the most formidable difficulty attending his analysis still remains. Freud finds the primal basis of religion in the racial infantile helplessness which is so familiar a feature of psychoanalytic doctrine. The issues plainly extend beyond the confines of religion as such, and affect the validity of the entire Oedipus complex hypothesis. For once again the concrete facts of experience provide no support whatever for this theory, which rests indeed on the simple, but nonetheless fatal, fallacy of confusing the *fact* of childish helplessness with the child's own *consciousness* of its helplessness. The fact itself is plainly indisputable, alike in man and in animals; but it by no means follows from this, nor does it ever actually occur on the universal scale demanded by the Freudian theory, that either child or animal is *directly aware* of its own feebleness, as it clearly ought to be, no matter how vaguely, in order to account for the complex in question. This is easily established by both observation and experiment. The newly born creature, to begin with, is not definitely conscious of weakness or of anything else; and when awareness does arise, it is normally not the awareness of weakness at all. On the contrary, young animals notoriously exhibit unusual vigor, activity, and curiosity altogether foreign to any consciousness of helplessness, although (to repeat) this is their actual condition. This holds true of even such timid species as the frolicsome lamb and frisky rabbit, and obviously much more in the case of young Carnivora. Animals are therefore almost as unconscious of their physical deficiencies as is a magnet of its own molecular constitution. It is well known that animals unfamiliar with man will approach him fearlessly, exactly as young chicks and ducklings will roam quite freely so long as patent dangers are absent. These facts are wholly consistent with infantile responses to the parents' warning calls; for here likewise we are concerned with reflex or instinctive reactions which, ingrained for countless generations in the nervous system, are practically as automatic as the magnet's purely mechanical pointing to the poles. We have therefore only the slightest grounds, if indeed we have any at all, for supposing that the chicks sheltered by the parental wings are themselves conscious of their "state of helplessness," actual though this undeniably is. It must of course be remembered that we are dealing with normal conditions, not with the production of abnormal terror due to equally abnormal stimuli.

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[6] *Op. cit.*, p. 45.

Now what is thus normally true of young animals is also true, *mutatis mutandis*, of young children. In their minds also terror and the *consciousness* of feebleness—here again to be sharply distinguished from this itself—are produced only by abnormal cruelty and ill treatment, which are, on the whole, far rarer among savages than among debased and brutalized "civilized" families. That the normal healthy child is actually unaware of danger is only too familiar to all parents who have had to guard against their offspring's cheerful temerity in climbing ladders and fraternizing with large and fierce dogs. Psychological experiments bear this out by showing that childish fears are aroused only by definite, and once more, abnormal stimuli such as loud noise or the sudden loss of support. All this might indeed be theoretically anticipated, since it is patent that any continuous and constitutional consciousness of weakness, such as Freud's theory must necessarily attribute to children, would be absolutely fatal to racial survival.

Quite similarly, further, with the childhood of the race. Savages, normally, are resourceful, brave, and even audacious. It is true that they may be terrified by quite abnormal influences, though even this is by no means the case universally; but again we are concerned with the savage's normal reaction to his familiar environment; and here the parallel to children and young animals is precise. Unusual natural phenomena, such as eclipses and earthquakes, unquestionably arouse fear and awe; but apart from these events modern savages, like our most primitive ancestors, remain blissfully ignorant of their real feebleness, habitually and unthinkingly facing perils and accepting risks to which civilized man would quickly succumb.

The entire Oedipus complex theory seems equally doubtful. For if we refuse to be hidebound by the neuroticism of the consulting room, we must ask the simple question, "How many children actually assume that relation to father and mother respectively which Freud claims to discern?" How many children, affectionately treated in the normal family, come to regard their fathers as intruders upon their relation to their mothers? How many actually cherish the "unconscious" wishes that Freudian theory demands? and how can that theory, modify it how we will, be applied to the countless matriarchal societies where the father is practically unrecognized? If, once again, we exclude inherited neuroses due to abnormal stimuli such as terrorism, the proportion becomes negligible; so that if at the same time we distinguish, as we must do, between the *condition* of infantile, or primitive human, helplessness on the one hand, and the *consciousness* of this condition on the other, the two theories of the Oedipus complex and of the consequent development of an entirely illusory religious experience are seen to be absolutely fallacious.

In conclusion, it is impossible to plead that Freud's analysis of the phenomena, whether it is valid or not, is limited to their purely psychological aspects alone. For although (as I have admitted at the outset) these aspects are of crucial importance, it is just as illogical to restrict our consideration to them in the case of religion as in the precisely parallel cases of science and art. Investigation is compelled to pass beyond psychology and its allied fields of inquiry into the wider realm of philosophy, as scientists at least are fully prepared to admit. It is, further, quite unnecessary here to defend the historic series of logical arguments in support of religious beliefs extending from Plato and Aristotle to Hegel, not to mention living thinkers; it is sufficient to recall their existence, and to ask if it is seriously suggested that they are all nothing more than extremely complex manifestations of wish fulfilment? If so, we end where we began—on the verge of the sheerly ridiculous. But Freud treats the whole problem as if none of these great philosophers had ever uttered a single word on the subject.

JOHANNES REDIVIVUS

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SLAYING the slain is not an occupation suited to the columns of the *Journal of Religion*. However, writers on the fate of the Apostle John may claim exemption from the ordinary rule. That he met a martyr's death in the streets of Jerusalem between 64 and 70 A.D. our most eminent authority in the field of apocalyptic literature, Archdeacon R. H. Charles, considers to be established as a fact of history no longer deniable. In his recent massive and able commentary on Revelation,[1] after citing a "considerable body of independent and diverse forms of evidence," Dr. Charles states that this, taken together with the Papias fragment from Philip of Sidé, appears to him "to remove the Papias tradition (of the martyr fate of the Apostle) from the sphere of hypothesis into that of reasonably established facts of history." More recently Dr. Bernard, in his equally massive commentary on the Gospel according to St. John in the same standard series,[2] has this to say concerning the same Papias tradition:

> All that can be said with confidence is that the sentence [quoted from "the second book of Papias"] as found in the *Epitome* [of Philip of Sidé] is corrupt, and that no historical inference can be drawn from a corrupt sentence in a late epitome of the work of a careless and blundering historian. To base upon De Boor's fragment an argument for the martyrdom of John the son of Zebedee is, as Harnack has said, "an uncritical caprice."

It is customary to maintain that "where doctors disagree" the question must be considered still open. Hence our return to it. On the other hand, it should be realized that no proposition could ever pass "from the sphere of hypothesis into that of reasonably established fact" if it were first necessary to convince eminent authorities who had previously committed themselves in widely circulated writings to a positive denial. This as against the authority of such names as Bernard and Harnack.

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[1] *International Critical Commentary* (1920), Vol. I, p. xlix.

[2] *Ibid.* (1929), Vol. I, p. xlii.

Be the facts as they may as to the alleged martyr fate in Jerusalem of the certainly authentic John, son of Zebedee, fisherman of Capernaum, disciple of Jesus, and in his later years "pillar" of the church in Jerusalem under James the Lord's brother, reports regarding the pseudo-John of Ephesus, whether we so designate with one school of critics the professed author of Revelation, or with another the alleged Elder, or with others still the John who, like Saul among the prophets, has "become another man" since the Spirit fell upon him in Patmos, are of very different type. The pseudo-John of Ephesus is notoriously Hydra-headed. Given a cup of poison to drink (the legend asserts, however, that it contained nothing more perilous to the drinker than the venom of a viper), he quaffs it smiling and unharmed; immersed in a caldron of boiling oil, he emerges from it refreshed as an athlete anointed for the games. His very ghost is so difficult to lay that two separate tombs are not enough. If the same story was told at each, each was a cenotaph. The body of the Apostle, laid for a brief hour in the pit as prescribed, ascended visibly to heaven in the presence of his astonished disciples. Or, if the story differed, the variant described him as yet alive. In Augustine's time it was still believed by some that John's body did not taste corruption, but that the earth heaved over his grave as if he were still breathing.[3]

We shall leave to Archdeacon Charles the "considerable body of independent and diverse forms of evidence" which, to our judgment as to his, "removes the Papias tradition from the sphere of hypothesis into that of reasonably established facts of history." They appear to represent an older tradition, superseded in the period of debates about the canon by another adjusted to a theory of authorship which finds apostolic authority for the body of writings current among the churches of Asia early in the second century by ascribing them to this Apostle. In proportion as the need was increasingly felt for such apostolic authority for the writings, generally recognized as having appeared at Ephesus "in the end of the reign of Domitian" or later, the tradition of the Apostle's death in Jerusalem a full generation earlier would inevitably give way. Adjustment of it to the admittedly later date of the writings would naturally be the first step. Ultimately, as the Johannine authorship of these became more and more an established doctrine of the canon-makers, we should expect the older tradition to fade out entirely save for remote and scattered traces. Granting all that Bernard-McNeile have to say about the Epitome of Philip of Sidé as a "late epitome of the work of a careless and blundering historian," it is as good as a confession that the tradition did actually exist as late as A.D. 450 to say that the Epitomizer gives details unknown to Eusebius of stories related by Papias,[4] including the present regarding John's martyrdom. To allege that the details in question might be due to "independent tradition" (*loc. cit.*), when the Epitomizer explicitly states, whether from his own knowledge or much more probably from Philip's, that they were taken from Papias, specifying, in the particular case we are interested in, that it was from the "second book" of the Exegeses, is practically to surrender the case against the fragments. Until reason appears to the contrary, it must be simply accepted as fact that in the second division of his treatise Papias declared that John and James his brother were "killed by Jews."[5]

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[3] Bernard-McNeile, *ICC*, p. lvii, citing the Latin Preface to the Vulgate text of John, and Augustine in John, chap. 21.

Reason to the contrary is precisely what Bernard attempted to bring forward, first, in his *Studia Sacra* (pp. 260 ff.); secondly, in the Bernard-McNeile commentary on the Gospel. From the latter we take the following extract, which seems to embody all that Bernard could adduce in answer to Charles' reply to the *Studia* in his commentary on Revelation. Says Bernard:

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[4] *Op. cit.*, p. xl.

[5] The fact that "Jews" appears without the article has no significance. Exactly the same form is used by Eusebius and Jerome with reference to the martyrdom of James the Just, where the meaning is obvious, if indeed the occasion was not (as we believe it was) the same.

> James the son of Zebedee was not killed by Jews, but by Herod (Acts 12:2), and Christian historians have never laid the guilt of his death upon the Jews. It is impossible to believe that Papias had any different tradition on the subject. Again, if Papias said that John the son of Zebedee was killed by Jews, we should have expected that in the *Epitome* incredulity would have been indicated. The Epitomiser believed that John wrote the Apocalypse, but this would have been impossible had John suffered martyrdom at the hands of the Jews. Nevertheless, the Epitomiser adds no adverse comment upon the belief with which he seems to credit Papias here, as he does in [another] paragraph. This statement, then, both in regard to John and to James, provokes the suspicion that it is a misrepresentation or corruption of what Papias said [*op. cit.*, pp. xl f.].

The answer of R. H. Charles to this argument as previously made in the *Studia* will be found on pages xlvi–l of his commentary. He disposes briefly of Bernard's objection above quoted by saying that it is based on the impossible supposition that the Apostle John was the real author of Revelation. This answer will be sufficient for many. It will be convincing to those who place the actual indications of the book itself over against the assertions of its prologue. But there are many on whom the critical evidences of internal evidence never avail to outweigh a long-accepted tradition concerning the origin of a book. Charles is quite right in his feeling that real demonstration involves a positive as well as a negative factor. It is not enough to prove a tradition erroneous; one must also show whence and how it arose. For this reason his answer to Bernard concludes as follows:

> The primitive tradition as to the martyrdom of John was gradually displaced by the later tradition represented by Irenaeus; but even so the

primitive tradition maintained itself in various places down to the 7th century, as we have shown above.

Whether Bernard's statement quoted above, centering on the proposition "The Epitomiser believed that John wrote the Apocalypse, but this would have been impossible had John suffered martyrdom at the hands of the Jews," is a sufficient answer to Charles' evidences of the "gradual displacement" of the earlier by the later tradition we have now to inquire. Both authorities take their stand upon the Irenaean date "the end of the reign of Domitian" as correct for the appearance of the book of Ephesus. An unnamed anti-Montanistic writer cited by Epiphanius is even more exact. His calculations determine the actual year as 93 A.D. This corresponds so closely with the internal evidences of the book in its resultant form (all critics agree that it is highly composite, involving early "prophecies" of Palestinian origin as well as the Ephesian outer envelope) that it is practically axiomatic today as against the Tübingen attempt to date it under Nero. In fact, Harnack makes this date (A.D. 93–95 for Revelation) a foundation stone for other New Testament dates in his *Chronology of Early Christian Literature*. We may therefore take it as our own point of departure: The Irenaean, or later, tradition of the date of Revelation is correct. What of the earlier tradition which is gradually displaced? If it maintained a date "under Claudius" for the origin of the writing, it was certainly incorrect; but how is it to be accounted for?

We return to Bernard's objection to the report of the Epitomizer that Papias would be unlikely to say that James son of Zebedee was "killed by the Jews." What Christian "historians" he has reference to as not "laying the guilt of his death upon the Jews" he does not state. The only Christian historian whose statement would have any weight is Luke (Acts 12:2). Now to plead that James "was not killed by Jews, but by Herod (Agrippa)" is almost ludicrous to one who knows that the keynote of Agrippa's policy was to conciliate the favor of his Jewish subjects, especially the Pharisees, by insisting that he, unlike the other descendants of his grandfather, Herod I, was "not an alien" but a Jew, descended on his mother's side from the old native royal family of the Hasmoneans. Luke shows how appreciative he is of this persistent (and highly successful) effort of Agrippa to ingratiate himself with the dominant Jewish sect, the Pharisees, by observing that "when Herod saw that [his beheading of James] pleased the Jews" he proceeded to imprison Peter also. We fully agree with Bernard that "it is impossible to believe that Papias had any different tradition on the subject" from Luke's, but how his sympathy with Luke's point of view could be more exactly expressed in the same number of words than by saying that "James was killed by the Jews" one finds it difficult to imagine.

Bernard's second objection to the exactitude of the Epitomizer's statement is that since he appends adverse comments to other statements of Papias where Eusebius had led the way, we should expect him to express incredulity anent the statement regarding John's martyr fate, to which Eusebius makes no reference! But he explicitly says that he takes this datum from "the second book of Papias." Why, then, should we expect him to "indicate incredulity," when Papias himself found no difficulty with the tradition?

For Papias, by explicit testimony of Andreas of Caesarea, who had the book in his hands and could and did quote from it "word for word," insisted that the statements of the book (having principal reference, no doubt, to the disputed passage Rev. 1:9–11) were "worthy of belief." Papias himself, therefore, quite as much as the Epitomizer, accepted the earlier, incorrect, and pre-Irenaean tradition which, as Charles has abundantly proved, dated the sojourn of John in Patmos (Rev. 1:9–11) "under the Emperor Claudius." In short, both Papias and the Muratorianum find no more difficulty than the Epitomizer with a martyrdom in 64–70 for the author of Revelation, because they date the book before the coming of Paul to Ephesus. Thus, the very failure to find any difficulty with the statement of Papias, so far from disproving the authenticity of the excerpt, is one of the clearest proofs that the Excerptor (standing for Philip of Sidé) did take it, as he says, not from Eusebius but from "the second book" of Papias.

We need delay no longer with Bernard's objections to the authenticity of the fragment. The urging of such as these is in itself the strongest confirmation one could ask of Charles' convincing evidence.

We turn, therefore, to the constructive side of the argument, endeavoring to bring into clearer relief than even Charles has done the evidences of that "gradual displacement" of the earlier (Papias) tradition by the Irenaean.

I

From the moment that the Appendix to John (John 21:24 f.) began to secure its cautiously planned effect of obtaining for the Gospel the apostolic authority obtained for the Revelation only at the cost of a prolonged and vehement struggle, adjustment of the earlier (Papias) tradition of the death of John in 64–70 to the Irenaean, which dated Revelation "in the end of the reign of Domitian," became an unavoidable necessity. Of the many evidences which still survive of this "gradual" process, not all are mentioned even by Charles, some are actually adduced by Bernard himself in complete blindness to their real significance. After the normal type of oriental apologetic they attempt harmonization by simple addition. John was indeed martyred, as had long been claimed, doubtless with citation of Rev. 1:9; but had also survived to an extreme old age. He, together with his brother James, had "fulfilled the prophecy of the Lord concerning themselves and their own undertaking" respecting a sharing of his cup of suffering and his baptism of blood; but John survived. The "cup" which he drank was a beaker of poison, which left him unharmed.[6] The "baptism" was immersion in a caldron of boiling oil, which had the effect already noted! To Bernard it is sufficient fulfilment of the much-mooted prediction of Mark 10:38 f.=Matt. 20:22 f. to say that the two brothers were warned to expect hardship: "The plain meaning of Mark 10:39, 40 is that they should both endure tribulation and pain even as He was enduring it; and so it came to pass." But we are not asking, How can a modern sermonizer extract from the text an edifying moral? We are asking: How came the alleged utterance of Jesus to be recalled by our evangelist from forty to fifty years after the event, and given just this remarkable form? We are also concerned to know—not how a modern conservative critic can impose an expurgated sense harmless to the accepted tradition of John's survival—but in what sense the verse was understood by those who transmitted it. The sense in which it was understood in the second century is made sufficiently obvious by the form assumed by the apologetic legend, the "cup" of poison and the "baptism" in boiling oil.

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[6] Papias related this story of Justus Barsabbas. Philip of Sidé supplements the extract as given in Eusebius by stating that Papias had it from the daughters of Philip of Hierapolis and giving the nature of the "poison" as the venom of a viper. Later versions apply it to John, who in medieval art is represented holding a chalice, from which protrudes a serpent's head.

An example of Bernard's own contribution to the argument of his opponent is furnished on page lvii, where comparison is made of the story related in the second-century Acts of John and the Monarchian Prologues with the earlier tale of the Muratorianum. All represent attempts to bring the Appendix passage (John 21:24) into line with the ancient tradition of martyrdom. The Muratorianum assumes the date "under Claudius" for both Gospel (John writes on behalf of the whole apostolic body) and Revelation (Paul, in writing to seven churches only by name, is "following the example of his predecessor John"). The Monarchian Prologues, depending on the Acts of John, assume the Irenaean date "in the end of the reign of Domitian." The Prologue follows the uniform tradition of the later date of the Gospel as compared with the Revelation, stating that John wrote the Gospel "in Asia," after the Revelation had been written in Patmos. The later years of the aged author are described in terms which, if not the actual source of the many modern romances based on the same slender and precarious foundation, at least remind us very strongly of them:

> This is that John who, when he perceived that the day of his departure had arrived, called together his disciples in Ephesus and commended Christ to them with many miraculous proofs; then, descending into a place of sepulture dug out for him, when he had offered prayer, was laid to his fathers. He is found as free from the pang of death as from corruption of the flesh.

Bernard's comment is entirely apposite and correct, though he manifests a curious inability to see how it bears out his opponent's contention regarding the "gradual displacement" of the earlier by the later tradition:

> Here, the expression "convocatis discipulis suis in Epheso" is to be noted, for although this is not directly connected by the author with the composition of the Gospel, as is the similar phrase in the *Muratorianum*, both go back to some early tradition based on, or interpretative of, Jn. 21:24.

As already noted, the Muratorianum follows the tradition of Papias, dating the writings "under Claudius" and interpreting the "we" of John 21:24 as meaning the twelve disciples of the Lord, whereas the Prologues follow the Irenaean tradition which dates them under Domitian, and is therefore obliged to obtain a miraculous extension of life for the apostle and "martyr." The point of transition is the intervention of the Appendix to the Gospel, with its cautious intimation of the Apostle John as author of the work.

II

To understand the process by which the canon of the New Testament developed throughout the second century, its assembling being the work of Ephesus, its final delimitation the work of Rome, is to hold in one's hand the key to the whole mystery of the resurrected John in Asia.

Professor Goodspeed has recently adduced significant evidence that the first collection of seven Epistles of Paul was produced at Ephesus, headquarters of the Pauline mission field, late in the first century. Marcion in 140 follows this example by prefixing to his expurgated "Gospel" ten Epistles of Paul. Ultimately in the church's canon the number is increased to fourteen by addition of the Pastorals and Hebrews. The compiler of the Revelation, incorporating under the name of "John" at about the same date and in the same church as the canonizer of Paul all that Asia could furnish of Palestinian "prophecy," commends the work to "the churches of Asia" by an introduction consisting of seven Epistles of the Spirit. "The Elder" who performs a similar work for the evangelic tradition current among the Hellenistic churches of Samaria, Northern Syria, and Asia Minor, uses a similar device. He constructs in imitation of Paul's Phrygian group: Ephesians, Colossians, and Philemon, a group of three Epistles, one "catholic," one "to the church" (III John, vs. 9), and one to "Gaius."

The method is still followed for the collection of the seven Epistles of Ignatius, concerning which the Philippian church has written to Polycarp in 115. Our concern, however, is only with the Asian canon given out under the name of John. This has first a book of "prophecy" closing with an appeal for exclusive canonical authority, an appeal all the more suspicious for its vociferous claims to divine inspiration and its demands for acceptance unchanged to the rejection of all rivals (Rev. 22:18 f.). The Asian canon comprises next a Gospel, accompanied, if not introduced, by three letters of authentication and warning against heresy. May not these beginnings of canonization be reasonably termed "Ephesian" in the curiously distinctive method they display for securing "apostolic" authority? As yet the appeal of the Johannine canon seems to be only to "the churches of Asia"; but for authentication it employs the well-known device of "letters of commendation."

But the determined assault of Marcion on Rome in 140 against these attempts to claim "apostolic" authority for the written tradition was to bring into boiling activity those efforts of Western churchmen which issued at the close of the century in a catholic canon of New Testament writings, fully authorized and certified as "apostolic," a canon substantially identical with that in use today.

The literary foundation of the Ephesian canon, Revelation, had been in violent dispute from the beginning. Marcion's attitude toward this writing is declared by Tertullian to have been that of the pronounced hostility we should expect. However, Marcion directed his chief efforts to disproving the claims of "those Gospels which are published as having apostles for their authors (*sc.*, Matthew and John)" in favor of his own expurgated edition of "the" Gospel (*sc.*, Luke). The issue of the pre-Marcionite conflict over the claims of Revelation was the century-long Chiliastic controversy ardently disputed in Asia before the tide of battle shifted to Rome. The issue of Marcion's own assault was the series of pronunciamentos recorded in the Muratorianum, the "Monarchian" Prologues to the Pauline Epistles, the Anti-Marcionite Prologues (in their present form emanating from North Africa and reflecting the polemic of Tertullian), and a series of apologetic works in defense first of the Revelation, later of both the Revelation and the Gospel of John, from second- and third-century fathers. Epiphanius, who knows little more than he could gather from the pages of Hippolytus' defense of the Revelation and Gospel against Gaius of Rome, punningly dubs these objectors to the canonizing of the Johannine writings Alogi, "unreasonable" in their resistance to the Phrygian doctrine of "Logos." The Montanistic controversy, though it also began in Phrygia, was carried to Rome like its predecessor the Chiliastic. The crucial point in the Montanistic controversy was, of course, the Gospel, which was now claiming by virtue of the catholicizing Appendix to represent the teaching of both Peter and John.

What, then, of the "gradual displacement" of the earlier tradition, forged to meet objectors to the claims of Revelation, by the later framed to bring in the Gospel too under the aegis of the same authoritative name?

The stages of the process exhibit a remarkable correspondence with the growth of the tradition so far as our limited data enable us to trace it. In the earliest period, ending with the Epistles of Ignatius and Polycarp, there is merely blank silence. Every writing in which one might expect to find mention of so outstanding a personality as the only survivor of the Twelve, Jesus' intimate associate, does all that such a writing could do to disprove his presence in Asia by saying nothing whatever about him. All references to apostolic tradition and authority, whether it be Acts, or First Peter, or the Pastoral Epistles, or Clement of Rome, or Ignatius, or Polycarp, or even the *Vita Polycarpi*, look back to Paul, or Paul, Silvanus, and Timothy, as the great apostolic authorities for Asia. No one hints in any manner that the questions of doctrine or discipline which agitate those addressed by Clement, Ignatius, and Polycarp could be settled at once by reference to this supreme apostolic authority, a disciple of the Lord but lately, or even contemporarily, presiding over the great church in Ephesus. The earliest writers do not mention John redivivus at all.

A second stage is marked by positive affirmations of the presence and teaching of the seer and "martyr" of Patmos. Papias (140) is sure that the statement of Rev. 1:9–11 should be "believed." All the millenarians who follow Papias' lead, from Justin through Melito to Irenaeus and Hippolytus, are as positive as can be in favor of everything alleged in the Revelation, though curiously silent or uncertain regarding anything else, as, for example, the date of the alleged exile, the "word of God and witness for Jesus" which led to it, the opportunity for writing afforded to a member of the penal colony, and in general what went before and what followed after. As we have seen, the pre-Irenaean form of the tradition dates the Patmos sojourn under Claudius. The implication is almost certainly that the dispersion of the Twelve from Jerusalem "twelve years" after the Ascension, occasioned by the persecution of Agrippa, a persecution which began with the martyrdom of James and ended with the release of Peter (after Agrippa's death in 44?) from prison, drove John also into hiding. This Dispersion of the Twelve in A.D. 42, the second year of Claudius, was an outstanding epoch for the apostolic church. In its pre-Irenaean form the tradition merely alleges that the visit took place "in the times of the Emperor Claudius." John is next heard of in Jerusalem again at Paul's visit to the "pillars." This was in 46–47 A.D. There could not, in Papias' time, be any scruple about adding that he was afterward "killed by the Jews," meeting the fate of "James his brother." This was probably in 62, when, as Josephus relates, James the brother of Jesus that is called the Christ, together with others, was stoned to death in the streets of Jerusalem by the anti-Christian mob. Papias doubtless understood Rev. 1:9 to mean that in this "driving out" (also referred to by Paul in I Thess. 2:15) "for the word of God and the testimony of Jesus" John found temporary refuge on the Isle of Patmos, where "in the Spirit" he received the revelation given out (in 93?) to the churches of Asia.

The "displacement" of this earlier (and perfectly consistent) form of the tradition constitutes the third stage. As already stated, it is the claim of John 21:24 which compels the substitution of the later, because the Ephesian provenance of the Gospel was undeniable. John, therefore, now returns, not to Jerusalem, but to Ephesus, where he continues to reside "down to the age of Trajan," the known date of the Gospel.[7] Even as late as the letter of Polycrates (195) John is called not "bishop and martyr," like the others cited, but "martyr and teacher." As Bernard quite properly notes: "In the cases of Polycarp and the rest, bishop and martyr is the description of their Christian course. They were bishops before they were martyrs." John is conceived as having undergone his martyrdom (bloody or otherwise) before he wrote the (catholic) Epistle and Gospel which show the quality of his teaching. It is quite possible that

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[7] On this phrase as conventional for the survival of apostolic witness to the exclusion of heresy see my forthcoming article in the *Journal of Biblical Literature*, "The Motivation of Jn. 21:15–25."

Polycrates meant to apply the title "martyr" to John in a more attenuated sense than to his other authorities. So Bernard contends. But it is very certain that this was not the case with those who continue to recite the legends of the cup of poison and the boiling oil. These are determined to cling to the "fulfilment" of the Lord's prophecy in its full sense. The idea of "white" martyrdom might serve for scholars such as Polycrates and the author of the Appendix to the Gospel. For the average man no such pale substitute would suffice. John, like his brother, must suffer the full penalty of loyalty. If needed a generation later to become the author of the Gospel, then John, like his namesake the Baptist, can be a Johannes redivivus. The poison cup and the caldron could still be retained as his insignia.

In the foregoing delineation of the process of displacement necessitated by the exigencies of the canon-makers, the sequence is fortunately established. We can even fix an approximate date between Papias and Tatian for the transition. It is not possible, knowing as we do the chronological relation of the Chiliastic to the Montanistic controversy, to put earlier for later. The claims of Revelation came first, as tradition invariably maintained; those of the Gospel and Epistles followed after. Hence it is not possible for the critic who knows the history of debate over the Ephesian canon during the second century to give any other rational account of the strange aberrations of the tradition of the Apostle John in Asia than the following.

First.—A period of several decades after the opening of the second century when the idea of any John whatever in Asia is unheard-of, save as advocates of the claims of Revelation (Chiliasts) maintain that the statement of Rev. 1:9–11 "should be believed." This statement was taken to imply that at the dispersal of the Apostles from Jerusalem in 42, when James was "killed by the Jews," John took refuge in Patmos, where he was granted the vision of the millennial reign (Papias, Justin).

If the date of the appearance of Revelation (93) was then known, no difficulty was felt by faithful believers in "prophecy" because of implied knowledge of later conditions (for example the martyrdom of Antipas [Rev. 2:13]). It was simply assumed that "in the Spirit" these later conditions would be miraculously present to the illumined mind of the "prophet."

At this date also the date of 62 for the martyrdom of John in Jerusalem was equally devoid of difficulty. It was not only stated in plain terms by Papias in his "second book" as a fulfilment of the Lord's prophecy (Matt. 20:22 f. = Mark 10:38 f.) but is implied in one of the older "prophecies" incorporated in Revelation itself. The vision of the doom of Jerusalem in Rev. 11:1–13, written while the inner sanctuary in the hands of the Zealots was still holding out against Vespasian (69), presents a vivid application of the Jewish doctrine of the return of Moses and Elias to bring to repentance Jerusalem and the mixed multitude who "tread down" the city "forty and two months." The bestial Adversary from the Abyss makes war upon the "witnesses," overcomes, and kills them, leaving their dead bodies exposed in the streets, while the gentile world (vs. 9) makes merry over their fate. But God now intervenes. To the terror of their beholding enemies the two "witnesses" are raised from the dead and taken up in a cloud. A mighty earthquake shakes the guilty city, destroying a tenth part of it and killing seven thousand persons (the population of Jerusalem is estimated at 70,000), but "the rest were affrighted and gave glory to the God of heaven" (*sc.*, the divinity worshiped by the Jews).

The incorporator of this vision of desperation from the hand of some clearly Jewish prophet offers in verse 8 an identification of the two "witnesses" ("martyrs") and of the city concerned, an identification certainly not needed by the original readers, and with equal certainty contradictory of the original sense. "The great city" is said to be "called spiritually Sodom and Egypt" (*sc.*, places from which the people of God escape before their doom). Then follows the unmistakably Christian gloss "where their Lord also was crucified." But this expression cannot have been applied to a bona fide Moses and Elias, though these stereotyped "two witnesses" of Jewish mythology were originally clearly intended (vss. 3–6). The Christian redactor has his own idea of the martyred two witnesses, after whose fate "Vespasian besieged the city" (Hegesippus). Moses and Elias, like the names "Sodom and Egypt," must be understood "spiritually." Thus interpreted they can only be James the Lord's brother and John, the other surviving "pillar" of the church.[8] These shared the cup of "their Lord" in the guilty city. They are the Christian surrogates of the Synagogue's "two witnesses." At the second Coming the two Sons of Thunder will no longer be restrained as formerly (Luke 9:51 ff.) from invoking fire from heaven on those who have rejected "their Lord."

To the present writer's mind this Christian gloss interpreting a Jewish "prophecy" is an item of no small weight to add to the "considerable body of independent and diverse forms of evidence" adduced by Charles, which "remove the Papias tradition from the sphere of hypothesis into that of reasonably established facts of history."

Second.—In the course of the prolonged controversy over the claims of Revelation its advocates found it increasingly difficult to maintain their original proposition that the vision was seen "under Claudius." It was a little too definitely specific regarding conditions as they were in the churches of Asia in 93 to make such foreknowledge really plausible. But another consideration impelled even more strongly to restatement. A new and vital factor had now entered in. The Appendix to John was pleading for admission under the aegis of apostolicity; not clamorously, like Revelation, but suggestively, persuasively. If apostolic support could be found for Revelation, conceded now to be not earlier in date than 93, why not for the Gospel

[8] In the confused and overcharged account of the martyrdom reported by Hegesippus the two intercessors for Jerusalem are compared to Jeremiah and Baruch.

also? The Hellenistic tradition of the teaching was entitled to as much consideration as the Palestinian of "prophetic" visions. Thus, Elder and Prophet are now baptized together into the name of John. A new John is born of nature hitherto unknown, Hellenist on one side, Jewish-Christian on the other. And new characteristics are found, chiefly now in Gospel and Epistles, to clothe the returned sojourner in the other world.

Third.—The second century had witnessed the formation of the canon; the third and fourth centuries belong to the critics and historians who rectify and consolidate the tradition. The former age is the period of the prefixing of titles, of ascriptions and subscriptions, of Marcion's heretical canon, of prologues, Marcionite and anti-Marcionite, and finally of the Roman canon known as the Muratorianum. The canon-makers base their positive and authoritative assertions on romances of the type of the Leucian Acts of John and on legendary "traditions" of the Apostles, orally transmitted or compiled in writings such as the Gospel according to the Hebrews. Apologists, such as Irenaeus, who follow, and critics, such as Origen and Dionysius, who attempt clarification and harmonization pave the way for the great apologist-historian Eusebius.

The "other" Johns of Ephesus, the phantom "Prophet John" distinguished by Dionysius from the Apostle, teacher, and martyr, the "Elder John" created by Eusebius from a misinterpreted passage of Papias in aid of the anti-millenarian hypothesis of Dionysius—these and all the modern "other Johns" are pure creations of higher-critical imagination. Jerusalem had indeed its authentic Apostle John, "pillar" of the church and martyr. It had also in the same period and locality another John, son of Zacchaeus, a teacher famous for his propensity to (apocalyptic) "prophecy." He, however, happened to belong to the synagogue and not to the church. He is known as Johanan ben Zacchai. The church of Jerusalem had also its Elder John, a contemporary of Papias' earlier years, who appears midway of the Jerusalem succession from James to Judas (135) in the succession lists of Eusebius and Epiphanius alike, Epiphanius supplying in addition the year 117 as the date of his death. These are authentic, real personalities. The phantom Prophet John and Elder John of Ephesus belong exclusively to higher-critical mythology.

It is from Bernard-McNeile that we take the perfectly correct statement (*op. cit.*, p. liv) that "no writer for a hundred years after Papias seems to have supported the tradition that more than one John had to be reckoned with. Dionysius of Alexandria (A.D. 250) distinguished two Johns, but he reached this conclusion on critical grounds, as a modern scholar would do." We also take from the same unimpeachable source a criticism of the use of the terms "apostle" and "elder" in Irenaeus, the apologist whose loose combinations from Papias in support of his personal claims to be the supreme representative in his time of apostolic tradition were so thoroughly pricked by Eusebius that during all the later centuries which could still refer to the work of Papias not a single voice was raised against the calamitous disproof. The statement is as follows:

> As in Acts 15:4, 22 the distinction between *ἀπόστολοι* and *πρεσβύτεροι* is clearly marked, the apostles being the original leaders, while the presbyters were those who carried on their work. Irenaeus uses the term *πρεσβύτεροι* to designate those who, whether officially or unofficially, had succeeded to the position of leadership which the apostles had held. . . . . Again the term *πρεσβύτερος* is sometimes used by Irenaeus of men of the third Christian generation. . . . . That is to say, presbyters are either disciples of apostles, or disciples of their disciples;[9] they are the leaders of the Church in the second and third generations. There is no example in the literature of the second century of the equation *πρεσβύτεροι* = *ἀπόστολοι*.

This, of itself alone, should suffice to confirm the criticism brought by Eusebius against the confused and boastful pretensions of Irenaeus. It does not, however, give any better ground for Eusebius' own attempt to so interpret the disputed passage as to supply the missing "other John" whom Dionysius had vainly sought at Ephesus. Eusebius is too honest not to acknowledge that the only trace he could find in Papias of the alleged direct connection with "the Elder John" was a "frequent mention" by Papias of his "traditions," traditions which there is strong reason to hold were derived indirectly from "the Elder John" of Jerusalem. The "other Johns" of Ephesus, created by critics of the canon in the third and fourth centuries, are proved by the inability of writers such as Polycrates and Dionysius to discover them to be pure phantasms, as devoid of foundation in Irenaeus' claim to have heard in his boyhood public utterances of Polycarp about sayings and mighty works of the Lord transmitted through "John" as in his exaggerated inferences from Papias. They must be sharply distinguished from the second-century John, who rests exclusively on the statements of Revelation for his foundation. The Irenaean equivalence Elder=Apostle is a self-glorifying delusion.

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[9] The passage on which this statement is made (Haer. IV, xxvii.1) illustrates our conjectured emendation of Papias, which reads after the mention of "Aristion and the Elder John" "the disciples of *these*" instead of the incredible "disciples of the Lord."

What, then, finally of this earliest, second-century John of Ephesus, apostle, prophet, martyr? Is he too a phantasm, as the silence of contemporary writers suggests? At least he is no mere creation out of ancient books evolved by the ingenuity of apologists and critics of the canon. However, this John also has no more reality than the "other Johns" of Ephesus, no more reality than the shade of Samuel evoked by the witch of Endor to warn and rebuke a persecuting king. He too is a phantom, but born of different stock.

A conjecture has been offered elsewhere by the present writer[10] as to the real compiler and editor of the book of prophecy which appeared in Ephesus "in the end of the reign of Domitian" purporting to convey messages of "the Spirit" to the churches of Asia, and with them "visions" of the Apostle John sojourning in Patmos "for the word of God and the testimony of Jesus." Whatever the particular personality of the writer, it is unfair to him (or her) to apply the term "pseudonymity" to the form under which the message is delivered. The form is that of impersonation, a stereotyped convention of "prophecy," whether intended to deceive or not. The speaker uses habitually the "I am" style. This may stand for either a superhuman or a human agent, regarded as using the "prophet" (or "prophetess") as a "medium." It is equally unfair to the apocalyptist to assume that he (or she) is dishonest or insincere in framing the substance of the message. In the case of the Palestinian groundwork of Revelation the fact is patent to the modern critic, and certainly was not concealed by the Ephesian compiler, that the "visions" belong to an older period and a Judean setting and environment. The material is adapted from conditions such as the actual John might have faced, and from "prophecy" both Jewish and Christian. The Ephesian "medium" is really trying to deliver the message of the Spirit as the Apostle and martyr John would have given it. What is more, indications are not wanting that the "medium" had actually known John, and could to some extent authentically speak for him. All this, however, does not give reality to John of Patmos who thirty years after the martyrdom of the real John addresses a message of warning "in the Spirit" to the "churches of Asia" some of which were not even founded till after the death of Paul. He has no more tangible reality than the Samuel who returns at the bidding of the witch of Endor to give warning and rebuke to Saul. Revelation is very instructive about what was believed in Ephesus about 93 A.D. concerning the Apostle and his fate. Of the actual whereabouts of John, son of Zebedee, from the Dispersion of Agrippa in 42 to his return to Jerusalem in 46, it gives no more of information than could be derived from I Thess. 2:15. Of his martyr fate shortly before the fall of Jerusalem it conveys nothing more than can be gathered from the (Jewish) apocalypse of the "two witnesses" in Rev. 11:1–13 interpreted by the Christian editor in the interjected verse 8, supplemented by the fragment of Papias preserved by Philip of Sidé.

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[10] In the *Harvard Theological Review* for July, 1930.

THE RELIGION OF THE HEBREWS

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THE civilizing process may be briefly defined as the human quest for a more satisfactory adjustment to the universe. A civilization, to us, means a definite phase of that quest, the whole distinctive art of living achieved by a certain section of the race in some definitely defined range of time. Religion is habitually described rather as a quest for God than for a manner of living, a habit of thinking or believing rather than an art of conduct. Even to say that religion is a quest for God in human life is not a sufficient approximation to the truth as the records of religion reveal it. Religion is rather a quest for a way of life made with special reference to the possibilities which lie in the mysterious and inexplicable phenomena of environment. It is, broadly speaking, life lived under the stimulus of curiosity about the universe.

Religion and the civilizing process are related as the part to the whole. It is entirely unnecessary, for our purposes, to fall into the extravagant error of those who, on the one hand, claim that religion is the civilizing process, or, on the other, that it is merely an excrescence of the civilizing process. We make no claim for the religion of the Hebrews other than the modest contentions that it was, first, an integral part of their evolving civilization; and, second, an influential part of it.

I

As our aim is to discuss the religion of the Hebrews rather than their civilization as a whole, it will suffice if we begin by examining only one phase of the latter in search of its great characteristic. Only as we see what this distinguishing trait was, shall we be able to evaluate the relation of the religion of the

Hebrews to their quest for a more satisfactory adjustment to life. Let us begin, then, by tracing briefly the evolution of social structure among the Hebrew people.

The masses of any race are proverbially inert. Change, and more especially social change, is abhorrent to them. They never indulge in it until it becomes literally easier to do so than to endure the *status quo*. The Hebrews were characterized as much by inertia as any other race. Even their first great adventure, the thrust forth from desert nomadism into Canaan, when viewed in relation to the whole economic and political situation of the day, establishes no claim for their exception from this universal human attitude. Exchange of habitat was then not the exception, but the rule. Racial movement was the order of the age. The Hittites, attracted by a social decline in Egypt, were pushing southward from Asia Minor. The petty city states of Asia Minor, similarly losing confidence in Egypt, were plunged into exaggerated instability. It was a period when migratory movement was, so to speak, in the very air one breathed. It is not to be thought that the invading Hebrew tribes had developed, before their entry, any idea of what they as a race wished to do with the land once they possessed it, much less even the slightest conception of what the land might do to them once it possessed them. Considered as a social integration they simply became involved in a great readjustment of populations and followed the course which was, by and large, easiest to follow.

At the time of their entry they possessed the measure of social cohesion which inheres in the socialistic clan-tribal structure. This may even have been slightly enhanced by a federating tendency stimulated by the problem of conquest itself. But the promise of wider integration which here budded never came to flower. Little by little, in the long process of settlement, they became, in all but name, Canaanites. Once having penetrated the land it became easier to break up into local integrations. The small city-state social structure of the indigenous population; the broken and mountainous terrain; the opportunity for the settled, laborious, and locally absorbed agricultural life—all these, in the course of centuries, inevitably broke down the social solidarity of nomadism.

This resort to the path of least resistance is reflected throughout the early historical narratives of Judges and Samuel. Even a Deborah could not rouse all the clans. The Danites could be driven from their coastward heritage without protest from brother-tribes, and could, in their passage, raid the premises of an Ephraimite and threaten him with dire consequences if he resisted. Only Gideon's tact prevented the sheikhs of Ephraim from forcibly expressing their displeasure at his success, and even the memory of his success did not prevent his son, by a native Shechemite woman, from disrupting the clan in an attempt to establish a new city state. The stirring championship of a Samson was embarrassing to Hebrew farmers who much preferred to till their fields than to fight the Philistines. In short, so whole-heartedly had the Hebrew tribes conformed, in point of social structure, to their new environment, that we may hazard the opinion that had the final Philistine crisis come a few generations later, even David himself could not have saved the Hebrews from being penetrated by them as easily as the Hebrews had previously penetrated the Canaanites.

The transition from a locally autonomous social structure to the monarchy is likewise, in its turn, conformity to environmental forces. The Hebrews, as a people, had little or no part in establishing this new social order. Just as they had entered Palestine on the crest of a great wave of interracial conflict and migration, so, during their settlement, the whole environmental situation was being changed by the withdrawal of the great powers from the eastern littoral of the Mediterranean. The rise of the sea peoples in the west and of the Assyrians in the east had brought about a realignment and a redirection of world-forces. The Hittites, threatened on both sides by these new entrants, and the Egyptians, menaced from the sea, were, for the time being, not interested in Palestine. As a result of this withdrawal of pressure from the area under consideration, racial consciousness began to develop there. Forceful individuals asserted themselves and built up larger social integrations in Syria. Similarly, the Philistines, a strong, homogeneous, invasive group of sea peoples who had been hurled back from the shores of Egypt on to the Palestinian coast, began to exert pressure from the southwest. The formation of the Hebrew monarchy was in reality an assimilative response to this altered situation. The larger integration became a necessity, but even so it was to the masses a necessary evil, and had it not been for David's forceful personality and methods they might have submitted to conquest rather than engage in this social experiment.

Yet hardly had the new social machinery been set up when the world-environment again changed. Out of the welter of the clash between the greater powers, Egypt, in the west, and Assyria, in the east, began to emerge as dominant. This ultimately meant a period of intense external pressure upon Syria and Palestine, the bridge between Asia and Africa. And that meant the gradual breaking-down of the larger social and political integrations in Palestine. The disruption of Solomon's kingdom, in which Egypt was directly concerned, was the first result of the new environmental tendency. The story of the divided kingdoms is, politically speaking, the story of a vain attempt of lesser monarchies to survive the struggles between surrounding greater monarchies, and, socially speaking, the story of the gradual prevalence over tribal socialism of the individualism which inheres in the monarchical system.

In such an age there were two possible policies for the lesser peoples of Syria and Palestine. The first of these was exemplified by Ahab, who is credited, in his more statesman-like moods, with having attempted the political unification of Syria and Palestine. The second is exemplified by Jehu, who chose alliance with the strongest great power against his local neighbors. But both these policies, socially speaking, involved racial and cultural interpenetration. They were simply rival techniques of conformity to environmental influence. Down to their final defeat each of the Hebrew kingdoms played the world's game, sometimes by one system, sometimes by the other, sometimes by a fusion of both. But the point is that throughout the whole process they conformed, socially as well as politically, to environmental pressure, following exactly the same course as did all the peoples about them.

The people of the northern kingdom, after its fall in 722 B.C., gave proof of their dominant tendency to assimilate to world-life. They were absorbed in the common Semitic civilization which, at that time, found its most powerful exponent in the Assyrian Empire. It is not so easy to see the predominance of the same assimilative disposition in the Judean people. Here it is necessary to remember that the Judean or Jewish colony in Babylon constituted a comparatively small and highly specialized minority of the national group. It is plain from writings like Haggai, Zechariah, and Ezra-Nehemiah that the Judeans who escaped exile to Babylon took the path of least resistance. Those of them who went to Egypt had no distinctive contribution to make to their specifically racial life until the Greek period, and this was derived from the restored Babylo-Judean community itself, and not from the common pre-Exilic life. The Assuan papyri make it clear that there was nothing in the life and attitude of earlier Jewish immigrants in Egypt to distinguish them from other Semites. Likewise the Jews who, after 586 B.C., remained in Palestine were penetrated by surrounding Semitic stocks with whom they fused, evolving a composite civilization.

But what of the Babylonian Jewish community which admittedly became the directive force in the post-Exilic life of the Hebrew race? Ezekiel and the Deutero-Isaiah, when their writings are read with some comprehension of their Babylonian background, bear witness that the easy and natural and, doubtless, prevalent course, among Babylonian Jews, was to merge with the world-civilization of the time. Even the earliest Babylonian Zionism, such as preached by the Deutero-Isaiah, though its aims were dissimilative, was a creature of environment, its most enthusiastic protagonist finding his inspiration in the rise of Persian power, and seeing Zionism's opportunity in the latter's liberal policy toward minor groups.

When one follows the course of Jewish history from the so-called restoration down to Roman times, one finds that there are, in the main, two great movements of the race. The first is a movement for world-penetration. The great world-empires of Persia, Greece, and Rome made this inevitable. Their comprehensive political control and its consequent facilitation of world-trade encouraged cosmopolitanism and discouraged provincialism. The growing Jewish diaspora is its great contribution to this movement, its monument of conformity to the time spirit of the day.

The second movement in post-Exilic Jewish life looks toward the creation of a racial center of integration in the homeland. Yet even when, after a century of struggle, that avowedly dissimilative center was established, it began to conform to the dominant tendencies of the area. Lying on the bridge of the world, it played the world's game. So, in the late Persian era, it was found in intrigue with the Greeks against the Persians. So, under Greek power, its leaders, priests though they were, would, but for a protesting minority, have made their country into a Hellenistic province, that they might maintain a measure of social control. It is, indeed, not too much to say that throughout the history of the Hebrew people their dominant social tendency was toward absorption in the prevailing world-civilization.

II

The religion of the Hebrews, being an integral part of the whole civilizing process as it worked itself out in their life, naturally reflects what we have seen to be the general trend of that process, namely, conformity to the common life of the whole environing area.

The Old Testament offers three distinct sources of evidence concerning this question, namely, its legal, historical, and prophetical writings. In examining these it must ever be borne in mind that they reflect only indirectly the religion of the masses. Prophet and priest alike were, each after his own fashion, endeavoring to give direction to the mass. Their writings, and the writings of the historians whom they influenced, naturally give direct evidence concerning their own views and indirect evidence concerning the actual life they sought to guide.

The legal codes in the Bible, since in large part they preserve for us the record of the actual technique of what we would call today "organized religon," are bound, if a tendency toward conformity was dominant in Hebrew life, to afford us evidence of the fact. When these are chronologically compared it is seen that, on this technical side, there is, in the first place, a progressive trend toward refinement and complexity, and, in the second, a similar trend toward the magical. The disposition toward refinement may be illustrated by reference to the ark. In the most primitive reference to it in this legalistic literature (Num. 10:33 ff.) there is no description of the object itself. In the Deuteronomic code of the sixth century it is described as made of acacia-wood (Deut. 10:1 ff.). While, in the later post-Exilic priestly law it is made of the same material, but overlaid within and without with pure gold, has a solid-gold top surmounted with cherubim of the same precious metal, and even its acacia-wood carrying staves are similarly covered (Exod. 25:10 ff.). The development of complexity in the official cult may be observed especially in the evolution of sacrifices and offerings and in the corresponding increase in number and differentiation in rank and function of the clergy. The late priestly laws deal definitely with such subjects as the age of priestly service, the rite of their consecration, their qualifications, clothing, ceremonial cleanness, authority of higher over lower priestly orders, and the clothing, duties, and ceremonial cleanness of the high priest—all of which clearly have no regulated place in the pre-Exilic cult. And even when the priestly codes deal with matters also covered by the earlier laws, the greater technical complexity of the former is always obvious.

The laws concerning the ark may again serve as an illustration of the development of the magical technique in the official cult. In the most primitive mention of the ark in the legal literature it plainly is conceived as possessing what we should call magical properties. It is a focal point for the manifestation of mysterious, superhuman power (Num. 10:33 ff.). Yet even here this power is under the control of the Levite, Moses, who has the necessary formulas for causing the ark to function. That this was a valid early conception of the nature and use of the ark is supported by the story of the ark of Shiloh in the early historical writings (I Sam. 4:1 ff.). There the ark is carried before Israel in the conflict with the Philistines in the obvious expectation that its presence gives Israel an infallible talisman of victory. Likewise it is the manifestation of the magic inherent in the object itself which insures its return by the Philistine victors. The Deuteronomic ark (Deut. 10:1 ff.) is quite different. It is the repository of the tablets containing the decalogue. Its function is not magical but oracular. Moreover, close by it is to be deposited the book of the law (Deut. 31:24), which is to be "a witness against" the people. Obviously this law was an attempt to check the magical tendency and to insist that the ark's true function is to be a means of revealing God's will and not an instrument for influencing it. But the post-Exilic priestly law (Exod. 25:10 ff.) shows that this protest has had only a partial effect. It has succeeded in bringing about a refinement of the magical element, but has not succeeded in emphasizing the oracular function of the ark. For this priestly ark becomes now the repository of the written law, which the Deuteronomists designed to be a "witness against" the people. Not only so, but that once authoritative written word is now covered up with solid gold, and, at the ark, reposing in the holy of holies which the high priest alone may enter, the latter comes into direct communication with mysterious deity and is expected to placate him and control him for the comfort and prosperity of his people. It is plain, then, that what has happened in the development is merely that the crass magic of earlier days has been succeeded by a magic of a more refined type.

The significance of all this is only understood when considered in the light of the prophetic and historical writings, the latter of which is itself just a form of prophetic literature. This literature shows us that from earliest times the natural and dominant religion of the Hebrews differed hardly at all from that which was common throughout the Semitic world. Their world also was first polydemonistic and then polytheistic. They perceived no unity in nature, no relation as of cause and effect in its phenomena. Those inexplicable events were isolated occurrences directly due to the activity of innumerable spirits. The technique by which they dealt with these spirits was that of placation and identification. They made offerings to please the deity and identified themselves in blood covenant with him that he might be bound to protect them. Sacrifice, circumcision, blood revenge, blood covenant, mourning customs, wizardry, necromancy, ancestor worship, totemism—all these lie in the background of the prevalent religious technique of the Hebrews in every age, no matter how it is sought to refine and spiritualize them. And all this was common to the whole Near East, the outward forms of a religion whose psychological basis goes back to fear—fear of deity who symbolizes the mysterious forces of nature; fear of man through whom those mysterious forces express their dangerous powers.

Hence we understand better the significance of the perennial, prophetic polemic against the prevalence, among the Hebrews, of what they regarded, and we mistakenly regard, as foreign cults and religious customs, sun worship, star worship, animal worship, religious prostitution, magic, and sorcery. The truth is that not these things were foreign to the Hebrew masses, but rather the religious teaching which opposed them. Jeroboam I, when he breaks politically with the south, reverts to the native fertility cult, whose symbol was the bull, because his Yahwism is only skin deep. Ahaz, after attending an Assyrian durbar at Damascus, sees nothing wrong in ordering a more elaborate altar, Assyrian style. The Hebrews were Semites and belonged, religiously as well as otherwise, with that whole Semitic environment to which, in every age, they manifested an astounding sensitiveness and an incorrigible tendency to conform.

The dominant religion of the Hebrew people, since it conformed to environment, is shown to be an integral part of the whole civilizing process by which all the near eastern peoples were seeking such an integration as would yield a more satisfactory and secure manner of life. This being the case, the significance of the tenacity with which the Hebrews clung to the common placatory religious technique is clear. To the experience of the masses of their race the totality of environment, natural and social, was inscrutable and potentially hostile. Such is, indeed, the experience of the masses in every race, and as long as it is so, they will continue to lean toward the magical religious technique. Only with the advent of a day which builds up a social consciousness of the friendliness of the universe will that ancient technique vanish from religion.

Being thus socially motivated, by the experience of the group as a whole, the dominant religion of the Hebrews ever lent itself to the pursuit of a realistic or materialistic synthesis with its environment. In the experience of the hardly driven masses man lives by bread alone. It must be his invariable habit, whether in his relations with deity or man, with the mysterious or the known, to seek first for food, shelter, and the power that spells social safety. One has but to run through the Psalms and the Proverbs to see how largely these things bulked in the aspirations of even the most pious of later Hebrews; or one need only recall the early hope of the "day of Yahweh," so criticized by Amos, to realize that it was ever thus. And so, dominated by the spirit of the world, the spirit from which there is no immunity for those who live in the world, the religion of the Hebrew masses, and of the classes who live by controlling them, went the way of the world.

III

But to insist, as we have done, that the religion of the Hebrews was an integral part of the whole civilizing process, is not, however, to imply that it was not also an influential factor in the process. Even the dominant, pragmatic, and assimilative religious forces served well one distinctive and highly influential function. They permitted no man to escape taking into account the mysterious and inexplicable forces in his environment. Whatever may be thought of their polytheistic interpretation of those forces, or of the technique they developed for dealing with them, at least this much must be granted, that they presented to the consciousness of every Hebrew an organized and therefore continuous challenge to speculate upon and to investigate the real nature of the universe.

It was in reaction to this challenge of accepted and organized religion that there were developed, within the religion of the Hebrews, dissimilative forces which resisted the natural tendency to conform to external pressure. These forces always integrated themselves about the conception of one particular God, Yahweh, and, from the very first, their insistence upon the validity of this deity's authority for them differentiated his followers from the great mass of their contemporaries.

The origins of this particular type of Hebrew religion are veiled in mystery, and several rival theories on the subject now claim the attention of the academic world. Not being primarily interested in origins, we may confine ourselves to characteristics which, for our purposes, are more important. The first characteristic of Yahwism is that it is invasive. The weight of biblical evidence points to the conclusion that Yahwism was not the religion of the Hebrew tribes, as a whole, before their entry into Palestine. Further, it is clear that it only achieves social recognition, as such, through David's rise to power over north and south alike. In other words, sometime during the long period of settlement, this religion, apparently as the faith of an aggressive, conquering, nomadic caste, penetrated the country, moving from south to north. For centuries the ancestral seat of this god was remembered to be in Sinai-Horeb, and the Levites, an early priestly caste, were closely connected with the expansion of his cult.

The second great distinctive characteristic of this type of Hebrew religion is that it is individualistically determined in its motivations and aims. In the most reliable tradition it begins with Moses, and its progress is through a series of social crises in which there arise, in succession, a line of great individuals who reinterpret it to the masses, each in the light of the circumstances of his or her own day. How natural it is for us to recall that great succession—Moses, Deborah, Gideon, Samson, Samuel, Elijah, Elisha, Micaiah, Amos, Hosea, Isaiah, Jeremiah, Ezekiel—not to mention lesser figures! And how bewildering it is for us, unless we remember that this is essentially a personal religion, to reconcile their varying and often conflicting conceptions of their God and his purposes!

Still a third differentiating characteristic this type of Hebrew religion possessed which we may best understand by noting the contrast between its characteristic technique and that prevalent in the common Semitic religious life. In its technique emphasis was placed on revelation of the divine will by oracle rather than on the magical control of it so prominent in the nature cults. It worked through a revelation from the deity. It did not seek to placate him so much as to understand and obey him. Thus it becomes clear that the psychological basis of this religion is not fear but faith. A deep conviction that the mysterious power which plays in the natural and social environment is essentially friendly underlies it. And, what is perhaps more important, it develops the conception that this power is cosmic and purposive and personal, and as such can communicate its will to picked individuals who are, thereby, under obligation to communicate that knowledge to their contemporaries and promote their use of it for their own social welfare.

Being thus, in its genesis, individualistic, Yahwism expresses itself, in every age, as an idealistic reaction against environment, the nature of these reactions being inevitably conditioned by the circumstances and conditions of the time. It is interesting to compare several outstanding Yahwistic reactions with the characteristic mass tendencies in different periods. During the centuries of the settlement in Canaan, for example, the ruling disposition among the Hebrew tribesmen was to become, as the Canaanites had before them, immersed in local affairs, devoted to the arts of peace and to the attainment of the cultural level of the indigenous stock. In such a life racial loyalties declined and social solidarity was weakened. Hence all the great individual Yahwistic reactions of the time are toward opposition to such a tendency through appeal to racial pride and the combative instinct. Deborah's revelation is calculated to inspire Barak with confidence to lead, and the people with the will to fight, against Sisera's meekly endured aggressions. Gideon, a member of a community devoted to a Canaanitic fertility cult, is represented as being called by Yahweh, through an angelic visitation, to a new insight of a better order to be gained through resistance. Samuel summons Saul to obey the inner urge to resistance, which cannot fail to come to one whose tribal inhibitions are broken down, during an age of social conflict. And it is the great individual David who tortuously and ruthlessly expresses in himself this individualistic, resistive spirit—inspired always, in spite of his moral obtusities, by a dream of a better day for his race and a conviction that Yahweh was guiding him toward success.

With its establishment as an official state cult under David and Solomon, Yahwism passed into a new phase of its development. It became a national religion, a fact impressively symbolized by Solomon in his great temple at Jerusalem. Simultaneously, as we have seen, the dominant social forces, conforming to the world environment, entered, politically, upon an age of military and diplomatic activity, and, socially, upon an age of advancing individualism. Official, socially motivated Yahwism now began to conform to the tendency of the age and became Yahwism in name only. Such is the Yahwism denounced by Amos and Hosea. Officialdom has robbed it of something vital. It has left it, indeed, in an intensified degree, its faith in the friendliness of its own deity. But, if we are to believe Amos, it has obscured the idealistic and ethically vital idea that that friendliness is conditioned upon a search for the will of God, and upon a resolution to obey it. In other words, official Yahwism has lost its ability to believe that there is a better way of living than that in which the world about it is living. For the energizing and resistive idea that men must seek to conform, not to environment, but to some more ideal norm denoted as the will of God, official Yahwism has substituted the native religious technique of placation and magic, as, for example, Amos' attitude to the sacrificial customs at Bethel shows.

Against every phase of this conformatory tendency the great prophets fought. They opposed military measures. They resisted diplomatic intrigue. They castigated the antisocial disposition of the monarchical order. They mocked and denounced all foreign cultural influences. They made every appeal they could think of to their people to preserve in their life some differentiating ethical characteristics which would mark them as different from surrounding nations. And in their struggle with, and contempt for, the fruits of a monarchical society they conceived their great ideal of a theocracy.

But struggle as they might, the pre-Exilic prophets and their followers lived in a world completely organized on the monarchical and imperial pattern. Thoroughgoing theocratists as they were, they were so influenced by their world that they could conceive, for their theocracy, none other than a monarchical pattern. They could think of no other institution through which to realize their ideal than the monarchy itself. Inevitably they indulged in a struggle for its control.

The great fallacy underlying that prophetic attempt to seize and control the national institutions, which attempt we know as the Deuteronomic reform, was that such a step inevitably involved, not only executive, but also cultural identification with the order from which they sought to escape. There is always identity between spirit and form. The world cannot be ruled by men for God as it is ruled by men for themselves. Yet even in this moment of subtle danger, true, dissimilative, idealistic Yahwism found a leader in Jeremiah, whose instinctive spiritual insight led him to refuse participation in this worthily motivated, but ill-conceived, enterprise, the failure of which hastened the catastrophe which plunged the dissimilative religious forces into a new situation and new problems.

Judah's loss of political sovereignty in 586 B.C. proved a blessing to the idealistic religious elements of the nation. The institutional organization of the country was wrecked, thus making way for the evolution of institutions more reconcilable with the theocratic ideal, which, even among exiles living in the midst of a great world-civilization, could still command the support of the few. Two quite distinct reactions to the new situation are traceable in the Exilic literature. The first is found in the writings of Ezekiel, a man belonging, by birth and training, on the institutional side of religion, but, by reaction against environment, on its idealistic side. It is not surprising that one who was thus both dreamer and organizer should see the opportunity of the moment to lie in the organization of his people in such a way as to render them impervious to external cultural pressure by focusing their attention upon their own culture. His vision was that of a church whose cultus was to be an everlasting symbol of separation from the world. The working-out of such a vision was bound to be a slow and difficult task, especially in view of the natural tendency to assimilate which carried many Babylonian Jews into the stream of the dominant civilization.

The second reaction is represented by the Deutero-Isaiah who seems to belong among the descendants of that pre-Exilic group which had sought to express its ethical idealism through political institutions. His faith was that Yahweh's providence embraced a design to vindicate himself, and save humanity, through his own people. Thus he tried to bridge the logical, philosophical, and social gap which had always existed between those who wished to conform to the world and those who sought to contribute something of transforming ethical force to it. His monotheism was the concomitant of this position. Israel could only hope to influence the world if its God were sovereign of the world, and if he were prepared to establish his people, as an entity, in the eyes of the world. Hence this prophet preached Zionism and declared the transition from Babylonian to Persian rule to be its divinely indicated opportunity.

That the earliest attempts at restoration in Palestine were led by idealists of Deutero-Isaiah's school seems clear from the prophecies of Haggai and Zechariah. That they did not commend themselves to individuals who followed Ezekiel's teaching is also no far-fetched inference. Zionism's opponents were not all found among renegade Jews. The political sense of these opponents was vindicated by the fate of Zerubbabel, who led an abortive attempt to restore the Davidic house to power in Jerusalem. And the soundness of their judgments on cultural matters is confirmed by the evidence of Isaiah, chapters 56–66, and Malachi. The first seventy-five years of the restoration movement's history serve only to confirm the impression that it is well-nigh impossible to preserve and promote any differentiative idealism except through an institution specially designed for that purpose.

Such an institution at last, after nearly a century of evolution in the midst of the seductions of a great foreign civilization, invaded Palestine in force. This legalistic sacerdotalistic movement was frankly cultural and ostensibly non-political in its aims. It sought to promote a distinctive attitude to the world, a type of life which should differ from that of the world and yet be able to transcend its hostile pressure. Yet its leaders, Nehemiah and Ezra, like its founder Ezekiel, did not see that the central temple, with its sacrificial rites and its authoritative hierarchy, was not essentially an educative but an executive institution. The hierarchy, organized for the centralized control of society, was really a conformative force. The law, administered by scribal ethical idealists, was essentially a nonconformative force, capable of projection not only into Palestine but also into the uttermost parts of the earth. The cultus stood for the influencing of deity, and no legal restriction of magical technique could make it other than it was. The law stood for the education of the individual in matters of conduct, and no sacerdotal disguise could veil its inherent threat to all naturalistic superstition. This basically divided church, which sought, by its legalism, to incorporate prophetic idealism, and, by its sacerdotalism, to exploit the superstition of the masses, came to grief when it was invaded directly and indirectly by Hellenistic civilization. Under pressure of the changed environment the priestly guardians of sacerdotalism sought, in the immemorial manner, a marriage of convenience. They would Hellenize if they might maintain the control of society which their central temple symbolized.

And now once again the indomitably tenacious ethical idealist appeared upon the scene and so, first by the Hasidim and later by the Pharisee, there was waged the struggle of a minority who insisted upon their right to interpret the past in the light of the present, and their authority to develop a technique adequate for their idealism, against those whose only concession to idealism was more and more elaborate devices to conceal their lack of it.

It is not too much to claim, in conclusion, that Hebrew religion was an influential part of the whole civilizing process precisely because of this eternal battle between the assimilative and dissimilative forces therein. The whole religious struggle served to keep vividly before the masses the great question of the real nature of the universe. The important fruits of the conflict are not the dogmatic interpretations of the universe which the contending forces threw off in their travail. The great achievement of the religion of the Hebrews was that it kept alive, in an increasing mass of humanity, an insatiable curiosity about the universe and a divine discontent with man's achieved adjustment to it.

From the womb of Hebrew religion have issued three world-religions, Christianity, Judaism, and Mohammedanism. Each of these three daughters now travails, as did the mother-faith before it, to learn more about our mysterious universe and to find a better way to live within it. Civilizations come and go. But the civilizing process is endless. And religion, now as then, is an integral and, on the whole, a benignly influential part of it.

THE CASE-WORK METHOD IN THE CURE OF SOULS

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At a conference of religious and social workers which had been called to discuss the terms of co-operation between these two groups in their common enterprise of helping people out of trouble, one of the questions faced was: "If the clergy are to be in close touch with social work and social workers, must they not master the technique of social work, as various clergymen have done?" This question aroused a more lively discussion than any other raised during the afternoon. The group divided rather sharply about two positions. The proponents of one position held that the religious worker ought to familiarize himself sufficiently with the technique of social work to enable him to understand the objectives and methods of the social worker, but that it was too much to ask the religious worker to gain a "mastery" of this technique. The spokesmen for the other position, however, held that the technique of the social worker was precisely the technique that the religious worker needed to master if he would carry on successfully a ministry for "the cure of souls." None felt, it need hardly be added, that religious and social workers could afford to ignore each other.

The problem stated above was bound to come to the focus of attention sooner or later in view of the direction taken in the development of technique by the social worker. Originally, practically all the functions now performed by social welfare organizations and professional social workers were performed by the church and clergy. Now these functions, with many others—as education, for example—have been taken over by specialized agencies, which have developed elaborate techniques for their purposes. It quickly became evident that social welfare work was no simple task. The social worker soon found that he—or she, for social work has been predominantly a feminine interest—had on hand a much more baffling problem than the first cursory glance might seem to indicate. It could not be met by the mere doling-out of a little food and clothing, or by the paying of rent, to tide a needy family over a period of temporary distress. There were cases, of course, where nothing much more was needed. But there were even more cases where a wide variety of social causes was found to be responsible for the present economic distress. And the task of the social worker came to be the discovery of those deeper-lying causes of human misery, and the effort either to remove those causes or, where their removal was not possible, to secure the best possible adjustment of the individual or family to the situation. Many of the causes of human misery were, of course, found to reside in the economic structure of society and in other basic factors of social organization which could be changed only by legislation and social action. With these matters the social case-worker has not concerned himself directly, although the campaigner for improvement of the social order has always been able to count on the backing and support of the social worker who was directly in touch with human need. The field of the social case-worker has been, rather, in personal and friendly contact with individuals and families in trouble. And his task has passed far beyond that of providing temporary amelioration. He has sought to help his clients to a more satisfactory permanent adjustment to their varying situations, to effect the rehabilitation of individuals and families, and to establish them as happy and successful members of society.

It was in dealing with such problems that the technique of the social case-worker was devised. This technique was, of course, a gradual growth and is still in process of development and modification. It has called for the co-operation, both in diagnosis and treatment, of an increasing number of experts. Sickness required the co-operation of the physician or surgeon and the public-health worker; juvenile delinquency and family disorganization required the co-operation of officers of the courts and possibly psychologists, sociologists, and others; cases of mental deficiency or personality disorder required the co-operation of the mental hygienist or psychiatrist. The upshot of the matter is that the original impulse to provide economic relief has carried the social worker into a much wider field. It has resulted in the co-operative effort, by a large group of specialists, either to remove or to secure the best possible adjustment to adverse circumstances, and in every way possible to improve the condition of their clients. The social worker attempts both to ameliorate external circumstances that militate against human welfare and to assist the individual to make those personal adjustments which are essential to happiness and success. The task which the social worker has come to set himself, in short, is not merely the temporary relief of a person or family in distress, but the reclamation and readjustment of that individual or family, and their establishment upon a new level of wholesome and successful living.

Now, it seems clear to some that the social case-worker, especially when dealing with personality problems, is seeking essentially the same goal as is the pastor in the cure of souls. Both are dealing in intimate, personal, friendly fashion with persons whose world has, in some respects, gone wrong. Their clients or parishioners are faced with circumstances which threaten to defeat or overwhelm them. The social worker's cases, it is true, usually have come to his attention because of acute economic need, but he soon finds that many other factors are involved, and a group of problems must be dealt with if success is to be achieved. The minister's cases, on the other hand, usually originate in a sense of moral failure, mental distress, or despair. But even the minister may find that the economic situation is no small factor. At any rate, both the minister and social worker find that they are dealing with persons who face untoward circumstances. They seek to aid them to cope with and overcome their difficulties. And, above all, they try to secure for those with whom they deal such an adjustment to circumstances as will result in a full, free, and satisfying life.

But there are marked differences between the traditional approach of the minister to the cure of souls and that of the social worker in his efforts to remedy personal maladjustments. Consider the traditional theological point of view which almost inevitably conditions, at least partially, the minister's treatment of the sick soul. The theological explanation of human failure, particularly in the moral realm, is that human nature is corrupt. An inherent depravity is shared by all the sons of Adam. Inevitably men fall into sin. Sin is a violation of God's law and merits condemnation and punishment. But redemption is provided through Christ who bore the penalty of our sins. By repentance of sin and faith toward Christ men may become the beneficiaries of that sacrifice and be saved. And the vocational training of the minister has been largely determined by this theological explanation of human failure and the means of cure. The minister must be thoroughly trained in the Bible, for the Bible is the authoritative revelation of the plan of salvation. He must therefore be able to interpret accurately that all-important record, both in his pulpit and in his personal ministry. And his training, apart from the study of the Bible itself, was largely the perfection of techniques for the effective public and private presentation of the plan of salvation revealed in the Bible. The progressive theological seminaries of the present day have, admittedly, considerably modified and enriched their curricula. Religious education and the social sciences have been given prominence. It has become clear that these newly introduced disciplines throw important light upon the problem of character development. But the movements toward a modification of the curriculum have been somewhat tentative and uncertain. There has been little sense of assurance and conviction. Ultimately, it would seem, theological education must face a complete reorganization in the light of the new knowledge of human nature which the social sciences, particularly psychology and sociology, are now contributing.

The traditional theological pattern, then, has inevitably affected the minister's point of view with regard to the cure of souls. He has approached the problem with a clearly conceived explanation of the root trouble, and an absolutely assured remedy. It was for him to point out to the sinner the error of his way, to warn him against the inevitable consequences of wrongdoing, and to urge repentance and faith. Whatever the undesirable conduct might be, it was "sin," and the plan of salvation was the remedy. The minister's practice, however, has been better than his theory; he has taken account of circumstances, and given sound counsel to troubled and tempted souls in their hour of need. But, even so, the theological explanation of the situation was in the background of the minister's thinking, and largely biased his work.

Now, the social worker approaches a case of trouble, whatever its nature, from quite another angle. His approach is much like that of the physician—indeed, the social worker is greatly indebted to medicine for suggestions as to the development of technique. The social worker wants to learn all that he possibly can about the conditioning circumstances of the present trouble, however far back they may reach. Heredity, environmental conditions, and the experience of the individual must be examined. Only on the basis of such knowledge can he hope to render service of permanent value. For he is thinking of the trouble as residing, not in an inherited depravity, but in some maladjustment between the individual and his environment. He believes that two things must be accomplished: the causal factors of the present difficulty must be removed or modified, and the individual in trouble must be stimulated to do all that lies in his power to achieve a better adjustment to life and its problems.

Such an approach as that described above is squarely based upon the new knowledge of human nature which the social sciences have contributed. For conduct issues not from any inherent goodness or badness of original nature. The human individual is simply a bundle of biological impulses, entirely nonmoral in themselves, launched into a social order which has rigidly established its codes of behavior. The individual has to learn what is socially acceptable conduct and what is not; and he does learn from earliest infancy by the gestures of approval or disapproval with which his spontaneous activities are met. Desires take form in the interaction of impulse and social habit. But impulses and desires may conflict with one another, or with the social habits of the majority. Organic hungers, conflicting human desires, opposing social habits of various groups, constantly threaten the integrity of the individual. It is out of this turbulent conflict of human life, and the extraordinary difficulty of securing perfect adjustment, that the troubles of humanity emerge. To achieve a personally satisfying and socially adjusted life is a task of enormous difficulty. And the pastor, in his ministry for the cure of souls, would do well to take his cue from the social worker and endeavor, as a first step, to make an accurate diagnosis of any case of soul sickness he seeks to alleviate. He needs to know what interests or desires of his parishioner have been denied satisfaction, or which, perhaps, he has been trying to satisfy by conduct disapproved by society. Only on the basis of such knowledge can the minister counsel wisely and help his parishioner to such a reorganization and redirection of his life as will yield at once a rich and satisfying experience and social approval. For, after all, it is the lack of social approval that is responsible for the pangs of conscience. It is a violation of the mores developed in social and racial experience, interpreted as the will of God (and how else than by social discovery shall we know the will of God?), that brings the sense of guilt. And it is by means of a reintegration of personality around ideals and socially approved purposes, a redirection of life which it is believed that God will approve, that a sense of self-respect, security, and inner peace can be achieved.

A careful study of the technique of the social case-worker will help the pastor to develop an adequate technique for his own purposes. The methods developed for exploring backgrounds and getting at causal factors in cases of individuals in trouble, as well as the practical programs used in helping people out of trouble, may, to a very considerable extent, be used by the minister to great advantage. This does not mean that the minister will supplant the social case-worker. The social case-worker's task is primarily with individuals and families suffering economic distress and maladjustment. The minister will, indeed, find increasing opportunity for effective and helpful co-operation with the social worker as he learns to appreciate the diagnostic method of approach which the social worker uses, and as the social worker becomes increasingly aware of the resources available in religion to aid in the rehabilitation of individuals and families. But each worker will have his own peculiar task. Neither will the pastor supplant the psychiatrist or the physician; they too are team-workers with him, bringing their specialized knowledge, techniques, and skills to the aid of people in distress. But the pastor who would effectively administer the cure of souls will need to make fundamentally the same realistic approach as all these specialists, by seeking to discover precisely what is wrong and what can be done about it. And he will have his insight, knowledge, and skill to contribute, just as does the social worker, psychiatrist, and physician. He must be an expert in the field of religion. He must know what religion can do to aid men to overcome difficulties, to gain a sense of serenity and poise, to integrate personality about purposive activity on the higher moral levels, to implant and reinforce lofty ideals, and to secure for the individual a rich and satisfying life. This is his particular province. While he should have a sufficient acquaintance in other fields of knowledge to enable him to co-operate helpfully with the social worker, physician, and psychiatrist, and know when to call for their aid, in his own field he should be prepared to make a major contribution.

CRITICAL REVIEWS

INDIAN THOUGHT

Perhaps never before in the entire history of India, has she attracted so much widespread interest as within the last decade or so. And even though spectacular political events and leaders have of necessity been in the foreground, there nevertheless hardly is an important phase of Indian life and culture which has escaped scrutiny and inquiry on the part of the Western world. The prodigious number of books on India published during the last few years testifies to this fact.

Under such circumstances every serious contribution to our understanding of India's intellectual foundation is welcome indeed. And especially so when it combines, as Dr. Betty Heimann's work[1] happily does, scholarly method with a style and treatment intelligible to the interested layman. In the twenty-one papers composing the work under review, Dr. Heimann examines the fields of Indian religion, philosophy, sociology, law, poetry, and architecture—in short, the entire field in which the intellectual life of a people manifests itself. It is a significant feature that the method of approach used is psychological, as opposed to the historico-analogical method which so far has been very popular with European scholars. The author postulates the following question: "Is it scientifically accurate to judge and compare Indian religion and philosophy by the standards of European analogies?" This question Dr. Heimann answers in the negative, stressing the fact that, although the final forms of religiously philosophical thinking in India and in the West are not infrequently very similar, they nevertheless have been arrived at by totally different ways. Moreover, the entire structure of Indian thought rests upon a foundation differing greatly from anything Europe offers. So, for instance, in spite of all the progress achieved through a period of many centuries in the methodology of thinking, the original basis of speculation is never abandoned in India. In the West, on the other hand, an attempt is made to rebuild the entire intellectual structure anew, as soon as a higher method of thought is reached. This characteristic feature of Indian thinking accounts for many seemingly hopeless contradictions and discrepancies in the realm of Indian religion and philosophy. Thus a man of keen intellect and Western education like Gandhi, can maintain very genuine allegiance to most of the doctrines of Hinduism as evolved already two thousand years ago. And in this, undoubtedly, we may discern one of the most important reasons for Mr. Gandhi's strength and immense popularity with the masses of India. He is to them the ideal national hero, whose whole being derives its power from the Sacred Wisdom of the Veda, that is, more precisely, from the Upanishads. Many views of Mr. Gandhi—such, for instance, as his stern opposition to the introduction of machine-civilization into India—have their philosophical foundation in his typically Indian *Weltanshaung*.

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[1] *Studien zur Eigenart Indischen Denkens.* By Betty Heimann. Tübingen: J. C. B. Mohr, 1930. vi+328 pages. M. 26.

The present reviewer agrees, generally speaking, with Dr. Heimann's point of view. There is no doubt that Deussen and other Western scholars have gone too far at times in their effort to demonstrate parallel currents of thought in India and the West. A clear example of such an attempt is Deussen's theory establishing a close parallel between the metaphysics of the Upanishads and the systems of Plato and Kant. But, as already Hermann Oldenberg in his *Lehre der Upanishaden und Anfänge des Buddhismus*, has pointed out, every effort to find something like Upanishad philosophy in the vicinity of Kant is doomed to failure. Kant's method is absolutely foreign to the Upanishads; and, as Oldenberg suggests further, a much more suitable material for comparison with the thoughts of the Upanishads might be found in the writings of a Christian mystic like Eckhart. As in the Upanishads, so in Eckhart, we find the inclusion and merging of every existence in the unity of the Divine. Eckhart describes this unity as "neither this, nor that," that is, almost in the identical terms of the Brhad-Aranyaka Upanishad. And numerous other similarities and parallels can be found. But the thought-processes of both systems, as we discover once again, exhibit a fundamental difference; the results may not infrequently be the same, but the method used in attaining them lies in each case in a distinct intellectual plane of its own.

Another point to which Dr. Heimann devotes considerable space, must always be stressed greatly, it seems to the reviewer. This is the extraordinarily important rôle played by influences of anthropo-geographical nature in the history of India in general and in her spiritual development in particular. Only a hypothesis based on the powerful influence of climatic and racial surroundings can explain satisfactorily, for instance, that tremendous psychological upheaval, which was necessary to transform the buoyant, materialistic optimism of the Rigveda, into the world-negation of the Upanishads and the still more thoroughgoing pessimism of early Buddhism.

A very useful problem-index is attached to the book, permitting the easy location of any point of importance discussed in the studies. This removes certain inconveniences which might otherwise have presented themselves because of the division of the book into twenty-one more or less independent articles.

G. V. BOBRINSKOY

UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO

GANDHI'S AUTOBIOGRAPHY

The complete autobiography of Mr. Gandhi is a large two-volume work, entitled, *The Story of My Experiments with Truth.* Another work of his, *Satyagraha in South Africa*, includes a considerable amount of autobiographical material. Mr. Andrews, a close friend of Gandhi's for many years, has performed a difficult task, with distinct success, in abridging the story of Mr. Gandhi's life from these three volumes.[1] The essential features of the longer story have been well preserved in this shortened form.

Mr. Haynes describes the narrative aptly as characterized by "a simplicity that is almost naïve, a frankness that is frequently startling, an integrity that is almost sublime." Certainly it is the story of a life full of absorbing interest, and will be widely read. The life of India today is so much wrapped up with the life of this great man that it cannot be neglected.

Upon those who know Mr. Gandhi intimately he always makes the impression of one who is sincere in his quest for truth and in his desire that soul-force (*satyagraha*) should be the guiding influence in his own and the life of his fellow-countrymen. What was accomplished in South Africa was amazing. The present experiment in India is on a much larger scale. One wonders sometimes whether Gandhi realizes the risks involved. It is easier to persuade people to try soul-force than to dissuade them from violence when their passions are aroused. Whatever may be one's views of his political and economic theories, one cannot but admire the moral integrity and courage of the man.

It would be precipitous to pronounce judgment on the place which Mr. Gandhi will occupy in the permanent annals of history. Mr. Holmes allies himself with those who compare him to Jesus. It is of interest that the Indian people, seeking for some "mahatma" great and pure enough to whom they might compare Gandhi, turned to Jesus. His passive resistance policy is likened to the teaching of Jesus. It ought not to be forgotten that Jesus' suggestion of turning the other cheek had no implications in the nature of a weapon, whereas with Gandhi non-co-operation is definitely meant as stubborn resistance. It is extremely doubtful policy to draw such comparisons. Perhaps future historians may do so; perhaps not. Of this we may be certain—that Gandhi's interest in the religious life of India is on the side of moral rather than ceremonial religion. He is doing a fine service in helping to rid Hinduism of some of the accumulated excrescences and to revitalize it with spiritual power. To him the Bhagavad Gita and the Ramayana of Tulsidas are incomparable inspirational literature, and he finds a consolation in the Gita which he even misses in the Sermon on the Mount. There are many who have followed Gandhi and his work who feel that his lasting contribution to India and the world is in the field of moral idealism rather than politics or economics. Others are sure that his significance is precisely his ability to carry that idealism into these so-called worldly affairs. The advantage of an autobiography is that it leaves the reader free to formulate his own judgment.

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[1] *Gandhi of India—His Own Story.* Edited by C. F. Andrews, with an Introduction by John Haynes Holmes. New York: Macmillan Co., 1930. 372 pages. $2.50.

A. S. Woodburne

Crozer Theological Seminary

THE RELIGIOUS CULT

This is the second volume[1] of an impressive work by a member of the faculty of Protestant theology at Strasbourg. The first volume discusses the rapport between the worshiper and the worshiped. The third and final volume will be devoted to the sociology of religious worship. Though the range covered is very wide, the student of religions must feel that, as far as the historical side of this work is concerned, it gives proportionately far too little attention to non-Christian religions to be justly described by so general a title. Its chief value lies in its critical analysis of the implications of the details as well as of the general character of Christian worship. The present volume constitutes an outstanding contribution to that type of philosophy of religion which starts out, not from a preconceived idealism, but from the practical facts of religion in its historical expression. It deals with the phenomena of religious worship—the first part with the principles, the second with the forms. The treatment does not rule out an ultimately spiritualistic interpretation of existence, but it seems equally compatible with a dualism of physical and psychical with a theistic dominance of the whole. Dr. Will regards worship as a relation between the religious subject and the divine object mediated by particular phenomena. These are the means used in the interaction between man and God. Religious worship involves a "descent" of the divine to man, and an "ascent" of man to the divine; an attraction of man to God by the action of God, and an aspiration of man to God. Worship appeals in the measure in which its phenomena communicate to the devotees the sentiment of divine presence.

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[1] *Le Culte: Étude d'Histoire et de Philosophie réligieuse.* Vol. II: *Les Formes du Culte.* By Robert Will. Paris: Felix Alcan, 1929. 568 pages. 60 Fr.

If religious communion with God is the aim of worship, the presence of God is just as indispensable an element as that of the religious subject, and in the study of the phenomena of religious worship appeal must be made to metaphysical speculation as much as to psychology and to the history of religions. It is not sufficient to consider the phenomena from the side of the subject only. The complex nature of the phenomena can only be determined by reference also to the Object. In the phenomena of worship two movements meet, one from the transcendent reality, the other from the religious life of the subject. The concurrence of these does not exclude a certain *primordialité* of the divine action.

Man being body as well as soul, the aim of human culture is not the unrealizable ideal of pure spirituality, but an organic synthesis of the two elements of our nature so that the soul may be truly the "form" (in the Aristotelian sense) of the physical life. Worship involves the physical and the spiritual; the physical is used by the divine in its commerce with man, and man uses the physical in his attempts to associate with the divine. From the point of view of the subject, worship is a psychical necessity, the typical expression of its inner life as a whole. Even the so-called most-spiritual religions make use of phenomenal intermediaries in worship—at least in the wide sense in which Dr. Will understands these phenomena. The acts of worship, the objects used in it, the places of worship, even special times, have the character of symbols. Such symbols are at one and the same time intelligible and unintelligible—at least unintelligible in the sense that they imply something not expressible in rational terms. This unintelligible element represents, says Will, "the prolonging of practical knowledge in the direction of intuition." The divine cannot be entirely intelligible in anthropological terms, so neither can worship and its phenomena, since they have reference to the divine. Symbols are always inadequate. They are incapable of expressing perfectly what in the experience of man is higher than man. The phenomena of worship, though symbolic, are nevertheless not merely fictitious imagery or arbitrary allegory: they are realities by which we enter into "communion with the ineffable."

It is quite impossible to enter here on a critical examination of the details of this vast survey. Minor errors concerning facts do not affect the main contention. In that Dr. Will appears justified: that the phenomena of religious worship fully understood involve not only certain fundamental features of the human soul but also of a divine object. In other words, no adequate interpretation of human religious worship is possible apart from recognition of a transcendent being in active relation with his worshipers.

ALBAN G. WIDGERY

DUKE UNIVERSITY

THE RELIGION OF JEREMIAH

This volume[1] will be welcome to the many people who have a feeling that a picture of momentous import and unusual beauty lies concealed in the Book of Jeremiah, but who have been hitherto unable to piece together the present badly incised text and remove the extraneous superimposed materials that the original may be revealed. Of course it is not to be expected that the reconstruction here given us is perfect in all respects, for the work is too poorly preserved, and our knowledge of the characteristics of the creator's art too insecure, to permit us to hope to restore the original. A sincere and earnest attempt has been made, however, and we are presented with a delightful picture through which we catch a glimpse of the genius of Jeremiah and his function in his age. While the reconstruction does not completely restore the oriental background, it discloses a living, vital personality which the hands of later mediocrists and geniuses had effectively blurred.

The author attempts to give us not merely an interpretation of the writings of Jeremiah, but a biography. In this age when Old Testament research is progressing so rapidly and daily discovered historical evidences necessitate overnight changes in opinion, this work is relatively free of errors, especially in consideration of the fact that it is written by one who is not professionally an Old Testament scholar. There is no doubt but that here is revealed the soul of Jeremiah, and the author accomplishes his purpose of making a study in personal religion. The book is full of much that is of great religious value, and it is especially to be noted that it lacks those a priori theological assumptions which distort so many treatises on the Old Testament.

There are a few technical points at which the reviewer would differ with the author. The latter assumes that the prophecies of the foe from the north refer to the Scythians, but recent historical research has disclosed that the Scythian menace to Palestine at this period may be a myth. These prophecies must, perhaps, be dated much later in the life of Jeremiah. If this be accepted, the failure of Jeremiah's prophecy at this point, and his resulting reaction, must be discounted in the biographical sketch. The author's description of the relation of Jeremiah to the Deuteronomic reform is also questionable, for the connection of Jer. 11:1–8, 18–23, and 12:1–6 with that reform is dubious, and the interpreted change of attitude of Jeremiah toward the Deuteronomic reform is not sufficiently supported by these passages. Further, too little attention is paid to metrical form as an aid to interpretation, and the dating of some of the passages is too definite.

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[1] *Jeremiah, the Prophet.* By Raymond Calkins. New York: Macmillan, 1930. 382 pages. $2.50.

In spite of this, however, the book is very readable and valuable, presenting the problem of Jeremiah in a realistic fashion. It should be a factor in reviving interest in Old Testament study.

W. C. Graham

University of Chicago

A GENERAL HISTORY OF JEWISH LITERATURE

Although Jewish literature, because of its vast productivity, its multiform manifestations, and its constant contact with world-literature, must be of great interest to the scholar and to the general reader, nevertheless a complete history of Jewish literature has not hitherto appeared in English. The significant histories of this literature have appeared in German, e.g., the works of Winter and Wuensche, Karpeles, and the famous Steinschneider. Dr. Waxman's work,[1] therefore, fills a gap and merits a warm welcome.

This first volume (and judging by the ground it covers the entire work will be complete in two volumes) begins with the close of the canon of the Bible and goes down to the end of the twelfth century. The book does not follow a strictly chronological order, but necessarily deviates from it because it classifies and deals with the literature according to the various subject matters. Thus, chapter i discusses "Apocryphal and Apocalyptic Literature"; chapter ii, "Development of the Halakah"; chapter iii, "Organization of the Halakah"; chapter iv, "Hellenistic Literature"; chapter viii, "Biblical Exegesis"; chapter ix, "Poetry"; and so forth. Each chapter is provided with an introduction. Then the main works are named and a description given of their contents. The book is embellished with a number of illustrations and is made usable by a full Index and Bibliography.

[1] *A History of Jewish Literature—from the Close of the Bible to Our Own Days.* By Meyer Waxman. Vol. I: *From the Close of the Canon to the End of the Twelfth Century.* New York: Bloch Publishing Co., 1930. xvi+501 pages. $3.50.

Naturally in a work as ambitious as this there is much that is debatable. For instance, it is questionable whether the author does justice to the Jewish liturgical literature by discussing it as late as chapter ix and there merely as an appanage to the discussion of Jewish medieval poetry. Furthermore, it is strange that in the chapter on science no reference is made to Abraham Zacuto, who was court astronomer to John II of Portugal and whose astrolabe made Vasco da Gama's expedition possible. Columbus made use of Zacuto's almanac and tables and Zacuto's pupil, Vecinho, was consulted as to the feasibility of Columbus' expedition. If this were a strictly chronological history of literature there would be reason for omitting him on the ground that he lived after 1200, which is as far as the volume seems to go, but, inasmuch as in the Introduction the author says that he is taking up the various topics by subject (and particularly because the subject of science is after all not an extensive one in Jewish literature of the Middle Ages), at least some preliminary remark might have been made about Zacuto in the section on science.

Moreover, since this book is intended also for lay readers, the author should have given more than a description of the contents of important works. Actual excerpts would have added to the interest of the reader.

However, all these objections are comparatively unimportant. The book, as a whole, is complete, systematic, readable, and will prove to be of great value to all who are interested in the part played by Jewish literature in the literature of the world.

SOLOMON B. FREEHOF

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AN APOLOGY FOR INSPIRATION

The traditional attitude toward biblical authority and its metaphysical basis, rather than the intrinsic character of the Bible, form Lusseau's[1] criteria. Inspired by the Holy Spirit, the Bible has God as its author, but not as its writer, for the early Protestant theory of verbal dictation is untenable. The writers of the Bible retained their liberty, their personality, and their individual characteristics; yet such was the influx of the Holy Spirit into every item of the writers' intellect and will that, although they remained the writers' own will and intellect, they were totally subordinated to God. Further, the Holy Spirit, author of the thoughts of the Bible, must have also been the inspirer of the concrete terminology of the Bible, for the thoughts and the terminology cannot be separated, since the distinctiveness and separate nature of the former is dependent upon the latter. Thus the Bible is not only *la pensée de Dieu*, but *l'écrit de Dieu*. Such casuistry as this makes it possible for the author to recognize the variant characteristics of the writers of the Bible, while still maintaining as strict a doctrine of its absolute divine authorship as that maintained by the early Protestants.

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[1] *Essai sur la nature de l'inspiration scripturaire*. By H. Lusseau. Paris: Librairie Orientaliste, Paul Geuthner, 1930. xix+242 pages.

Further casuistry and astute scholastic juggling of abstractions permit a reconciliation of biblical science and history with modern science and history. When the Bible is concerned with natural phenomena, it explains them as they "appeared" to the ancient world, and it speaks in terms of these "appearances" because only such terminology would have been intelligible in the ancient culture. Likewise, when the Bible speaks in terms of the opinions of the time according to the methods of the primitive historians, it is not merely borrowing the false beliefs of ancient contemporaries, but explains in terms of "appearances," thus employing terminology intelligible to those contemporaries. The Bible lays no claim of authority in "modern" science and history. But these "appearances" do correspond to an actual reality, and the Bible can still be said to be inerrant in history and science.

Lusseau's work indicates that Catholic dogma has not been influenced by modern biblical criticism since the days of Loisy's unsuccessful attempt to be "modern" within the church. The author has presented an interesting statement of Catholic dogma without saying anything detrimental to *la saine doctrine*.

W. C. GRAHAM

UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO

PALESTINIAN JEWISH LITURGY

Palestine, the land of the Haggadah, the Midrash, and the old Piyyot is also the cradle of the liturgy. Nevertheless, we know far less of the Palestine Rite of the Liturgy than we know of the Babylonian Rite. This is chiefly due to the fact that the Babylonian schools and exilarchs dominated Jewish life for centuries, so that their ritual decisions became the norm and the *Seder Rav Amram* sent from Babylon to Spain became the best known Jewish liturgical work.

In recent years scholars have learned more about the almost lost Palestinian rite. The Genizah has proved to be a fruitful source of information on this subject. Now Dr. Abraham I. Schechter adds considerably to our knowledge through this study of *Seder Hibbur Berakot*.[1]

[1] *Studies in Jewish Liturgy* (based on a unique manuscript entitled *Seder Hibbur Berakot*). By Abraham I. Schechter. Philadelphia: Dropsie College, 1930. viii+139 pages. $2.00.

The *Seder Hibbur Berakot* was a liturgical manuscript found in the Turin library. It had attracted the attention of many modern scholars, Zung, Berliner, Solomon Schechter, and Marx. In 1894 the library was destroyed by fire but, fortunately, Dr. Solomon Schechter had copied the manuscript referred to. Dr. Abraham Schechter uses, therefore, the manuscript prepared by his famous namesake.

The author comes to the conclusion that the manuscript is the oldest version of the Italian rite and is based almost entirely upon the original Palestinian rite. In order to demonstrate it he gives not only liturgical proofs but also the a priori proof of the close relationship between the Jewry of Italy and that of Palestine. The second half of the book gives a full analysis of the contents of the *Seder Hibbur Berakot* and thus makes the work available for further study by other scholars. It is to be hoped that the author will have the opportunity of making an edition of the complete text of this unique liturgical work.

SOLOMON B. FREEHOF

CHICAGO, ILLINOIS

PAUL IN EPHESUS

This is the most important book[1] which has yet appeared in support of the theory that the epistles of the captivity belong to the period when Paul was working in Ephesus. Professor Duncan elaborates the usual arguments, and presents a number of others, suggested to him by close study and comparison of the epistles. He aptly compares his work to that of the detective who builds up his case from data which mean nothing to the casual observer. It may be added that in the present book the qualities of the good detective are combined with those of the good detective novelist. A problem which is largely technical in its nature is invested with human interest, so that the reader takes part with something like excitement in the quest for its solution.

Although the author is immediately concerned with the date of the epistles he is led to discuss the much larger question as to Paul's activities during the obscure but all-important period of his stay in Ephesus. On all the difficult problems of this Ephesian ministry Professor Duncan has new light to throw, and especially on the crisis which arose in Paul's relations with the Corinthian church. All future students of the Corinthian letters will have to take account of the suggestions put forward in this book. It is hardly less valuable for its appreciation of the pastoral epistles. While unable to accept them as Pauline, the author is convinced that they embody authentic fragments of Paul's correspondence and are of real historical importance. He suggests that Timothy himself may have expanded the brief Pauline notes, and that the pastorals, as well as the other epistles of the captivity, may have received a final editing in the Roman church, which would be anxious to identify Paul's work as much as possible with Rome.

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[1] *St. Paul's Ephesian Ministry*. By George S. Duncan. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1930. xiv+303 pages. $2.75.

With regard to his main thesis Professor Duncan argues that there were three outbreaks of hostility to Paul in the Ephesian period, and that each of them was followed by imprisonment. During the first of these imprisonments Philippians was written; during the second (after the riot recorded in Acts), Colossians and Philemon—also Ephesians if it is to be accepted as genuine, which is left an open question. The third imprisonment was in an outlying part of the province, after Paul's return from the "painful visit" to Corinth, and on this occasion he wrote the letter to Timothy which is partially preserved in II Tim. 4:9–22. This complexity may seem at first sight an element of weakness in the theory, but when it is assumed that during his whole stay in Ephesus Paul was in constant trouble there is a strong probability that he was imprisoned more than once. It is argued (to our mind convincingly) that the reference to "fighting with wild beasts" in I Cor. 15:32 is to be taken in its literal sense, "if men had had their way, and I had been thrown into the arena."

It has to be admitted that the most skilful argument cannot make the thesis of the book more than plausible. Every reference that seems to point to Ephesus may be explained, with equal probability, as pointing to Rome. Professor Duncan lays the main stress on the names mentioned in the salutations. It is fairly certain that these men were with Paul in Ephesus, but there is no positive evidence that they did not follow him to Rome. When the chief apostle of the church was on trial for his life it was only natural that his friends should rally to his side. A great deal is made of the distance to Rome and the difficulty of communication, but it must be remembered that it was an age of travel, and that time was of little consideration. Rome, too, was the great center, and perhaps it would be easier to get passage from Asia to Rome than from one Asian town to another.

The strongest argument against the Ephesian theory is the character of the letters themselves. They contain some of Paul's weightiest thinking, and could hardly have been composed in brief spells of imprisonment when he was waiting every moment to be thrown to the lions. It cannot be forgotten, too, that the imprisonment at Ephesus is hypothetical, while we know for certain that Paul was a prisoner at Rome. But however we regard his theory there can be no doubt that Professor Duncan has made a real contribution to New Testament scholarship. He has raised a doubtful hypothesis to the level of a serious possibility, and has done much to answer some of the most perplexing questions in the career of Paul.

E. F. SCOTT

UNION THEOLOGICAL SEMINARY

THE EPISTLE OF JAMES REINTERPRETED

This book,[1] whatever we may think of its main thesis, is certainly one of the most important contributions ever made to the study of the Epistle of James, and is bound to influence all future investigation. Professor Meyer begins by reviewing the various problems which are raised by the Epistle. It is Hellenistic but fundamentally Jewish; Jewish and yet Christian; primitive in character, but in many of its ideas and phrases seems to betray a late origin; it is made up of sections which are strung together without any logical sequence; it seems to contradict Paul but is not really opposed to him, and with all its apparent polemic is, in a curious way, Pauline. Professor Meyer examines at length the many attempts to arrive at a theory which will solve all these problems, and is satisfied with none of them. He believes that the real clue to all the difficulties is to be found in the opening words of the Epistle: "James, to the twelve tribes of the Dispersion." On these words he bases a theory which is briefly this: that the writing was originally Jewish, and belonged to a class of literature in which the patriarch Jacob was supposed to offer warnings and exhortations to his sons. The earliest example of this literature is given in Gen. 49:1 ff., and the idea suggested by this chapter was elaborated in the *Testaments of the Twelve Patriarchs*. The model provided by that work was largely adopted for hortatory purposes by later Jewish writers. One of those Testaments of Jacob was apparently composed in the age of Philo, and addressed to Hellenistic Jews; and at some time between A.D. 80 and 90 was shortened and revised by a Christian writer, Jacob now being identified with James. Professor Meyer claims that in the light of this theory all the difficulties can be explained. The abrupt transitions belong to the original character of the work; the relation to Paul is not one of borrowing or antagonism, but is due to presuppositions common to Hellenistic Jews. At first sight the theory seems more ingenious than probable, but as the author proceeds to apply the various sections to the sons of Jacob we cannot but feel that they sometimes fit in with surprising aptness. Apart, however, from its main thesis the book is of first-rate value because of the general discussion with which the earlier chapters are occupied. With remarkable learning and penetration the author examines the character of the Epistle, its place in the canon, its affiliations with Jewish literature and with other Christian writings, especially the letters of Paul. The theory at which he arrives is not likely to meet with very wide acceptance; but Professor Meyer has brought together a rich mass of material, and has offered what seems to be the true solution to not a few of the disputed questions.

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[1] *Das Rätsel des Jacobusbriefes*. By Arnold Meyer. Giessen: Alfred Töpelmann, 1930. xii+336 pages. M. 20.

E. F. Scott

Union Theological Seminary

THE NOTION OF HOLINESS

This,[1] we would gather, is the first important work by a Norwegian scholar whose name, if we may judge by the present book, ought some day to become eminent. Along with great width of learning he displays real critical sagacity, and original insight into religious ideas. Starting from the conclusions arrived at by Professor Otto in his well-known book, he sets himself to examine the conception of holiness as it meets us in the New Testament, beginning with a most instructive account of the development in Judaism. He finds that the term "holy," as applied to the divine in contrast to the mere earthly sphere, was invested by the Hebrew mind with an ethical value. In later Judaism it was connected, on the one hand, with the law as a *numen praesens*, so that a life in harmony with the law made Israel "holy"; on the other hand, with the higher world as conceived in apocalyptic. The Christian idea of holiness was fundamentally the same as the Jewish. The church was regarded as "holy"—related to God in such a manner that it stood apart from mere earthly existence. Like the Jewish community it was holy in the double sense that it possessed a divine law and had thrown in its lot with the supernatural order of the age to come. What was new in the Christian idea was the place assigned to Christ as the pre-eminently holy one. His character was now the touchstone of all else that claimed to be holy; while at the same time the higher world took on a new reality through the belief in him as Messiah. At once ethically and in the purely religious sense a deeper significance attached to Christian "holiness." The book is valuable not only for its main argument but for its investigation of a number of related questions; e.g., the meaning of the petition "hallowed be thy name," the various uses of the term "saints," the growth of ritual ideas in the church, and above all the Pauline doctrine of the Spirit. While it deals with the use of one particular word it is not to be confounded with the many word studies (compiled for the most part by diligent sifting of dictionary and concordance) which darken the lives of those who read the more recent New Testament literature. The word of which it treats is a vital and central one, and in his study of it the author relies far more on theological reflection than on verbal statistics.

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[1] *Die Heiligkeit in Urchristentum*. By Ragnar Afting. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1930. xiv+332 pages. M. 19.50.

E. F. Scott

Union Theological Seminary

PROFESSOR BACON'S STUDIES IN MATTHEW

When the Buckingham Professor Emeritus of New Testament Criticism and Exegesis in Yale University publishes a book, his colleagues in the field are at once interested and expectant. The readers may differ from the writer, but they cannot dismiss him with a wave of the hand. The combination of fine scholarship and real but controlled earnestness will prevent that. Accordingly one turns to the volume[1] under review with anything but indifference.

For many years—in fact, since 1909—Professor Bacon has been publishing important works on phases of gospel criticism, and this is by no means the least of these works. When one recalls that among these publications are volumes such as *The Beginnings of Gospel Story* and *The Fourth Gospel in Research and Debate*, one realizes that this must be a book of considerable substance to measure up well with such predecessors. And so it is, no matter what view a reader takes of its method and conclusions.

Taking the position that the final issue of gospel criticism should be a story of the career and contribution of Jesus, called, for lack of a better term, a "life of Christ," the author willingly takes his place among those who do this preliminary work of opening up an "approach to the story of Jesus." He states that three principal lines of inquiry are necessary in this prolegomenon to the crowning work. They are investigations of: (1) the story of Jesus' career as prophet and messianic leader up to his tragic fate in Jerusalem, (2) the nature and content of his message, (3) the permanent significance of his personality and work for the history and practice of religion. The first of these lines concerns itself with Mark, and

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[1] *Studies in Matthew.* By Benjamin Wisner Bacon. New York: Henry Holt & Co., 1930. xxvi+533 pages. $5.00.

Professor Bacon thinks that his publications on Mark come nearer to completeness than those on either of the other lines. For the third he hopes to supplement his former volume on the Fourth Gospel at a comparatively early date by a work entitled *The Gospel of the Hellenists*. The present volume is concerned with the second line of investigation, but will need to be supplemented by a volume of studies in Luke, which unfortunately the author does not feel that he will have either time or strength to produce. One wishes they might be granted to him. Of his present work he says: ". . . . the present studies in Matthew . . . . aim to clear the way for such appreciation of the great religious Teacher as can only be gained by placing the witness of Mt in right relation to the richer resources and more sympathetic touch of Lk."

The author is particularly anxious in his present volume to lay to rest, so far as that can be done in a single attempt, two misconceptions regarding the gospel which bears the name of Matthew. The first is the "illusion" of apostolic authorship for either our Greek gospel or, failing that, some Aramaic Matthew of which the Greek might be considered a translation. The second is "the fallacy of the Matthean Logia." Against what he considers the unwarranted and ill-advised attempt to identify Q and the "Logia spoken of by Papias," Professor Bacon turns the artillery of an indignant scholarship. So far as this is still a position from which any try to solve the problem of "a non-Markan source" for Matthew and Luke, many New Testament scholars will agree with the writer. Having already paid his respects to Mark as a source for the career of Jesus, and incidentally of the Gospel of Matthew, the writer is here most closely concerned with the source of the teaching material. He designates this source by S, which is not Q. Q is an important part of S and is perhaps the most easily recoverable part of it. It (Q) is apparently the common material which Matthew and Luke have drawn from S. Peculiar material in Matthew and Luke must be critically studied in the attempt to reconstruct S. This peculiar material is designated "P." In addition to Q and P there is redactional material indicated by "R." But this is not all. When the author presents his interesting translation of the Gospel, he has marginal indications for these sources in addition to those already mentioned: N, which designates material derived from a Nazarene targum, that is, an Aramaic form of gospel tradition used by a body of Nazarene Christians, and O, which represents material derived from oral tradition. So with the interweaving of six or seven classes of material one can be prepared for a long and intricate task of extricating or identifying them.

Whatever one may think of this theory of sources, some of which must doubtless be classed as conjectural, one is grateful to the author for calling attention in a most effective way to the well known but too often ignored artistic, if not artificial, literary structure of the Gospel. This he finds in seven rather clearly marked parts: "Preamble (chh. 1–2); Book I, subdivided into a Narrative A, introducing a Discourse B (chh. 3–4 and 5–7); Book II, similarly subdivided (A, chh. 8–9, B, ch. 10); Book III (A, chh. 11–12, B, ch. 13); Book IV (A, chh. 14–17, B, ch. 18); Book V (A, chh. 19–22, B, chh. 23–25); Epilogue (chh. 26–28)."

The book proceeds on this general plan. Part I bears the title of "General Introduction," in which external evidence as to the tradition of Matthean origin is carefully examined with some rather devastating results to the tradition as representing actuality. The internal evidence regarding date, structure, the use of sources, and the final editor is set forth at some length. Part II extends over more than a hundred pages and concerns itself with a quite minute examination of the contents and structure of the seven constituent sections of the Gospel. The third part of the volume contains an interesting and scholarly translation of the Gospel with various source indications in the margin. Part IV is entitled "Themes" and is devoted to a further consideration of the five central "books" of Matthew from the standpoint of the ideas and the representation of Jesus' thought rather than from that of the sources. Valuable suggestions as to the specific aims served by these ideas appear frequently in these discussions. The fifth and closing part of the book comprises ten appended notes on subjects which have emerged in the course of the study and which the author thinks merit further comment.

It is not an easy book to read or even to follow in many places. The positions taken depend so completely upon detailed study that specific comment upon them in a review is impossible and mere general comment might easily become unfair. That it is an important contribution to synoptic criticism is evident even upon a first reading. It is thought-provoking throughout and not the least so when the writer moves out from his literary study of sources to a consideration of the situations to which the material of the Gospel is addressed. It may be that a more detailed consideration of the sources of the "books" from the "problem-situation" point of view might be of help to the literary study.

The writer has doubtless accomplished a part of what he set out to do. The specter of Matthean authorship of the Gospel is surely laid. The resistless investigation of literary structure and such of the author's positions on the use of sources as will be generally accepted make the hypothesis of apostolic authorship untenable save for a hopeless obscurantism. Nor is a reader of the book likely to hold an unshaken conviction of the "Matthean Logia" as identifiable with Q or with any recoverable immediate source. In so far as Professor Bacon set this as his task, he has accomplished it.

But when the reviewer reads this volume with recent varied conjectures on non-Markan synoptic origins in mind, even with such brilliant work as that of Mr. Bacon and Mr. Streeter before him, he cannot escape the question as to the positive advantages of wandering in a synoptic labyrinth with little more than hypotheses that are so largely subjective to guide us. For, to change the figure, if Mr. Bacon helps us to escape the Scylla of Q, for some of us a gratifying escape, he throws us on the Charybdis of S, a hypothetical something whose father and mother we do not know and whose features are largely if not entirely hid from us. If Q was hypothetical and vague, is S less so?

But the reviewer is appreciative of the vast amount of earnest work that has been done on these studies. If he feels a bit skeptical about recovery or identification of definite non-Markan sources in synoptic study, he nevertheless is grateful to be compelled to face the matter again. Perhaps a comparative study of various source hypotheses will one day bring us to a more desired haven of the understanding of the sources of our knowledge of the career and thought of Jesus, but that day is not yet. There are rich and rewarding sections in this volume, and its readers will eagerly await *The Gospel of the Hellenists*.

Ernest William Parsons

Colgate-Rochester Divinity School

A COMMENTARY ON LUKE

Professor Creed and his publishers are to be congratulated for providing an attractive and useful volume on the Gospel of Luke.[1] Besides the aspects of its contents noted on the title-page, there are some additional notes on the "Magnificat and Benedictus," including Klostermann's useful chart of LXX parallels, on "Lysanias, Tetrarch of Abilene," in which reasons for accepting such a person in the reign of Tiberius as Luke supposes are adduced, on "The Baptism of John," on "The Appearance of the Risen Jesus to the Disciples" and on the similarities between the gospels of "St. Luke and St. John." In the Introduction, though the usual questions of authorship, date, sources, theology, style, and text all are dealt with, the longest and most useful section is on the "History of the Gospel and Its Interpretation."

The reviewer of a commentary is usually tempted to lay too much stress on questions of introduction; the reader is usually too much concerned to know what the commentator thinks upon author and origin. As a matter of fact, the body of the commentary is far more significant than the author's guess upon these subjects, especially when the text and its interpretation have such slight bearing upon them as in Luke. The Book of Acts is the real ground upon which the tradition of Lucan authorship must be attacked or defended. The name Luke, to be sure, is traditionally attached to the Third Gospel. Professor Creed accepts the tradition partly because he thinks it cannot be readily explained except as resting upon fact. He clings, too, to a very attenuated remnant of the medical argument. He believes that the language confirms the tradition that the author was a physician, though it does not prove it.

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[1] *The Gospel According to St. Luke: The Greek Text with Introduction, Notes and Indices*. By John Martin Creed. New York: Macmillan, 1930. xc+340 pages. $3.30.

As for date, neither the earliest nor the latest proposals are accepted. Josephus' *Antiquities* was not known to the author; hence he need not be dated later than A.D. 93. But the fall of Jerusalem A.D. 70 was known to him; hence Luke-Acts cannot be moved back as far as Harnack last moved them.

There are other general matters on which the detailed comment gives a commentator a certain right to speak. They must be decided by a comprehensive study of the whole text. Thus, on sources I think Creed's judgment must carry weight. He has observed carefully the editorial changes made in incorporating Mark, and he concludes that Luke's other sources are neither so extensive nor so influential as some modern critics have supposed. It appears to him unlikely that a Proto-Luke was more decisive of the Gospel's arrangement than was Mark, while many, if not most, of the details which have led scholars to assume that Luke had parallel but independent sources, especially in the last chapters, can be explained as due to editorial influences. Changes in Mark are not often due to superior oral information. The author himself thus is shown at work throughout the commentary in admirable fashion.

The language of the Gospel is discussed not merely in a section of the Introduction, where Lagrange's good summary is made the basis, but elsewhere. The idiomatic Greek character of certain words or phrases is as plainly brought out as the recurrent Semiticisms. The latter are attributed by Creed largely to LXX influence or to the oral effect of Aramaic origin. He is not much inclined toward the idea that Luke is translating from a written Semitic source, not even in the first chapters. It is strange that here he seems to be quite ignorant of Torrey's work and that on the whole subject of Semiticisms he has no reference to the work of his countryman W. F. Howard. He seems also to have given undue space to the purist rules of Phrynichus. But his judgments of language are, I think, quite sound.

As for the accuracy of Luke's material, Creed also shows a sensible and realistic viewpoint. He realizes that the material has come to the author through tradition and is subject to earlier motifs as well as to the coloration by the final author. These older motifs are often now submerged, but they influence the stories none the less. He frankly doubts Luke's account of Jesus' birth at the time of the census of Quirinius, and in many other passages he admits that Luke has not thought through his representation and that details cannot be pressed as though they were historical. Luke's changes in Mark, already alluded to, both qualify the historical character of his work and reveal his own interests. Among these, Luke's softened and deferred eschatology is frequently noted.

The general character of the commentary should be further described. Each section is preceded by a well-considered summary of the problems—literary or historical—which it involves. The comments placed in two columns under the Greek text, in the manner of the other Macmillan New Testament commentaries, are themselves hardly available for students who cannot read Greek. They are admirably condensed. Among the longer ones are those on 1:34 and 35, 46 (where he assigns the Magnificat to Elizabeth), 17:21 (where he prefers "within you" to "among you") and 22:15–20 (on the text). No effort is made in this commentary to supply either an improved text or an improved textual apparatus, though it is an advantage to print beside Westcott and Hort's text the authorities for the variants to which they call attention as well as for a few other readings of interest.

The condensation to which we have referred does not prevent our recognition of the abundant reading, thought, and time which have been given to this work. Along every line of comment—textual, philological, historical, literary, theological, etc.—strict choice of what to say has been necessary. The selections of patristic comment or Septuagint parallels are sparingly but wisely made. For classical and Jewish parallels the author has relied mostly upon Wettstein and Strack-Billerbeck and has referred the reader to these sources for more. Of commentators he has been apparently influenced most by Wellhausen and Klostermann (first edition). Miscellaneous theories of extraneous religious influence have not been ignored, though the literature in this field is scattered and hard to control. The works of German "Formgeschichte" are known and used, but the commentary is far from being the illustration we have been looking for by which that new science might be thoroughly tested. Nor will the American "Sozialgeschichtliche Schule" think he has done justice to their line of emphasis. Here, too, we should like to see the theories illustrated by a thoroughgoing continuous exposition. Like the actual commentary, the bibliographical material evidently aims to be selective rather than complete. Thus the book has much excellently selected matter and sensible opinion for the elementary student of the Greek Luke and not a little that is suggestive for a more experienced scholar.

The conscientious reviewing of such a conscientious work raises some general questions with which we may pertinently conclude. Here is an excellent commentary following hard after two other good English commentaries by Ragg and Easton. Though of course each is different in scope, each covers to some extent every aspect of the commentator's work. Therefore, none can be complete in any field. Is it not time to mark off distinctly the various phases which a commentary could include and to encourage commentators to departmentalize in their work? Probably the beginner should be introduced to all aspects of commentarial literature by simple and judicious volumes like these; but more original and deeper scholarship would be promoted if some commentators could be encouraged to choose certain restricted fields and to go deeper. A mere classification of the fields would be helpful. Instead of so many general commentaries, we need some special commentaries on specific aspects of the work discussed. Instead of so much repetition and reviewing of old material, we need the study of new problems. A supplementary commentary that aimed merely to add what the standard commentaries do not contain might be a small volume but would be a real addition to learning.

A clearer classification of the commentator's several tasks would incidentally help the reviewer. He could then evaluate commentaries along each separate line. One can easily imagine a chart which could provide a kind of grading to different commentaries on the same book of the Bible with respect to each category open to the commentator's labors. The reader would then know whether to turn to Easton for textual criticism, to Ragg for Jewish parallels, to Creed for "Formgeschichte," etc.

These are merely some general suggestions apropos of the latest addition to the typical New Testament commentaries. But evidently it befits neither the present writer nor the present occasion to enlarge on the interesting theme, "How commentaries ought to be written," or even, "How commentaries ought to be reviewed."

BRYN MAWR COLLEGE

HENRY J. CADBURY

A SKETCH OF BARTHIAN THEOLOGY

In a series of four lectures[1] delivered at various European universities during the years 1929 and 1930 the reader who has followed Professor Brunner's work will find a brief statement of some of the main ideas developed in such earlier and more comprehensive books as *Der Mittler* and *Die Mystik und Das Wort*. Here is the familiar emphasis on man's needs for revelation and on the uniqueness of the revelation vouchsafed by God through Christ. Here also is an expression of the dissatisfaction which all the "theologians of crisis" feel with the tendency to make religion a branch of culture. One finds here also the same stress on man as sinner, on the antithesis of sin as not goodness but faith, and on man's need for justification. Much is made, furthermore, of the "identity-doctrine" of both idealism and mysticism, and of the danger inherent in any philosophy which fails to make clear the essential difference between God and man and the impossibility of overcoming this difference except through God's grace.

Brunner is unquestionably an excellent spokesman for the crisis theology. He indulges less than does Barth in dark and paradoxical sayings, his interests are not so largely exegetical as are those of Bultmann, and he is less given to extravagances of statement than is Gogarten. In spite of his professed dislike for philosophy, Brunner is himself primarily a philosopher. He hopes that his readers will not become philosophical but he tries to give them philosophical reasons for not doing so. Since he is willing and able to develop his position intellectually he has come nearer than have any of his colleagues to making the theology of crisis intelligible. It should be said, also, that Brunner is gifted with a style unusually lucid for a German or Swiss theologian. He is a born expositor and has found his appropriate niche as the systematizer of this crisis or dialectic theology.

His arguments, however, clearly presented as they are, can hardly be expected to appeal to any except those who already make the ideas of supernatural and miraculous central in their theology. To others he will seem to be attempting vigorously, but with little success, to adapt thought forms from an older age to a new intellectual climate.

SMITH COLLEGE J. S. BIXLER

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[1] *Gott und Mensch*. By D. Emil Brunner. Tübingen: J. C. B. Mohr, 1930. 100 pages. M. 3.60.

AUGUSTINE AND FREE WILL

This essay[1] deals with the problem of the free and unfree will in Augustine's thought. Jonas does not review Augustine's entire theology, but is concerned only with its early and later phases under the influences of Paul. Furthermore, he discusses only Augustine's interpretation of Rom. 7:7–25. But this specializing study of a very special problem deserves general attention, for it presents significant results.

The Christian idea of liberty is first of all characterized in contrast to the Stoic version. For the Stoic, liberty was the maximum of independence from nature. For the Christian, the problem of liberty begins where, for the Stoic, it ends. He asks whether he, the individual personal being, can be what he ought to be as an absolute subject under God's law. The Stoic desires freedom from nature and from "the other." The Christian searches for freedom from himself (from his *superbia* and *concupiscentia*).

Augustine very definitely understood the problem in its Christian aspects (cf. *Confessions*, chap. x), but he was unable to give an adequate theological analysis of it. That is made evident in his exegesis of Romans, chapter 7. In his earlier period he interprets the text as referring to man *sub lege;* later on, when the Pelagians were using the explanation, he claimed that it dealt with man *sub gratia*. Neither exegesis is correct. The first one does not do justice to the fact that it is the Christian who feels obliged to obey the law, and it interprets the text either on the basis of a superficial psychology (prohibition arouses desire) or by relating it to a pre-Christian (Jewish) state of religion. The other emphasis misrepresents the text, which speaks expressly of the law. Jonas, who writes as a pupil of Bultmann and of Heidegger, makes it clear that the only possible explanation of the passage is one which keeps in mind that the religious man who finds himself in the presence of the absolute God is *simul peccator et justus*.

Augustine, who felt all this very distinctly, was unable to give it theological expression, because he identified will with appetite. But for Paul and the Christian the problem of the will and its "liberty" is not a problem of getting something but of becoming a new creature. Christian liberty is not concerned with a *Habenwollen* but with a *Seinwollen*.

The reviewer earnestly recommends this little book because it presents a most diligent and searching discussion of a problem which is not only of historical but also of most modern interest. New Testament exegetes, historians of dogma, and theologians will read it with great profit.

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[1] *Augustin und das paulinische Freiheitsproblem: Ein philosophischer Beitrag zur Genesis der christlich abendländischen Freiheitsidee.* By Hans Jonas. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1930. 79 pages. M. 6.50.

W. Pauck

Chicago Theological Seminary

A MEDIEVAL JEWISH TEXT[1]

After Maimonides, in his classic work, *Guide to the Perplexed*, had attempted to harmonize Judaism with Aristotle's philosophy, and in his magnum opus, *Mishne Torah*, had brought system and clarity into the confusing maze of Talmudic lore, a great controversy arose in Judaism over his opinions. For centuries Jewish scholars were divided into opposite camps, Maimonideans and anti-Maimonideans.

During these centuries of dispute philosophy gradually fell into disfavor and a mystical semi-philosophy, the Kabbala, took its place. Even the followers of Maimonides were affected by the Kabbala, and their philosophic writings are often transfused with mystical speculation.

Among the semi-mystical philosophic writers was Judah Campanton, whose work *Arba'ah Kinyanim* ("Four Possessions") is the subject of the present volume. Dr. Golomb does as well as can be done with the scant biographical data available. His chief accomplishment is the editing of the test which he bases upon two manuscripts, one in the Jewish Theological Seminary (New York) and the other in Trinity College (Cambridge). The text is now published for the first time. It is well annotated and provided with many helpful references. It is a pity that the work was not completed and only two out of the four parts published. The author states that inasmuch as the last two parts are not of great scientific value he decided not to publish them. This is unfortunate. It is always valuable to have a complete medieval text made available, especially when the editing is done as well as this seems to be.

Solomon B. Freehof

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A DEFENSE OF ROME

The author of this *apologia pro vita sua*[2] was reared a Presbyterian, was converted to the Episcopal church in consequence of reading the Ignatian epistles while studying under Professor Emerton at Harvard, and continued for thirty years in the ministry of that church, during which time he occupied a rather important position in Anglo-Catholic circles. Some months ago he made his submission to Rome. To call him (as the publisher does) "the leader" of the Anglo-Catholic party is far from exact. Indeed, it would be more true to say that at no time was he a real Anglo-Catholic. His temperament, his attitudes, his devotional tastes, have all along been thoroughly Latin. For years he was Roman in every respect save the pope. He appears to have been predestined for Roman Catholicism. Quite naïvely he tells us that he rejected the thought of marriage because to marry would close to him the way to the priesthood of the Roman church, and that way he long ago felt he might some day want to take.

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[1] *Judah ben Solomon Campanton and his "Arba'ah Kinyanim,"* By Elhanan H. Golomb. Philadelphia: Dropsie College, 1930. 110 pages. $2.00.

[2] *Why Rome?* By Selden Peabody Delany. New York: Dial Press, 1930. 233 pages. $2.50.

The book seems to have been written primarily for the writer's own eyes—for his intellectual self-justification in the step he was about to take. It is hardly unfair to Dr. Delany to say—for in substance he says as much himself—that after thirty years of futile effort to catholicize the Episcopal church he quit the battle discouraged and disillusioned. The church stubbornly refused to be de-reformed. Had he been a true Anglo-Catholic, Dr. Delany would have been content to go on, as many do, teaching Catholic doctrine and leading the Catholic life in our extraordinary Anglican mélange. But since his temperament and his insistence on infallible external authority rendered that course impossible, he chose the only way remaining open to him—to accept the papal claims and make submission. Since he had "the will to believe," there was no great difficulty here. Now, of course, he perceives the ineradicably Protestant character of the Episcopal church, and is quite pessimistic as to the future of Anglo-Catholicism.

P. V. NORWOOD

WESTERN THEOLOGICAL SEMINARY

THE ANGLO-CATHOLIC CONGRESS

Four times since 1920 the Anglo-Catholic Congress has met in London. It serves as an imposing demonstration of the strength and fervor of the movement.[1] We read of a congregation of fifteen thousand at the out-door High Mass, of audiences numbering five or six thousand at the Albert Hall meetings, of a procession of five thousand laymen on a hot July evening, of a total Congress registration approaching thirty thousand. It serves also to give sanity and coherence to the Anglo-Catholic program. Its speakers are chosen from the scholars and intellectuals of the movement, men fully aware of contemporary thought-currents and largely in sympathy with them. They share a robust conviction that the gospel of the incarnation implies the church; that salvation in Christ is socially mediated. Rightly or wrongly, they believe that Catholicism is above all a way of life, fuller and richer than anything Protestantism has to offer.

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[1] *Report of the Anglo-Catholic Congress. Subject: The Church. London, July, 1930.* Milwaukee: Morehouse, 1930. xxii+214 pages. $2.50.

The 1930 Congress chose for consideration a very timely theme—"The Church." If we are to be occupied with the problem of Christian reunion, it is well to have some fairly definite idea of what the church is and what it is not. The Congress speakers discussed the subject in terms of the four notes of the church enumerated in the Nicene creed—its unity, holiness, catholicity, apostolicity. No static conception, no medieval theology is theirs. Behind what they had to say lies a whole social and religious philosophy that marches with the modern world. No Roman Catholics speak their language except such rare voices as Karl Adam or the late Baron von Hügel. Official Rome would reject much of it as rank modernism. And for Anglicans who think such thoughts and speak such language, Rome has no allurements and affords no standing place.

In addition to the eleven papers on the church, there are expert practical instructions on penance, on the Eucharist, on prayer, and on retreats; also a series of addresses on men and women and the church, and on the church overseas.

P. V. NORWOOD

WESTERN THEOLOGICAL SEMINARY

THE CHURCH IN AMERICAN HISTORY

A standard work on the history of Christianity published a third of a century ago states in its introductory paragraph that "the grandeur of human enterprise and achievement in the discovery of the western hemisphere has a less claim on our admiration than that divine wisdom and controlling providence which, for reasons now manifest, kept the secret hidden through so many millenniums, in spite of continual chances of disclosure until the fullness of time."

A work[1] published in 1930 entitles its first chapter "Creative Forces in American Religion," and after stating that there are two hundred and thirteen denominations of Christians in the United States sets itself the task of answering the question, "What are the forces that have been responsible for such seeming confusion?"

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[1] W. W. Sweet, *The Story of Religions in America.* New York: Harper & Bros., 1930. vii+571 pages. $4.00.

Perhaps no other words could more clearly indicate the difference between the approach made to a study of the history of Christianity a generation ago and that of today. One is supernatural; the other, social. One sees God in direct control of the human process, the end foreordained from the beginning; the other sees man working out his destiny under the urge of his ideals, his hopes, his aspirations, his belief in the will of God concerning himself. Religion is thus a social force, an integral part of human life which must not be overlooked by the historian, the effort of man whatever his varying conditions and circumstances to attain what he conceives to be his divinely ordered estate.

So this present work is a story of the activities of people motivated by such principles and convictions. It is a history of America from this aspect of human interests. We have people landing on these shores with their European background of heritage and culture which gave the social order here its initial form and direction. But settling in this virgin land, devoid of all organization, civil or ecclesiastical, forced to conquer the wilderness, they were compelled to fashion their own order of society for the successful conduct of their affairs. Consequently this vast extent of territory with its economic opportunity and necessarily more liberal political institutions created a new sense of human values and rights, making the Revolution inevitable, guaranteeing complete religious freedom.

Then came the period of nation-building. A free people must work out their high destiny under the command of God, and in the effort to interpret his will innumerable sects arose. With that mighty sweep westward that followed, the loneliness and dread of the frontier, the pioneer settlers, deprived for a time of any religious ministration, experienced marvelous revivals when the ministers did arrive, bringing man once again into personal fellowship with his God and developing a new form of Christianity.

The rapid influx of immigration and the settlement of the country, resulting in sectionalism, brought likewise greater divisions in the religious organizations of the people, especially so with the secession and conflict waged over slavery. But the period of reconstruction had its counterpart in the work of the churches. There was a return to co-operative, if not united, effort; missionary interests were strengthened; religion became more practical in its enterprises, evidenced by the founding of such institutions as the Y.M.C.A. and the Y.W.C.A. With the swift rise of the cities and the abundant growth of wealth came an additional interpretation. There arose a demand for the "sanctification of resources"; men of wealth were stewards thereof; the social gospel began to be preached. Finally, the World War, with its political and economic involvements internationally, broadened the horizons of American Christianity.

Such is the story of religions in America! It is not the history of sectarianism, or of denominationalism, or yet of the church. It is the story of peoples in one of the most marvelous achievements of all time as they have been influenced by and in turn have influenced their religious forms expressed in denominational and church orders. It is a great human drama, thrilling and captivating, the race on its westward march conquering a continent, in so far as it has been seen by the author to have been guided by religious concerns.

With his comprehensive grasp of general American history and his trustworthy scholarship, Professor Sweet has produced a work that for many years will serve as a text on this subject within our colleges and seminaries. The religious attitudes toward the great national problems confronting the country in the critical periods of its history, and the mutual effects produced, are accurately treated. Necessarily sketchy in sections, the story of three hundred years is compressed within one volume, yet all the essential facts are set forth.

An extensive but well-chosen list of Bibliography is appended and the Index is sufficient for all requirements.

However, certain details may perhaps be challenged. In the light of researches made by C. Burrage,[2] and the evidence from other available sources, it is very questionable whether the traditional view that the Pilgrims led the Puritans into Congregationalism can be substantiated. The Puritans, especially the Independents, had adopted this form of church government in England many years before this particular group settled at Salem and at Boston.

Again, recognizing the very sharp and admittedly proper distinction the author makes between the purpose manifest in the founding of Rhode Island and in that of Maryland, yet one may not agree with the historical correctness of the statement that Maryland was founded on "the principle of religious liberty." Rhode Island undoubtedly was established specifically on the principle, with soul liberty granted to all inhabitants whether Christian or not. In Maryland, from its initial founding, it would seem to be religious toleration and for Christians only. A non-Christian in religion or an atheist had no guaranty, evidently, by charter or later legislation.

So likewise, appreciating the author's keen and excellent analysis of the differences between the particular attitudes of the denominations toward slavery, there is room for a divergence of opinion as to whether the northern churches were as idealistic as the treatment of this issue seems to indicate. Did members of the northern churches demand the abolition of this evil or rather a restriction of it only? Was slavery the actual cause of the divisions of certain denominations into North and South, or was it an incident merely which forced a growing difference over many questions to a complete break; for example, in the Methodist Episcopal, the bishops' autocracy; the Baptists, a tendency toward centralized authority; the Presbyterians, the sanctity of a formal constitution?

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[2] *The Early English Dissenters.*

It may be added that a very real lack felt by the student is the failure to provide documentary footnotes.

R. E. E. Harkness

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APOSTLES OF THE "INNER LIGHT"

Hans Denck and George Fox have much in common, and both have come to fresh notice in the modern revival of mystical and spiritual religion. Biographical studies of both have chanced to come at the same time to the reviewer's desk. Denck died in 1527, and the book on him by Alfred Coutts[1] appeared during the four-hundredth year from that event. The author has given us an informing and objective study, which, though not a work of deep research, should prove a highly useful one. In the title Denck is described as "humanist and heretic." Of humanism as classical scholarship we learn little except the evidence of his early mastery of Greek; the humanism of his life is rather a religious liberalism and breadth of sympathy that made it impossible for him to be a bitter type of heretic. Indeed, his heresy itself is not very explicit, but his doctrines carried with them certain revolutionary implications which the orthodox reformers were quick to sense and to condemn. Coutts places him in the succession of the medieval mystics, and indicates the presence of the influence of Tauler, mediated through the fanatical Münzer—whose fanaticism, however, never affected the gentle spirit of Denck. He was never a typical Anabaptist, but joined the "apostolical brethren" who represented the right wing of that movement. It was only from a desire to associate himself with this group, and so become a member of a spiritual communion, that he submitted to rebaptism from them; and this step he afterward regretted. While he never accepted either Lutheranism or Zwinglianism as a system, he formed and kept a friendship with Oecolampadius, and after being driven in turn from Nürnberg, Augsburg, and Strassburg, availed himself of the protection of the Basel reformer.

Dr. Coutts gives an orderly exposition of his ideas, which center in a doctrine of the "inner light." While this led him far from the dogmatic scheme of Lutheranism, he fully utilized Luther's teaching on the priesthood of believers, and adopted other spiritual elements in the Reformation doctrine of the church. Apparently he never quite solved for himself the problem of how to attain to a realization of the communion of saints, which he constantly stressed, without giving attention to the institutional organism of the church, for which he had no regard. But Denck was always a learner, and, as his "Last Confession" shows, could make adjustments to necessity. He earnestly desired to be on terms of communion with all Christians. One is led to wonder whether, if the plague had not taken him off at thirty-two, he would ultimately in the Basel atmosphere have overcome his dislike of a state and church connection, and so have earned the good will of Bucer and Zwingli, become a recognized member of the Reformed church and found in it some vent for his spiritual teaching. His influence is hard to trace. If, as Dr. Coutts points out, his church ideal has largely found recognition in liberal Reformed circles in modern times, it still remains doubtful whether this is in any appreciable degree due to his testimony and not rather to a variety of other liberalizing agencies.

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[1] *Hans Denck 1495–1527, Humanist and Heretic.* By Alfred Coutts. Edinburgh: MacNiven & Wallace, 1927. 262 pages. 5*s*. net.

The new biography of Fox[2] by Rufus Jones appears in a series of "Creative Lives" edited by Professor Speight. The eventful and relatively well-recorded life of the founder of the Society of Friends offers to the biographer a wealth of materials which Dr. Jones, with his knowledge of the psychology of mysticism and of the genius of Quakerism, is peculiarly equipped to interpret. In a chapter on "Fox as a New Type of Mystic" he develops the idea of the "affirmation mysticism" of Fox—a variety which appears not to have been new in history, though still new to those minds in which mysticism is regarded as essentially a *via negativa*. Fox became immovably convinced that God revealed himself to him not from without, but from within. With this conviction he began his mission, making a complete break with Calvinistic theology, and turning to "this spiritual principle in man's soul as his new basis of authority in religion." Two chapters are given to Margaret Fell, whom he married, and one to his relations with Cromwell, whom he finally repudiated in terms the severity of which Dr. Jones regrets. The chapter on "Fox's American Travels" is made up chiefly of choice selections from his *Travel Diary*, and is a contribution to his history of the roads as well as of the religion of early America. The roads were, if anything, a little worse than the religion; but neither physical nor spiritual obstacles could make his apostolic spirit quail. Summing up Fox's character, as revealed in his *Journal*, Dr. Jones finds in it nothing more impressive than "the uncompromising bravery of the man." He was a mystic who, as Josiah Royce, after a study of his *Journal*, declared, was at the same time a man "essentially keyed for action."

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[2] *George Fox, Seeker and Friend*. By Rufus M. Jones. New York: Harper & Bros., 1930. viii+224 pages. $2.00.

His intensity and activity have given Fox, the journeyman shoemaker, an incomparably greater influence on posterity than Denck, the university scholar, who anticipated his fundamental religious principles. Yet it is not impossible that, in a world that selects its saints by reading biography, Denck may be in the end more widely loved. For, deeply convinced as he was of some things, Denck kept his mind in a state of growth, and did not anathematize his opponents. Fox, if we may resort to parody, was an Englishman in whom was no compromise. He was an apostle driven by an irresistible inner force, and too resolutely sure of the rightness of his way to be considerate of those who were not prepared to follow him.

JOHN T. MCNEILL

UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO

FREEDOM AS A RELIGIOUS PRINCIPLE

"God in Freedom" is the theme not only of this book[1] but of the life of the distinguished author, Luigi Luzzatti (1841–1927). "The grand old man of Italy" was a lifelong exponent, both in practical statesmanship and in scholarly research, of the principle of liberty. For him liberty was a religious as much as a political principle; and practically significant only in so far as it was religiously based. The chapter on his life and work contributed to the book by Dora Askowith reveals a splendid record of progressive public measures of social reform and disinterested personal service to the needy and oppressed. The editor of the English edition, Max J. Kohler, quotes a tribute pronounced by Mussolini in the Italian Chamber of Deputies, in which Il Duce attributes to Luzzatti "Italy's high place among the nations in social legislation." Luzzatti's position is partially conveyed in these words of his:

> I am a theist, outside every church; one who sucks honey from every faith, from every philosophy, and considering religions as facts of human natural history, I defend their liberty; and feel injured by every offence to every creed, whichever it may be. . . . . But the defense of heavenly freedom, in whatever corner of the world it is violated, is the condition, the food of my moral life. I defend the inviolability of all religious and philosophical faiths, and therefore I am. This is my application of the famous Cartesian dictum.

Born a Jew, he sympathetically examined all the higher religions, and his work exhibits a special admiration for Christianity, not in its institutional but in its spiritual manifestations. This is nowhere more evident than in the summary of his debate with Professor Formichi on the topic "Buddha vs. Christ" in which Luzzatti, who is always a great admirer of Buddhist religious toleration, nevertheless affirms vigorously the superiority of the Christian way.

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[1] *God in Freedom*. By Luigi Luzzatti. New York: Macmillan, 1930. xxxix+794 pages. $5.00.

The book itself was about half its present size when it originally appeared under the title, *La libertà di coscienza e di scienza* in 1909. The editor has added to the greatly enlarged 1926 Italian edition six chapters by American authors on themes more or less appropriate to the commemmoration of the one hundred and fiftieth anniversary of the constitutional establishment of religious liberty in America. This section includes an address on the world-struggle of the Jews for civil equality by William Howard Taft.

It is impossible briefly to summarize a book so extensive and so varied in its contents. It is made up largely of occasional addresses and reprinted articles. There is no development in the treatment of the subject; chronological order is little regarded, and often a single incident, having been used in more than one of these originals, is repeated in the book. Thus King Asoka, Servetus, and Roger Williams make a number of appearances. Part IV is entitled "Miscellany"; but it is only a little more miscellaneous than the other parts. Yet the book, after all, loses little by these faults of arrangement. It conveys by this seemingly defective order a more definitely personal impression. We are very conscious of the multitudinous activities and wide interests of the author, and we realize that a stricter plan would deprive us of something valuable.

Luzzatti's range of interest and sympathy enables him to present with equal understanding and enthusiasm such subjects as "the superiority of Asia in the exposition and application of freedom of conscience," "the spiritual return of Francis of Assisi," and "the religious evolution of Scotland." But when we have reflected on the seeming universality of his mind, we begin to see its limitations. He has a tendency to rate every personage of history solely on the basis of his contribution to religious freedom. For religious freedom is the sum of his philosophy. And he has little conception of social facts as conditioning the development of ideas. We feel therefore a certain sympathy with the acute criticism of Benedetto Croce, quoted at length in one of the nineteen appendixes. Croce accuses Luzzatti of having no philosophy. "In writing the history of religious strifes," he remarks, "one cannot condemn the persecutors and exalt the persecuted in the name of the principle of freedom of conscience: this is a practical and limited principle arisen in late times." "Luzzatti's condemnation of Calvin," says Croce, "has no rational significance, it is poetry, not history." Croce would use tolerance even toward the intolerant of the past. It must be said that Luzzatti is not severely intolerant even to the persecutors of history; but his treatment is none the less one-sided.

Though large, the book lacks an Index; one who wishes to return to one of its many captivating and memorable passages can recover it only by search. But the book justifies itself as a treasury of much that is precious in human history, and the record of the intellectual labors of a noble idealist.

JOHN T. MCNEILL

UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO

THE TENTH ANNIVERSARY OF THE HUS THEOLOGICAL FACULTY OF PRAGUE

On the occasion of the tenth anniversary of the Hus theological faculty, the Protestant theological department of the University of Prague, a number of publications was issued. The first among these, specifically commemorating this event, is a collection of articles written by the members of the faculty,[1] dealing with all the departments of theological science represented. The most extensive of these studies is the one prepared by the professor of church history, Dr. Ferd. Hrejsa, which deals with the history of the Salvator parish from 1609 to 1632. There is also an interesting study of Hus's work, *De ecclesia*, written by Professor F. M. Bartos, an expert on Husite history. These special mentions are not intended to detract from the value of the rest of the articles, which are well done and testify to the high scholarly standards of the new Czechoslovak Protestant faculty.

The second publication is the *Year Book of the Hus Faculty* for the year 1929–30,[2] which contains a report of the dean for 1928–29, Dr. J. L. Hromádka, professor of systematic theology, and the inaugural address of the dean for 1929–30, Dr. S. Daněk, professor of the Old Testament literature. The third work—the first in a series of "Publications of the Hus Theological Faculty"—is a *Collection of Laws and Regulations of the Republic of Czechoslovakia, Regarding Religious and Ecclesiastical Matters*,[3] compiled by a member of the faculty, Professor Fr. Bednář. The text of the laws is accompanied by explanatory remarks which greatly add to the value of the work.

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[1] *Sborník Husovy Fakulty, 1919–1929* (nákladem státním; Praha, 1930).

[2] *Ročenka Husovy Fakulty za r. 1929–30* (Praha, 1930).

[3] Fr. Bednář, *Sbírka zákonů a nařízení ve věcech náboženských a církevních v republice Československé* (Praha, 1929).

MATTHEW SPINKA

CHICAGO THEOLOGICAL SEMINARY

THE ANTECEDENTS OF AMERICAN CULTURE

We have here an attempt to interpret American Christianity in terms of an old-world tradition,[1] which goes back to John Wyclif and the Lollard movement. The author's thesis is that the term "Puritan" has been used far too generally and that in most cases—indeed "in ninety-nine cases out of one hundred"—the phrase "the Anglo-American Dissenting Mind" should be substituted for the term "Puritan." The first part of the book is given over to a discussion of the origin of this dissenting tradition, in which is pointed out the distinction between Puritanism and this older form of dissent. In the teachings of Wyclif and in the Lollard movement he discovers numerous practices and ideas which he thinks have been reproduced in America. He proclaims Wyclif the father of Anglo-American Protestantism and claims that the doctrines he taught and the practices he instituted "still control the lives of thousands and thousands of men and women in England and America," though it is wisely admitted that many of the "simple folk" in the land which Wyclif did not know existed are not aware where they got their inspiration.

The author has made some very interesting suggestions and has called attention to many similarities between certain forms to be found in America and what he terms the older form of English dissent. There is no doubt but that much has been read into the term "Puritan" which does not rightfully belong there, but the chief trouble with this book is that the author, in attempting to explain American Christianity, even down to our own day, leaves out of account, almost entirely, the peculiar American influences which have been at work through more than three hundred years. One wonders, for instance, whether it was not the influence of the frontier which produced many of the ideas and practices which the author credits to Wyclif and Lollardism. But the author seems not to be aware of this frontier influence, for an examination of his rather extended bibliography does not reveal a single title which would indicate such awareness. Indeed the bibliography is largely made up of books published before 1910. With this in mind one is tempted to question the real value of books which attempt to explain America solely in terms of old-world traditions.

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[1] *The Religious Background of American Culture.* By Thomas Cuming Hall. Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1930. xiv+348 pages. $3.00.

William W. Sweet

University of Chicago

HISTORY OF THE MORMONS

The direction of historical interest as well as the output of historical scholars often depends upon the type of historical documents which come to their attention. This, to a large degree, no doubt, is the explanation of this interesting volume,[1] for such a study seems to be quite outside Mr. Quaife's well-known "line of interest," or at least is a side interest, of which few if any of his friends were aware. It has to do, however, with a phase of early Wisconsin and Michigan history, and the author as a former secretary of the Historical Society of Wisconsin, and now secretary of the Burton Historical Collection in Detroit, has every qualification as well as every right to present this strange narrative of Mormon adventure.

The central figure in this story is James J. Strang, a man of active mind and varied talents who was born in central-western New York in 1813, and in 1843 came to Nauvoo, Illinois, where under the instruction of the three highest dignitaries of Mormonism he professed conversion to the new faith, and was soon occupying a position of importance among the Latter Day Saints. At the time of Prophet Joseph Smith's murder (June 27, 1844) Strang was in southeastern Wisconsin, where he was urging that a Mormon center be constructed, and here he professed to have received a divine appointment as the successor of Smith to Mormon headship. Other contestants were Joseph Smith (the prophet's eldest son), Brigham Young, and Sidney Rigdon; but it is with the career of Strang from this time forward to his tragic death in 1856 that this narrative deals. The reader who desires fuller understanding of the main current of Mormon events, especially from 1844 to 1850, should read W. A. Linn, *The Story of the Mormons*, Book IV.

In 1845 Strang experienced a second angelic visitation, when he claimed to have had revealed to him the location of certain metallic plates covered with inscriptions, which, by the aid of the same miraculous spectacles which Joseph Smith had used, he was able to translate. The finding of these plates marks the real beginning of Strang's prophetic career, and his efforts to gain the Mormon leadership began now in real earnest. While the larger body of Mormons in northern Illinois was getting ready to remove to the Far West, under the leadership of Brigham Young, Strang went about among the scattered Mormon communities, presenting his claim to the leadership, and with such success that even some of the Brighamite leaders were won over to his claims, but in the end only a comparatively few followers were persuaded to accompany him to the village of Voree, Wisconsin, the first Strangite New Jerusalem. Here were gathered from 1845 to 1848 a band of visionaries, and among them a considerable sprinkling of rascals. Here was continual turmoil, and indeed to the end of Strang's career he was compelled to contend with an ever fresh crop of apostates.

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[1] *The Kingdom of Saint James: A Narrative of the Mormons*. By Milo M. Quaife. New York: Yale University Press, 1930. 284 pages. $4.00.

In 1846 Strang received a divine command to remove the "Saints" to the Beaver Islands near the northern end of Lake Michigan, and by the winter of 1848–49 twelve Mormon families were there established. The next year (1850) Strang received a most startling divine announcement, through the medium of the "plates of Laban" which when their characters were translated proved to be a command for him to set up the Kingdom of God on earth, over which he (Strang) was commanded to rule. From this time on Strang posed not only as a prophet, but also as a king with power of apportioning the lands of his island kingdom among the Saints.

At the beginning of his movement Strang was strongly, even bitterly, opposed to polygamy, terming it an abomination of the Brighamites. Later he characterized the practice as "born in hell and begotten of the Devil." But the coming of a schoolmistress, Elvira Eliza Field, to instruct the children of the Saints, together with another divine revelation, completely changed the mind of the prophet and king, and Elvira became his first plural wife. Later he contracted three other polygamous marriages, though at the end of his movement there were not more than eighteen or twenty polygamous families living on the islands.

By the year 1856 there were in excess of twenty-five hundred Mormons on the Beaver Islands and the adjoining mainland. Meanwhile, the gentile population had grown in like proportion, and conflicts between them came to be of frequent occurrence. One of the reasons for the general attitude of hostility of Gentiles against Mormons was the contemptuous attitude toward the government. Mormon prayers for the blotting-out of "such a cruel and bloodthirsty nation" were frequent. Another factor was the belief commonly held among Gentiles that Mormonism was synonymous with gross immorality and that monstrous crimes were commonly perpetrated by them. The conflict between Gentiles and Mormons on

Beaver Islands culminated with the brutal shooting of Strang, and his final death at Voree, Wisconsin, some weeks later. With his leadership gone the Mormons on the islands were "as sheep without a shepherd," and in July they were herded on board lake steamers by swearing, drunken ruffians, under the command of the sheriff of Mackinac County. The mass of them were unloaded at Chicago and Milwaukee, where they were left to their fate. The church Strang had organized died with his death, not because of the cruel experience through which it passed, but because Strang refused to name a successor.

Readers will doubtless differ as to the historical importance of the Strangite movement, but all will certainly agree that as Mr. Quaife has told it, it is a most fascinating story. And Mr. Quaife deserves congratulation on writing the most unbiased account of Mormon activity which has ever appeared.

William Warren Sweet

University of Chicago

THE APOSTLE OF RELIGIOUS LIBERTY

The author of this volume[1] very evidently set out to make a sizable book, and in order to do so was compelled to use a large amount of padding. From one-third to a half of its three hundred and ninety-nine pages has little direct bearing upon Roger Williams. The long Introduction—sixty-five pages—describes early eighteenth-century London; Part I—another sixty pages—entitled "The Youth of Roger Williams," is devoted largely to Sir Edward Coke, Roger Williams' patron. The remainder of the volume deals somewhat more directly with the subject, but even in these chapters the author is prone to permit more or less extraneous matter almost completely to bury her hero. This does not mean that the book is a total failure, or that we are not presented a fairly adequate picture of the first apostle of religious liberty. As a matter of fact, even the padding is both interesting and instructive; but a reader with his mind fixed on Roger Williams is likely to become impatient to find him buried so many times before he is dead.

A recent interpreter of Roger Williams has termed him a political philosopher rather than a theologian, and a reading of Miss Easton's book will confirm this statement. One who has thought of Roger Williams as primarily a preacher will be surprised at his many interests, and at his wide range of activities. He engaged in many enterprises. He was a frequent peacemaker between the colonists and the Indians. He went to England to obtain a charter for the Rhode Island colony; he wrote several books. But his greatest contribution was his theory of the commonwealth which Parrington considers "the richest contribution of Puritanism to American political thought."

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[1] *Roger Williams, Prophet and Pioneer*. By Emily Easton. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1930. 399 pages. $5.00.

W. W. SWEET

UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO

WHAT IS KNOWLEDGE?

Professor Arthur O. Lovejoy in his Carus lectures[1] engages in the most thorough and searching criticism that has probably ever been made of the outstanding theories of knowledge which are now being upheld by philosophers. After tracing the development of these theories from the time of Descartes, he gives the body of his book to showing the inadequacies of the theory of knowledge as it is upheld by the pragmatists, the idealists, and the new realists. He gives most attention to Mr. Whitehead and Bertrand Russell, always with a view to showing the untenable nature of their exposition of the nature of knowledge.

It is regrettable that the masterly work by Mr. Lewis on this subject, *Mind and the World Order*, was not published in time for Mr. Lovejoy to avail himself of it. We believe that many of the difficulties which Mr. Lovejoy so elaborately exposes in other theories of knowledge have been overcome by Mr. Lewis. Indeed, we think that Mr. Lovejoy and Mr. Lewis go together very well. Not that they agree. Far from it. But they go together because Mr. Lovejoy gives all his strength to showing the failure of all other attempts to give an adequate explanation of the nature of knowledge. In all the 317 pages of his book he says scarcely anything at all to support his position. Even in the last chapter, where he seems to approach a constructive statement, he does so chiefly by showing how hopeless it is to explain knowledge in any other way and that therefore his own view of critical realism must be accepted. Thus Mr. Lovejoy is altogether destructive—so destructive, in fact, that he seems almost to leave his own view tottering. Even his critical realism is apparently for him a matter of faith, held only because he can get nothing better.

Thus it is that Mr. Lovejoy clears the ground for the constructive work of Mr. Lewis. Destruction is necessary before construction can be appreciated. We do not mean that Mr. Lovejoy would so regard his work. If *Mind and the World Order* had been before him at the time of his writing he probably would have attacked it as viciously as ever he has assailed every other view. But it was not before him, and so it stands untouched by his devastating blows. Furthermore, we do not believe he could have destroyed it if he had attacked it.

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[1] *The Revolt against Dualism.* By Arthur O. Lovejoy. New York: W. W. Norton & Co., Inc., 1930. 325 pages. $4.00.

Mr. Lovejoy holds that conscious experience is always separate from, and other than, the object known. The only exception to this is our knowledge (if it can be called knowledge) of our own conscious experience at the moment. The physical world is something we never experience in consciousness. We know it only because our consciousness can be used to represent physical things; but nothing in consciousness is ever identical with anything physical. So also our own past experience, and the experience of other people, whether past or present, and future events, are never consciously experienced by us. They are known only through something in conscious experience which serves to represent them.

The intricacies and subtleties of every modern theory of knowledge are so great that it would be useless for us in a brief review to enter into a criticism of this position defended by Mr. Lovejoy after he has demolished every other. We can do nothing better than refer the reader to Mr. Lewis as an antidote to Mr. Lovejoy. The two should be taken together.

Henry Nelson Wieman

University of Chicago

THE MYSTICISM OF JACOB BOEHME[1]

The strange admixture of superstitious alchemy and speculative philosophy which Boehme's writings present have made him more of an enigma than a help to modern students. Yet his basic ideas have been acknowledged gratefully by Spener the German pietist, by William Law the Anglican who turned Quaker, by Coleridge and the Continental Romanticists, and by Schopenhauer and other philosophers. To disentangle the philosophic insights from the superstitious and fanciful flights of alchemy is the task which the author has set for himself.

The central problem of mysticism is presented as that of harmonizing the two wills: the one reaching out into nature in search of an inclusive view of the cosmos, the other directed inward in search of unity. When the first is stressed nature-mysticism results, with its tendency toward aesthetic absorption of the self into the object. When the second is dominant the external world vanishes into self. But in Boehme the nature mystic and the abnegating mystic were combined; and out of the torment came his insight into the identity of the ultimates reached by objective study and by subjective feeling. Accordingly, in the curious labyrinthine ways of Boehme we are led from nature to God and from God to nature by a cyclical process. The soul, going forth, comes back to itself; and, seeking itself, it finds the meaning of the world.

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[1] *The Mystic Will (Based on a Study of the Philosophy of Jacob Boehme).* By Howard H. Brinton. New York: Macmillan, 1930. xiii+269 pages. $2.50.

That he has made the Boehmenistic system intelligible is his great achievement in this volume, though Dr. Brinton constantly admits the risks of making an obscure writer clear. At times the reviewer has a feeling—lack of intimate acquaintance with Boehme renders it no more than that—that the exponent has perhaps made the ideas more logical than they really were.

At any rate, in this volume Boehme arrests attention by the winsomeness of his own spirit, the freedom of his intellect in the limited scope of the sixteenth century, and the striking similarity between his ideas and many of the recent currents of philosophic thought. That they bear startling resemblance to notions of Lloyd Morgan, Eddington, and Whitehead may, however, mean little more than that Boehme and Morgan are both naturalistic, and that the other two moderns share the idealist philosophy of the old shoemaker of Görlitz.

EDWIN EWART AUBREY

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ESSAYS ON RELIGIOUS READJUSTMENT

The Living Mind by Professor Warner Fite[1] is a collection of essays published in various reviews and magazines during the decade from 1908 to 1918. Only the introductory essay is entirely new. The book is well named, none the less. Its various chapters deal with the sort of issues that one would associate with the phrase "The Living Mind."

"Nothing should seem more characteristic of our day . . . . than the scientific prepossession. By the scientific prepossession I mean that conception of present thought according to which, after centuries of darkness and superstition . . . . we now have, in the view of the world, known as 'modern science,' emerged into the clear, if sober, daylight of hard and naked fact." . . . . "One phase of the scientific prepossession is the belief that a fact is not fully a fact unless it is discovered in the laboratory; or at least by an expert scientist in his official capacity." It has been assumed that "for a real science of psychology," for instance, "the important thing is not a deep experience of mind on the part of the scientist, but scientific method, supported by ingenuity in the invention and use of apparatus."

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[1] *The Living Mind*. By Warner Fite. New York: Dial Press, 1930. ix+317 pages. $3.50.

Yet what about "the student of mind who keeps the eyes of his mind open," and the "hundred facts to be got from ordinary intercourse with men for one to be 'discovered,' with elaborate ingenuity of apparatus, in the psychological laboratory"?

The passages quoted, when joined to the following, give one a very excellent impression of Professor Fite's point of view. "The distinction between how it *feels* to be man, a dog, a child, a professor, business man, hodcarrier, and how it *looks* to a disinterested observer, seems to be the concrete core and root of the whole metaphysical distinction between inner and outer, subjective and objective, spirit and matter, and the rest."

With a dialectic that, at times, is notable, Fite resists the type of modern psychology that calls itself scientific. The type, in other words, that lays away among the discarded superstition of an unscientific past not only man's immortal soul but his mind as well, if mind be conceived in the sense of an inner, personal, spiritual experience; that type, in other words, that reduces psychology to a branch of technical science registering items of behavior. What, on this view, Fite seems to suggest, becomes of that which men have always called personal experience, personal choice, personal relations, knowledge of values, etc. "Conceiving yourself as agent the only conceivable ground of action is, never a cause, but a *reason*. Other men may be caused to act but one's own action can be conceived only as the expression of some conception of value. . . . . What the observer views as a relation of cause and effect is for the agent a relation of ground and consequence." This distinction between cause and reason, effect and consequence is pressed constantly.

The Living Mind as a book of essays does not pretend to be a unified presentation of a theme that is coherent right through the book. It is remarkably coherent, none the less. Its chapters fluctuate all the way from Eucken's "Philosophy of Life" to a new essay on the "Psychology of Advertising"; from "Realism and the Rejection of Consciousness" to "Moral Values and Economic Laws"; even "Birth Control" is given due consideration together with "Consciousness" and "The Human Soul and the Scientific Prepossession." There are fourteen chapters in all.

MILES H. KRUMBINE

CLEVELAND, OHIO

THE NEW ENGLAND PHILOSOPHY OF LIFE

Curiously little attention has recently been paid to the development of religious thought in America. Since an earlier generation produced the "American Church History Series" the church historian and the historical theologian have concerned themselves primarily in the modern period with European life and thought. Now, almost simultaneously, the publication of two books gives hope that American historical scholarship will again become domesticated and endeavor to interpret our religious tradition in terms of indigenous and familiar minds and events. The two centers of this interest are Chicago and Columbia, under the leadership of Professor Sweet and Professor Schneider.[1] So novel is their undertaking that they find it appropriate and necessary to append an extensive Bibliography to their respective books. It is with the second of these books that this review is concerned.

Puritanism is a slippery term. To Professor Schneider it means a philosophy of life in terms of a sovereign God in comparison with whom human beings are sinful and worthless and yet who commissions some of them to be his special agents in carrying out his purposes and of whom he therefore demands a discipline of character that entails the severest searching of the soul. The theme of his book is the portrayal of the way in which a changing social environment first of all transformed the manifestations of this philosophy of life and then finally all but annihilated it. The initial reference of Puritanism in this country was political. The New England leaders thought and acted in terms of a holy commonwealth. They sought to translate Puritan philosophy into a political and social organization in which the clergy should exercise control. When this hope had finally to be abandoned the reference of Puritanism became private. For the sovereignty of God over the church and state Jonathan Edwards substituted the sovereignty of God over the inner life of the individual.

This interpretation is somewhat misleading. The sovereignty of God over the inner life was no new discovery of Edwards. It was equally characteristic of the religion of the early New England leaders. Puritanism as a political theory doubtless was abandoned. Perhaps it was not originally as significant as Professor Schneider would have it. But Puritanism as a personal religion was as typical of the seventeenth as of the eighteenth century. Yet Professor Schneider is right in his assertion that the same external forces which brought about the abandonment of the political reference (he would say, the shift from the political to the personal) ultimately broke down also the interpretation of divine sovereignty in personal terms. Nothing remained but a Puritan ethic minus the Puritan religion, and finally even that was abandoned. Among these disintegrating forces he enumerates: the presence of an increasing number of people who did not at all share the Puritan philosophy, the prosperity and consequent softening of the moral fiber of the second and successive generations, the advance of humanitarian and republican ideals, the discovery and appropriation by these middle-class New Englanders of the culture of aristocratic England, and the gradually acquired economic and geographical security. The Puritan way of looking at life became not so much untrue as irrelevant. In its stead there developed a humanist and humanitarian religion of self-reliance and social service which obviously lie beyond the limits of this book and to which the author devotes only summary attention.

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[1] *The Puritan Mind.* By Herbert Wallace Schneider. New York: Henry Holt & Co., 1930. 301 pages. $3.00.

One of the most notable chapters is the sympathetic study of Jonathan Edwards. Professor James H. Tufts recently remarked in private conversation that this chapter was remarkable for its omission of any reference to the hell-fire sermons. Undoubtedly Edwards preached them, but Professor Schneider, by his silence, quite rightly indicates that they did not bulk as large as tradition would have it. Were suggestion to be made of improvement in this treatment of Edwards it would be a plea for a more ample discussion of Edwards as a psychologist of religion. Noteworthy as he was as metaphysician and ethical philosopher, he was quite as significant and influential as a psychologist—a kind of forerunner of William James. Professor Schneider has an ability to turn a good sentence. Occasionally, however, his itch for epigram has led his judgment astray. "It was Edwards who attempted to induce New England to lead a godly not a sober life; it was Franklin who succeeded in teaching Americans to lead a sober not a godly life." However true this may be of Franklin it overlooks Edwards' relentless insistence on testing the genuineness of religion by its ethical consequences, or, to use his own favorite word, by its fruits.

A. C. McGIFFERT, JR.

CHICAGO THEOLOGICAL SEMINARY

CHALLENGES TO COLLEGE MEN[1]

This book is somewhat akin to *Whither Christianity*, a symposium of essays on a wide range of topics concerned with the Christian life and faith, introduced by Reinhold Niebuhr's analysis of the socio-economic causes of modern disbelief and concluded by the editor's (Henry P. Van Dusen) discussion of the resources which the modern man may find in religion to give him power to do what he knows to be right.

Directed specifically at the college youth, the volume is for the most part characterized by really pioneering thought. That is to say, while there is little that is new in content to the well-informed religious leader, the attitude of the presentations is not apologetic. There is dynamite in Fosdick's challenge to denominationalism—and he has not hidden it, either. Wieman's call to humanity to give up its corporate introspection and dedicate its energies to cosmic progress has some of the old prophetic ring in it. Bishop McConnell's essay on God is disappointing in its brevity, for he has only sketched a prolegomenon to the problem. Rufus Jones, with his usual scholarly sainthood, talks intimately of prayer in a way that students will heed with reverence. Richard Roberts modernizes the drama of the Cross along lines already familiar to those who have read him before.

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[1] *Ventures in Belief*. By Henry P. Van Dusen and Others. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1930. vi+242 pages. $2.00.

Other essays are contributed as follows: by President Coffin, on "Christ"; by Miss Blanchard, on "Religion's Services to Life"; by Angus Dun, on "The Christian Portrait of Man"; by Kirby Page, on "Society"; and by David R. Porter, on "Eternal Life."

One cannot help wishing that the authors' own titles for their essays had replaced the schematic "what I believe about ———" form of the Table of Contents. I am sure they would be more intriguing to students. Mr. Van Dusen has rendered a service to college, and other, religious leaders in collecting these essays.

EDWIN EWART AUBREY

UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO

TWO NEW TEXTS IN RELIGIOUS EDUCATION

This first book[1] by Danielson and Perkins gives the records of classroom testing of the newer theories in religious education of children and is most welcome. The editors of this group of class notes have given us an excellent opportunity to study the processes that are being talked about and theorized on in nearly every meeting of religious educators. Although the actual attainments are far from perfect, they show very clearly the way in which teaching techniques may be improved. It would be easy to find faults and pick out shortcomings, but the reviewer prefers to give credit to this group for being willing to put down in black and white their experimental notes. They have dealt with real children, and without textbooks have demonstrated that very much worth-while work can be done in organizing teaching around the normal experiences of everyday living. The average teacher would not be as skilful as these experienced educationalists in adjusting methods to the various situations that a live group of youngsters presents, but such illustrations as this book affords will give a capable teacher new ideas on how to improve his teaching. The descriptions of experiments with nursery groups, kindergartners, Primary and Junior classes, are all very suggestive. Practical outcomes are sought, for, as Miss Jessie Moore says, "The manners and customs of the little Kingdom of the beginner's class become standards for conduct in the big outside world" with which they make meaningful contacts. Likewise, Professor Adelaide Case concludes that a project of studying the religious significance of "problems of living in New York City" with a group of Junior children was well worth while. Mistakes were made but the children had a good time, learned to work together, and grew in a religious interest in New York City. The reader of this book may not want to discard all textbooks, but he will have to admit that nearly every case here recorded gives evidence of more vital experiences for the children than are ordinarily found in textbook teaching. Progress will be made as more trained workers are willing to teach before they write.

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[1] *Teaching without Text Books*. Edited by Frances W. Danielson and Jeanette E. Perkins. Boston: Pilgrim Press, 1930. 240 pages. $2.00.

The second text[2] does not recognize the psychological principle of teaching as well as the first, but it is the finest collection of material for teachers who are interested for educating for peace that has yet been published. It is an answer to the question, "Where can the best type of materials for peace education be secured and how can these materials be most effectively utilized?" The authors believe that children should be reared in an atmosphere of peace, for peace is a state of mind and education for peace is a most subtle task. It cannot be promoted by merely political manipulation, and is a distinct challenge to the religious educator. While not discounting the education of adults, their first emphasis is on the guidance of children into habits of co-operation. "We who desire peace must write it in the hearts of children."

The homes are criticized for conditioning children against the expectation of world-peace; churches for defending the existing order; public schools for militarizing education. Suggestions are given as to how to rectify the point of view in each situation.

The authors have made other contributions in this field, but this is undoubtedly their most complete and satisfactory presentation on peace education.

E. J. Chave

University of Chicago

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[2] *Educating for Peace.* By Elizabeth Miller Lobingier and John Leslie Lobingier. Boston: Pilgrim Press, 1930. 216 pages. $2.00.

RELIGIOUS DRAMA

Here are twelve dramatic services of worship as worked out in the Riverside Church (Dr. Fosdick's) in New York in 1929–30.[1] Each service includes hymns, scripture readings, prayers, and at its center a one-act drama or two or three episodes—all along a given theme such as forgiveness, love, freedom, thanksgiving, etc. Such services must be witnessed to be appreciated. In their written form most of them seem strong and effective in reaching the deeper emotions. A few seem to be broken up into so many episodes that emotional continuity could hardly be attained. The significance of this collection lies in the fact that it is the first assembly of dramatic services of worship for adults. Until now we have had pageants, biblical dramas, and some modern dramas of spiritual power used with a view to inspiration and education. But this is the first notable attempt made to collect in one volume a series of practical experiments made from the standpoint of worship.

It is not surprising to learn that these services were popular or that the groups of young people who worked them out grew in numbers. Such services offered them not only an opportunity to express themselves, but to exercise their creative faculties in a ministry of beauty and worship for others. From such experiments may come the dramatic liturgies which the Protestant churches so sorely need if they are to conserve the beauty and the emotional strength of the Christian religion.

The book is well illustrated and contains an excellent Foreword describing the simple equipment needed for the production of a religious drama. Doubtless it will be followed by another volume containing other services. The next volume might well omit the printing of hymns and other material easily accessible elsewhere so that the cost will be reduced.

FRED EASTMAN

CHICAGO THEOLOGICAL SEMINARY

HAS THE CHURCH FEDERATION MOVEMENT REACHED ITS PEAK?

"It is very much within possibility," says Dr. H. Paul Douglass in the volume under review,[2] that

> the [church] federation movement may nearly have reached its peak, that it may have come close to the end of its course as a narrowly co-operative agency

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[1] *Worship through Drama*. By Ryllis Clair Alexander and Omar Pancoast Goslin. New York: Harper & Bros., 1930. xxxvi+330 pages. $5.00

[2] *Protestant Co-operation in American Cities*. By H. Paul Douglass. New York: Institute for Social and Religious Research. xviii+514 pages. $3.50.

limited to the fields of the church's "life and work" and ignoring those of its "faith and order." . . . . Very likely it must now become much more than it is, or else much less. Constant subjection to unnatural inhibitions, the weight of narrow and suspicious denominational control, the continuous thwarting of vital impulses by the ecclesiastical hand upon the machinery, might well render the best of movements permanently powerless to incarnate the profounder meanings implicit in it.

This is no casual opinion, lightly tossed off, on the basis of superficial observation, but is the sober judgment of perhaps our best informed student of the subject, based upon an exhaustive investigation of Protestant co-operation in American cities. Practically all of Dr. Douglass' elaborate studies of the church enterprise in urban America, conducted under the auspices of the Institute for Social and Religious Research, have served to pile up evidence for his chief finding, namely, that the problems confronting the city church can be solved only by the churches and denominations acting co-operatively. A deeper fraternal spirit and a vastly improved technique of co-operation is essential. This finding naturally suggested the desirability of a study of the Protestant co-operative movement, and in this volume we have a second report issuing from such a study. The first report, published about a year ago, under the title *Church Comity*, dealt with only one phase of co-operation; this report covers the entire range of other co-operative activities. Twenty fully organized church federations or councils of churches are selected for intensive study, but incidental attention is given also to other types of Protestant co-operation, and to the relationship of local to national agencies, such as the Federal Council of Churches.

The origins, history, and actual achievements of the federation movement are exhaustively investigated. An immense amount of factual information concerning these matters will be found compiled in this volume. But the author probes deeper. He seeks to discover the underlying implications of the movement. And, as part of that investigation, he undertakes an elaborate study of the judgments and attitudes of church federation constituents, of the formally announced aims of federations, and of the various ways in which expression is given to the sense of the deeper significance of the movement. And this deeper significance, the author finds, does not reside so much in the concrete forms and methods of co-operation which federation has achieved, but rather in the moral gesture it symbolizes. "It is as a gesture toward church unity that the federation movement interests men." "By a profoundly correct instinct . . . . the rank and file of the federations' constituents . . . . have allied themselves with federation as a testimony to their essential unity."

But the federation movement is torn by a profound inner conflict. Pushing on vigorously is the impulse toward Protestant integration. But opposing this impulse is the established ecclesiastical order, namely, denominationalism. And, since church federation is professedly co-operative denominationalism, the ecclesiastic, who is in control by the very terms of the contract, is able to lay a restraining hand upon all movements toward genuine unity. " 'What can best be done in common' invariably means what will not hurt the denominations." Co-operative activities can go forward only to that point where some denomination raises objection. And when there seems a threat that denominational prerogative will be trenched upon that, objection is raised. Consequently the programs of church federations lack adequacy and balance; they are piecemeal and opportunistic. Church federations do what they are permitted to do rather than what the situation calls for.

The urgent present need then, if the federation movement is to fulfil its largest promise, and realize the dearest ideals of its constituents, is the adoption of some basic philosophy of co-operation. It must either assume the rôle of an authentic movement of Protestant integration or "make way for a more virile and popular, a more fearless and affirmative movement, advancing in the same direction, but going much faster." The most conspicuous need of the federation movement at the present moment, in the author's opinion, is the roughing-out of some sort of unifying intellectual instrument, subject, perhaps, to continuous criticism and revision, which will provide at least the beginnings of the necessary basic philosophy of co-operative service.

One cannot read this volume without being provoked to very serious consideration of the issues raised by the author. One wonders if the time has indeed come when the church federation movement must be replaced by one of the "more daring movements (which) have appeared focussing attention on such world conferences as those at Lausanne and Jerusalem. . . . ."

Probably the great majority of church federation constituents will heartily sympathize with the author's call for more earnest thinking upon the deeper meanings and profounder implications of the federation movement. They earnestly hope that by working together a vital integration may be effected. But not many will be likely to view with favor any proposal that seeks to focus attention upon "faith and order" instead of upon "life and work." It may be permitted to doubt if Lausanne, in spite of Dr. Douglass' laudatory reference, advanced appreciably the interest of Christian unity. There is a deep conviction that the unity to be achieved must be based upon voluntary co-operation and must permit the widest variety of religious conviction and forms of church organization. And Lausanne certainly did not look in that direction. A really vital integration of Protestantism in America is much more likely to be promoted by Protestants of various denominations working together than by their sitting down together to discuss abstract questions of doctrine or theories of the church. The fundamental position of the federation movement, which calls for co-operation in "life and work" rather than discussion of "faith and order," is still sound.

At the same time, the federation movement would do well to heed the author's warning that it be not content to gain immediate, although insignificant, successes at the cost of avoiding major difficulties. The goal of the federation movement is indeed a vital unification of Protestantism, but this will not be achieved without a combination of great tact and great daring. It would be suicidal to take a position which would immediately alienate the denominations from which any given federation now draws support. But it would be equally suicidal—though death would come creepingly, as through the effects of a slow poison rather than by an act of violence—to take always the easy way. The movement needs now, if ever, prophetic spirits and scientific guidance. Meanwhile, it is cheering to remember, historical study is steadily undermining and crumbling the walls that separate the denominations. Perhaps there will be little of them left by the time that Protestants have had enough experience in working together to effect a vital rather than a merely artificial integration.

Whether one agrees or disagrees with Dr. Douglass' theoretical conclusions, he will find the book of great value. The student who wants the facts about the church federation movement will find them here. "The practical ideals and objectives, the structural characteristics, and the functions, means, agents and resources of the federations . . . . as well as the relations of city federations to other co-operative movements and to the national movement" are discussed in Part I, which is the general report. Part II, the technical report, deals with details of administration, major phases of federation programs, and the reactions of constituencies of federations. It is intended primarily for the practical guidance of federation workers. The book is invaluable to one who wishes to have authoritative knowledge of the present status of the church federation movement.

CHARLES T. HOLMAN

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WILL THE BARRIERS HOLD?

The three books under review form part of the great volume of current literature which evidences the vigor of the movement for international peace. They tell the story of the gigantic efforts which are being made, on a scale never before witnessed in the history of the world, to build barriers against the threat of war. Mrs. Boeckel, who is educational director of the National Council for the Prevention of War, has provided a book[1] which will be especially useful for women's clubs, men's forums, church and school groups, as well as for individuals who wish to study the great movements toward world-peace. It is essentially a group-study textbook in which the facts are carefully marshaled, and authoritative opinion extensively quoted. The necessity for peace, in view of the present-day interdependence of all nations, and the menace of war under modern conditions; the development of methods and agencies of arbitration and conciliation, and particularly of the World Court and League of Nations; the hindrances to the abandonment of war resident in nationalistic policies and piled-up armaments; and the various expressions of the organized peace movement—all receive detailed and painstaking discussion. There is also a valuable Appendix, giving an excellent bibliography of the subject, and a complete list of peace organizations and denominational peace committees. The book is admirably planned and executed for the purpose for which it is written.

President Butler's volume[2] is of quite a different character. Far from being organized as a textbook, it comprises a somewhat loose collection of occasional essays, addresses, letters to newspapers, etc., covering a period from January 15, 1924, to June 26, 1930. Included in the series are the Richard Cobden lecture delivered in London, and the address delivered before the Reichstag, in Berlin, both in 1930. As might be expected, since a period of six years is covered by these essays, some proposals which Dr. Butler advocates in early chapters are celebrated as accomplished facts in later chapters. It is a bit surprising, however, to find him in 1925 describing the proposal to outlaw war as "futile" ("Such outlawry would only last until human passion broke down its fragile barrier," says he), whereas, after the outlawry pact is signed, it is regarded as the greatest bulwark of peace, the climax of all the preceding treaties, conventions, agreements, etc. "But what," he asks the German Reichstag, ". . . . if some nation signatory to the Pact of Paris breaks its pledged word and begins hostilities against its neighbor? What then is to punish the offender and protect those against whom the offense is committed? The answer is quick and simple, Public Opinion, than which nothing is more powerful when it rises to heights of condemnation." This is a conversion, indeed. But in his changing opinion as to the value of the Pact, Dr. Butler only shared the experience of millions of his fellow-citizens as its significance became clear to them. So highly, indeed, has President Butler come to regard the Pact of Paris that he dedicates this book to that eminent French statesman out of whose proposals to America it grew: "To Aristide Briand, Minister of France, Master Builder of that New World of Nations, Whose Cornerstone is Peace."

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[1] *The Turn toward Peace.* By Florence Brewer Boeckel. New York: Friendship Press, 1930. x+214 pages. $1.00.

[2] *The Path to Peace.* By Nicholas Murray Butler. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1930. xiii+320 pages. $2.50.

President Butler's interest in the League of Nations, the World Court, the codification of international law, and other proposals by which it is hoped that peace may be advanced finds expression throughout the book. He particularly warns against "that ultra-nationalistic temper and mode of thinking" which, having been forced to renounce war as an instrument of national policy, "is now turning with renewed zeal and vigor to international economic combat of various forms. It would be a sorry commentary on present-day human intelligence," he says, "if the spirit of militarism, being cast out from one stronghold, were to find lodgment in another."

The League of Nations, as everyone knows, includes within its field of interest other concerns in addition to that of the prevention of war. And yet the prevention of war and the advancement of international peace involve activities and interests of so many and varied sorts that practically everything the League does is in some way related to that major interest. The story, then, of the first ten years of the League[1] may well be considered here. And it is a fascinating story of the building of machinery and methods—as well as of public confidence—by means of which the somewhat vague and general injunctions given it to promote international co-operation and achieve international peace and security might be fulfilled.

As Sir Eric Drummond, secretary-general of the League, points out in the Foreword which he contributes, this volume is not a history but a mere statement of facts. It does not seek to discern the causes of events, or to estimate their effects, but it is a document produced under the limitations by which the official is hedged, which will prove useful to the student and a valuable source to the scholar. There is no special pleading for the League; the record of solid accomplishment in the peaceful settlement of disputes, in the organization of peace and disarmament, in promoting international justice, financial, economic, and intellectual co-operation, in organizing international health and social and humanitarian activities, in providing for the protection of minorities, and directing the mandates system, as well as other services, is permitted to speak for itself. Sir Eric does, however, venture two judgments: first, that the mere creation of the League, and its continued existence during these ten years, is one of those great facts which inevitably stand out as landmarks in the history of the world; and, second, that during this space of ten years the League has definitely and greatly grown in strength—that is to say, in the hold it has upon public opinion throughout the world and upon the governments and administrations through which public opinion functions.

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[1] *Ten Years of World Coöperation.* By the Secretariat of the League of Nations. London: Hazell, Watson & Viney, 1930. xii+467 pages. $3.50.

Americans who think of their country as being completely isolated from the League will be surprised to learn that the League "is in close touch with the United States of America (which is) now co-operating in all its technical activities. American experts are members of several committees of the Communications and Transit organization, of the Health Committee, of the Committee on Intellectual Co-operation, the Committee of Experts for the Codification of International Law, the Financial Committee, the Fiscal and Economic Committees, and the Advisory Commission for the Protection and Welfare of Children and Young People." There is co-operation with the Rockefeller Foundation, the American Red Cross, the American Bureau of Social Hygiene; and the United States government has sent delegations to various conferences. The League has become such an effective and vital agency of international co-operation that to ignore it and refuse co-operation is practically impossible.

One cannot read these three volumes without being tremendously impressed with the massive strength of the barriers which are being so wisely and patiently erected for the defense of international peace. The genius and devotion of the world's best brains are being poured into the enterprise. And yet one is made aware throughout the reading that there are massive forces constantly threatening to burst these barriers—economic competition, the dissatisfaction of peoples with past boundary or economic settlements, widespread distrust, and much else. And one cannot help asking himself, uneasily, When the test comes, and some nation feels that now the time is ripe to strike and right past grievances, will the barriers hold?

CHARLES T. HOLMAN

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RECENT BOOKS

HISTORY OF RELIGION

ABBOTT, JUSTIN E. *Stotramala: a Garland of Hindu Prayers.* Summit, New Jersey: author, 1930. xvii+331 pages. $1.25.

The author of this book has learned to love India and the Indian people during a lifetime of devoted service among them. Here he selects from the poet-saints who were always close to the life of the lowly folk some of the prayers which link the religion of India with the religious yearnings of mankind. The prayers range in time from the thirteenth to the eighteenth centuries. The book contains a glossary of Indian terms as well as the Marathi text of the prayers.

HITTI, PHILIP K. *The Origins of the Druze People and Religion.* ("Columbia University Oriental Studies," Vol. XXVIII.) New York: Columbia University Press, 1928. xiii+80 pages, and one map. $2.00.

This is one of those neat little booklets about a little religion and its little people which all students of religion will heartily welcome. Professr Hitti is well equipped for such a job and knows how to present his materials in attractive form. Aside from this, it is difficult in a brief review to say much about a monograph in general so satisfactory. One might suggest that the Druzes are not quite so unique as the first sentence states. In Syria itself the Nusairis, Maronites, Monophysites, farther East Yezidis, Mandeans, etc., present not a few points of similarity. The greatest weakness of the book is its insistence on the Persian origin of the Druzes. To this Père Lammens does not adhere any more (cf. *Melanges de l'Université St. Joseph*, Vol. XIV, fasc. 2). The historical statements adduced do not suffice to outweigh anthropological tests and measurements, the results of which are distinctly negative as to Persian affinities. Anyway, the well-known shifts of populations adduced by the author were largely not truly Persian material at all. Finally, in four centuries and more, counting from Muʿawiyah's time, natural absorption would scarcely leave racial characteristics so subtle and so marked as the author's thesis demands. Eliminating this thesis, Professor Hitti is clearly on home ground in what he says, and all the information he gives from his own personal knowledge is most valuable to anyone interested in the subject. As to the derivation of Hamzah's precepts No. 3 and No. 4 on page 51, it may be suggested that the old Christian formula of baptismal initiation might be looked into.

KORTLEITNER, FR. X., *De antiquis Arabiae incolis eorumque cum religione Mosaicæ rationibus.* ("Commentationes biblicae," Vol. III. Innsbruck: F. Rauch, 1930. 115 pages. M. 3.00.

Not many books are written and printed in Latin in this day and age. It is, perhaps, fitting that this book presenting a good collection and an effective arrangement of source materials on the subject treated from a serious orthodox Roman Catholic point of view should be presented to the public in this ecclesiastical tongue. To the Arabic geographers on pages 3 f. *Al-Huwārizmī*, published by Mžik in 1926, should be added. On page 14, on Arabia Felix, Musil seems not to have been consulted. For the *adnotatio* on page 37 the addition of Philby might have made some difference. Eisler and Grimme appear to be the only authorities consulted on the Sinaitic inscriptions. These, for the book as it stands, are minor defects. In the main it will be a good and useful book for the purpose and for the circles for which it was written.

MENSCHING, GUSTAV. *Buddhistische Symbolik.* Gotha: Leopold Klotz, 1929. vii+52 pages. 68 plates. M. 18.

Even scholars well versed in the lore of oriental religions are at a loss many times as to the relation of the art materials to the temporal and local development of the religions. Here is a book which weaves the story of Buddhist hopes and ideas as religion and Buddhist symbols as art into a unified pattern. The interpretation of the religion by the symbol, and oft the symbol by the history of the religion, makes delightful reading. There are 68 excellent plates as illustrative material.

OTTO, RUDOLF. *Indiens Gnadenreligion und das Christentum.* Gotha: Leopold Klotz, 1930. v+110 pages. M. 3.60.

This study of the relationship in form, content, and ideal between the *bhakti* religions of India and Christianity is an expansion of the lectures delivered by Professor Otto at the Universities of Upsala and Oslo in 1926. It is a comparative study of ideas rather than a historical study. The great difference lies in the Christian idea of sin. India has no Cross and no Redeemer from sin. India has only Saviors.

SCHRADER, F. OTTO. *The Kashmir Recension of the Bhagavadgītā.* Stuttgart: Kohlhammer. 1930. 52 pages. M. 4.50.

Professor Schrader, in his study of the works of Abhinavagupta, discovered that his author's commentary on the Bhagavadgītā was not based upon the common Indian version. This led him to the discovery of a Kashmir version of the text, which is here presented, showing the variations from the common version.

SMITH, CATHARINE COOK. *In Defense of Magic.* New York: Dial Press, 1930. x+152 pages. $2.50.

Mrs. Cook is certainly correct in her analysis of the emotional vagaries of the modern age. We have no technique for the education and discipline of emotion. But her remedy is just another illustration of the tendency of the emotionally undisciplined to be attracted by vague obscurantisms. There is no answer to our emotional situation to be found in a return to outworn philosophic absolutisms, or magic techniques of relation to a supposed irrational. Mystery enough there is without complicating the universe with the creations of the ignorance of the past ages. Our emotions must be channeled in relation to the new world and as a vital reinforcement of our active living—but how?

THOMAS, WENDELL. *Hinduism Invades America.* New York: Beacon Press, 1930. 300 pages. $3.00.

Hinduism for the most part has not been a missionary religion. One of the essentials on which most Hindus agree is that to be a Hindu one must be born such. The change from the traditional attitude to that which lies back of this volume is significant. Swami Vivekananda, a disciple of Ramakrishna, came to America to attend the World's Parliament of Religions in 1893. He brought with him a new dynamic beginning to emerge in Hinduism, as a result of which he founded the first Hindu cult in this country in 1894. Today Hinduism is represented in America in two cults: the Ramakrishna

Mission and the Yogoda Sat-Sangha Society. Mr. Thomas has carefully traced the genesis and growth of these two cults. His work is done objectively, and is therefore the more welcome. Another chapter adds information of more sporadic efforts of Hinduism in the United States.

These two cults do not mean that Hinduism is becoming a missionary religion, as we understand the word "missionary." The missions are here by invitation, and the expenses are met from American funds. The adherents are largely from those who are critical of the Christian church, although in the case of the Yogoda Sat-Sangha one may be a member of a Christian church also. The movement is still too young for any appreciable influence to have been felt on American culture or religious thought. Christians who claim the right to propagate their faith can have no moral objections when those of other religions claim a similar right. The sharing motive in religion is fast displacing the older aloofness toward values other than our own.

Trattner, Ernest R. *The Autobiography of God.* New York: Scribner's, 1930. 312 pages. $2.50.

This startling title is justified only by the simple device of changing the third person to the first where God is mentioned. Otherwise the book is a most readable and well-conceived account of the evolution of religion, treated topically rather than chronologically. These topics cover practically the entire range of religious phenomena; and the volume thus serves as a popular ready-reference book on different aspects of the history of religion such as bibliolatry, holy wars, ritual cleansing and sacrifice, slavery, theories of atonement, and religious utopias.

The publishers have done the book a grave injustice by representing it as an essay in reconstruction of the idea of God. While the author hints at this in the last few pages, and while the entire book gives historical perspective for such reconstruction, the primary intent of the writer is clearly in a totally different direction. It should be classified as history rather than apologetics.

Wetherill, Francis M. *The Heart's True Home.* Boston: Gorham Press, 1930. 136 pages.

This is a Christian's gesture of appreciation of other religions. In some hundred and twenty pages of text, almost one-quarter of which are devoted to Christianity, the author undertakes the task of exposition and appreciation of the religions of the world. One can only commend any advance toward reconciliation made by Christianity toward other religions, but the brevity of treatment makes the exposition narrow and lifeless. Appreciation, without condescension, is very difficult for one convinced of the superiority of Christianity.

OLD TESTAMENT AND JUDAISM

Greenberg, Louis S. *A Critical Investigation of the Works of Rabbi Isaac Baer Levinsohn.* New York: Bloch Publishing Co., 1930. 80 pages. $2.00.

This booklet is, as far as the reviewer knows, the first complete work published in English on the life and writings of the famous Russian Jewish scholar and reformer, Isaac Baer Levinsohn. Levinsohn deserves to be brought to the notice of all students of history. In the lives of the five million Jews in the old czarist Empire he was an apostle of enlightenment and a pioneer of new economic ideals.

Dr. Greenberg devotes his first chapter to a biographical sketch of Levinsohn, the second to the sixth chapters to an analysis of his books, and the last chapter to an evaluation of Levinsohn as a reformer

The book is provided with a rich bibliography including works in Hebrew, German, Russian, and English. It gives a full portrait of the sickly yet courageous student who, at the dawn of the nineteenth century, brought the message of modern culture to Russian Jewry, initiated a "back to the soil" movement among them, and ably defended their Talmudic literature against the attacks of detractors.

JACKSON, FOAKES F. J. *Josephus and the Jews.* New York: R. R. Smith, 1930. xvi+299 pages. $3.00.

This is the book for which many persons must have been waiting. The Jewish historian, Josephus, despised by his kinsmen as a traitor and suspected of a Jewish bias among Christians, has been too often neglected by scholars. No one was better fitted than Professor Jackson to remedy the situation. In his new book one will find a readable but critical account of the life and work of Josephus. Throughout the whole discussion there is an utter absence of any polemical bias, a complete mastery of statistical details, and a clarity of classification and presentation that cannot fail to gratify even the most critical reader; but the subject is so admirably handled that the layman will not only have no difficulty in understanding the book but will find in it satisfaction and pleasure. The author has not yielded to the temptation, which has overcome some recent interpreters, to overestimate the value of Josephus' alleged testimony to Christianity, and, on the other hand, his importance as a source of information for the Judaism of his day has not been minimized. Each of these tendencies has too often marred the pages of some recent writings dealing with this period in history. The whole book is simply written and ought to be widely read in both Christian and Jewish circles.

MURRAY, DAVID A. *The Real Meaning of Genesis.* Boston: Stratford Co., 1930. 333 pages. $3.00.

The author purposes to present a study of the book of Genesis which will give new meaning and value to the Scriptures and revive the waning interest in the Old Testament. As much as we admire his purpose, we doubt if he has achieved it, for his technique consists largely of the interpretation of Genesis as a modern book, neglecting all historical perspective. In his opinion the story of Cain and Abel "might equally well have been written today," and the whole book of Genesis is the work of a single author whose message "is the same as that of the New Testament." The book is well organized, and its diction is beautiful, although the critical conclusions are hardly sound.

NEW TESTAMENT

BRAUN, HERBERT. *Gerichtsgedanke und Rechtfertigungslehre bei Paulus.* Leipzig: Hinrichs, 1930. 100 pages. M. 9.00.

Why does Paul assume a justification in the present by the grace of God, and yet insist that there is a future Judgment on the ground of works, to which Christians like all others must submit? Dr. Braun reviews the answers to this question which have been put forward by ancient and modern writers, and shows that they are all inadequate. His own solution is based on a thorough examination of the idea of Judgment in Old Testament, Greek, and especially later Jewish thought. He finds that while Paul thinks along two different lines, his Christian and his inherited Jewish beliefs, he contemplates a Judgment not merely on men's works but on their whole relation to God, as manifested both by faith and works. In his doctrine of Judgment Paul's intense moral feeling comes to expression. In spite of his reliance on grace, he insists on the importance of the ethical factor, and finds a higher ethic involved in grace itself. The book, with its careful and subtle analysis, is a real contribution toward the understanding of Paul. It is valuable also for its survey of critical opinion on one of the most intricate problems of Pauline theology.

MICHAELIS, W. *Pastoralbriefe und Gefangenschaftsbriefe. Zur Echtheitsfrage der Pastoralbriefe.* 6 Heft. Gütersloh: C. Bertelsmann Verlag, 1930. 163 pages. M. 6.30.

In the course of preparing a commentary on the pastoral Epistles Professor Michaelis has become convinced that the common decision against their genuineness has been reached too hastily. He believes that the whole question has been re-opened by the growing acceptance of the view that the Epistles of the Captivity were written not from Rome but from Ephesus, during the third missionary journey. It is no longer necessary to reconcile the situation indicated in these Epistles with that pre-supposed in the pastorals, and one main argument for their rejection has thereby been removed. Professor Michaelis takes occasion to review the other reasons which have been urged against their authenticity, and deals particularly with the questions of church organization, heresy, style, and vocabulary. Perhaps the most valuable part of the book is the discussion of church government. It is maintained, with considerable force, that the local ministry which existed from the first alongside of the itinerant one must have closely resembled that described in the pastorals; and that by setting them aside we discard our most valuable source of information on the government of the primitive church. In the attempt to prove that the theology of the pastorals is of true Pauline type, the author is less successful, and he does not by any means meet the arguments of Harrison against the Pauline character of their language. His main conclusion is that the Epistles were written by Paul at a period after the date at which the book of Acts closes. It is not likely that the book will overturn the practically unanimous verdict of criticism, but it is well that seemingly assured results should be subjected from time to time to fresh inquiry. The book abounds in acute analysis, and this is its weakness as well as its strength. The argument rests too much on ingenious manipulation of a great many separate points, without sufficient regard to larger considerations.

SPRAGUE, FRANK H. *Jesus and the Modern Outlook.* Boston: Christopher Publishing House, 1930. 173 pages. $2.00.

This book presents Jesus not only as the world's greatest philosopher but also as its "foremost scientific discoverer." His contribution was his exposition of the fact that physical or material existence is unreal, "a sham substitute, an infringement of the real article, an apparition projected from an erratic standpoint." True existence is spiritual. No explanation of the apparition or of its relation to the real article is offered.

HISTORY OF CHRISTIANITY

ARON, MARGUERITE. *Un animateur de la jeunesse au XIII*^{e} *siècle.* Paris-Bruges: Desclée de Brouwer et Cie, éditeurs, 1930. 396 pages. Fr. 20.

The thirteenth-century "inspirer of youth" whose life forms the subject of this informing book is Jordan of Saxony, the Paris mathematician who became Master General of the Dominican Order in 1222, and was the chief agent of its expansion throughout Europe during the fifteen years in which he held this office. The book sheds light on the university life of the time, especially at Paris, Bologna, and Oxford; introduces many scenes and personalities met with by Jordan in his Europe-wide travels; and for the first time unfolds fully and clearly the labors and character of this gifted and devoted leader. In her *Bienheureux Jourdain de Saxe: Lettres à la Bienheureuse Diane d'Andalo* (1924), Mlle Aron has previously translated an important series of Jordan's letters which enshrine the spiritual affection between him and Diana d'Andalo, an Italian woman of extraordinary piety and force of personality. Here the letters are frequently employed to illustrate his journeyings, as well as to show his religious method. For the range of its information and the clarity of its treatment this book will prove an indispensable aid to all who seek an understanding of the church history and religious life of the thirteenth century.

CUMONT, FRANZ. *Die orientalischen Religionen im römischen Heidentum.* 3. Aufl. Leipzig and Berlin: B. G. Teubner, 1931. xvi+334 pages. M. 14.

For a generation this work has been the basis for a knowledge of popular religion in the Roman world during the first Christian centuries. The main body of the book remains substantially the same as in the first edition, published originally in French in 1906. This appeared in English in 1911. There have been four new editions in French, the last in 1928; and the new German rendering has some additional features, particularly an appended series of fine illustrations with explanatory remarks. Besides the supplements in the notes, where the reference literature on the subject is thoroughly modernized, the most important addition made since the English rendering appeared, is a chapter on the Bacchic mysteries at Rome, where important recent discoveries are interpreted by a sane and experienced guide. The new German rendering is indispensable for the serious student.

ENGELHARDT, FR. ZEPHYRIN. *The Missions and Missionaries of California,* Vol I. 2d ed. Chicago: Franciscan Herald Press, 1929. xxiii+784 pages. $4.00.

A second edition of Volume I of Father Engelhardt's monumental work on the California missions is here presented. The first edition made its appearance in 1908, but it has now been out of print for several years. This fact, coupled with the discovery of considerable new material, has induced the author to bring out this new and enlarged edition. Every section, the author states, has been thoroughly revised and "more or less augmented," while the section dealing with the Dominican period has been completely rewritten and four chapters have been added to bring the story down to our own times. Since the general plan of the work is familiar to those who have had previous acquaintance with the book, it will only be necessary to state that the general organization remains as in the first edition. The book is a worthy piece of careful research and deserves to have a place in every first-class library, as it will doubtless long remain the standard authority on this subject.

NIVEN, W. D. *The Conflicts of the Early Church.* New York: R. R. Smith, 1931. xi+181 pages. $2.00.

This is a little book whose worth is far greater than its size might seem to imply. The author, who is professor of church history in Trinity College, Glasgow, makes a rapid survey of the first four centuries of Christianity's career. That "conflict" best indicates the outstanding characteristic of the period, no one will question, but the story is told with a due sense of proportion; and the form of presentation is such that the book's first service will be to the general reader or the elementary student. The church is conceived of as a living organism developing in an environment, not an entity that has always remained the same, nor yet a revelation of essential truth later corrupted. There is a good deal of reserve in allowing for the operation of environmental forces in the evolution of the specifically Christian belief and practice, but the entire discussion is pervaded by a healthful attitude of open-mindedness and stimulating suggestiveness.

PARPERT, FRIEDRICH. *Das Mönchtum und die evangelische Kirche. Ein Beitrag zur Ausscheidung des Mönchtums aus der evangelischen Soziologie.* München: Ernst Reinhardt, 1930. 80 pages. Bound, M. 5.50; unbound, M. 3.80.

A thoughtful short study of what the author calls in the subtitle, "the elimination of monasticism from the evangelical sociology." The three sections of the treatise deal with the character and influence of monasticism in the Middle Ages; the principles of its exclusion in the Reformation, with special attention to Luther; and the consequences of its rejection in Protestantism. In the last section Herr Parpert discusses the relation between monastic orders and sects, and regards the sects of Protestantism as a continuation of both the sects and the orders of the Middle Ages.

PULLAN, LEIGHTON. *From Justinian to Luther. A.D. 518–1517.* New York: Oxford University Press, 1930. 256 pages. $4.50.

There is little unfamiliar material in this short account of a long period of church history; but it contains numerous apt characterizations of persons and situations, and two or three informing chapters in which the less familiar areas of the field are explored. Dr. Pullan is no worshiper of the Middle Ages, and gives a rather gloomy picture of the pre-Reformation church. Some chapters are too compressed to convey any adequate idea of the subjects with which they profess to deal.

WAND, J. W. C. *A History of the Modern Church.* New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Co., 1930. x+314 pages. $3.00.

Since there is no authority to decide, it cannot be said that Mr. Wand is right or wrong in giving more than a third of his book to the sixteenth century. But this leaves him less than two hundred pages for what is usually regarded as modern church history. He writes out of full accurate knowledge and ripe reflection, in spirited and cultivated style. He is sympathetic and discerning with regard to diverse personalities and movements, and displays neither partisanship nor prejudice. As between Protestantism and Roman Catholicism he is reasonable and fair. Missions receive due consideration. Mr. Wand cannot be said to have forwarded the difficult task of organizing modern church history. He has no illuminating scheme of presentation for the whole movement. Moreover, strong Anglican interests limit his outlook and warp his spacing. More than a third of his pages dealing with events since 1600 are given to the Church of England. Nearly thirty more pages go to the Eastern church, on the ground of its *rapprochement* with Anglicanism. In the twelve pages given to American Christianity the Episcopal church figures disproportionately. On the other hand, nothing is said about the relation of Christianity to the social situation on the Continent in the nineteenth century and since, and very little about its relation to modern science or about the recent history of continental Protestantism. One wishes that so interesting a writer had had a more just perspective.

CHRISTIAN DOCTRINE

BRUNNER, EDMUND DE S. *Industrial Village Churches.* New York: Institute of Social and Religious Research, 1930. 193 pages. $1.50.

The industrial village which is neither rural territory nor urban constitutes a distinct problem in American religious life. Issues involved are clearly set forth in Mr.

Brunner's study which is a good supplement to the study on agricultural villages formerly made by Dr. Brunner.

BRUNNER, H. EMIL. *The Theology of Crisis.* New York: Scribner's, 1929. 118 pages. $1.75.

Vigorous lectures delivered in English at the Reformed Seminary in Lancaster by an eminent member of the Barthian group, who is professor of theology at Zurich. Together with Douglass Horton's translation of Barth's *The Word of God and the Word of Man,* this is the only available source in English for the study of the movement. Prophetic is the recognition that the theology of crisis must come to grips with the ethical problems of motivation and moral judgment.

CALKINS, RAYMOND. *The Holy Spirit.* New York: Abingdon Press, 1930. 228 pages. $1.50.

A plea for a recovery of vitality and enthusiasm in religious faith and practice. The ten chapters shy away from a discussion of the doctrine of the Holy Spirit, but describe, with a wealth of apt illustration, the Spirit's workings or absence in contemporary life. Prerequisites to the reception of the Holy Spirit are: love for Jesus, belief in his promises, and expectant waiting for their fulfilment.

CONDÉ, BERTHA. *What's Life All About?* New York: Scribner's Sons, 1930. xii+271 pages. $2.00.

This book is "a key for those who ask the question," but one cannot help feeling that the author is asking a Socratic question to which she already knew the answer. For whenever the expectant reader is led up to that point in any chapter at which the presentation of the facts is due, he is disappointingly confronted by authoritative (*sic*) statements which merely indorse the author's own conclusion. Those who are really asking this question with profound concern over the baffling realities of life will gain little help from this beautifully written volume. It is doubtful if they will read beyond that betraying sentence in the Introduction where it is said that "there is no alternative in this generation but to discover today's reason for yesterday's faith."

DINGLER, HUGO. *Metaphysik als Wissenschaft vom Letzten.* Munich: Ernst Reinhardt, 1929. 291 pages. M. 11.50.

This is the third in a trilogy of books by Dr. Dingler, the first two being *Der Zusammenbruch der Wissenschaft* and *Das Experiment, sein Wesen und seine Geschichte,* in which he endeavors to discover the ultimate ground on which all the sciences rest, which ground gives unity to them all and justifies our faith in their trustworthiness. This ultimate ground or absolute is also experienced by the mystic. It is the object of religious experience, of primitive instinctive intuition, and of the highest reach of scientific research.

ENGLAND, F. E. *Kant's Conception of God.* New York: Dial Press, 1930. 256 pages.

A very thoroughgoing piece of work which uses the substantially unchanging concept of God as measuring-rod by which to estimate the successive changes in Kant's philosophical outlook from the precritical to the critical standpoint. On the basis of a right construing of the critical premises the author points out the modifications which he believes must be made in the Kantian metaphysics. Appended is a translation of the first of Kant's metaphysical treatises, the *Nova dilucidatio,* 1755.

Falconer, Robert A. *The Idea of Immortality and Western Civilization.* Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1930. 61 pages. $1.00.

A historical essay, reviewing briefly some broad aspects of the development of Christianity and of humanism; delivered as the Ingersoll Lecture for 1930.

Fisher, Frederick B. *Personology: The Art of Creative Living.* New York: Abingdon Press, 1930. 212 pages. $1.50.

A series of optimistic lectures given in India.

Fry, C. Luther. *The U.S. Looks at its Churches.* New York: Institute of Social and Religious Research, 1930. 183 pages. $2.50.

This is probably the most valuable summary of the statistics of the religious groups in the United States on the basis of the 1926 census which is available.

Haas, Francis J. *Man and Society.* New York: Century Co., 1930. 456 pages. $3.50.

For the general introduction to sociology from the standpoint of the Catholic church, this book is valuable. It offers an unusually well-organized, systematic, and easy-reading study of man and his relation to society, intended to serve as an introduction to sociology.

The book opens with an examination of the various theories regarding the origin of man, and treats such topics as the age of the race, the oneness of the species, human personality and its social implications, and personal rights and duties. It then discusses the social forces of justice, charity, and equity; reviews the history of the family and examines its status in uncivilized and civilized society, and its functions; deals with the origin and present-day functions of the state; studies property, its historical development, and the problems of distribution; and, finally, treats extensively the subject of production and human welfare.

Le Roy, Edouard. *La pensée intuitive.* Paris: Boivin et Cie., 1929. 205 pages. Fr. 15.

One of the most prominent and devoted followers of Bergson here endeavors to rescue the concept of intuition from its misinterpretations and misuses and to show that when Bergson's idea of intuition is rightly apprehended it gives us access to the spiritual order of reality.

Litt, Theodor. *Kant und Herder, als Deuter der geistige Welt.* Leipzig: Quelle und Meyer, 1930. 291 pages. Unbound, M. 8; bound, M. 10.

An exposition of the thought of the romantic theologian Herder in the light of the critical philosopher Kant, whom he so bitterly opposed. Centering his discussion around the concepts of personality, society, and history, the author aims to gain for Herder a more sympathetic hearing and to throw light on contemporary aspects of these problems.

Marnecke, F. H. *Glaubenslose Religion.* Munich: Ernst Reinhardt, 1931. 197 pages. M. 5.80.

The writer of this essay is a self-confessed layman who, as a young student committed to scientific materialism, was overtaken by a strange experience of unspeakable joy which he has been seeking ever since to explain to himself.

Beginning with the fact that theological belief and religious fervor are not inseparable, he proceeds to study the religious experience on its affective side. He finds striking analogies and connections between religious feeling and a variety of other emotional experiences: those found in love, in aesthetic appreciation, in conscience, in group loyalty, in intensive work, and in the sheer physical sensation of health and vigor. The common element in all of these experiences is the sense of unspeakable happiness and inner harmony and, when they are denied, a terrific sense of emptiness and grief (*Schwernis*).

From this he concludes that all of these are manifestations of religious feeling, which has its roots in "the innermost Self" hidden in the subconscious. This deepest self is not accessible to reason, and hence the religious experience is irrational; it reaches out into the subconscious; there is conflict between the heterogeneous experiences of love, conscience, work, art, etc. Of these conflicts the unhappy saint is all-too-well aware; but harmony and peace are found in the innermost self which is the source of all these urges. Pantheists have called this God, but the experience is independent of this explanation. This experience is *glaubenslose Religion*.

SCHMIDT, NATHANIEL. *The Coming Religion*. New York: Macmillan Co., 1930. 262 pages. $2.00.

Professor Schmidt defines religion as "devotion to the highest." The book surveys the theories of religious origins, following, however, the traditional lines of a search for the origin of ideas of the supernatural which is not so much religion as theology. There are interesting and suggestive chapters on the relation of religion to science, art, morality, and the state. The coming religion, the author thinks, will be scientific, ethical, aesthetic and concerned with satisfying social relationships. "It will need no infallible prophets, no mediating priests, no spiritual lords to send the mind of man in search of truth into the highest realms, to impart a sense of peace and security, harmony and joy, and to strengthen the will for noble endeavor and mighty achievement."

SIEGFRIED, THEODOR. *Das Wort und die Existenz*. Gotha: Leopold Klotz Verlag, 1930. 301 pages. M. 10.

From Marburg comes this exposition and criticism of the dialectical theology. The first volume contains a critical analysis and estimate of Barth's *Prologomena to Dogmatics*. The second volume will treat of Gogarten and Bultmann.

STANDING, HERBERT F. *Spirit in Evolution: From Amoeba to Saint*. New York: Lincoln MacVeagh, 1930. 312 pages.

A fascinating series of examples from the annals of biological evolution is assembled in this volume, to trace the rise and development of those functions which contribute to spiritual life. The following sectional headings indicate the progress of the author's thought: "Response to Environment," "Nutrition," "Unification," "Race Preservation," "Sublimation of Mental Processes," "Evolution of Values."

For the speaker in search of pertinent illustrations of biological processes that underlie spiritual growth, the volume is a mine of suggestive information. The weakness of the book lies in its repetition of an old type of apologetic use of science: the tacking of personal speculations onto scientific findings in such a way that the unwary reader assumes that they are conclusions *from science*. An example is found in the author's careful tracing of the specialization of sight organs to its culmination in the human eye, after which he continues into the development of "inner vision," from which he launches into an exposition of clairvoyance and mystical insight. Unfortunately, the use of analogous terms is not evidential material, no matter how suggestive it may be etymologically.

STRONG, SYDNEY (ed.). *We Believe in Immortality.* New York: Coward McCann, 1929. 193 pages. $1.50.

A collection of brief affirmations on this subject by one hundred prominent men and women of all walks of life. To read this book is like entering into a great fellowship in which keen thinkers are exchanging their conclusions on a problem of critical and fundamental importance.

WARNER, AMOS GRISWOLD; QUEEN, STUART ALFRED; and HARPER, ERNEST BOULDIN. *American Charities and Social Work.* New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Co., 1930. xiv+616 pages. $3.75.

Those who have been using Mr. Queen's book on *Social Pathology* will welcome this new book, which has the advantage of gathering up in one volume the historical procedure through which social work in America has passed. This book is especially valuable for classroom work in college and seminary.

WICKHAM, HARVEY. *The Unrealists.* New York: Dial Press, 1930. 314 pages. $3.50.

Mr. Wickham is brilliant and witty. He makes a rapid sketch of the systems of thought presented by James, Bergson, Santayana, Einstein, Bertrand Russell, John Dewey, Alexander, and Whitehead. All these are unrealists, according to his view, because they deny the two great realities of God and the soul. Therefore they are sources of evil influence in our modern world. The book is evidently written to reach the popular mind and to help offset what the writer believes to be harmful tendencies in modern thought.

WOBBERMIN, D. GEORG. *Richtlinien evangel. Theologie zur Überwindung der gegenwärtigen Krisis.* Heft 3. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck und Ruprecht, 1929. 145 pages. M. 7. 50.

On the basis of his familiar "psychology of religion method" Dr. Wobbermin attacks Barth, alleging that the latter is not sufficiently thoroughgoing in his criticism of the attempt to solve the problems of life (1) by reference solely to history—"historism"; or (2) by empirical psychology—"psychologism."

RELIGIOUS EDUCATION

BOYER, EDWARD STERLING. *Religion in the American College: A Study and Interpretation of Facts.* New York: Abingdon Press, 1930. 105 pages. $1.25.

This is a small book. The chapters are brief and sketchy as compared with the size and importance of the matters touched upon, such as, "The Search for Reality," "The Department of Religion," "The Curriculum of Religion," "Teaching Religion at State Universities and Colleges," "A Development of Religious Education in Colleges." No one of these is treated adequately by a rigorous, systematic, and thoroughly supported study. Too many types of institutions of higher learning, too many aspects of religion in these institutions, are treated for the author's wide generalizations to have convincing weight. Frequently one reads such sentences as the following: "The history of church control in these institutions (the colleges with little church control), has developed, *with perhaps some variations*, after the following manner." "The total impression that is gained from the independent university is that it is not antagonistic to the fostering of religion. In fact, they *usually* have a divinity school as a part of the university." "The only method that is available to indicate the religious quality of college teachers is by their church relationship." Fifteen lines are given to the "Immediate causes of growth of the movement for education in religion," and thirty, to "The twilight of the sciences" (pp. 96–97). Footnotes are eschewed, but occasional references by number are made to a bibliography of twenty-two books, monographs, and magazine articles at the end of the book. The value of this book—and it has value—lies in the personal viewpoint of the author, his sense of the greatness and urgency of the problem, and in his valuable suggestions upon a number of points. For a well-nigh complete antithesis in scope and method, compare *A Study in Undergraduate Adjustment* by Robert Cooley Angell.

BROOKS, ANNIE SILLS. *Adventuring in Peace and Goodwill.* Boston: Pilgrim Press, 1930. 93 pages. $1.00.

This ten-day junior vacation school course seeks to develop among children the spirit of appreciation for people of other races and other countries. A book of the old type with worship service outlines, hymns to sing, verses to memorize, handwork to keep the children busy, and stories with preaching notes for those who are dependent upon helps.

HOLT, HAROLD. *Building Family Foundations.* Milwaukee: Morehouse Publishing Co., 1930. 85 pages. $1.00.

A small handbook intended to stimulate a series of studies on the family and its problems. A fair outline with some very good ideas and principles but little factual material presented. Too hortatory to be pedagogic.

PALMER, LEON C. *Church School Organization and Administration.* Milwaukee: Morehouse Publishing Co., 1930. 205 pages. $2.00.

This is a well-organized outline study for a leadership-training course. It is intended primarily for the Episcopal church but is the best manual of its kind yet published and would be suggestive to any group. It opens with a good historical survey, has a rather progressive point of view theologically, and is up to date in most of the techniques for the church school.

PATTON, CARL S. *Two Minute Stories.* Chicago: Willett, Clark & Colby, 1930. 131 pages. $1.25.

Another collection of children's sermonettes by a preacher. The inscription reads: "To boys and girls who listened and came back for more." The author has apparently a happy faculty of making an ordinary incident of adult experience interesting to boys and girls. In each case the preacher tells them what the experience means, for the children could not be supposed to draw the lesson that the preacher does. But what the children do with the lesson the writer does not tell us. They like the stories and come back for more; but the educationalist asks what provision was made for a transfer to the ordinary experiences of the child life, and why the preacher didn't take an incident from the children's experience.

RELIGIOUS DRAMA

COOPER, MIRIAM DENNESS. *The Quest of the Flame.* New York: Century Co., 1930. 33 pages. $0.35.

A Play in the Manner of a Medieval Miracle, reads the subtitle of this little book. It is an altogether beautiful adaptation of an old Christmas legend. The play is powerful in its simplicity and is intended primarily for production in the chancel of the church itself.

COOPER, MIRIAM DENNESS. *The Canticles of Mary.* New York: Century Co., 1930. 42 pages. $0.35.

A Christmas mystery play which is a tableaux-reader arrangement of the birth narratives as found in the Gospel According to Luke. It gives us, not drama, but an appealing pictorial sequence attained through simple means.

EASTMAN, FRED. *Religion and Drama: Friends or Enemies?* New York: Century Co., 1930. 19 pages. $0.25.

Being a brief account of their historical connection and their present relation. This booklet is deserving of special attention, for it would be hard to conceive of a more clearly defined or forceful putting of the case for religious drama. It is a thought-compelling statement, throwing much light on the church's duty as well as her opportunity in this field.

HARNWELL, ANNA J., and MEAKER, ISABELLE J. *The Alabaster Box.* New York: Century Co., 1930. 33 pages. $0.50.

A three-act presentation of an Easter theme. It is decidedly lacking in dramatic power.

ROBERTS, WALTER CHARLES. *The Light.* New York: Century Co., 1930. 42 pages. $0.50.

A Christmas pageant in three episodes. It is both skilfully and artistically written and carries a valid religious appeal. It may be presented by groups varying in size from fifty to more than two hundred persons. Its staging is more or less elaborate.

VAN RENSSELAER, ALEXANDER, and BUTCHER, FRANK. *Yule Light.* New York: Century Co., 1930. xi+41 pages. $0.75.

A Christmas pageant. It is an effective and interesting presentation of traditional material. The play makes much use of the Yule customs of "Merrie England." It could be produced with ease by any church able to furnish thirty or more persons with good singing voices. There is a royalty of $5.00 if no admissions are charged, and of $10.00 if admissions are charged.

MISCELLANEOUS

BILBERG, E. E., *The War Cry of the Sioux: A Historical Romance from the Sioux Outbreak of 1862.* Boston: Christopher Publishing House, 1930. 162 pages. $1.75.

A good story poorly told would seem to characterize this attempt at historical romance. The author is undoubtedly familiar with the main happenings of the Indian uprising in the Dakotas and Minnesota during the Civil War, but has little facility in writing. The story, however, is so interesting that, once begun, the reader will want to finish the tale.

MICHELSON, TRUMAN. *Contributions to Fox Ethnology—II.* (Smithsonian Institution, Bureau of American Ethnology Bulletin 95.) Washington: Government Printing Office, 1930. 183 pages. $0.75.

This pamphlet has two parts. The first (pp. 1–41) is devoted to "A Sketch of the Buffalo Dance of the Bear Gens of the Fox Indians," which the author obtained from a Fox Indian, and contains some five specimens of Fox oratory. An informing diagram (p. 7) of the dance accompanies the description. The second division (pp. 47–182) of the pamphlet consists of "Notes on the Great Sacred Pack of the Thunder Gens of the Fox Indians." The notes are from texts by Fox Indians and are translated by Mr. Michelson. An excellent diagram showing how the summer festival is conducted accompanies the description.

RICHMOND, MARY E. *The Long View.* Papers and addresses by the author, edited by Joanna C. Colcord. New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1930. 648 pages. $3.00.

Selected and for the most part previously published papers of this noted social worker and thinker, extending from 1861 to 1928. A complete list of her published works is given in Appendix A.

ROBERTS, FRANK H. H. *Early Pueblo Ruins in the Piedra District Southwestern Colorado.* (Smithsonian Institution, Bureau of American Ethnology Bulletin 96.) Washington: Government Printing Office, 1930. ix+190 pages. $0.75.

The field work which produced the data for this booklet was conducted in the summer of 1928 in the corner of Colorado bordering on New Mexico, Utah, and Arizona. After an introduction explaining the various stages through which the cultural growth of this region passed, the author describes the progress of their excavations and the results. Numerous drawings and photographs are interspersed, greatly adding to the clarity and interest.

TAYLOR, MARIE E. *Just Boys and Girls of Dear Old Chicago.* Boston: Christopher Publishing House, 1930. 143 pages. $1.50.

An entertaining and healthful story for youngsters.

TROELS-LUND. (Edited by Leo Bloch.) *Himmelsbild und Weltanschauung im Wandel der Zeiten.* 5 Auflage. Leipzig: B. G. Teubner, 1929. 276 pages. M. 8.00.

The fifth edition of a simplified interpretation of human history in terms of the developing conceptions of the difference between day and night, light and darkness, which the author believes to be the inner nerve of all advances in human culture.

UNIVERSITÄT TÜBINGEN. *Reden bei der Rektoratsübergabe am 30. April, 1930. Tübingen:* Mohr, 1930. 32 pages.

This brochure contains the year's report of the retiring rector, Edwin Hennig; the inaugural address of the incoming rector, Enno Littmann, on the subject "Occident and Orient"; and an obituary note on Josef Hass.

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THE PLACE OF ADOLPH VON HARNACK AMONG CHURCH HISTORIANS

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I

ADOLF VON HARNACK was born in 1851. His father, Theodosius Harnack, was then professor of practical theology in the University of Dorpat, Germany. He was the author of *Christian Worship in the Apostolic and Ancient Catholic Period* (1854). His maternal grandfather, Gustav Ewers, edited and published the *Handbook of the History of Dogma* by Muenter[1]—a fact to which the grandson, Professor Harnack, refers with appreciation in the Preface of the first edition of his *History of Dogma*, Volume I (1885). His father-in-law was Professor Thiersch (1817–85), who at one time was a member of the faculty of the University of Marburg (1846–50). Heredity and environment were unusually favorable for the making of the future church historian, perhaps in his generation the most widely known and read scholar of two hemispheres—more of a cosmopolite than Erasmus ever dreamt of becoming. As in the case of Paul, he was set apart from his birth, and called by grace, to a distinctive historical interpretation of the origin and growth of the Christian church.

His academic career covered a period of fifty-four years, not counting the last two years of his retirement from active service.

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[1] *Handbuch der aelteren christlichen D.G.* (1802–4).

He was *privat docent* in church history in the University of Leipsic from 1874 to 1876, when he became *professor extraordinarius* until 1878. He was called to Giessen as *professor ordinarius* in 1879 and remained until 1886. For two years, 1886-88, he taught at Marburg, when he was called to Berlin. Here he resided and lectured and wrote until he died, June 10, 1930. Since 1905 he had served, also, as general director of the Royal Library in Berlin.

His last publication was a pamphlet of 128 pages, with the title, *The Letter of the Roman Church to the Corinthian in the Time of Domitian* (*I Letter of Clement*). He recognized it as his swan song; for on the cover, in large red letters, is the inscription: "Diese Blätter sind mein Abschiedgruss.—A. VON HARNACK."

In the Preface of this tract he allows us to look for a moment into the inner chamber of his soul; we see not only his method of working, the secret of his enormous productivity, but also the joy he had in his comrades, his co-workers, and his gracious acknowledgment of having "learnt more from these studies than they." The whole paragraph is evidence not only of the indefatigable labors of a critical scholar but throbs also with the spirit of a noble soul.

The translation of the passage is as follows:

> With the publication of the following pages I shall close my church-historical Seminar, which I have directed in Leipsic, Giessen, Marburg, and Berlin for 54 years (1874–1928), and which was for me the center of my academic work. A large number of studies and of monographs in the history of the Church by my comrades have come out of the Seminar; yet I surely learnt more from these studies than they. For this I cordially thank them; but above all for the hearty confidence which they constantly showed me. These pages are my farewell greeting; they are to remind my co-workers of the spirit of the Thursday evening hours. It was an earnest, joyous spirit; may it be true to them in heavy times—*non potest non laetari qui sperat in domino!*—He is able to rejoice who hopes in the Lord.
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> V. HARNACK
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> BERLIN, June, 1929

II

To give Professor Harnack his setting—his perspective among church historians—one must show: (1) how he agreed with, and differed from, Baur and the Tübingen school; (2) his relation to the *religionsgeschichtliche Schule* of which Troeltsch was master, and which came into prominence, not without long preparation in the latter part of von Harnack's life; (3) his distinctive point of view, his way of working, and his conception of Jesus Christ and the gospel, which for him is the controlling principle of the history of the church.

Baur died in 1860. Professor Harnack wrote in 1885, "I am far from disparaging the historical importance which belongs to the Tuebingen School." He considers that the highest praise is given it to affirm that Baur and his followers were the first to define the problem of early church history—the rise of Catholicism and the point of beginning for its solution in Paul and Paulinism. At the same time he asserts that "as regards the development of the Church in the second century . . . . the hypotheses of the Tuebingen School have proved themselves everywhere inadequate, nay erroneous, and are today held only by a very few scholars."[2]

Harnack was in full accord with Baur in treating the history of the church as part of universal history. The subject of his St. Louis address (1904) was "The Relation between Ecclesiastical and General History." In it he maintained that there are not two kinds of history: one for the church, the other for the world—a sacred and a profane history. The historian, therefore, must recognize the organic relation between the history of the church and political, religious, philosophical, and economic history. An illustration of this sort of historiography is the *Cambridge Ancient, Medieval, and Modern History.*

The church historians from Eusebius to Neander regarded the church in its origin and its spread as a supernatural institution

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[2] *Reden und Aufsaetze*, II, 220.

—*in* the world but not *of* it. The consequence was a dualism between the history of the world and of the church, each controlled by its own laws and ideals. The two were not organically related and, therefore, the church was not part of the historical process. The world may invade the sphere of the church and the church may subdue the world; men may enter the church and conform to its doctrines and laws, or they may corrupt it by heresies and schisms—but the church itself is part of another order different from the world, after the analogy of the ark in the troubled sea of life.

Harnack agreed also with Baur in rejecting the pragmatic atomistic interpretation of church history, which was in vogue among the rationalists of the eighteenth century. This school was so much engaged in accounting for men and movements through the manifold play and operations of individual and particular causes that it lost sight of the governance of a general idea, a universal reason, of which specific events and persons are partial embodiments. Harnack recognized the value of secondary and accidental causes of phenomena but he held them in subordination to the dominant ideas of an age. The conception of what the Christian religion is "must ever remain the guiding star of our researches, however wide the range which they will have to take."

Harnack conceded, also, that Baur put his finger upon the real problem in the history of early Christianity, namely, to account for the wide gap between Jewish and Pauline Christianity, on the one hand, and between apostolic Christianity and the ancient Catholic church, on the other. Hitherto, Heinrich Thiersch's theory, in one form or another, was prevalent. It was assumed that a fall took place comparable to that of original man in Paradise, from the high plane of the apostles to the low plane of the Apostolic and Greek Fathers.

Baur explained the rise of the ancient Catholic church with its dogmas and institutions by the use of the Hegelian formula of thesis, antithesis, and synthesis. Petrine or Jewish Christianity was the thesis, Pauline or Gentile Christianity was the antithesis, Catholic Christianity was the synthesis. This process of reconciliation was traced in the literary sources. They were interpreted as *Tendenz-Schriften*. The Gospel of Matthew was Jewish Christian, the Gospel of Luke was Pauline or Gentile Christian, Acts and the Gospel of John were the outcome of the reconciliation of opposing tendencies. They conserved the best elements of each and prepared the way for the Catholic church of the third century. Thus ancient Catholicism was supposed to be a product of a modified Jewish and Pauline Christianity—through the toning-down of discords the later developments in dogma, polity, and culture were explained.

Professor Albrecht Ritschl was the first to break away from Baur's theory of the rise of the ancient Catholic church in the second edition of an epoch-making book, entitled *The Origin of the Ancient Catholic Church* (1857). The young Leipsic professor, Harnack, became an ardent follower of Ritschl in his conception both of the essence of the gospel and of the development of early Christianity. In a lecture before the Theological Conference at Giessen in the summer of 1885 on "The Present State of Research in Early Church History" he defines the points in which the Ritschlian historians advanced beyond the Tübingen school. I shall cite only two. First, church historians have discovered that Judaism was far less uniform and far more varied in its religious ideas and interpretations of its traditions than the Tübingen historians assumed. Much is now made of the distinction between the Judaism of the dispersion and that of Palestine, a distinction which has played an important part in the formation of early Christianity but which Baur ignored. Second, the Tübingen school resolved all the antagonisms of the church of the second century into a great antithesis between Jewish and Gentile Christianity. Today it is recognized that Jewish Christianity was, in the second century, no longer a factor in the development of the Christian church. On the soil of gentile Christianity quite new antitheses developed, new issues arose, which had absolutely nothing to do with the problems at issue between Paul and the reactionary Jewish Christians. The Tübingen School did not acknowledge and take account of the new factors that came into the expanding church of the latter part of the first and in the second centuries—the Greek spirit and the spirit of the whole ancient world. In the words of Richard Rothe, which Harnack reiterates in his addresses, "The ancient world built up the Catholic Church on the foundation of the gospel, but in doing so built itself bankrupt."

One must not forget, also, that Professor Harnack's lot was cast in a generation that had become "richer in historical points of view." History was emancipated from the thraldom of theological and philosophical systems. The historical spirit also freed men from the static dogmatism of the religion of nature; Herder and the romanticists, and not least among them, Ranke, acknowledged the relative values in the successive stages of tribal and national life and recognized the supreme significance of personality in human progress. In the study of early church history Harnack had forerunners and contemporaries to whom he felt indebted. Among them were Richard Rothe, von Englehardt, Renan, and Hatch. I heard him say, "Bishop Lightfoot was the greatest Patristic scholar of the 19th century." New documents, or new recensions of known documents, inscriptions in the Roman catacombs, improved editions of the writings of the Greek and Latin Fathers, became part of the working capital of church historians and enabled them to study Christian origins in a more scientific way.

III

Professor Harnack's major works were:

1. *Dogmengeschichte.* 3 vol. 4th ed. 1909.
2. *Texte und Untersuchungen zur Geschichte der altchristlichen Literatur,* by Harnack and von Gebhardt; since 1907 by Harnack and Karl Schmidt. 45 vol. 1883 ff.

One may include in this work the edition of the Apostolic Fathers in collaboration with von Gebhardt and Zahn (1876 ff.).

3. *Geschichte der altchristlichen Literatur bis Eusebius:* (*a*) "Die Ueberlieferung und der Bestand" (1893); (*b*) "Die Chronologie der Literatur bis Irenaeus" (1904); (*c*) "Die Chronologie von Irenaeus bis Eusebius" (1904).
4. *Die Mission und Ausbreitung des Christentums in den ersten drei Jahrhunderte* may also be considered a major work.

Of the score and more of books, pamphlets, and articles we shall not make mention.

1. The publication of the first volume of the *History of Dogma* attracted the attention of the scholarly world. Here was a history of dogma that was based upon an accurate knowledge of the sources and was at the same time a work of literary art—pure science in exquisite rhetoric. That alone sufficed to give the author a position of eminence among church historians. His conception of dogma and of the factors that entered into its making were original and raised questions and protests both among orthodox and liberal scholars.

Harnack's work marks an advance beyond all previous treatments of this branch of church history. "It abandons the customary division into a general and a special section, with the wearisome mustering of all the dogmatic *loci* of each period, describing instead, in interesting succession, the characteristic dogmatic movements of each period, in accounts of the labors, opponents, and conflicts of the respective representative theologians and churches." Harnack was free from Baur's philosophical prepossessions, *die Selbstbewegung des Begriffs*, as Pfleiderer calls it. He shows "how the ideas took shape in the minds of individual theologians, how widely different motives of faith and philosophy, of cultus and ecclesiastical usage and constitution co-operated and reacted, how common interests were promoted or retarded by the opinions and passions of individuals." In this way the history of dogma acquires much greater life and richer variety than are found in Baur's *History of Dogma*.

Harnack blazed a new path, also, in his definition of dogma and of the factors that entered into its development. He limited dogma to the authoritative doctrinal decrees of the ancient and medieval church—an infallible statement of "the faith which ought to animate every Christian heart, and which makes the Christian a Christian."[3] The history of dogma, in his sense of the term, comes to a close in the sixteenth century when there is a threefold issue: (1) Tridentine Catholicism including Jesuitism and Vaticanism; (2) anti-Trinitarianism and Socinianism; (3) Lutheranism. Of the first, the Council of Trent and its outcome, he says, "The whole idea of dogma, however, is in reality discarded so far as it is left to each individual to determine whether or not he can adopt the faith in its whole extent."[4] Of Socinianism he says, "It broke with the old dogma and discarded it." Of the Reformation he says, "The Reformation obtained a new point of departure for the framing of the Christian faith in the Word of God and it discarded all forms of infallibility. . . . . In this way that view of Christianity from which dogma arose was set aside."[5] The Reformation is in principle the dissolution of Catholicism in the antique Christian sense of that term. In this respect Harnack has had no followers. Loofs, Krueger, Otto Ritschl, and, of course, Reinhold Seeberg, have traced in their books the history of dogma through the Reformation to the present time.

Of more significance, however, was his epigrammatic statement that Christian dogma is "the work of the Hellenic spirit on the soil of the Gospel." In other words, "The Catholic Church is rather that form of Christianity in which every element of the ancient world has been successively assimilated, which Christianity could in any way take up into itself without utterly losing itself in the world."[6] In short, Catholicism is the Hellenization of the gospel. Harnack was not the first to advance this theory; Erasmus and the later rationalists—Toland, Souverain,

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[3] *History of Dogma* (English trans.), VII, 23.

[4] *Ibid.*

[5] *Ibid.*, p. 24.

[6] *Reden und Aufsaetze*, II, 229–30.

Gruener, and Loeffler—traced the elements in the dogma of the church that were alien to the simple gospel to Greek sources.[7] Harnark, however, worked from a new point of view and with a master-mind and a master-hand.

But he offended both orthodox Catholic and Protestant theologians on the one hand and failed to satisfy the liberal and radical historians on the other. The former felt that he submerged Christianity in Hellenism; the latter, that, in a measure at least, he divorced Christianity from history. The *religionsgeschichtliche Schule* considers the formula of the Hellenization of Christianity too narrow in scope and puts strong emphasis on the oriental influences which are in evidence in the cultus and in the non-theological faith of the congregation rather than in official dogmas.[8] At the same time, however, Hans von Soden finds in Harnack's interpretation of church history the curative antidote to Spengler's succession of purposeless cycles of human cultures that have no vital relation to one another.[9] Harnack considered Jesus to be unique, not so much in doctrine as in person and life. He cannot be accounted for by historical development or by psychological analysis. This point he emphasized especially in an address in 1901 when he said, "Christianity in its pure form is not a religion beside others, but it is *the* Religion. It is the Religion because Jesus Christ was not a master among others but the Master."[10]

The liberals, such as Pfleiderer, Troeltsch the leader of the *religionsgeschichtliche Schule*, and Loisy the Catholic modernist, charged Harnack with being in the grip of an a priori, an absolute, in the light of which he explains and criticizes the beginning and the growth of the dogmas and institutions of the church. The essential gospel is the measure of values in the development of the church; that alone is the permanently valid in the changing historical forms.[11] Troeltsch, for example, in his resolve to be true to the historical method, knows no absolute, deals only with the relative. He regards Christianity as one of the religions; Jesus as one of the founders. All of the religions and founders may be superseded. At this point Pfleiderer finds the chief defect in what he considers in other respects an epoch-making work in Harnack's *History of Dogma*. He says:

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[7] See Glawe, *Die Hellenisirung des Christenthums, etc.* (1912).

[8] Harnack, *Ehrung*, article by Hans von Soden, p. 471.

[9] *Ibid.*, pp. 473–78.

[10] Die Aufgabe der theologischen Fakultaeten, *Reden und Aufsaetze*, II, 172.

> Whilst Baur was wont to interpret dogmas in relation to their age and to judge of them as the necessary expression of the Christian consciousness in the various stages of its historic development, Harnack, on the contrary, is accustomed in his estimate of the formation of dogma to apply a standard foreign to it and brought from another region, which was the habit of earlier Rationalistic historians.[12]

This criterion is the gospel of Jesus. Pfleiderer contends that what Harnack and the Ritschlian school call "the gospel" is not a historical datum but an ideal that does not correspond to a concrete historical fact, whether one seeks it in the teaching of Jesus, in the Synoptic Gospels, or in the New Testament as a whole. In his conception of the gospel Harnack, it is claimed, is no more true to history than the Tübingen school or the rationalists of the eighteenth century. In identifying the beginning of Christianity with an absolute ideal and making that the test of value of historical developments, one necessarily must take, as Harnack does, a pessimistic view of church history, similar to that of the earlier orthodox and the later rationalist historians. Church history, then, becomes a process of secularization, a gradual corruption of the original ideal, a progressive Hellenization, Romanization, and humanizing of Christianity. The first result was Gnosticism, which Harnack described as "an acute Hellenization of the Gospel." This humanizing process is counteracted and overcome through reforms led by great personalities, in whom the original gospel, at least to some degree, again becomes active, such as Athanasius, Augustine, Luther.

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[11] Harnack, *Ehrung*, Rade's article, p. 455.

[12] *Development of Modern Theology*, p. 428.

2. The other major works, the *History of Christian Literature* and the *Texte und Untersuchungen*, were the outcome, partly at least, of his exhaustive studies in the preparation of the *History of Dogma*. In the Foreword of the first volume of the *History of Christian Literature* he says, "Long before I began the *History of Dogma* I collected and sifted material for a history of ancient Christian literature." Accordingly, when the Royal Prussian Academy of Science proposed a new edition of the *Greek Church Fathers* (1891), Harnack, in collaboration with Licentiate E. Preusschen, entered upon the colossal task of publishing a history of Christian literature covering the period from the apostles to Eusebius. The first part appeared in 1893. One may include in this kind of work the edition of "The Writings of the Apostolic Fathers"[13] in the preparation of which Harnack was associated with Oscar von Gebhardt and Professor Zahn.

When von Gebhardt died, having been a co-worker with Harnack for thirty-three years, the latter wrote a memorial tribute in the second series of *Texte und Untersuchungen*, Volume XV, in which he throws so much light on the genius of his own life that I venture to quote a paragraph:

> When I learnt to know him [von Gebhardt] at Leipsic in 1872, he was twenty-eight years old, I was twenty-one. He was by far my superior in knowledge and experience, superior above all in his appreciation [*Einsicht*] of the fact that work half-done or poorly done is worse than laziness [*Faulheit*]. I then began to set my sails for a joyous voyage into the realm of science, which like a sun-lit ocean lay before me. He disdained not to steer his vessel, which had wrestled with wind and wave, by the side of mine.

3. The *Texte und Untersuchungen* contain the result of fifty-four years of historical critical studies of the sources and authorities of church history by the foremost biblical and church historians of the generation of which Professor Harnack was the guiding spirit. Some of his monographs, as, for example, his book on Marcion, were first published in the successive volumes

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[13] *Patrum apostolicorum opera.*

of this series of studies. This is a truly monumental work which in church history probably has no equal; which has, however, inspired scholars in other lands to engage in similar researches of high value. So far as critical scholarship is concerned, the sources of church history have been prepared for the use of the historian with the same scientific accuracy as the sources of secular history by men like von Ranke, Mommsen, and their contemporaries and successors. It matters not what historians of different schools may think of von Harnack's conception of Jesus Christ and the gospel and of his interpretation of the development of primitive into Catholic Christianity, historical scholars of all lands and churches and times will acknowledge the permanent value of the point of view, the method of study, and the results of indefatigable labors that are found in these major works for which we are in large part indebted to von Harnack. These studies are sufficiently scientific and free from theological prepossessions to satisfy even the profanest of the profane historians of the American Historical Society.

In his *Epochen der Kirchengeschichtschreibung*,[14] Baur speaks with admiration of the breadth of the scope of vision, the gigantic labors, the massive accumulation of material taken from every known source that one finds in the *Magdeburg Centuries*, the *Annals of Baronius*, and Arnold's *Kirchen- und Ketzerhistorie*. He realizes, however, that these works are merely a vast accumulation of raw material which must be critically sifted and analyzed before it can be used by the church historian of the present and the future. "*Die Masse hat noch weit die Uebergewicht ueber die Form*" ("The mass by far overbalances the form").

Furthermore, each new distinctive interpretation of history must be based upon a deeper and richer study of the sources, in which the wealth of historical life and its manifestation in outward form are unveiled. Historians, like Neander, Giessler, and Baur, led the way into the study of the sources. Their work, however, was carried forward in grand style and with improved methods by Harnack and his associates. For this the Berlin professor, with his fifty-four years of active life and labors, will always rank among the foremost historians of the church of all time.

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[14] P. 116.

IV

Professor von Harnack was a richly gifted personality. He was a master of source work (*Quellenforschung*), and skilled in the arrangement and presentation of massive material in clear, fascinating form. His *History of Dogma* is a work of literary art, full of vitality, interest, and rich in power of fascinating the reader. He was brilliant as a lecturer, capable of inspiring his pupils with enthusiasm for history as well as guiding them with never failing patience in the scientific mastery of its content. He was a man of the finest culture, with sympathies wide as humanity; he bowed reverently and humbly before the mystery of the universe and of life. To understand the spirit of the man, in addition to the science and art of the scholar, one must read and ponder the articles, addresses, and memorial tributes that are published in the seven volumes of *Reden und Aufsaetze* and *Aus Wissenschaft und Leben*. He is one of the inexplicable men of genius—men that appear only at long intervals of time but for whose lives and labors the world is a little brighter and better. Such men belong to the ages.

TRAGIC ACTION IN THE SECOND GOSPEL: A STUDY IN THE NARRATIVE OF MARK

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STUDY of the narrative of the gospel according to Mark, with particular reference to its plot and its chief character, Jesus, indicates that the Man of Nazareth is to be classed among the outstanding tragic figures of the race, an accompanying conclusion being that the Second Gospel comes under the classification of Greek tragedy.

In support of this thesis it is proposed first to sketch the plot of Mark, tracing its complication to the climax, which has also a recognition scene after the Aristotelian canon (*Poetics* xi, xvi–xvii), thence to the tragic end, with some exposition of the opposing forces as these appear in the course of the action. The second part of this article will present a discussion of the degree of correspondence of Jesus with the ideal tragic hero of Aristotle, and will point out conclusions as to the genuinely tragic function of the whole action.

The Second Gospel must be regarded as a closet drama,[1] that is, drama whose power is felt by the reader without stage presentation. For the gospel is not divided into acts and scenes, consists only in part of dialogue, has no stage directions, and lacks the "embellishment of song," unless, with some, a kind of Hebrew parallelism be discovered in certain verses. Yet within its prose narrative the Second Gospel has a well-constructed plot that corresponds to the demands of Greek dramatic criticism[2] as shown in the following sketch of the story of Mark.

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[1] "Fear and pity may be aroused by any spectacular means, but they may also result from the inner structure of the piece, which is a better way, and indicates a superior poet. For the plot ought to be so constructed that, even without the aid of the eye, he who hears the tale will thrill with horror and melt to pity at what takes place" (*Poetics* xiv. 1 [Butcher's translation, as elsewhere below, from *Aristotle's Theory of Poetry and Fine Art*, by permission of The Macmillan Co., publishers]).

I. THE PLOT, OR STORY, THAT CONSTITUTES THE TRAGIC ACTION IN MARK

Jesus, a young man of Galilee, known to his fellow-villagers in Nazareth as "the carpenter" (6:3), at the beginning of the story is found responding to the call of a prophet, John, who had come from his desert retreat to proclaim a new era for Israel and to demand radical reforms on the part of those who would enter into its realization (1:4–8).

Jesus left home to identify himself with the new movement by submitting to the rite of baptism, which John administered to all that showed sympathy with his program (1:9). It would appear, from the ready response of Jesus to John's call, that reflection upon the contemporary forms of religion had led him to conclusions that differed from those of the conventional leaders in Judaism (1:22). As Jesus' later message showed (6:34), he was convinced that his people were deprived of real spiritual leadership, that they were as "sheep not having a shepherd." His initial message stressed the imminence of a "reign of God" that should be for his folk adequate, inspiring, and impartial (1:15).

Jesus' response to the prophet cost him dear, for his relatives were out of sympathy with his departure from home (3:21, 31–35), and as time went on they came to believe that Jesus was demented. The alliance with John was probably of short duration (1:9,12). The impulse that drove Jesus into the wilderness marks the rise of certain opposing forces, following the discovery that he could not work with John the Baptist,[3] and offers the occasion for the so-called temptation. In the arena of this spiritual conflict Jesus met Satan, whom contemporary Jewish thought pictured as leader of a spiritual order opposing all good, and of whose reality Jesus had no doubt (1:13; 3:23). The temptation is conceived of as a period during which Jesus decided upon his program and method of bringing the people of Israel under the real leadership of God.[4]

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[2] "Tragedy is an imitation of an action that is complete, whole and of a certain magnitude. A whole is that which has a beginning, a middle and an end. A beginning is that which does not follow anything by causal necessity, but after which something naturally follows some other thing, either as a necessity or as a rule. A well-constructed plot, therefore, must neither begin nor end at haphazard, but conform to these principles" (*ibid.* vii. 2 f., by permission of The Macmillan Co., publishers).

[3] The question of method seems to have separated the two reformers. Jesus deferred the initiation of his own movement until the time "after John was delivered up" (1:14).

It is in harmony with the rest of the action to suppose that as Jesus reflected upon the method by which he should seek to purify religion, Satan (1:13) is thought of as the directing influence in certain plans presented to Jesus' mind. But the plot, as it develops, shows that Jesus selected peasant companions, proclaimed the imminence of a new order, and directed attention to the power of God by healing diseases, casting out demons, and exercising authority over that demon world represented by the Satan who had "tempted him the while" as Jesus worked out his plan in his wilderness retreat.

Not long after the first public appearance of Jesus (2:6) a formidable opposing force arose in the persons of several scribes, who represented the Jewish hierarchy. At Capernaum Jesus healed a paralytic, forthwith announcing the forgiveness of the man's sins (2:5). The scribes took issue and the struggle was on. Definite issues formed the subject of a series of debates (2:1—3:6), as follows: the right to forgive sins, association with those whom contemporary religious leaders ostracized, abstention from fasting, observation of the Sabbath, especially with respect to healing on that day—all of which debates resulted in a triumph for Jesus. Failing in argument, the scribes turned to conspiracy (3:6) against the hero.[5]

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[4] The brief notice of Mark leads to the inference that Satan did not appear bodily (not even in 1:13) but rather worked on the minds and behavior of those whom he "possessed" (as in 8:33, where Peter is vividly addressed as "Satan").

[5] The view of Martin Albertz (*Die synoptischen Streitgespräche*), that this series of "controversies" was found by Mark and adapted to his narrative, without deleting the conspiracy of 3:6, thus failing to harmonize with the Markan plan, which first introduces this note directly after the scenes at Caesarea Philippi and the mount (chaps. 8–9), may be fully accepted. Whatever the original purpose of the collection, the material func-

Some account should be made of the popular movement that attended the public activity of Jesus in Galilee. Apparently favorable, in reality this was a menace to Jesus' safety. It hindered his private instruction of the disciples, so that he withdrew from the cities (1:45), yet the multitude sought him as he crossed and recrossed the Sea of Galilee (4:35 f.; 5:18; 6:32, 45), as he went to Tyre and Sidon (7:24), and again as he retired with his disciples to the north (8:27 ff). True, only one act of hostility on the part of the people appeared during the first part of his activity, namely, in his own village of Nazareth (6:1 ff.). The Gerasenes asked him to leave their territory for reasons not at all connected with his reform rôle. Only in the last part of the action did the fickleness of human applause appear when (15:11) "the chief priests incited the multitude" to demand the death of Jesus.

The so-called Galilean ministry (up to 8:30) presents the rising action of the tragedy of Jesus. With the words, "And he began to teach them that the Son of man must suffer many things, and be rejected by the elders and the chief priests and the scribes, and be killed" (8:31), Mark introduces the "change of fortune" of his hero.[6]

In order to appreciate the tragic significance of this reversal of fortune let it be recalled that for many decades the Jewish people had been expecting the advent of an outstanding person, who should be commissioned of God to lead his nation to victory and peace. A popular form of this expectation had it that a

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tions admirably to illustrate in detail the rising tide of opposition. For the mention of the conspiracy and the alliance of Pharisees and Herodians (3:6) accentuates the fact that at this point the position of Jesus is considered a strong one.

[6] Aristotle *op. cit.* x: "Plots are either simple or complex. . . . . A complex action is one in which the change is accompanied by Reversal, or by Recognition, or by both." In Mark both change of fortune and recognition occur in chaps. 8 and 9, namely, the so-called "confession of Peter" at Caesarea Philippi and the transfiguration scene. These two narratives function mutually to intensify the recognition of Jesus as Messiah, while the "falling action" toward the dénouement reveals the manner in which the action swings upon the massive pivot of the recognition scene. (By permission of The Macmillan Co., publishers.)

descendant of David was to occupy the throne and make of Israel a great and enduring nation. As this messianic expectation was universal, though its form might vary with times and parties, Mark assumes that each of the dramatis personae was thoroughly acquainted with the fact. The answer of Peter at Caesarea Philippi, "Thou art Messiah," is the heart of the recognition scene, for as Mark delineates the action, Jesus had hitherto been known as "the carpenter" (6:3). From that moment indicated in 8:29 the carpenter became to the disciples the Messiah. Dramatic tension is maintained by the introduction of Jesus' cautionary word (8:30) that "they should divulge this to no one."

The placing of the scene of transfiguration directly after that dialogue at Caesarea Philippi intensifies the recognition of Jesus as the Messiah. His face luminous (transfigured) and his clothing glowing, he is seen by his disciples in conversation with worthies of old, Moses and Elijah. Words from their prophetic writings might well have come to the minds of the bewildered onlookers, identifying the radiant Jesus with that other transscendant being, the Son of Man.

In dignity yet with falling fortunes the hero of the story took his way to Jerusalem. He frequently reminded his followers that he was facing an untimely fate. The air, no longer that of enthusiastic Galilee, grew murky with shadowy premonitions, skulking figures, treachery within the band, double-edged questions from inquiring scribes and at last definite conspiracy on the part of the hierarchy.

Meanwhile, Jesus entered the Temple itself, emptied the sacred inclosure of its trading and roguery, and emerged from his controversy as to his authority for the Temple-cleansing with calm but decisive words (11:33*b*): "I do not need to tell you in what my authority consists." The cutting parable that followed offered definite occasion for the renewing of the offense on the part of Jewish leaders.

Events moved swiftly toward the tragic event. The triumphal procession, a remarkable combination of royal claim and show of humility, was but the forecast of the procession along the Via Dolorosa. The Last Supper gave Judas the coveted opportunity to do conveniently his deed of treachery. The precious perfume lavished upon Jesus' body was in fact an anointing unto death. Every incident, in those days was darkened by the shadow of the cross. In the garden, while that last fierce struggle with self was raging, the friends of Jesus slept. A few minutes later the very disciple who made his pronouncement of recognition in the northern retreat was ready to deny that he had ever known Jesus. The tragic incident itself (*Poetics* xi. 6) was the crucifixion, following the arrest, trial, and condemnation.

The details were few. The leaders, fearing popular interference (14:2), planned how to obtain possession of their victim privately. Once under arrest, a few skilful leaders could shape the temper of the crowd—midnight and Gethsemane, hall of the chief priest, witness after witness, affectation of horror at alleged blasphemy, appeal to Pilate to bring into action the Roman judicial power!

Dramatically enough, while Judas was leading his band out to arrest Jesus in his retreat in Gethsemane, the hero was raising for the last time the question as to his supreme devotement to the path upon which he had come thus far. Shall he follow his chosen program even unto death? "Father, if it be possible, remove this cup!" However much he may have shrunk from the consequences, he won his victory over any selfish suggestion that harassed him and turned calmly to face his enemies. "And they bring him unto the place Golgotha, ... and they crucify him, and part his garments among them, casting lots upon them what each should take. . . . . And they that were crucified with him reproached him. . . . . And at the ninth hour . . . . Jesus uttered a loud voice, and gave up the ghost" (15:22–37).

In further comment upon the story, attention should be called to the presence, here and there, of bystanders who function in the tragedy of Jesus as did the chorus in the classical plays. As the group of mariners in the *Ajax* of Sophocles, or the chorus of Mycenean women in the *Electra*, offer their comments upon the action, so the inhabitants of Capernaum or a group of the disciples themselves, on occasion, or a deputation of scholars from Jerusalem interpolate chorus-like comments upon events or separate scenes in Mark.

An example (4:41) is offered in the words, "Who, then, is this, whom even the winds and the sea obey?" The function of the question in heightening the dramatic effect of the narrative is similar to words of the chorus in Sophocles' *Antigone* ii. 278 f., with reference to the discovery that Polyneices' body had been buried, contrary to Creon's decree:

> I had misgivings from the first, my liege,
> Of something more than natural at work.

Other examples of the chorus motif introduced by the writer of the Markan tragedy are found in the short ejaculations, as (2:12*b*) "We never saw it thus," in the expression of wonder on the part of the hearers, "And . . . . they questioned among themselves, saying: A new teaching with authority" (1:27); "He hath done all things well; he maketh even the deaf to hear and the dumb to speak" (7:37*b*).

The chorus as such is to be distinguished from simple dialogue, as found throughout the gospel in normal measure. But dialogue in the hands of a dramatist may serve to prepare for an episode of importance, as in the case of Sophocles' *Electra* (1098–1173) where a dialogue between the chorus, Electra, and Orestes prepares skilfully for the recognition scene in which Electra finds that her living brother stands before her and that his ashes are not in the urn which she holds in her hand.

Mark uses a shorter dialogue (8:27–30; 9:5–7) in each part of his twofold recognition scene to introduce the recognition itself. The *Electra* cited, it may be noted, has also a double recognition scene. In the first part Chrysothemis identifies the hand of Orestes in the libations at Agamemnon's tomb, and in the second part, after hearing her sister's story, Electra meets and at length recognizes Orestes.

II. JESUS THE PROTAGONIST IN THE TRAGEDY OF MARK

In comment upon the plot outlined above the answers to two questions will be sought: (1) Does Jesus meet the requirements of an ideal tragic hero? (2) In what way does the action in Mark function as genuine tragedy?

1. In the thirteenth chapter of the *Poetics*, Aristotle discusses the type of hero demanded in good tragedy. The spectacle of a blameless (ἐπιεικής) man who is brought from prosperity to adversity is alien to tragedy, for it is simply shocking. Likewise, the spectacle of a bad man brought from adversity to prosperity possesses no single tragic quality. The downfall of an utter villain may satisfy the moral sense but cannot excite pity or fear. Such may be poetic justice but not tragic action. The ideal hero is neither extremely good nor utterly bad, but rather inclines toward the good and is preferably of exalted station in life. This hero must be human, like the spectators or readers of the tragedy, else he cannot inspire in them the appropriate emotions. Aristotle includes in his discussion the canon that the tragic hero meets his fate, not through sin, as such, but through a tragic error in judgment or conduct (ἀλλὰ δι' ἁμαρτίαν τινά).

At first sight the traditional sinlessness of Jesus would seem to disqualify him, in the light of the canon against blamelessness in character. The claim of sinlessness is not made in the Second Gospel, however, while his genuine humanity is so stressed by Mark that it may be possible to identify even a tragic error.

Butcher[7] suggests that Aristotle's reluctance to admit a perfect character to the place of protagonist is that "blameless goodness seldom has the quality needed to make it dramatically interesting." It wants the motive power which leads to decisive acts of will, which impels others to action and produces a collision of forces. "Goodness, ... in refusing to strike back, brings the action to a standstill."

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[7] *Op. cit.*, pp. 310 ff.

The same writer notes, however, that in classic Greek tragedy there is to be found Antigone, who, though a blameless character, serves admirably as protagonist in a genuine tragic action. Too much stress should not be laid, therefore, upon any particular shade of goodness resident in the hero. Rather the test is to be found in the ability to carry the part. For example, the ability to make a decision of high moral quality and to hold it in the face of determined opposition belongs to the part of protagonist and is also "dramatically interesting."[8]

The Occidental point of view may prefer to speak of a contest of wills rather than of a contest between an individual and "fate" or "destiny." Certainly the dramatic action in Mark is that centralized in a supreme will which sees clearly what it wants, pursues its way toward its goal, at first overcoming opposing wills, at length overcome in the contest by mighty opposing wills. It is the clash of the prophet's will with the will of the established order, a theme not new even in the first century.

Precisely the rigid adherence of Jesus to the program that he chose at the opening of his public ministry brought him to the judgment hall and to the cross. Coincident with the reversal of fortune, this hero foresaw the tragic outcome (8:31) and sent out a challenge to all who would ally themselves with him in devotement to the same program. "If any man will come after me, let him deny himself, and take up his cross and follow me." Jesus talked of a baptism and a cup, in which the truly ambitious should share (10:38), holding that all that is worth while in life is to serve men, at whatever cost (10:42 ff.).

History was written in too-large characters for Jesus not to see that his fate could be no other than that of the prophets, who, in seeking to purify religion of its imperfections, had been stoned or otherwise martyred.[9] The descendants of their executioners had reared the prophets' tombs all too late.

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[8] Brunetière (Preface of *Annales du théâtre* [1893]) makes the test of a tragic hero practically to center about the exercise of will. "Some one central character wants something." Hence tragedy represents the defeat of a person whose will is directed at an object the attainment of which is denied by some more powerful will. (Brander Matthews, *Study of the Drama*, p. 94.) The French critic "found a confirmation of his theory," remarks Matthews, "in the fact that the drama has flourished most amply when the national will has stiffened itself for a magnificent effort," (*op. cit.*, p. 96, by permission of Houghton Mifflin Co., publishers).

Butcher[10] protests that in the case of a martyr who perishes while the cause for which he contended actually flourishes because of his death, the tragedy is not true to classic form. The protest is not well sustained, for Butcher includes too much in the action. The sequel of the gospel story of Jesus, as found in the later additions to Mark and in other gospels, does not belong to the Markan narrative.[11] The *Iphigenia in Tauris* does follow in sequence the *Iphigenia at Aulis*, but each plot has its distinct unity. The tragic action in Mark ends with the finding of the empty grave, suggesting an element of mystery but offering no happy ending.[12]

Two objections may be urged against the inclusion of the resurrection story in the tragedy of Jesus. First, the resurrection forms the beginning of a new story. Second, if introduced, the resurrection offers an anticlimax to the story as the accepted text of Mark offers it. Aristotle's objection to the "happy ending" has already been adduced. In regard to the first objection, support is found in the demand for unity of plot. The classic definition of tragedy demands that it involve such a series of selected events that the whole shall possess unity—a unity of plot, not unity of hero (*Poetics* viii). "All the actions of a man do not make unity," says the Greek critic. Tragic action must be definite, unitary, in that the action begins, rises to a climax and ends. The "end" of the action in Mark is the death and burial of the hero. Events continue to occur, but they belong to other stories.

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[9] I Thess. 2:15: "Jews, who both killed the Lord Jesus and the prophets."

[10] *Op. cit.*, pp. 311 f.

[11] Here may be found a good argument for the view that the ending of Mark was never lost—a view further supported by the discovery that the word γάρ occurs more than once at the end of a Greek sentence.

[12] Aristotle contends that in a well-constructed plot the change of fortune should be not from bad to good, but reversely, from good to bad. They are in error, he says (*op. cit.* xiii. 4–6), who censure Euripides just because he follows this principle in his plays, many of which end unhappily. (By permission of The Macmillan Co., publishers.)

In answering the question, then, whether Jesus meets the requirements of the ideal tragic hero, an affirmative is reached if Jesus stands out as a man who sets his will to the attainment of a definite somewhat, holding even the continuation of life itself subordinate to the attainment of his aim. His words at Caesarea Philippi (8:35) express this attitude: "For whosoever would save his life shall lose it, and whosoever shall lose his life for my sake and the gospel's sake shall save it."

With Antigone, the blameless heroine of the Greek stage, the tragic error that brought about her downfall was her persistence in the choice of a higher duty. What can be identified in the story of Jesus as the tragic error? No sin as such can be found in Jesus' life, even though no claim is made for his sinlessness in the Second Gospel.

The identification of a tragic error, through or by which Jesus was brought to his death, is not absolutely certain. The tragic error in Aristotle's judgment was not *κακία*, i.e., sin or vice as such, but judgment, and would not involve moral turpitude. In the case of Jesus an early choice was made of a program and method of carrying on his ministry. This chosen method involved, as Jesus saw, definite antagonisms between himself and the constituted authorities, especially in those points brought out in the controversy sections (2:1—3:6; 11:27–33; 12:13–40). This is the most likely identification of the "error" in Mark. It would be possible to find the "tragic error" in connection with the refusal of Jesus to take the crown as Messiah but for the fact that Mark omits reference to this (cf. John 6:15 with Mark 6:35), although John includes data that associate repulse of the popular clamor with the hasty voyage across the lake. Or again, the triumphal procession down the slope of Olivet toward Jerusalem (11:1–10) might constitute a strategic error on the part of Jesus as he was bringing his program to the capital city. But not a single word about the manner of entrance into the city is cited against Jesus in Mark's account of his trial. Thus it seems advisable to discover Jesus' "tragic error" in the choice of and rigid adherence to his program.

2. Satisfied that Jesus fulfils to a degree the classic requirements for protagonist, the further question needs to be asked: In what way or to what extent does the action in Mark function as genuine tragedy?

The tragic hero in classic drama is a man of like nature with those who behold his misfortune. Although generally the protagonist is a conspicuous person (i.e., of prominent family), his fate is such as any one of his beholders might experience. His death, or his passage from prosperity to adversity, fills the spectator with pity, for the misfortune is unmerited. The kindred emotion is fear. One pities the hero in a situation which, if it should become one's own lot, would induce fear. With Aristotle, true tragedy produces both pity and fear, even if the latter, as he says, is modified somewhat by the fact that the tragedy is in the realm of art rather than in reality.

The contact between hero and spectator indicates that tragedy is really universal in that it deals with human experience. Not many different dramatic situations are possible.[13] In human experience the same combination of dramatic elements have confronted the spectator and he sees himself, either potentially or actually, in the artistic representation of the unfolding plot. "The poet and historian differ," says Aristotle, "not by writing in prose or in verse. The true difference is that one relates what has happened, the other what may happen. . . . . Poetry tends to express the universal, history the particular."

The modern reader of Mark is impressed with the injustice of killing a good man whose aim was to purify and ennoble life. Pity in a real sense is felt not for the man hanging on the cross so much as for the man who prophesies his own fate yet continues resolutely upon the fateful path. This is constructive pity, not empty sentiment. Such pity might well deserve the approval of an Aristotle in that it purifies the soul, ennobles the thinking, and clarifies the insight of the beholder into the deeper truths of life.

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[13] See Georges Polti, *The Thirty-six Dramatic Situations* (1924), a translation by Lucile Ray.

Fear, the other side of pity, turns toward the spectator himself. The tragic action of Mark is not merely a bit of history; it is a transcript of life. The life of Jesus is universal in the sense that essentially the same conflict which he found to be fatal may well confront the reader of his tragedy. In the Markan plot the death-grapple of mankind with the enemies of truth, with error itself, is finely portrayed. Wrong may be intrenched in custom and supported by tradition. Men who champion new vision of truth must ever combat well-barricaded champions of untruth. Eternally, it would seem all progress costs pain and even death.

The story of the carpenter of Nazareth who proved to be the Messiah (son of King David, 10:47 f.; 12:35 ff.) belongs among the ranking tragedies of world-literature. Its writer may or may not have been familiar with the written works of Aristotle, nevertheless his art is clearly in correspondence with principles on which the drama of his day was constructed. The church early saw its dramatic power, and to the present day the passion story of the gospel draws beholders from all the earth to witness again its moving action as presented by living players. Many are those who take up the cross daily in response to the challenge of the written gospel. The work of Mark, the writer of the Second Gospel, is the undying appeal of the man of Nazareth to follow in his footsteps, in the path of unfaltering loyalty to the vision of truth.

This study is offered as a contribution to the understanding of the estimate of Jesus that flourished in the minds of his followers a few decades after his death. It seems clear that the Second Gospel is not intended as a biography of Jesus, but as a portrayal of the meaning and the power of his self-sacrificing ministry.

ROYCE ON THE PROBLEM OF EVIL[1]

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THE treatment of the problem of evil by the absolute idealists has been particularly unsatisfactory to their opponents. The arguments which they use to defend the presence of evil in a universe which, according to idealistic logic, is perfect, are similar to those employed by the Stoics many years ago. These arguments received brilliant criticism at an early date and yet have reappeared at various intervals throughout the history of philosophy. At the present time it seems that the theist is unable to swerve very far from the general approach of monistic idealism to the problem of evil even though he may not agree with the whole metaphysical system. The problem is still that of the Stoics: If the whole is perfect, why are the parts imperfect?

Perhaps no member of the group of absolute idealists has faced this question more frankly than Josiah Royce, and it is to him I feel inclined to turn for a satisfactory answer if one is to be found. Royce insists that the real key to the solution of the problem of evil is to be found in the central thesis of idealism.

> The idealist maintains that there is in the universe but one perfectly real being, namely, the Absolute, that the Absolute is self-conscious, and that his world is essentially in its wholeness the fulfilment *in actu* of an all-perfect ideal. We ourselves exist as fragments of the absolute life, or better, as partial functions in the unity of the absolute and conscious process of the world. On the other hand, our existence and our individuality are not illusory, but are what they are in an organic unity with the whole life of the Absolute Being.[2]

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[1] Part of a dissertation presented for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Yale University, 1929.

[2] J. Royce, "The Problem of Job," *Studies of Good and Evil*, p. 15.

How is this principle the key to the solution of our problem? Let us consider first of all the way in which it deals with the fact of suffering. Finite beings are included in the Absolute, and all of their experiences are the experiences of the Absolute. When an individual suffers, therefore, that suffering is God's suffering. All of our experiences are included just as they are in the absolute life. The pains, the sufferings, and the ills of fortune which come to us are genuine parts of the absolute experience. The Absolute, however, knows perfectly all of our experiences while we are unable to view them in their wholeness, in their entirety, as he does. This accounts for the fact that many times the universe seems to us partly evil in its very structure. We are unable in our finite existence to be fully aware of what it is for which we hope, what precisely our ideals are. Thus it is not strange that what we think to be our purposes seem to be met not merely with resistance on the part of the universe, but with positive defeat. Again, we cannot fully know the effects of our acts. We have to learn the nature of things piecemeal, unable to take in everything at a single glance. The Absolute, whose experience includes our fragmentary knowledge in the temporal order, is nevertheless fully conscious of all of the effects of all acts.[3]

There are present here two different notions which are both upheld and yet which seem to conflict. One is that the Absolute experience is one in which the triumph over evil is included as well as the evil itself, and the other is that the Absolute includes our experience of evil just as we experience it. This supposition seems to involve a contradiction in terms.[4] It asserts that a mental state can remain the same although its relationships in consciousness are decisively altered. We have been discussing the question of suffering. The suffering which I experience as a real evil is that in which there is to me no justification for it, that which comes as genuine defeat. How can I have this type of suffering and in the same consciousness have the answer to the seeming irrationality of it? I can remember this evil as a past experience, but this memory of it is not identical with the experience itself. The way in which I can imagine with vividness the suffering of the past is to banish from my mind as far as possible the consciousness of my more recent triumph. It is true, of course, that the present inclusive experience is what it is partly because of the temporal duration in which my suffering was meaningless, or when it meant only defeat to me. However, there remains always the distinction between the immediate feeling of the state of suffering which I had and my later knowledge of that state. Now when we think of the inclusion of all this in the Absolute we must do away with the time element. All is present as an eternal now, a *totum simul*, in his consciousness. Thus we are bound to assume, on Royce's hypothesis, that my experience of evil forms an absolute piece of existence, whose nature is not influenced by the character of its associates. Does God suffer as I suffer? If so, then he is not sure as to the outcome, but can have only faith that there may be triumph over evil. He must live in time, growing in experience as is the case with human beings. This possibility is obviously out of the question as far as absolute idealism is concerned.

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[3] Cf. A. E. Taylor, *Elements of Metaphysics*, pp. 395, 396.

[4] Cf. A. K. Rogers, "Professor Royce and Monism," *Philosophical Review*, XII (1903), 47–61.

On the other hand, if my immediate feeling of suffering is different from God's consciousness of suffering, then the fact of my experience must change as it enters into the larger whole. But if this fact is changed it is not the same fact; there seem to be two facts, only one of which is directly included in the Absolute experience. My suffering is something which is capable of dominating my whole self and of crushing my whole purpose. It can never mean this for the Absolute experience. The difficulty is now apparent. If all is included within the Absolute, then the really acute experience of evil, which cannot enter into the Absolute experience, must be unreal; or, if this evil is real, then there must be certain facts which lie outside the

Absolute. Yet Royce maintains both that evil is real and that nothing exists which is not included in the Absolute.

Even though we should disregard this difficulty and admit the possibility of Royce's contention there remains the further difficulty as to why God suffers in us in this way. We are continually reminded of the difference which exists between our way of experiencing evil and the way God experiences it. We experience it as something which we cannot help, something foreign which interferes with our purpose, something irrational in the rationality which we seek. But God has evil as a part of his total being because he chooses so to have it. It is nothing foreign to his nature, nothing which forces itself upon him from the outside. These evils are a necessary part of the total perfection which is his. They are not "a physical means to an external end. . . . . It is logically necessary that the Captain of your salvation should be perfect through suffering. No outer nature compels him. He chooses his own perfect selfhood. He is perfect. His world is the best possible world."[5] That for which I strive God possesses in eternity. Through my "tribulation the Absolute triumph, then, is won."[6]

This may solve the problem for the Absolute, but it still leaves little room for comfort for the finite individual. It is only in the Absolute Self of whose complete experience the human self falls short that the solution is to be found. If God chooses to suffer that through this suffering he may be perfect, it appears that he is rather indifferent to the value of human beings. We must assume that the "child born with an unearned heredity of misery," to use one of Royce's phrases, endures his miserable existence that the life of the whole may be perfect. The only way in which this may be taken as an adequate solution of the problem is in terms of the part-whole relationship. The whole is perfect, but many of the parts taken by themselves are evil. Yet this concept leads to a further difficulty which comes as the result of the fact that I, as a part of the whole, am also a conscious being. I am not only a limited element in the total consciousness, but, I possess the ability to feel this very limitation. Everything may be solved for the Absolute in whom I as the sufferer am but one element, and an element transcended in the perfection of the whole; but as far as I am concerned, I am still conscious of my suffering which is not transcended in my experience. I still know that I am a being limited in this way. The part-whole relationship might solve our problems for us if we were all elments of the absolute consciousness in the same way that the various sensations make up the totality of our conscious experience. But this is not the case. One of my sensations does not feel that it is a limited element in the whole of my consciousness, while I am conscious of the relation which I have with the totality of being. In order that the concept of a suffering God may be intelligible as throwing light on our problem, it must be shown how we may benefit by the perfection which God attains through suffering.

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[5] "The Problem of Job," *op. cit.*, p. 14.

[6] *The World and the Individual*, II, 409.

How does the triumph of God solve our problem for us? It may be that God suffers through us and that our tribulation is in his experience that which is overcome to form his perfection. But how is this triumph related to us as individuals? Royce feels the weight of this question and answers it by asserting that just as our trials are God's trials, so is his triumph our triumph. "In the Absolute I am fulfilled. Yet my very fulfilment, and God's, implies, includes, demands, and therefore can transcend, this very sorrow."[7] Furthermore, it is my own fault if I am entirely sundered from this triumph. Of course I, as I now am, a fragment of the whole, cannot see the whole truth or have the complete experience. But in so far as I do see his truth at all, "in thought, if not in the fulfilment of thought, in aim if not in attainment of aim, in aspiration if not in the presence of the revealed fact, I can view God's triumph and peace as my triumph and peace."[8] As a matter of fact, the individual can

[7] *Ibid.*

[8] "The Problem of Job," *op. cit.*, p. 27.

have in his own experience a clear indication of the feeling of triumph over suffering.

> Perfect through suffering, that is the universal, the absolutely necessary law of the higher spiritual life. It is a law that holds for God and for man, for those amongst men who have already become enlightened through learning the true lessons of their own sorrows, and for those who, full of hope, still look forward to a life from which they in the main anticipate joy and worldly success, and who have yet to learn that the highest good of life is to come to them through whatever willing endurance of hardness they, as good soldiers of their chosen loyal service, shall learn to choose or to endure as their offering to their sacred cause.[9]

Thus far we have said that the implications of Royce's doctrine of the relation between God and man for the solution of the problem of suffering are that God suffers in, with, and for the sufferer, and that inasmuch as God triumphs over evil, the sufferer can view this triumph as his own. We have found certain difficulties involved in the concept of God including in his consciousness our experience of evil in just the way we have it. Now, what about our ability to share in God's eternal triumph over evil? In order to show that we may realize this triumph in our own experience there is introduced a confusing notion. The individual reality of the Absolute is made intelligible only on condition that it is needed as the fulfilment of finite ideas, experiences, and purposes, which are always of a fragmentary nature. When human beings are thought of as mere elements in the life of the whole, then the Absolute has meaning and Royce's method of solving the problem of evil seems to be adequate as far as the Absolute Self and that self alone is concerned. But when the attempt is made to show how the Absolute triumph is also the solution of the human individual's problem, another principle is introduced which is destructive of the first. This principle is that man himself can have a realization of perfection through suffering. Not only in the Absolute but in my own life is there a taste of the peace and satisfaction which crown the effort of conquering evil. But if this latter be the case, then the solution is not to be found in the Absolute after all. We do not need the postulate of the world-self, which is defined as the fulfilment of our purposes which we ourselves cannot execute; the realization of everything we intend but cannot effect. What we need in order to solve the problem is to look more deeply into that fact of suffering as it is experienced by us, not by the Absolute, and show how it may be helpful to us for the attainment of perfection.

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[9] "What Is Vital in Christianity?" *William James and Other Essays*, pp. 173–74.

These two principles cannot be maintained at the same time. If, on the one hand, we are mere fragments of the whole, if our finiteness is such that our purposes and fulfilments are not presented in and to us, but only in and to the Absolute, then we can abandon hope of solving the problem of evil for ourselves and be content with the faith that it is solved for the Absolute Self. No importance is attached to human souls save as they aid in the perfection of the Absolute. If, on the other hand, the triumph is experienced to some degree in finite experience itself, then a certain amount of importance is given to human souls, and the interest in solving the problem as it is presented to us becomes all absorbing and the need of the Absolute, as defined above, disappears.

We have been tracing the application of the principle of the oneness of God and man to the question of suffering. What we have said, however, applies with equal truth to moral evil. God suffers in us when we suffer. Likewise God's will is our will when we are engaged in morally evil acts. But the evil deed is included within the perfect whole not merely as the expression of the will of the evildoer, but as a conquered, an overcome, a supplemented fact in the life of the whole. Moral evil differs from physical evil in that the former is the work of some finite moral agent. The moral agent is possessed of a limited amount of freedom. That is, he is free to give attention to the good as he knows it or to ignore the good. He is thus partially responsible for making his world better or worse according as he chooses to attend or not to attend to the Ought as he at any particular time has come to know it. His world, as we have said, is made better or worse according to his free choices. In the temporal reality the deeds of his evil will produce an evil which need not have been at all except for him. As far as the eternal world is concerned, however, the evil deeds of a finite agent cannot take away the total perfection. In the eternal realm all moral evil is supplemented, is atoned for, in some way so that perfection remains complete.[10]

In this connection we shall have to omit adequate treatment of two important questions because of the limitations of this paper. One has to do with the whole problem of whether on the idealistic hypothesis the individual does have any such individuality and freedom as is here maintained. The other is concerned with the nature and meaning of the atonement. For the moment, therefore, let us accept the fact of the freedom of the moral agent as Royce describes it; let us keep in mind the hypothesis that all evil is somewhere atoned for, and see what the consequences are for the moral life.

The life of the Absolute is perfect. He suffers in us and chooses so to suffer that through suffering his perfection may be attained. Moral evil is likewise a condition of perfection. The good of evil is that it exists to be overcome, to be cast down. The complete goodness of God could not be had if he were merely innocent, if he were beyond and above all sin. It is a part of his goodness that he does include in his experience a knowledge of evil deeds which exist in the totality of his being as thwarted elements. The point is that moral evil must be present in order that moral perfection of the Absolute may be attained through the overcoming of that moral evil. Furthermore, from the infinite point of view, the quantity of moral evil seems to be of little importance. No matter how many evil deeds there may be, they will all serve their purpose as so many facts to be scorned and overcome in the perfect whole.

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[10] Cf. "The Problem of Job," *op. cit.*, p. 28, and *The World and the Individual*, II, 365–67.

Royce has said that both mysticism and realism are destructive of the moral order.[11] Does his hypothesis do any better? In the first place, on this hypothesis the evil will is just as important as the good will. The sinner is serving the cause of eternal goodness just as much as the good man. The relationship is something like that which obtains in a well-written melodrama. When the villain plays his part well he is making a genuine contribution to the whole of the play. As a matter of fact, the hero could not be what he is, nor could the whole production be a well-rounded melodrama, if the bad character did not perform his part as a thoroughly detestable scoundrel. From one point of view he is doing a more sacrificial bit of service of the whole than the morally upright hero is. The audience which observes the play tends to applaud and admire the good man, and to dislike the villain. The latter, in performing his necessary bit, is, then, acting the harder part. Thus the evildoer may logically argue that since evil must be a constituent part of the world-self, his evil deeds may be interpreted as genuine service of God. A sinner might thus be conscientious about his sinning obligations.

In the second place, the carefree, reckless type of evildoer can, on the present hypothesis, dismiss from his mind any worry about what effects his thoughtless deeds may be having. They will all be overcome in the eternal life anyway. If he is enjoying his "lack of attention to the good"—and most of us will admit that we can be just as happy acting in a way which is far inferior to the Ought as we know it as we can in religiously doing always what we know to be the best—let him enjoy it, for he can do no permanent harm. Even the suffering which his evil deeds may cause others is transcended in the Absolute. How is this result any less Antinomian than the result of mysticism? Whereas the latter said that since there is no evil you may do anything you please and still not commit an evil deed, idealism now says that although evil is real, still you may go ahead and produce all the evil of which you are capable because some evil is needed to make perfect the life of the whole and at any rate all of your evil deeds will somewhere be supplemented, overcome, atoned for. This, of course, is not the spirit of idealism, but is the logical outcome of the doctrine as we have thus far examined it.

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[11] Cf. *The World and the Individual*, Vol. I.

The logic of the theory which we have been examining seems to be as follows: If the Absolute is a perfect being, if his choices are perfectly rational so that the world he chooses is a perfect world, and if there is such a reality of evil in the world, then it logically follows that evil is necessary. The appearance of evil in a perfect world is explained by saying that without this evil the good could not exist. It is not to be understood merely as an unavoidable incident in the production and maintenance of the good, but as an indispensable factor in the very essence of perfection and a positive contribution to its value. "The existence of evil . . . . is not only consistent with the perfection of the universe, but is necessary for the very existence of that perfection."[12] Evil is necessary as a part of the Absolute life. It is no foreign power which forces itself upon the world, nor is it something which God sends into the world as a means to the separate end of goodness.

Although evil is a logical and not a physical necessity, there is a way in which it may be considered as a necessary means. The world is to be interpreted in teleological terms and so evil is a teleological necessity. God is no finite power who is forced to use means for the attainment of ends, and yet there is a connection between the evil as the means and perfection as the end —a connection which is one "of organic part with organic whole; that goodness has its life only in the instant of the discovery and the inner overcoming of the evil will; and that therefore any life is good in which the evil will is present only as overcome, and so as lost in the good will."[13] It is in this sense that evil is a teleological necessity.

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[12] "The Problem of Job," *op. cit.*, p. 25.

A deed may be courageous. But what do we mean by courage? It is that which endures and overcomes a fear or dread. That dread in and of itself is cowardly. It is destructive of courage. Nevertheless it finds its place in the courageous deed as that which is surmounted. It is the very condition of courage, the means to the perfectly courageous act. Likewise a morally good act is dependent upon temptation to evil. If there is no temptation the act can possess no moral qualities whatever. The possibility of evil thus seems necessary as a condition of the good act, for "only the tempted can be holy."[14] This possibility of evil through temptation implies actuality, and it is the actual evil of the temporal world which forms the conquered element in the Absolute as the temptation is that which the finite individual overcomes in order to attain moral character.

There is no fact in life, no matter how foreign it may seem to moral perfection when considered in isolation, which does not somewhere form a part of the good. The virtuous agent is made such by his knowledge of evil, his insight into those features of existence which must be thwarted and which in being thus thwarted make for true perfection. The good man does not consciously remain in sin to achieve this insight, but finds the good of evil in looking back upon it as something which he has entirely overcome.[15]

This is the way in which evil is shown to be a teleological necessity. It may also be represented as necessary from another point of view. The very nature of perfection is such that without evil as a constituent part it would not exist. Thus evil is an intrinsic necessity.[16] In all organic life we find the combination in harmony of opposing tendencies as the underlying principle.

[13] *The Religious Aspect of Philosophy*, p. 458.

[14] *The Spirit of Modern Philosophy*, p. 459.

[15] Cf. "The Knowledge of Good and Evil," *Studies of Good and Evil*, p. 120.

[16] Cf. *The World and the Individual*, II, 409, 410.

Thus the phenomena of physical life involve at every instant, as a part of themselves, all the essential phenomena of dead tissues. Applying this principle to moral excellence, we find that within the truly moral perfection are elements which by themselves would seem to be the very destruction of the moral good. There is a "close relation which exists between the ethical worth of the individual and the presence of evil tendencies and temptations in his consciousness."[17] The intrinsic necessity of evil does not mean that evil is needed merely as a foil to set off the good and make it more attractive. It is simply the fact that the good is meaningless except in relation to the evil. "The good simply is not and cannot be realized, save in the midst of the conflict with evil. Yet that truth makes the good no less good, and the world no less divine."[18] Evil is an integral part of goodness; it is that without which there would be no goodness whatever. It does not form a baffling puzzle but is understandable as a necessary element in life. When we engage in thought we do so that we may gain wisdom. Our thinking is thus due to an ignorance which had to be overcome. In like manner our choices of right action are made in order that we may avoid the wrong; therefore our moral life is dependent upon the presence of moral imperfections.

Having briefly stated the logic of the position, it remains to examine its validity. The central feature of the problem at this point is to be found in the definition of the good. Royce has tried to show that evil is an inevitable condition of perfection, but we have reason to believe that there may be certain "pure" goods—goods which do not depend for their existence upon the presence of evil.

A strong and powerful love may emerge from experiences of mutual distrust, of hate, of estrangement, in which we can truly say that these evils are swallowed up in the greater good. On the other hand, a love may be pure, that is, free from all such antecedent evils, such as the love which the mother has for her child. The latter type would be no less valuable than the former, would be a genuine good, and yet one in which we can find no trace of evil. The physical state of an individual subsequent to an operation which he has undergone may be one of health and well-being. The pain and discomfort of his surgical experience were in a way necessary to the good which comes as a result. But the good health of a person who has had no such past discomfort is no less a good. As a matter of fact, he is in all probability a great deal better off for having been free from all the suffering incident to a hospital record.

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[17] "The Knowledge of Good and Evil," *op. cit.*, p. 92.

[18] "Tennyson and Pessimism," *ibid.*, p. 85.

To the class of these pure goods it seems that the aesthetic and intellectual pleasures would also belong. One may move within the world of the best in art and have a thorough appreciation of it without having first to endure a study of the worst. Nor is the musical chord a greater good because one has heard discords. Even in the field of thought we can find corroboration of the statement that there are certain goods which are not dependent upon a contrasting evil. It is true that many of our ideas come to us only after a painful experience of a racking brain. But can there be no intellectual good apart from this dreadful struggle? What of the idea which suddenly flashes upon one? This is just as thrilling and pleasurable as the other type and yet is not the result of a painful experience.

There is, then, a large class of goods neither the existence nor the essence of which is in any way conditioned or constituted by the presence of evil. Many aesthetic, intellectual, and physical satisfactions may be quite free from any conquering of disagreeable foes, may be given as pure goods. At once we discover the fact that Royce's description of the nature of all perfection as necessarily involving conquered evil elements is not universally substantiated in experience.

Royce admits, however, that the necessity of most of these evils is not empirically verifiable. These must to a certain extent remain a mystery. "Because we know so little, therefore we can never tell whether those externally seen seeming evils are blessings in disguise, or expressions of some wicked diabolical will-power at work about us. Somehow, then, we never know exactly how, these seeming great evils must be in God universal good."[19] In speaking of the seeming irrationality of the universe as witnessed in such facts as the cruel accidents of disease he says that "from our finite point of view there is no remotely discoverable justification for this caprice."[20] The one department of human life where the truth of the argument can be seen even by finite minds is in the moral sphere. Surely here is an excellent example of the nature of universal perfection. It certainly cannot be denied that the value of virtue seems to depend upon the existence of vice. If there were no moral evil there could be no moral good. For virtue consists in conquering vice; merit is the fruit of struggle; character is made by temptation and suffering. "The temptation to do evil is indeed a necessity for spirituality."[21] This is the final stronghold of absolutism, and yet even this may not be impregnable.

In considering the nature of moral character, are we after all confronted with a good which gets its essential goodness from the fact of evil which it has had to conquer? Is this the genuine nature of the good or does it merely express the fact that in this world as it now stands the good, if it is to be realized at all, must be realized amid conditions which are adverse to it? In the present arrangement of things it is indeed true that we do attain moral perfection through temptation and suffering. This is the meaning of the moral life. But because we are better after having passed through the temptation to do evil, does it necessarily follow that we are better because of this experience? Why is it that we call this later state good? Not merely because we have overcome the temptation, but because this goodness has brought us nearer the ideal. If it were the fighting of desires alone which constituted the good life, then the man who victoriously overcomes his good desires is as meritorious as he who suppresses all wrong. Surely the fight is worthy only when the victorious result brings us into a state of living which is closer to perfection.

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[19] *The Religious Aspect of Philosophy*, pp. 454–55.

[20] *The Spirit of Modern Philosophy*, p. 470.

[21] *Ibid.*, p. 465.

It is assumed, nevertheless, that the excellence of moral character achieved through the thwarting of evil impulses is of a much higher grade than that which is naturally good, or spontaneously right. It is only in the former case, so we are told, that there can be any real strength of character. Yet mere strength of character in and of itself is not the value for which we are searching. Strength of character is admirable only as it is a means to moral rectitude. The fact that there is such a thing as temptation simply implies that there is a human weakness. Our wills are sufficiently defective to permit the actuality of temptation and of evil acts. Since this is the situation in which we find ourselves, the only possible pathway to perfection is that of a constant and costly battle with the forces of evil. But in a world in which our wills are perfect, there would be no temptation; we would be naturally endowed with the rectitude which it is the purpose of our moral activity to achieve. In such a world moral goodness as we now know it would cease to be, but there would remain that which now makes the struggle with evil worth while. It means that we would come naturally by that perfection to the acquisition of which moral action is now the necessary means.

This hypothetical world is not one in which we would suffer from boredom, one in which there is nothing more to do. On the contrary we should still labor, but the activity in which we engage would always be pleasant. Royce seems at times to identify evil with mere opposition. But opposition which we enjoy overcoming, obstacles which it is a pleasure to cast aside, are not evils, but friends. The evil we actually experience, however, is no such friendly being which serves to make life interesting. It is rather a deadly enemy, a hated foe, which we do not want, and of which we feel we must rid ourselves before the real joy of living can begin. Yet it is into just such a friendly adversary that Royce seeks to transform our hated foe in the Absolute experience. It is only through such transformation that the Absolute can be thought of as perfect. The same fact may be evil for me and yet friendly to the perfection of the Absolute. My sorrow is God's happiness, my defeat his triumph. Thus we find that even in the moral realm evil is not a necessary part of that which is the goal of our moral striving. Not only have we discovered certain goods which are pure of any evil admixture, but it is this type which sets the standard for all goods so far as they have been able to make naught of their evil origins.

Our conclusion is that Royce ends with the dilemma from which he started. We have found that his theory, when stripped of rhetoric, is that the imperfection of the various parts of the universe is consonant with the perfection of the whole. The absolutist inevitably gets into trouble because of the ambiguity involved in his use of the term "perfection." It is true that the perfection of the world from one point of view is in no way affected by evil facts. But this is true only as long as we think of perfection as synonymous with explained systematic existence. The fact that all things in the universe are intelligible bears no relation to the moral values of those same things. We are able to find explanation in the constitution of nature for that which we call evil as well as for that which we call good. Good and evil are equally intelligible, equally consistent with the systematic character of the universe, and so do not invalidate the conception of universal perfection. But Royce insists upon attributing to reality a perfection in which all of our purposes find fulfilment, whether they be intellectual or ethical.

This confusion of natural with moral perfection is inherent in the whole theory, and it is only by making dim the distinction between the two with noble phrases that the solution possesses even the semblance of plausibility. How can an Absolute which includes everything within itself be morally perfect when its parts are morally imperfect? In a morally perfect world it is not sufficient that things be explained; they must be shown to be good in that they find room for themselves within the perfect whole. The part must find its moral value in its congruity with the moral order. The natural perfection of the universe depends upon the intelligibility of its parts. A universe could not be completely comprehensible in which events are incomprehensible. Likewise moral evil cannot be included within an Absolute which is morally perfect.

Nor does it help the case of the absolutist at this point to resort to an analysis of ethical experience to show how the good can have meaning only in containing evil as a part of it. We have shown that the moral goodness does not, after all, get its essential goodness from the fact of evil which it has had to conquer. Rather there is a type of good which is pure, which is free from evil elements, and it is to this type that we look for the standard for all goods so far as they have been able to overcome their evil origins.

The evil which we experience is not a help to perfection but a hindrance. The struggle with it is a struggle which we do not enjoy, and the victories which are won over it are so costly as to render questionable the value of the victories. That is the meaning of evil for us. Royce tries to make evil out as a welcome adversary or friendly opponent in the Absolute experience. But this sort of thing is not evil, it is good, and we have seen that Royce's attempt to show how the same facts can be really evil for finite minds and yet instruments to the perfection of the Absolute is unsuccessful. If, on the one hand, evil existed in the Absolute *qua* evil, the Absolute would not be perfect. On the other hand, if the evil is merely the necessary and welcome condition of the Absolute's perfection, then the Absolute can have no moral value for us. We are in agony that God may have the peace which comes when pain is quieted. We experience the crushing blows of defeat that God may know the triumph. We sink to the degradation of sin that God may have a perfect moral life and consciousness. The peace, triumph, and moral perfection of the Absolute cannot be shared by us, for were we to know these the conditions of God's perfection would be removed. His peace depends upon our suffering, his triumph upon our defeat, his perfection upon our sin.

If we really had to act upon such a hypothesis which thus brings about cosmic consecration of evil, the results would be disastrous. The universe would not be merely indifferent to evil, but would be morally no worse for our sins and imperfections. When we act morally we must act as though there were no Absolute, but as though the world were actually capable of improvement. An Absolute to whose perfection evil and imperfection are necessary is quite as irrelevant to the moral ideal as a mechanical world which is indifferent to them.

The Absolute of Royce's philosophy is the individual life in which are found not only all logical possible questions but the answers to them, not only the complete knowledge of all objects but the objects themselves, not only all finite purposes but their fulfilment as well, not only all evil but the victory over all. Such an Absolute can include all distinctions of value within himself only by turning these distinctions into mere differences of equally valuable facts.

Hence we must conclude that it is only by means of a latent naturalism that Royce's monism is saved from moral anarchy. An Absolute which chooses to have all evil and suffering as part of himself is not only one who cannot be completely good but one who cannot be completely sane. In spite of the fact that Absolute is written with a capital *A* and that the word as employed is synonymous with God, it is practically a naturalistic and not a moral perfection that we attribute to him. It is only in this way that we can conceive of the possibility of making the world better. If, on the other hand, our moral ideals and aspirations are to have metaphysical significance, a thoroughgoing monism must be abandoned. The concept of a suffering God can have meaning only if the suffering which he endures comes as the result of the fact that there is an environment in which he lives and in which he must execute his purpose. He cannot have—as Royce maintains in his doctrine of eternity—as perfect a knowledge of the future as he has of the past. So far as Royce's treatment of our problem is concerned our thought is still restricted to the choice between the moral indifferentism of naturalism and the dualism or pluralism involved in the conception of a finite God. The theist, therefore, who honestly faces the problem of evil must look upon the activity of God as but one of two or more forces in the totality of existence.

CHARACTER EDUCATION

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THIS present decade has witnessed a significant revival of interest in the problems of character education. Both in Canada and in the United States there have been frequent and notable indications of such interest. Within the past three years two educational conferences of the first importance for character education have been held in Canada, viz., the third biennial session of the World Federation of Education Associations, an organization devoted exclusively to character problems, which convened in Toronto, and the Vancouver Conference of Educators of the British Empire, which devoted a large share of its time and attention to problems of character education. In the United States a number of graduate institutions have concentrated expert attention upon this field; deserving of special mention have been the researches made by Professors Hartshorne and May at Yale under the auspices of the Institute of Social and Religious Research and those of Professor Edwin D. Starbuck and his associates of the Institute of Character Research at the University of Iowa. Many universities and graduate schools are now offering courses and stimulating research in the field of character education; cities such as Boston, Buffalo, Cleveland, Chicago, St. Louis, and Los Angeles have launched or are launching ambitious educational schemes of a community-wide character; a recent annual meeting of the Religious Education Association, held in Des Moines, Iowa, had for its theme: "Character Education a Community Responsibility"; and in Paris this summer is being held the Fifth International Moral Education Congress, a body which in its turn will work in co-operation with a committee of the League of Nations.

The reasons for this widespread general interest in the new movement are not far to seek. It has sprung directly out of a felt need. There is no blinking the fact that crime and criminal tendency (especially among youth), insanity, and feeble-mindedness have shown steady increases. We would appear to be reaping the fruits of a type of public education that has been very much concerned with the intellectual and proportionally little with the moral emphasis. The tide has turned, however; and there is unmistakable present evidence to indicate that our educational leaders in the future will endeavor to compensate for this lack in the past. But the movement has behind it not only the very laudable aim and desire to promote constructive social modes of living and to reduce criminal tendency, but, more positively, to promote the building of richer, finer personalities. It is setting about the work in a scientific way. Science is seeking ever fresh fields for invasion, new worlds to conquer. Not content with the realm of concretion, she is making her way into that of the imponderables. Already she has produced those who make it their boast to be able to measure anything that exists. And in truth, considering the comparative newness of the attack upon the problem, already some very striking gains have been scored in the field of the scientific testing and measurement of character, character-making forces, and character traits. The aim is to bring the whole matter out of the area of mere opinion and traditional attitude over into that of fact and demonstrated truth.

From time immemorial leaders of thought have recognized the importance of the character objective in education. At the same time both theory and practice have varied widely and deeply as to the best means of attainment of the goal. To the ancient Hebrews education was rooted in religion and the experience of God. The curriculum was the law and the method didactic. Youth was thoroughly instructed in the precepts of the laws of Jehovah: "Hear, O Israel: our God is one Jehovah: and Thou shalt love Jehovah thy God with all thy heart, and with all thy soul, and with all thy might. And these words, which I command thee this day, shall be upon thy heart; and thou shalt teach them diligently unto thy children, and shalt talk of them when thou sittest in thy house, and when thou walkest by the way, and when thou liest down, and when thou risest up. And thou shalt bind them for a sign upon thy hand, and they shall be for frontlets between thine eyes. And thou shalt write them upon the door-posts of thy house, and upon thy gates." The result was the narrow and intense religious devotion and ethical character of the Hebrew.

Among the Greeks and Romans it can scarcely be said that ethics and religion motivated life in any way comparable with the Hebrews. They were never the all-consuming interest even in the case of a Socrates or a Cicero that they had been for the eighth-century prophets of Israel. To the versatile Greek character was but one value to be placed alongside other cultural worths of equal weight; and the earlier Roman ideal of *gravitas* suffered a sorry eclipse even before the Republic had given way to the Empire. Moral soundness was at the best an uncertain quantity; the ablest teachers were no guaranty of fine character in their students. Alcibiades was the pupil of Socrates, Alexander the Great of Aristotle, and Nero had for his tutor Seneca. And yet the thinking of the greatest at least of the philosophers of classical antiquity reflects familiarity both with the reality of the problem of character education and with the true psychology of approach. Thus in the *Protagoras* Plato writes: "The master compels the boy to learn passages of the good poets by heart, choosing such poems as contain moral admonitions, and many a narrative interwoven with praise and panegyric on the worthies of old, in order that the boy may admire and emulate and strive to become such himself." "Long is the road through precepts, short and effective through examples," was the sage observation of the younger Seneca. And such was the emphasis attached to the moral aspects of education by leaders as Cicero and others of his day that we find the teacher of rhetoric Quintilian defining the orator as "a *good* man skilled in speaking."

It is a far cry from the days of Quintilian to the twentieth century, but the problems of educating for character are yet with us—save that they are tenfold more complex, acute, and persistent. Theory and practice today traverse the whole ground from the extreme of an indoctrination emphasis and the method of formal discipline, representing a "carry-over" from the days of the Protestant Reformation to the opposite of sheer anomalous individualism. But out of the seeming chaos of conflicting ideas and procedures there are emerging certain guiding principles. Where psychological theories move as rapidly as has been the case in the past two decades the task of our educational philosophers has been no light one. But at least it is obvious that pedagogical method is passing through such a revolutionary process as signifies an all-but-complete parting of the ways from the traditional norms. Instruction has passed over into creative co-operative participation in activity; formal discipline has been deleted from the working vocabulary altogether; the center of the curriculum has been shifted from that of material content to life-experience; attention has passed from lessons and textbooks to the child, the learner, from the "virtues" to life-situations, from catechisms and doctrines to the concrete experiences of living of the student—all of which, needless to say, appertains to procedures in progressive schools.

At the heart of the new character-education movement resides an intense and growing faith in a scientific approach to the problem and in the power of scientific method to secure results. It is not an unreasoning or dogmatic faith; it is based on a steadily accumulating body of evidence. Coupled with this faith is often to be found among the leaders of the movement an attitude of marked depreciation of traditional modes. We have rested in an unintelligent belief that the old formal, factual, disciplinarian, content-centered method was the tried and true one; we are coming to realize that it has been, rather, tried in the balances and found wanting. We are coming to recognize with Professor Dewey that all sound education is character education, and that the all-important thing is that it be sound; that such training must be co-ordinated with and broad as the whole range of life and experience itself; that character can never be simply imparted but must be achieved; that it must be developed, not by formal courses tacked on to an existing curriculum content, but by the appropriate modification and enrichment of the curriculum in its inclusive meaning.

We are committed to a philosophy of education that conceives its function in terms of socialization. The truly educated man is the most thoroughly socialized; and he alone is free, liberated, and enlightened. A true educational process liberalizes and socializes. It seeks to guide the pupil in interaction with his total environment; to aid him to make fruitful use of his widening experience; to help him in the integration of that experience in a rich, growing personality. There is the subtle danger lest the sociologist lay an overdue stress on the fact of environment as such. And there is the danger lest the psychologist overrate the potency of individual attitude as such. Human personality itself is the resultant of the constant interplay of the conscious self with its environment. And the supreme concern of the educator in seeking to achieve personality and character development is with the character of the reactions that are made to individual situations. Thus we are never justified in the assumption that because certain materials are "taught," however sacred in themselves, that character growth is an automatic resultant. It is not a case of the content taught but rather the kind of response elicited from the learner in the process. The important thing is always the kind of impression made. Have enthusiasms been kindled, emotions stirred? If so, there is hope of positive result; but if not, nothing has been gained, however accurately certain knowledges may have been acquired. In so far as it is possible to set up a criterion by which to judge the efficacy of an educational process in its character-producing aspect, such a criterion would be, What is the effect upon the social attitudes of the learner? How does it affect the character of his responses to other persons?

It would appear that the two primary requisites for effective procedure in this field are sympathy and intelligence. For better or worse—for better, most of us hope—we are committed to democratic and scientific attitudes toward the manifold issues that confront us today. Authoritarian and arbitrary methods will no longer serve. We have had thrust upon us larger and constantly increasing amounts of leisure time, the proper disposition of which has itself become an intricate problem, as over against the custom of former days when in a form of society for the most part simple and rural our young people achieved character through the execution of home tasks co-operatively with the older folk. Today finds a majority of folk living in crowded urban communities where normal home life is seriously threatened, where energized machinery performs the labor formerly done by hand, and where the problem of the use of growing amounts of leisure has become acute. Too often we have been guilty of yielding to constitutional inertia and have failed to bring our methods of dealing with new situations up to date. As Professor Dewey has insistently told us, it is we older folk who need re-education rather than the children and youth. We have been ever ready to lament the rebellious tendencies of modern youth; the fault lies not with youth but with middle age. Every child has the right to be trained by parents and teachers with sympathy and intelligence. The misdemeanors of children and young folk are but the result of faulty training; it is not they who are guilty, but the fault lies at the door of those who have been responsible for the training. Let the punishment be assessed upon the responsible persons!

The clinical work of Dr. Morgan and his associates at Northwestern University has demonstrated beyond the shadow of a doubt the truth of the statement: "Since his conduct depends in large part upon his training, the cause of the personality difficulty is usually to be found in the treatment he had received, in the attitude of those who have had him in charge." Intelligence and sympathy, a real understanding of the fact that each child is unique and requires the kind of treatment appropriate to his own case, the realization that any given instance of a misdemeanor is simply the logical result of the whole of the training that has preceded it, a consistent attitude of sympathetic understanding of the whole life of the child, the recognition that forms of wholesome co-operative activity need to be created to replace the home duties of the simpler way of life of former days—these are a few of the elementary requirements of any effectively functioning character-building process. To quote from Professor Dewey:

> Character development must be rooted in real experiences; it implies participation in wide ranges of real experiences; it needs broadening contacts with work, and play, and social interests; it needs creative expansion through imaginative living in realms untrod by the feet of man; it needs integration through cultivation of analytic and constructive thinking; it needs the chance to practice and conserve its gains through experience in actual areas of social and personal responsibility. In short, it needs to find freedom to effect, in the realms of personal living, the same sort of achieved results that the scientist works for in the realm of pure research and intellectual control.[1]

Purpose, curriculum, and method comprise the trinity of interest today in the educational world. They are so closely related as to be but three phases of a common problem. The educational revolution through which we are passing is affecting them all radically, and practice in local situations is gradually coming into conformity. Purpose in education has become socialized; curriculum has changed from the former Herbartian emphasis on a solid subject-matter type of content to a content that finds its center in pupil experience; method is rapidly changing from a formal instructional and disciplinarian type to a technique characterized by co-operative teacher-pupil participation in multiform activities. Needless to say, developments in the field of general education cannot but leave their impress upon the more specialized branches of moral and religious education. And what applies in the one case applies all round. What is good or bad educational procedure in the public school is certain to prove likewise in the school of religion. Instances are continually cropping out of conspicuous success or equally marked failure according as purpose, curriculum, and method are above or below standard. The method of formal admonition and exhortation has been rather clearly demonstrated to be ineffective so far as actual results are concerned.

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[1] *Religious Education*, Feb., 1929, p. 116.

In one type of school the formal disciplinarian begins her work in September by telling her charges precisely what they are and are not to do. She completes her list of regulations and prohibitions by the injunction that no one is to climb up on the school fence. She discovers to her dismay at the recess period that all the pupils have done exactly what she forbade except one little fellow who, too small to climb up himself, was waiting to be pulled up by the others. In another case the teacher is greatly perplexed by the problem of how best to deal with a group of boys whose habit is to maltreat the birds in the neighborhood. Warnings and exhortations had proved of no avail. Then a new method is tried. The suggestion is made that a "Kind to the Birds Club" be formed. All take part in its activities. Birdhouses are made; classes vie with one another in the production of the finest homes for the birds. Instead of persecuting the birds, the boys begin to be fond, intelligent students of bird life. Right method has prevailed.

In a certain Sunday school was a class of obstreperous juniors. Seemingly nothing could be done with them. Many different teachers had attempted to cope with the problem but had failed miserably. The boys came armed with pea-shooters to Sunday school and enjoyed immensely their success in causing discomfiture and mortification to teachers and officers. Finally, a certain boy-lover volunteered to teach the class and was accorded the privilege. The first Sunday he made no attempt to instruct them in the conventional Bible "lesson." Instead he took them for a drive in his car to a nearby stone quarry where they all made a study of the rocks. A second Sunday they spent the hour discussing the flowers of the neighborhood; another the bird life, etc. Finally, one day he was able, holding their interest all the time which had taken on real spontaneity in the meantime, to kindle their imaginations with the story of the great Creator of all these wonders of the world of nature. From stage to stage of increased interest, loyalty, and effective functioning he led on this group of boys, guiding them in steps of organization, conduct of the group activities and projects, counseling with rather than dictating to them. A sorry failure had been transformed into striking success. Clear vision of purpose, a curriculum content centered in actual life-experience instead of abstractions divorced from the pupils' actual interests, and a technique characterized by pupil participation instead of authoritarian discipline had prevailed.

The difference between true ideals in educational theory and practice and malpractice is often so subtle as not to be recognizable save to the practiced eye of the expert. Take, for instance, the field of history and the teaching of patriotism through history. The problem of international and racial relations will be solved eventually through the better understandings that shall result from an enlightened educational procedure with youth. Meanwhile, who can estimate the harm that has been done to the cause of international peace through the propagation of militaristic and pseudo-patriotic ideals by means of textbooks that pervert truth and play upon ingrained prejudice, and by means of utterly mistaken pedagogical procedure. One's mind leaps at once to the recollection of the recent Chicago fiasco. But there are multiple evidences of educational practice that is pernicious and destructive of true peace-building ideals. Here is a school where the exercises of Armistice Day have for their net effect an intensification of the war spirit in the breasts of the children. The little folks in the first grade are taught to associate the national flag with the glory of arms and the heroism of defense of native country on the field of battle. The public speakers of the occasion inveigh against the sin of unpreparedness, and the day following witnesses upon the playground the staging of a mock battle participated in with martial ardor. A teacher is mortified when asked if she had an equally effective technique for attaching in the minds of children the thought of the flag with civic and national enterprises of peace. A very fine illustration, on the other hand, is found in Dr. Rothney's little book on *Character Education in the Elementary School* of the way in which sound technique motivated by lofty purpose resulted in the effective solution of a difficult educational problem involving also the war spirit. In this particular school fighting on the playground had become a chronic nuisance. Conventional means had failed to achieve results. Then the superintendent suggested to the boys and girls that they constitute themselves a League of Nations, the various classes sending elected representatives to a common council. Says Dr. Rothney:

> Ultimate results were all that could be desired. Through the *work* of the league, fighting, swearing, and obscenity were suppressed, and the attitude of the school toward these evils changed. Instead of exulting in them the pupils repudiated them. Their attitude toward the teachers changed and they became sympathetic. Their attitude toward law and authority changed, and they became diligent in observing rules and getting others to do the same. Their attitude toward one another changed. Might was no longer right, but right was might. The pupils united in a common cause rather than divided over family feuds.[2]

Inevitably the question arises, What is the function of the teacher in the process, and what is the effect on the character of the student of different types of teaching method? A very great deal is heard today concerning the evils of indoctrination. It tends to fix the thinking modes of the learner in permanent molds; it fails to develop independence of judgment; and it leads at the stage of later adolescence either to an indisposition to face honestly and think through the new intellectual problems of dawning maturity or to a violent breach with the past accompanied by all the inner experience of pain incidental to the process of unlearning the indoctrinations of earlier years. The average boy or girl is accustomed to a method of ethical and religious teaching that is positive, even dogmatic. It turns upon such themes as the personality of God, the moral law, the reality of sin and punishment, a future judgment, a geographical heaven and hell, the Bible the literally inspired word, etc. The learners are as a rule passive recipients of these knowledges; "theirs not to reason why." The more venturesome minds are prepared to question some of these "truths" before adolescence is reached. The writer is reminded of the anecdote of a certain eight-year-old who shocked his teacher horribly one day with the blurted-out remark: "I've found out all about this Santa Claus stuff that there isn't anything to it; and I'm going to look into this Jesus stuff too." Such attitudes, however, are exceptional.

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[2] *Ibid.*, June, 1927, p. 608.

For the most part the attitude is one of docile acceptance of the "spoon-fed" teachings, an attitude which may very likely continue through later life also. But in the case of the more thoughtful minds, certainly in that of those who carry on into the higher schools of learning, questions are bound to arise; there is likely to be a period of "everlasting nay" and a "center of indifference." The earlier beliefs have been knocked into a cocked hat and nothing is sure. The experience is painfully unsettling. Who is there who has studied the physical and social sciences in undergraduate days with even a half-open mind who has not felt the pain of it? And there are those who agree with Dr. Lynn Harold Hough in his view that too often the instructors in our great secular institutions of learning needlessly add to the painfulness of it by their caustic jibes at the expense of religion and religious beliefs.

In so far as it is possible to indicate the best educational procedure in an exceedingly delicate and difficult problem at best, one feels that leaders in this field are on the right path in counseling a different type of religious teaching in the early periods of development. Instead of answering the questions of the child with the finality air of the oracle, the true religious teacher will give the impression of being a truth-seeker along with the learner, whose delight is to join in a mutual quest rather than arbitrarily close the mind of the child to further inquiry. The fostering of attitudes of open-mindedness, awe, wonder, and the questioning habit in early years will bring it to pass that when adolescence and university days arise the mind so trained will find it a much easier task to make the adjustments called for by widening experience of truth. There will be a minimum of unlearning, and the pain of adjustment will be largely reduced. To be sure, it is not well that the spirit of independence in inquiry be carried to the degree of individualism which rejects all certainties. The Scylla of complete uncertainty is as treacherous as the Charybdis of dogmatic assurance together with the mental complacency that accompanies it.

Norms we need and must have. Great is our indebtedness to the past for beacon lights to guide us. Even in these days of enlightenment we cannot do better than seek in the Book of Books for those standards and materials which have never been superseded or excelled in character-building power. It is not the biblical materials that have been at fault but the altogether wooden way in which they have been used. The skilful teacher is the one who knows how to re-create the historical situations, imaginatively live over again with his pupils the life and experience of prophet and apostle, lift the elements of universal human appeal to their true perspective of emphasis; in other words, make the Bible live for his students, and cause them to be filled with romantic faith, hope, idealisms, and enthusiasms enkindled through the emotional response to the appeal of religious heroism so splendidly portrayed in the Christian's Bible.

The problem of the building of character is one that can never be solved by any one of the several agencies directly concerned. We no longer hold one institution responsible for the development of the mind, another for that of the body, another for that of the spiritual growth. The disparateness of the old faculty psychology has gone forever. We think today in terms of unity of the individual life and a close sympathetic interrelation of the elements and potencies of that life. The newer education is thinking in terms of the whole personality developing and functioning as a unit, whether in the playing field, the classroom, or the house of prayer. And the only rational procedure is so to correlate the programs of the several educative agencies as to subserve the common purpose and the common goal. Character-building, from the standpoint of the institutions involved, requires a clear recognition of the necessity of working together toward a single end. They are in no sense competitors or rivals but co-operative agencies. And true co-operation in such a program of education implies integration. There ought to be such a carefully wrought-out system of correlated endeavor as shall result in the complete integration of personality of the educand. Symmetrical wholeness and oneness is what we seek. And the very attempt to work out such correlated programs in any community is itself a project containing within it the finest educative values.

It is just at this point that is to be found one of the most serious weaknesses of the whole educational effort of the present day. In the individual communities and in the wider area of the national community we lack in the fundamentals of integration in our educational processes because we are not at one in our purposes and interests. Very common, indeed, nowadays is the complaint of overlapping, duplication of programs, excess of extra-curricular activities. There are some who feel that the public schools in their new zeal to relate the educational experience of the child vitally to the whole of his life have exceeded their province in making excessive demands upon the time and energies of the child's out-of-school hours. Instances are not unknown of communities being divided over the question whether the school of the church had the first claim on the student's time during certain evenings in the week. And in the wider sphere of the "great community" how obvious that we are working at cross-purposes! It is probably too much to expect, even were it desirable, that there should be a fixed uniformity of educational objective throughout a great nation. But at least there ought to be a closer approximation to such a unity of purpose and plan as would reduce to a minimum many of the glaring contradictions of the present day. For example, one's attention was called to the fact that in a recent number of a well-known periodical there appeared side by side two articles, one of which gave a series of concrete illustrations of ways in which certain intelligent, peace-loving parents and teachers are educating for ends of peace and world-brotherhood in their respective communities in accord with the most approved modern method; the other of which was a well-written exposition of the systematic way in which the militaristic party is applying the last word in educational psychology in a widely ramifying propaganda in behalf of military preparedness. There is something half-amusing in a situation, were it not for the tragic seriousness as well, where the government of a great nation can commit itself outright to a pact for the abolition of warfare and at the same time the courts of law deny citizenship to a subject who is a conscientious objector to bearing arms.

But within the range of the life of the individual community itself must be worked out the chief problems of an integrated educational experience. The home, the school, the church, the impact of the community life as such, comprise the chief forces exercising influences upon the self that is largely the resultant of its personal reaction to those influences. Most social psychologists agree that the home is the dominant factor in the bending of the twig. The influences of the first three years of the child's life foreshadow and predetermine largely the whole temperament and social attitude in later life. To be sure, supplementary corrective training such as the school and church are able to supply will go far to compensate for a faulty home-training in infancy; but the process is always slow and difficult at best. The atmosphere of the home is all important. The child is always influenced most powerfully by that which makes the strongest impression upon him; so that the net effect of much preachment and exhortation to be good accompanied by a nervous, irritable disposition on the part of parents, or by open friction and discord, or by constant threats, warning, and coercion, or by a habit of meekly acquiescing in all manner of unsocial conduct, is certain to be destructive of desirable character traits in the little folk. The earliest impressions and the strongest count for most in the creation of character tendency.

Thus it is not simply a trite truism but a scientific fact always to be reckoned with that the greatest problem which confronts any nation is that which centers in the homes of its people. And when one takes into consideration the host of facts related to the disintegration of the modern home, the marvel is, not that juvenile crime has shown a steady increase, but that there is not far more than there is. Surely it speaks volumes for the natural desire and ability of our young people to "go straight" when given a half-chance.

There is greatly needed today a new conception of the dignity of the home and home life, a vitalized belief in the sacredness of its function in bearing and giving to the world the ongoing generation responsible for the destiny of the future. It seems inevitable that increasingly the responsibility for the mental and social sets acquired by our children shall rest with the mothers of men. The modern man of affairs spends his time and energies largely in other avenues. It is the mothers who have most to do with shaping trends of character of their offspring. "It is the work that demands the broadest culture. . . . . We bear the world, and we make it. The souls of little children are marvelously delicate and tender things and keep forever the shadow that first falls on them, and that is the mother's."[3]

The wise parent will recognize that this plastic, delicate instrument in her hands requires a type of handling that is marked by true understanding. The parent will realize that the petty misdemeanors of childhood are usually caused by artificial repressions, and that such call for educative treatment rather than for punishment. So much of parental behavior toward their children is really motivated by the desire to assert their own superior wisdom, the now-don't-you-see-that-I-know-best attitude rather than by an attitude of sincere respect for the personality of the child, which is the only sound basis. The little child as well as the grown-up is happy when his personality is really respected, is unhappy and resentful when it is humiliated. It, too, has been made in the image of God. Instead of the all-too-prevalent practice on the part of parents of moralizing, threatening, and punishing—thus working irreparable harm to the sensitive personality of the child—normal practice is that which encourages the desirable social attitudes, invites these to grow, arranges manifold opportunities for the child to "practice with satisfaction" to himself those forms of behavior which are to be desired. All of which will demand the best in the form of enlightened intelligence and true sympathetic understanding, comradeship rather than monitorship.

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[3] *Ibid.*, Feb., 1929, p. 132.

Probably next in direct influence upon the character of the child is the place of the school. Can this influence be spiritualized as well as that of the home? Former President Coolidge declares: "All our science and all our arts will never be the means for the true advancement of the nation, will never remove us from the sphere of the superficial and cynical, will never give us a civilization and a culture of any worthy and lasting importance unless we are able to see in them the outward manifestations of a spiritual reality."[4] Mr. Coolidge here borders on a religious interpretation of the function of the schools. Few educators deny the obligation of the schools in the direction of character-building, which is at least a close by-product

[4] "Emphasis Must Be Given to Development of Moral Power," *School Life*, Vol. XIII, No. 2 (Oct., 1927).

of religion; and the most thoughtful among them are agreed that character is the most important of the educational objectives.

Present-day interest in this matter as it bears upon the work of the schools revolves about the question of method. There are advocates aplenty of both the direct and indirect modes. In the one case the attempt is made to teach ethics as such, either quite independently of other curriculum materials or as a distinct entity within a course on "Citizenship." The champions of the indirect method, on the other hand, favor the plan of a careful selection and use of all curriculum materials with a view to subserving the ends of character-building.

Very fundamental questions are being raised with reference to the whole problem of the bearing of religion upon ethics and the efficacy of religion as such in the control of conduct. A few would go so far as to deny that religion is efficacious in determining conduct. Most educators, however, are agreed that it is potent, given the right method of approach. In so far as the school is concerned, the question at once arises, Are our schools prepared to cope with the problem of character education? To be very specific, Are our teachers equipped with the necessary training to render this essential service? In the report of the Commission on Character, Moral and Religious Education of the World Federation of Education Associations given at Geneva, Switzerland, August 2, 1929 (Walter S. Athearn, chairman), we find:

> This table shows that sixty-five of the eighty-five institutions studied offer no courses intended specifically to prepare their students to develop the moral character of their pupils. . . . . This investigation makes it clear that the rank and file of the teachers of the public school in the United States are going with their certificates of graduation from the normal schools and colleges of the nation into their classrooms without acquaintance with this important teaching material [curriculum material available for moral instruction in the various grades of the public schools] and with no reasoned judgements with reference to the ethical problems of our democratic citizenship.[5]

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[5] *Religious Education*, Nov., 1929, pp. 822 f.

Every inquiry into the subject of moral and religious training through schools leads eventually to the crucial question, Is the teaching personnel qualified? Today more than ever emphasis is laid at the door of "teacher personality." It is commonly agreed that one does not succeed in teaching religion without personal convictions and a body of religious experience. The prevailing tone of our state institutions of higher learning is scientific, secular, mildly irreligious. How then can we expect successful teaching of religion in the public-school system on the part of the graduates of those institutions? In other words, the problem cuts clear across the whole tissue of the educational system of our country.

On the side of curriculum materials for the teaching of ethics and religion in the schools two typical solutions have been offered. Canon Raven has suggested in his recent book on "Christ and Modern Education" that the churches have overstressed their religious differences and that it is both possible and an incumbent duty on their part to prepare a curriculum content of religious educational materials suitable for use in the schools.

> Christians, when they are convinced of the compelling need for action and have a clearly defined object in view, discover that beneath divergencies of outlook and tradition there is in fact a measure of unity which covers most, if not all, of the fundamentals of religion and which it is not impossible to formulate. . . . . If the officers of the Federation [World Student Christian Federation] were asked to frame a scheme of teaching for its members, they would readily do so until the later stages of the programme were reached. Surely those whose work lies, not in the universities, but in the primary and secondary schools, would find such a task still easier. Their business is with the simple facts of the faith, with God and Jesus Christ, with the Christian character, with worship and service; and for children, at least after adolescence, the matters that divide us do not, and in any sound education could not arise.[6]

Another solution, more in the nature of a compromise, is that which proposes to confine the interest of the public school as such to such elements as civics, ethics, practical character-building projects and worship, and to the use of non-biblical materials, reserving the latter for the schools of the churches.

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[6] Raven, *Christ and Modern Education*, pp. 98 f.

The central difficulties seem to inhere in that the teaching of the public school is bound to be much more effective from the pedagogical standpoint than that of the church school, but that there is no guaranty of the right quality of religious interest and experience in the teacher. On the other hand, the potential character-building values of church-school worship and instruction programs are high, but are in general very imperfectly realized, owing to the poor educational standards maintained by the average Sunday-school teacher. Investigations have repeatedly shown that church-school instruction from the standpoint of the correlation of biblical knowledge with ethical judgments is only one-third or less efficient, that altogether wooden methods of Bible interpretation are everywhere prevalent, and that results in character growth are meager. Hartshorne and May have not found that the fact of Sunday-school attendance as such has been other than neutral in its influence on developing character.

In sum, it would appear that the broad objectives toward which we must direct effort are toward the putting of the spirit of religion into education and the spirit of education into the life and work of our institutions of religion. Fundamental to the objective of putting religion into education is the creation of the sense of need. The reality of the need is patent enough.

> While our public school education in the United States costs us $1,820,743,000 annually, our crime bill is in the neighborhood of $10,000,000,000. . . . . The lack of adequate courses on character education in our training schools for teachers, in the face of the moral trend of the present day, is appalling. The greatest need in the public schools of today is effective character education. To what avail is education if the one thing which makes education worth while is neglected?[7]

The situation is probably not quite so appalling as these statements imply. Research is gradually bringing to light the lines upon which an intelligent approach to the problem must be made. Very significant, for instance, is the work of Professor Starbuck and his associates in the compilation of materials of literature from the point of view of their character-building qualities. There has been and is bound to be much difference of view concerning such matters as the appropriateness of the teaching of religion in the public schools by the direct method through such agencies as the week-day school of religion; there must also inevitably continue to be the problem of the fitness of the teacher of secular subjects to teach religion as such effectively. But no thoughtful person would gainsay the wisdom of developing state-wide and country-wide programs of character education based on sound educational principles as the results of expert investigation continue to be made known; programs in which there shall be a clear vision that the primary goal of the total educational process is the building of sound character; programs in which that objective shall be articulated with the whole of the curriculum in such a way that each teacher shall see his own specific departmental function in its true relation to that objective and that the wealth of character-education techniques, extra-curricular activities, literary materials biblical and extra-biblical, shall be increasingly utilized with a view to subserving the ends of the central objective.

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[7] Albert John Murphy, *Religious Education*, Feb., 1927, p. 179.

There must always be a differentiation of function as between the institutions of secular and religious education. However desirable the work of the week-day school of religion and however beneficial its work has undoubtedly been, as witness statistics which afford proof of its efficacy in the reduction of juvenile delinquency, etc., its importance is subsidiary to that of the taking of the whole educational process definitely in terms of the character-building objective—what we have ventured to call putting the spirit of religion into education. The making of religious persons is something that cannot be forced; a religious resultant is the by-product of a religious atmosphere. It grows best in an atmosphere of spontaneity.

Thus there remains for the educational agencies of the church a vast area of opportunity which has been very imperfectly explored and developed in the past. The fundamental weakness in the functioning of the educational forces of the church is the lack of an adequate sense of the value and significance of education in religion. Rabbi Silver, of Cleveland, has said that America is religiously indifferent and morally cruising. Probably no one single thing would mean more to the religious life of America than a revival of the "family pew." A child who is sent to Sunday school cannot possibly think of that institution in terms of the prestige which it ought to bear. Only where there is a sharing of fellowship on the part of parents and children in the area of worship and religious instruction and activity as well as in the areas of home and recreational life may we look for the conditions of effective religious education in the churches. A great deal is to be said for those experiments being made in a number of churches the aim of which is to blend the Sunday school and formal service in such a way as to provide a suitable program of worship and instruction for all the age groups.

The whole array of knowledges, skills, and methods which have wrought a revolution in the science of contemporary education is available for the use of religious-education workers. We know that child nature is exceedingly plastic and can be molded largely at will; we know that the impressions made in the earliest years are most indelible; we know that "enthusiastic activity is the whole psychology of adolescence"; we know that the learning process is conditional on other factors than exhortation and formal instruction, and that the sharing of purposeful activity in the spirit of zest and spontaneous enjoyment is a main key to the solution of the character-building problem; we know that conduct is motivated by the enlistment of the emotions and sentiments, the affections and loyalties rather than by rational demonstrations. The wealth of knowledge and materials of the whole wide field of modern educational psychology lies at the door of the religious educator.

Not only so, but the religious educator can utilize these as one who presides in a very direct way over the oracles of the faith. The average child is "incurably metaphysical"; is wondrously responsive to the appeal of religion. The new psychology of worship is opening up to us a vision of what potentialities for character-building lie in the field of worship as experience of God, when rightly adapted to the several age groups. The project method in the Sunday school has wonderful potentialities in it, as the evidence continues to come in, for the building of Christlike character through relating in a vital way the life of the student to that great range of problems contained within the field of social ethics, such as are presented by industrial, international, and racial relations; modern missions; and community life. When the resources of art, literature, history, and the social sciences are levied upon in order to re-create the life-situation of our brothers in Christ, whether in China, India, Latin America, or the slum district of one's own city, the student is much more likely to react against a purely conventional approach and develop a genuinely Christlike attitude toward the issues involved. There are splendid potentialities also in the further expansion of the method of co-operative management of our church schools whereby all concerned, "from the least to the greatest," may come to feel that they are an integral part of the whole and have some part in the framing of policies through mutual deliberation and representative control. And in a peculiar sense it is the privilege of the religious educational agencies of the church to recognize that religion pure and undefiled has ever been and is likely to continue to be the most potent factor in the creation of fineness and fidelity of character. Ethical conduct grows best in the soil of pure religious experience. Those who preside directly over the oracles of religion have it in their power to put the aspiring soul of the little child in direct touch with the source of holiness and health.

JONATHAN EDWARDS: A STUDY IN GODLINESS

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JONATHAN EDWARDS has been a variously interesting figure. During the ascendancy of "New England theology" he was recognized as the authority in matters theological. But that is a long time ago. At the beginning of the present century considerable interest was aroused in his "early idealism" and its sources. His philosophical genius and originality became a matter of general acceptance, and after some discussions of his antecedents, the matter was dropped. At present, one will sometimes hear rumors to the effect that he was a great man, but his chief claim to distinction rests in his "hell-fire sermons" and his Calvinism, which are considered to be inseparable.

Such estimates of Edwards deserve some consideration, but not one of them is of basic importance for an adequate understanding of his character and his work. He was primarily neither a philosopher nor a theologian nor a "hell-fire preacher." His interest in philosophical speculation disappeared with his youth. His doctrinal essays, never put together as a "system," constitute a very minor part of his works. His hell-fire sermons, which, by the way, are not quite as hellish as is popularly supposed, were preached for reasons and under circumstances which provoke sympathy rather than denunciation.

However, the purpose of this essay is to give a fairly accurate statement of the essentials of Edwards' character and thought, and not to apologize for his real or imaginary faults. Our age, no less than any other, will benefit more from contemplating the virtues of the dead than from gloating over their follies. Edwards wrote some things which are of permanent spiritual significance. Both historical justice and the interests of present-day theological perplexities have motivated the writing of this essay. Edwards' contributions to the problems of contemporary theology prove, once more, that great insights are common treasures of many ages and many climes.

> When I was a boy, some years before I went to college, at a time of a remarkable awakening in my father's congregation . . . . I used to pray five times a day in secret, and to spend much time in religious talk with other boys; and used to meet with them to pray together. . . . . I with some of my schoolmates joined together, and built a booth in a swamp, in a very retired spot, for a place of prayer. . . . . My affections seemed to be lively and easily moved, and I seemed to be in my element when engaged in religious duties.

Edwards' notes on his childhood leave the reader with a set of impressions which are clear and consistent. He was a child of "lively affections," sensitive, emotional, and intense. From the first, "religious duties" were the mediums through which his feelings became articulate. Talking religion with other boys, praying in "a booth in a swamp," were delightful occupations, spontaneous expressions of his emotional life. This picture of the child Edwards is immensely valuable for a fair understanding of his later life. His famous "early idealism" was preceded by an early spirituality. This fact has been generally overlooked by those who have bewailed the fact that his mature thought was theological rather than philosophical. While in college, Edwards philosophized for the same reason that many an intelligent youth will be spurred to turn his thoughts on things profound and baffling. And being extraordinarily intelligent, his reflections were unusually fruitful. However, in the light of his childhood life, it is not at all surprising that he made religion, and not philosophy, the main concern of his life. Collegiate reflections seldom determine a career. Even at the time when he was jotting down his famous "Notes on the Mind," his soul was alarmingly restless, and he subjected himself to all manner of spiritual discipline because his "affections wore off . . . . and returned like a dog to his vomit, and went on in the ways of sin."

The spiritual conflicts of Edwards during his youth reveal another side of his character which is usually overlooked.

> I had great and violent inward struggles, till after many conflicts with wicked inclinations, repeated resolutions, and bonds that I laid myself under by a kind of vows to God, I was brought wholly to break off all former wicked ways . . . . and to apply myself to seek salvation, and practise many religious duties; but without that kind of affection and delight which I had formerly experienced. . . . . I made seeking my salvation the main business of my life. But yet, it seems to me I sought after a miserable manner.

The truth is that the kind of unhealthy introspection which is supposed to be characteristic of Puritan religion made Edwards genuinely miserable. He was hardly delighted when "God pleased to seize me with a pleurisy in which he brought me well nigh to the grave, and shook me over the pit of hell." When his religious affections came to the fore naturally and spontaneously, as they had in his early childhood, he was delighted to the utmost. But when they were forced upon him as results of illness, they made him unhappy.

His reaction to contemporary Calvinism is no less illuminating. One would expect that this supposed arch-Calvinist would have appropriated the current doctrines of Calvinism without question or ado. But that is not the case.

> From my childhood up my mind had been full of objections against the doctrine of God's sovereignty, in choosing whom he would to eternal life, and rejecting whom he pleased; leaving them eternally to perish, and be everlastingly tormented in hell. It used to appear like a horrible doctrine to me.

But Edwards soon learned to understand the spiritual motivation of this apparently obnoxious doctrine. On reading I Tim. 1:17, "Now unto the King eternal, immortal, invisible, the only wise God, be honor and glory forever and ever. Amen," he found it to be a doctrine "exceeding pleasant, sweet, and bright." He had discovered the essence of Calvinism, and with it a theology which was the proper symbol of his own religious experience.

> As I read these words, there came into my soul, and was as it were diffused through it, a sense of the glory of the divine Being; a new sense, quite different from anything I experienced before. Never any words of Scripture seemed to me as these words did. I thought with myself, how excellent a Being that was, and how happy I should be, if I might enjoy that God, and be rapt up to him in heaven, and be as it were swallowed up in him forever.

Here is the theme of the great writings of the mature Edwards. He was almost born with it; it dominated his childhood sentiments; it recaptured his imagination in his youth; and it remained his supreme passion until the end. His whole life is little other than a series of variations of this one theme. His writings are but elaborations thereof, and answers to objections to it. It is not possible to understand either his life or his writings without an adequate appreciation of this one fundamental motif. Let us turn to the story of its development.

> Not long after I began to experience these things, I gave an account to my father of some things that passed in my mind. I was pretty much affected by the discourse we had together; and when the discourse was ended, I walked abroad alone, in a solitary place in my father's pasture, for contemplation. And as I was walking there, and looking up on the sky and clouds, there came into my mind so sweet a sense of the glorious *majesty* and grace of God, that I knew not how to express. I seemed to see them both in sweet conjunction; majesty and meekness joined together; it was sweet and gentle, and holy majesty; and also a majestic meekness; an awful sweetness; a high, and great, and holy gentleness.

One cannot resist the temptation to go on with the story.

> After this my sense of divine things gradually increased, and became more and more lively, and had more of that inward sweetness. The appearance of everything was altered. . . . . God's excellency, his wisdom, his purity and love, seemed to appear in everything; in the sun and moon and stars; in the clouds and the blue sky; in the grass, flowers, trees; in the water and all nature; which used greatly to fix my mind. . . . . In

> the day I spent much time in viewing the clouds and sky; in the mean time, singing forth, with a low voice, my contemplations of the Creator and Redeemer. . . . . Before, I used to be uncommonly terrified with thunder. . . . . but now, on the contrary it rejoiced me. I felt God, so to speak, at the first appearance of a thunder storm; and used to take the opportunity, at such times, to fix myself in order to view the clouds and see the lightnings play, and hear the majestic and awful voice of God's thunder, which oftentimes was exceedingly entertaining, leading me to sweet contemplations of my great and glorious God.

The civilized city dweller of today might regard such outbursts of emotion with a certain amount of suspicion, and wonder if the whole thing is not somewhat overdone. It is even possible to accuse Edwards of sentimentalism. However, when one remembers that he was a man of profound emotions as well as a keen observer, it becomes more important to understand than to judge. Much could be said to the effect that the lack of great appreciations constitutes the essence of ungodliness and the many evils which are subsumed under that word.

The sun and the stars do not exhaust the realm of facts. There is man. There is Edwards. Therefore, he never was satisfied with his rapturous reactions to natural phenomena. His eyes turned constantly to the depths of his own soul, and searched its nuances with precision and diligent care. This is specially true of his one year's ministry in New York, 1722–23. Here we discover a marked increase in his interest in the ethical aspects of piety. He says:

> My longings after God and holiness were much increased. Pure and humble, holy and heavenly Christianity, appeared exceeding amiable to me. I felt a burning desire to be in everything a complete Christian; and conformed to the blessed image of Christ; and that I might live, in all things, according to the pure, sweet and blessed rules of the gospel.
>
> There was no part of creature holiness, that I had so great a sense of its loveliness, as humility, brokenness of heart, and poverty of spirit; and there was nothing that I so eagerly sought for. My heart panted after this, to be low before God, as in dust; that I might be nothing, and that God might be ALL, that I might become as a little child.

On March 6, 1722, he wrote: "*Felt* the doctrines of election, free grace, and of our not being able to do anything without the grace of God; and that holiness is entirely, throughout, the work of God's Spirit, with more pleasure than before."

In Edwards, more than anywhere else, we discover Calvinism as a living affair. He had "felt" the sweet majesty and glory of the Creator and Redeemer in and through his wonderful handiwork, long before he had written his masterly defenses of the doctrines of Calvinism. In fact, although he was a supremely clear thinker, his chief contributions to Christian literature must remain his great investigations into the essentials of genuine piety.

The excessive and futile emotionalism of the Great Awakening, which soon subsided leaving things worse than they were before, brought forth sharp and well-deserved criticism from the more sober minds, and caused Edwards to write his famous treatise on the *Religious Affections*. It was necessary to distinguish true religion from the many counterfeits which appeared during the Awakening. Edwards himself had been greatly responsible for the erratic and harmful workings of the spirit among the masses of the people. His aim had been to stem the tide of religious indifference which, already begun by the middle of the seventeenth century, had now come to assume alarming proportions. In the process of accomplishing his ends he resorted to a kind of preaching which, although immediately effective, aroused violent but spasmodic and fruitless sentiments. It was a drastic method, and it failed. Edwards had conducted a great experiment, and the results had been highly instructive.

> It appears that the witness of the Spirit . . . . is not any immediate suggestion or revelation, but a gracious and holy work of the Spirit of God in the hearts of saints, producing the dispositions and temper of children. It is a humble, child-like affection to God, casting out fear, or the servile spirit of bondage.

Religious experience is conditioned neither by "conversion" nor by fear. It is a certain type of disposition, a specific variety of affection; a "new spiritual sense," which makes it possible for men to see things in a totally new light, and thus produces a radical transformation in the world of experience. Man is filled with a new love, and is dominated by a new principle of "life and action." This "spiritual taste" or "holy disposition" becomes the basis of a complete transvaluation of values, a source for the discovery of new relations, proportions, and harmonies. Through the exercise of this new affection man "truly perceives the transcendent glory of divine things, is convinced of their divinity, as it were intuitively." He now regards creation as the handiwork of God, the manifestation of the attributes of God, partaking of his divinity, and a refulgence of his glorious majesty. Such is the nature of regeneration. It is a new quality of experience. It is holiness.

It may be necessary to remind one's self that a quality of experience is a non-rational affair. It arises from human intercourse with the environment, and belongs to the structure of "events." As an individual occurrence it is irrelevant to the problems of rational thinking. The function of reason is to bring order into the chaos of immediate experiences; this is a regulative and not a constitutive function. Experience is conditioned by structures which are either "there" or not "there." A rational treatment of any given event is an attempt to discover its connection with other events. But the events themselves, as mere happenings, are simply given. They are "there." One is either acquainted with them or he is not. This is true of things "divine" as well as of all others. For Edwards, holiness is quality of the world of events, and it is discovered by men who have holy dispositions, just as color is another quality of the same world and is discovered by men who have eyesight.

However, although it is true that holiness is a unique quality of experience, and as such cannot be described exhaustively in terms of any other quality, it can be analyzed into elements which are to be distinguished from it, and yet are sufficiently similar to it to suggest its character. It is, as it were, a compound of various spiritual qualities. It is "gracious," "amiable," and "excellent." It is constantly referred to as a sort of "beauty"—"holy beauty." It involves humility, loves of many kinds, goodness, and childlikeness. It is, as it were, the quintessence of all manner of virtue, in fact, the only "true virtue."

In his truly great essay, *The Nature of True Virtue*, Edwards is constantly insistent that "true virtue" is a unique affection. He distinguishes it from "natural conscience" and "moral sense." Pure morality, the ability of seeing things as right or wrong, is dictated by the "natural conscience." Parental love, the love of man and wife, pity, gratitude, etc., are also "natural" affections. And although plausible and often necessary, they are not holy. They are valuable animal emotions which have been given to "mankind for preservation." Justice and dutifulness are necessary for social harmony, and are practiced because of their utility. Similarly, the appreciation of "natural beauty of objects in nature" is conditioned by structural harmonies we discover in them. Such appreciation yields us particular beauties, "within a limited, as it were, private sphere." The practice of natural morality directed to particular objects and the particular discoveries of aesthetic harmony are independent from and often inimical to the interests of another morality and beauty which concerns "being in general." "True virtue most essentially consists in benevolence to Being in general. . . . . It is that consent, propensity and union of heart to being in general that is immediately exercised in general goodwill."

The consequences of such a distinction between "true virtue" and all other virtue are far reaching and profound. True virtue is independent from the exigencies of limited circumstances. It is the expression of a general good will, and has for its object "being in general." It is the ground of true love, and all particular expressions of true love grow from it. It is that primary affection which transforms all natural affections and gives them a supernatural quality.

Remarkable as Edwards' analysis of "true virtue" is, one is even more struck with the philosophical insight and logical accuracy which he displays in his discussions of "being in general" as the object of "true virtue." As the latter is no particular virtue, but a new quality of character, the former is not any particular being, nor is it the totality of all beings. Even Hopkins, the greatest of the "Edwardians," vitiated the thinking of Edwards by confusing the distinction between all being and being in general. The former, of course, is everything, the whole of creation. The latter is that character of being which is disclosed to a person of "holy disposition." The knowledge of the former is to be arrived at through a simple process of widening one's circle of acquaintance with the world of events. The knowledge of being in general is attained through the discovery of the essence of any being, which is also the essence of all being. The former is a matter of increased acquaintances; the latter is a matter of a unique and profound insight into the meaning of being in general.

Here Edwards combines "mysticism" with a rationalism which is just as thorough and just as essential to his thought. In the first place, true virtue consists in perfect disinterestedness. It is the ability to become a detached observer of facts, a perfect mirror of reality and realities. Self-love, the setting-up of the ego against the rest of the world as the object of supreme regard, irrational preferences and prejudices based upon natural and instinctive emotions, appreciations resulting from more or less limited egotisms—in short, the failure to regard all events with a completely dispassionate objectivity—constitute the exact contraries of "true virtue."

Second, "true virtue" consists in an adequate sense of proportion. It enables the intellect to discover the real relative importance of the facts which go into the making of a world of experience. The mutual relations of events are held in clear view, their "order and connection" discovered, and their mutual harmonies appreciated. The world is thoroughly intelligible, and it must be understood. There can be no "true virtue" without an adequate insight into the character of the world. True love and rational accuracy are thus inseparable. A love which cannot envisage the good of being in general is never truly virtuous, and it is impossible to envisage such a good without an understanding of the logic of events. Nor is any knowledge devoid of true love genuinely intelligent. True virtue, although logically prior to its expression in particular insights and appreciations, is both the ground of these, and their substance.

Third (and this is highly significant), the harmonies discovered through the exercise of true virtue comprehend the fulness of human experience. They are neither purely structural nor purely ethical nor purely aesthetic. They are all inclusive. The end of living is a maximum richness of being and doing, intelligent, harmonious, and intense. Perfection consists in a perfect appreciation of being in general, in a disinterested regard for the good of being in general.

True virtue is thus the crown of experience. It is that unique quality of character which marks the transformation of the natural man to the supernatural; the evidence of the true working of the Spirit of God in the human soul. Edwards' treatise on the *Religious Affections* is but a discussion of the more particularly Christian aspects of "true virtue." Holiness, no less than true virtue, is identical with highest excellence. The world as disclosed to the eyes of true virtue is a refulgence of divine glory, and its harmonies are but the manifestations of the attributes of the sovereign Creator and Ruler of the universe.

> God has infinitely the greatest share of existence, or is infinitely the greatest Being. . . . . So that all other being, even that all created beings whatsoever throughout the whole universe, is as nothing in comparison to divine being.

In his essay on the *Freedom of the Will* Edwards deduces the existence of God from the principle of causation. That God exists is clear from that nothing is or can be without a cause. But this proposition is devoid of content. It gives us but a "general abstracted notion" of the Deity, and therefore it is of little value. Any knowledge of the nature of God is necessarily arrived at through the empirical acquaintance of man with his world. The particular attributes of God are revealed through the impact of events upon a person endowed with a "holy disposition." God is holy, and will reveal himself to none but the "pure in heart." Holiness and the knowledge of God are the two aspects of the same experience, and therefore cannot be separated from each other. Where there is holiness, there is the knowledge of God; and where there is no holiness, there can be no vision of God. In love to God a truly virtuous mind is cognizant of "the expression of God's perfections in their proper effect, in the manifestation of God's glory to created understandings, and the communications of the infinite fulness of God to the creature, in the creature's highest esteem to God, love to God, and joy in God. . . . "

In writing of God, Edwards discloses a type of naïveté which has become well-nigh incomprehensible. He constantly speaks of God's glory, his wisdom, power, etc., his self-revelation and refulgences in the universe; but one looks in vain for a "proof of the existence of God." He is "assumed" to be the Creator of the universe, the Fountain of all existence, the sovereign and almighty Ruler of all being, but one searches in vain for a "definition of God." He gives us no "idea of God," no reasonable hypotheses as to why and how he should exist. God simply is. All creation, all things that come and go, have their being and becoming in God, and are but dim refulgences of his infinite and eternal glory. One endowed with "spiritual taste" and vision knows that God is, and that the glorious creation revealed to his senses is the handiwork of the eternal being. If one would understand God, if one would discover his nature and attributes, one needs must turn to the world of experience. The whole universe is full of things and happenings which declare the wisdom, and the power, and the goodness, and the glory of God. If one would know the mind of God, one must study the world. If one would know his plans and purposes, one must again look at the world. The love of God, the grace of God, the wrath of God, the justice and the righteousness of God, are facts of daily life, revealed to the saints and hidden from the ungodly. Beyond this man knows nothing, and perhaps there is nothing to be known. In Edwards one finds a healthy agnosticism and a genuine "radical empiricism" which if duly appreciated would put us moderns to shame.

God created the world, and rules it. But why?

> It appears reasonable to suppose, that it was what God had respect to as an ultimate end of his creating the world, to communicate of his own infinite fulness of good; or rather, it was his last end, that there might be a glorious and abundant emanation of his infinite fulness of good *ab extra*, or without himself; and the disposition to communicate himself, or diffuse his own fulness, which we must conceive of as being originally in God as a perfection of his nature, was what moved him to create the world.

The last end of God in creating the world was to display the fulness of his infinite perfections, and of these the created world is an infinitesimal part. The glory of God, which is the sum and substance of his attributes and perfections, is the last end of all things. And it is fitting and proper that this should be so. First, it is the highest good of man to be cognizant of the glory of God. Therefore, God in displaying his fulness has also made possible the fulness of human bliss, which is holiness. Thus, in a sense, God's last end in creating the world was the highest happiness of intelligent beings. Nevertheless, a truly virtuous man knows that the world exists not for his own benefit, but that the perfections of God may become manifest. As Edwards says:

> A real saint, enjoying evangelical discoveries of the glory of God, is too much engaged in what he views *without* himself, to stay at that time to view himself, or his attainment. . . . His pleasure at that time arises

chiefly . . . . from the divine beauty of that object which so powerfully engages his attention.

A disinterested regard for the glory of God is the essence of holiness. "A real saint" finds his supreme happiness in the enjoyment of the perfections of God as displayed in the world of happenings. His salvation consists essentially in viewing the "divine beauty of that object which so powerfully engages his attention." Here is another expression of the theocentric character of Edwards' religion. Man is saved by losing himself in God.

Second, God "has infinitely the greatest share of existence, or is infinitely the greatest Being." Therefore, it is well that he should make his own glory his last end. An adequate sense of proportion belongs to the substance of holiness. God is infinitely holy,,and is infinitely great; compared to God, creation is mere dust. Therefore, it is congruous with divine wisdom that he should make his glory his last end. God's holiness makes it necessary that his supreme regard should be directed to that which is most worthy of it. His conception of reality being absolutely adequate, it is well that his interest should ultimately rest in that which is most real and has the greatest share of being, that is, himself. Once more, knowing the glory of God to be infinitely superior to all created things, the source of all beauty and excellence, the fountain of the glories of the universe, "a real saint" recognizes the justice and the wisdom of God, and his perfect benevolence in making his own glory his last end.

Third, God's regard for himself cannot be opposed to his regard for his handiwork, because, in a most genuine sense, the happiness of all things is included in divine glory. The glory of the creation is the glory of God, diffused and reflected. "The whole is of God, in God, and to God; God is the beginning, middle, and end of this affair." All is an emanation of the infinite "internal glory" of God, a communication of himself to us, a refulgence of his own eternal bliss. Apart from God there is nothing.

But, one must be careful not to dub Edwards a "pantheist." The refulgent being of God must be carefully distinguished from his "internal being." This marvelous universe is only a dim reflection of the eternal perfections of God. The various words which Edwards uses to describe the relationship between God and the world make a pantheistic interpretation of his thought definitely erroneous. His appreciations of the world in which we live, of course, give to his thinking elements which can be easily denounced as "mystical" and "pantheistic." He is unable to discourse on the nature and the attributes of God except in terms of categories belonging to the world of human experience—a rather inescapable limitation. But he never fails to distinguish between God and the world. He is not quite as bold with hypotheses concerning the "transcendent" nature of God as other men of more doubtful logical accuracy, but that might be construed as a virtue rather than as a vice.

Fourth, "we may justly infer what God intends, by what he actually does." God's ends cannot very well be separated from their realization. His wisdom, and will, and acts, are revealed in the world of facts; that which he thinks, he wills; that which he wills, he accomplishes. These various aspects of the fulness of God cannot be separated from one another, nor can they be placed in a scheme of temporal sequence. We know of the benevolence of God, because in fact he is benevolent. We know of his diffusive disposition, because he does in fact diffuse himself—witness his creation. We know that God intends to display his glory, because he does in fact display it. "A real saint" knows that it is his last end, because there is nothing more supremely worthy of being such.

Given his views on God and holiness, Edwards had little difficulty in appropriating the theology of Calvinism. The latter is a radically theocentric theology, and Edwards was "God intoxicated." And yet he never wrote a "system of theology," and his doctrinal discussions occupy a very minor place in his voluminous writings. His essays, rather notes, on "efficacious grace," "decrees and election," and his well-known *Freedom of the Will* and the *Doctrine of Original Sin*, are all directed against the Arminian errors which were beginning to undermine the accepted Calvinism of New England. A survey of his works must soon convince a reader that his interest centered around investigations into the essentials of piety rather than around the particular doctrines which were its intellectual symbols.

However, he was quick to perceive the real import of "the supposed rational and generous principles of the modern, fashionable divinity." He saw that in attacking the doctrines of efficacious grace, decrees, and election, original sin and divine sovereignty, the Arminians were striking at the very essence of a type of spirituality which was his one dominant passion. He was confronted with affections and dispositions which were the contrary of holiness and true virtue. The new interest was in man, in the happiness of man, in the freedom of man; it was a new faith in the goodness, and the wisdom, and the power, of man. Man was becoming the measure of all things, the last end of creation, the master of all and the servant of none. For Edwards, whose supreme happiness consisted in the contemplation of the dim refulgences of the infinite glory of God in the universe, nothing could be more erroneous and perverse. Such an exaltation of man was maintained at the expense of a full appreciation of the wisdom and the power and the infinite perfection of God, the creator and sustainer of all being. Edwards revolted. He defended the doctrines of Calvinism with an intellectual vigor and cogency which has seldom been appreciated, except in the case of his essay on the *Freedom of the Will*, which is neither too original nor always very clear. As a doctrinal innovator his place in the history of theology is insignificant. But clear thinker that he was, his contributions to Christian apologetics contain philosophical elements of permanent value. Some of his arguments against Arminians could be employed quite as effectively against "humanists" and naturalists, who seldom fail to embarrass the "theist" of today.

> In efficacious grace we are not merely passive, nor yet does God do some, and we do the rest. But God does all and we do all. God produces all, and we act all. God is the only proper author and fountain; we are the proper actors. We are, in different respects, wholly passive, and wholly active.

Such a statement deserves a whole volume as a commentary. A proper understanding of it would obviate the vicious character of the theological dilemma of "determinism and free-will." The problem is based upon a confused assumption to the effect that divine causation and natural causation are commensurate, so that what is natural cannot also be divine. The hard-boiled empiricist who is forever asking the believer to tell him "where God comes in" is working with the same notion. The man who, unable to discover any physical divine fingerprints in the universe, must needs appeal to the ignorance of scientists and the plausibility of probabilities, and thus make a "venture of faith," is laboring with the same difficulty. Skepticisms concerning prayer and the value of worship, curious demands for "proofs for the existence of God," together with the equally curious types of reasoning employed to meet these demands, are due to a set of mental habits from which Edwards was singularly free. "God does all and we do all." Once more:

> The decrees of our everlasting state were not before our prayers and strivings; for these are as much present with God from all eternity, as they are the moment they are present with us. They are present as part of his decrees, or rather as the same; and they did as really exist in eternity, with respect to God, as they exist in time, and as much at one time as another. Therefore, we can no more fairly argue, that these will be in vain, because God has foredetermined all things. . . .

Even Edwards the metaphysician reveals a degree of sobriety and common sense which is remarkably encouraging. Prayers, strivings, holiness, and salvation are intimately related facts of man's inner life. Holiness is the condition of salvation. Holiness *is* salvation. Praying and striving are inseparable from the attainment of salvation. God's decrees whereby a man is elected to salvation and the man's holiness refer to the same fact. If God decrees all, and from eternity, then there is no sense in complaining that striving is unnecessary and futile because God has foredetermined all. Of course such a discussion of time and eternity is replete with difficulties, and presupposes a rather unpopular species of "idealism." But when it is expressed in a more comprehensible language, Edwards' fundamental empiricism and intellectual accuracy become evident. The decrees of God can be discovered only from what he does in fact accomplish—that is, what God does he also decrees. In his essay on the Trinity, Edwards makes it quite clear that in God there "is no distinction to be made between habit and act, between temper or disposition and act." "The idea which God has of himself is absolutely himself." The mind of God is the totality of essence and existence. The idea which God has of reality is reality itself, because God has a perfectly adequate idea of all being. This idea is eternally the same, because it is the manner of the interrelatednesses of all actualities and possibilities.

The notion of religion as a body of ultimately irrational over-beliefs is completely absent from Edwards' mind. When one attempts to rethink his thoughts on the various doctrines of Calvinistic religion, one is greatly impressed with his thoroughgoing empiricism and rational sanity. This is an encouraging discovery, and in this age, when misunderstandings about the intents and the contents of Christian theology have become well-nigh universal, it is impossible to overemphasize its significance. We have been too quick at judging orthodox theologies as "dogmatic," and no less quick in relegating them to the vast domain of ancient errors. Such historical misconceptions and the consequent injustices alone are sufficient to give one pause, and to cause one to examine one's own intellectual integrity. But the necessity of a more adequate revaluation of historic Christianity becomes imperative when one comes to discover that in this process of misunderstandings and misjudgments of the past we have been deprived of insights and ideas which are essential for the preservation and the growth of any genuine Christianity at all.

It must be admitted that the Christian theologian of today often finds himself in embarrassing situations. Although the "conflict of religion with science" has been repeatedly declared to have been eliminated, persistent though veiled interest in the subject makes it rather evident that the question is still fit matter for lively discussion. The fundamental articles of a modern and enlightened Christian's faith—God, freedom, and immortality—have become "inadequate ideas" and continue to defy rigorous intellectual analysis; nor have the "reinterpretations" of them by men of various religious insights and scientific or philosophical attainments been altogether happy. Ideas of God arrived at through attempts at scientific and rational respectability often turn out to be genuine misnomers, and thoroughly inadequate to stimulate and nourish the life of piety. The life of piety itself has been redefined repeatedly until it has become very difficult to distinguish it from any other kind of living. Under the circumstances the heated squabbles between men who choose to call themselves "theists" and others who will call themselves "humanists" often turn out to be curious misunderstandings between men who owe each other "the right hand of fellowship."

On the other hand, the position of the more genuine "theists," those whose readjustments to the thoughts of the present age has not destroyed their sensitivities to the values of historic Christianity is replete with disheartening difficulties, heroic hypotheses, and confusing inconsistencies, which make it generally unpalatable. The articles of belief have become "ventures of faith," or, as they appear to others, deductions from insufficient data. What is far more objectionable, it is next to impossible to follow a contemporary theistic discussion of God, freedom, or immortality. And, of course, one cannot believe what one cannot understand.

To the majority of those who are prepared to give religion some thought, there seem to be two alternatives open to choose from: they must either reinterpret it out of existence or cling to some things as matters of "faith." The latter is the so-called "practical solution"; it is recommended heartily as a basic religious principle, and justified philosophically as an application of "pragmatism." However, such an identification of pragmatism with irrationalism has served little the purposes for which it was intended. A lame concept is a very poor instrument for vigorous action. Affections which become articulate in inconsistent and chaotic mental behavior cannot be maintained as permanent sources of compelling convictions, and must soon lose their power and dwindle away. A religion of which the most basic ideas are perplexities may die out slowly, but die out it must. The process may be gradual and hardly perceptible, but a close scrutiny of its various stages will reveal transformations, both profound and radical. Therefore, it is always well to know histories of cultures and ideas. Every once in a while one will meet a man in whom a given human interest will shine forth clearly and brightly; a man with a dominant passion who will have discovered an "eternal truth." The knowledge of such men and such truths is the only safeguard a particular age can have against tragic intoxication with its own appreciations and attainments.

The life and the writings of Jonathan Edwards are of permanent human significance. He stands for a type of "true virtue" which has its roots in the essentials of human experience. Given man and his environment, the world has qualities which survive the superficial flux of cultures. There are truths which must forever ring true, because they are discoveries in the realm of eternals and belong to the essence of being in general; being basic reactions of man to his world, they belong to the very warp and woof of experience. Edwards' conception of true virtue and holiness is such a truth. Great appreciations, and a corresponding sublime selflessness; a deep-seated confidence in the ability of the human mind to understand its environment and to envisage a clear and coherent picture of being in general; the sense of supreme happiness which springs from whole-hearted gratitudes; and that holiness which is the perfection of a full and harmonious life—these are "affections" which must forever captivate the hearts of men and spur them to find their happiness in the love of God and in joy in God.

The variegated sensitivities and the clear mind of Edwards gave him a vision of godliness which is unique in comprehensiveness, cogency, and profundity; a godliness which demanded a superb spirituality, but never an "intellectual leap in the dark"; a faith which required insight, but no chaotic notions concerning transcendent reality; a heroic courage to accept the glory of God as the last end of creation, and no ill-placed devotion to the desires of the human heart. The faith of Edwards was a vision. Therefore it shaped his thought and governed his conduct. He is our witness to the truth that God reveals himself to men of vision and power.

RAISING RELIGIOUS EDUCATION TO A RELIGIOUS LEVEL

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UNDOUBTEDLY the most difficult task of the supervisor is to help his co-workers raise their teaching and other activities to a religious level.[1] Since the curriculum is conceived today as including all the directed or planned experiences of the pupils, as well as the occasions of formal worship and instruction, the problem is greater than it ever was. In his visitations and observations the supervisor has extreme difficulty in evaluating the situations and estimating where improvements ought to be made. There is no one way to be religious, and each situation involves a careful analysis to see in what way the religious quality or interpretation may be made significant. The term "religious" is often a vague concept and has not been analyzed into its essential factors, so that the supervisor needs to have at hand such analyses as will enable him to work through with his leaders the more important meanings and implications of religion. He should not try to make others accept his point of view but he should be able to make his interpretation of religion in any situation intelligible. By agreeing on fundamentals they can work together in mutual trust and confidence. This is a more satisfactory way than to avoid discussion of differences of opinion which so often causes unfortunate misunderstandings. If religion is dealt with from a functional rather than from a theological point of view there is usually little difficulty in agreeing on the fundamental issues and emphases. It is more important that statements be made in terms that allow growth of meanings and experience than that they be put in fixed dogmatic forms. It should be frankly admitted that differences will be expected arising from differences of training, disposition, and general experience. The discipline of trying to get each other's point of view, of appreciating each other's values, of recognizing the different ways in which religion may be expressed, is healthy for both teachers and supervisor, and is also a good preparation for mediating the meaning of religion to the pupils. Particular problems must be dealt with in sympathetic manner, and mass education is not expected to meet any but the most general needs.

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[1] A forthcoming book by Dr. Chave will discuss the whole problem of "Supervision in Religious Education." To be published by The University of Chicago Press.

In order to suggest possible varieties in the definition of religion, and to give a body of ideas and forms for expressing its meanings, the supervisor is advised to provide himself with a list of definitions, a few types of which are here given:

COMPOSITE DEFINITION

Religion is a conviction that supreme good is attainable and a setting of life in that direction. Religion is the quest for the highest good, and is usually accompanied by an energizing experience due to dependence upon a personal God, or to a rationalized appreciation of the total meaning and worth of life. Religion is the experience of such values in life that ideals are built up, conduct is controlled by them, and a faith in God or a supporting universe energizes the responsive personality.

INDIVIDUAL WRITINGS

"Religion is the serious and social attitude of individuals or communities toward the power or powers which they conceive as having ultimate control over their interests and destinies."—J. B. PRATT, *The Religious Consciousness*, p. 1.

"Religion ought to be characterized by the feeling of dependence on a personal God and dominated by the will to co-operate with God in the conservation and increase of values."—E. S. BRIGHTMAN, *An Introduction to Philosophy*, p. 321.

"Religion is the consciousness of the highest social values."—E. S. AMES, *Psychology of Religious Experience*, p. vii.

"Religion is a shared quest for the good life."—A. E. HAYDON, *The Quest of the Ages*, p. ix.

"Religion is man's acute awareness of the realm of unattained possibility and the behavior that results from that awareness."—H. N. WEIMAN, *The Wrestle of Religion with Truth*, p. 135.

"The interpretation of the experience of God is what makes religion."—H. N. WEIMAN, *Religious Experience and Scientific Method*, p. 41.

"Religion as known to most of us who are interested in this discussion is sharing with some worshipping group the experience of that divine purpose of righteousness and love which gives meaning to life viewed as a whole, and a consequent experience of growing competence to meet life as a total situation."—T. G. SOARES, *Religious Education*, p. xvi.

"Religion is essentially of the nature of creativity. . . . . Religion is organized around the as-yet-unrealized values of human living, ... it discovers the values that are resident in current experience and gives a powerful impulsion to human effort and aspiration in the direction of projected ideals. Religion brings all the values of life into such unity that life can be seen as a whole; it holds up self and its experiences in the light of God; it focuses attention upon the ideal aspects of experience."—W. C. BOWER, *Character through Creative Experience*, pp. 247–53.

"Religion is a complex of ideas, attitudes, habits, customs, and practices developed by a group as it adjusts itself to its total environment, social and natural, in its endeavor to achieve those values and satisfactions which are considered most worthful."—H. S. DIMOCK, "Trends in the Redefinition of Religion," *Journal of Religion*, July, 1928.

It will be noted in these definitions as in many others that there is a tendency to avoid the use of the word God, except where terms or phrases indicate the way in which the underlying reality is conceived. While some feel the intellectual difficulty of positing a personal God at the center of life others do not hesitate to declare that they believe that the idea of God is fundamental in any adequate philosophy of life. The first definition given above may serve to focus attention upon some of the essentials in a modern concept of religion, "Religion is a conviction that supreme good is obtainable and a setting of life in that direction." It is described as a conviction because it involves both reason and feeling. It involves not only this belief but also a tendency to act in a certain way. There is a "coiled spring feeling" of power and reserve and ability to do things. There is a sensitivity and a readiness to act in the direction of what is regarded as the highest social good. The Supreme Good is based upon experienced values and is called "attainable," which means that faith builds ideals out of the facts of life and so expects to realize the best.

The following outline is intended to suggest a way of pursuing the analysis of the religious elements of a religious educational situation. It is only suggestive, and should be modified by the workers in conference and shaped to express their own ideas. The supervisor should help his leaders to concrete each principle with illustrations relative to the groups with which they work. The exhortation "Lift your activities to a religious level" should carry specific meaning to each and every worker.

WHAT IS MEANT BY RAISING TEACHING OR OTHER ACTIVITY TO A RELIGIOUS LEVEL?

1. The religious level is not reached
    - 1.1 By merely labeling an activity as religious; calling an activity religious education; holding it on Sunday or under auspices of the church; calling a certain service worship or a set of words a prayer.
    - 1.2 By associating an activity with some custom or institution commonly thought of as religious. Class teaching that follows a worship period is not made thereby religious, nor is it made religious if it is closed by prayer. The religious significance may be brought out if it has been there or it may be transformed by association, but it may not.
    - 1.3 By the educator's seeing the religious significance of the activity if the learner is not made conscious of its meaning and import. Although it is not necessary for the educator to be always pointing out the religious meaning of an activity, nor desirable, yet from time to time the learner must be helped to see what makes an activity religious and the advantage of the wider outlook.
    - 1.4 By saying that there is no dividing line between morals and religion. Although the two move in the same direction religion has generally been taken in a wider significance, referring custom and social standards to what is considered universal human good and apparent divine will, or cosmic trend.

2. The basic needs for a religious point of view would seem to be
    2.1 That some working concepts of God and God's will be accepted as descriptive of the underlying realities experienced in life. Perhaps it is most logical to call God's will that which is felt to be the dominant upward trend of life, the way that seems to integrate human experience. God from this point of view is discovered inductively from an analysis of experience, racial and individual.
    2.2 That the experience of the race which is recorded in religious customs, institutions, literature, beliefs, values, and ideals be critically but fairly evaluated and that religion be appreciated as conserving the highest social values of mankind. That the Bible and other religious literature be studied, and that the experiences of others in religion be duly considered.
    2.3 That some definite convictions be held relative to the purpose and value of the church; religious practices such as prayer, social worship, and missionary service; religious beliefs such as responsibility for needs of fellow-men, immortality, possibility of co-operation with God; and the ultimate meaning and worth of life.

3. From the intellectual point of view the following criteria may help to designate an activity as religious or not. It may be that one or more of these factors will be sufficient to mark the act as of definite religious character. At any time the general spirit and attitude of the life is the real test.
    3.1 Is the activity in harmony with supreme good or what is regarded as God's way by those concerned? Has the concept of God's way been critically examined and is it consistent with the best-known scientific conceptions of life?
    3.2 Does the activity assume faith in a cosmic order that supports the highest social values? Are the laws of personality development and spiritual growth recognized and used in as real a sense as the physical laws of life?
    3.3 Is the activity consistent with the greatest good of the greatest number? Is this principle associated with the will of God?
    3.4 Does the activity reveal ideals, a broad perspective of life, and a determination to be consistent with one's philosophy of life?
    3.5 Does the activity permit the fullest possible realization of personality to all concerned? Is personality development thought of as a spiritual achievement? Is life lifted above the animal and mechanistic levels?
    3.6 Does the activity assume the continuing value of life?

3.7 Does the term Christian imply the highest-known social expression of life? Do the life and teaching of Jesus affect the activity because of their distinctive religious quality?

3.8 Is conduct measured by reference to any other person, or to any specific illustrations in the lives of others where the religious quality is recognized and approved?

3.9 Does the activity extend the values that have been conserved in religious customs and institutions? Is there an appreciation of racial experience in religion and a determination to carry forward the most meaningful interpretations of life and the best traditions?

4. From the standpoint of feeling or emotional reaction a religious experience may be said to have been reached under such conditions as

4.1 When one is overcome by beauty or some awe-inspiring spectacle and his deepest nature responds to this environment, and with desire and purpose to co-operate with the Creator.

4.2 When an individual feels a thrill in some unpretentious social expression of his best endeavors, or comes into contact with others where the finest capacities of personality are revealed.

4.3 When one feels that he has achieved successful co-operation with the creative forces of life and has a sense of power and of working with the cosmic creative forces.

4.4 When dependence upon God enables one effectively to share in a large human enterprise where human welfare is at stake and the test of faith and endurance is severe.

4.5 When in silent meditation, alone, or in company with others, on the total meaning and worth of life a quiet assurance is felt of being in harmony with the underlying forces of life.

MORALS AND RELIGION

There is no fixed dividing line between morals and religion and never can be. Both lie in the same direction, and the one merges imperceptibly into the other. Universalize morals and you are close to the integrating position of religion. The difference is in the center and horizons. Discover the best laws of human adjustment and you have found the God-laws of life. A man is moral when he obeys the accepted social standards of his group, and he is religious when he critically evaluates these customs and standards from the universal or God-point of view and tries to live up to the best. In religious education a leader needs to see things from both the moral and the religious standpoints, the latter usually being inclusive of the former. In morals man is trying to find his place in the social order and to build a satisfactory code for happy adjustments, while in religion he looks at things from a broader viewpoint and with a larger philosophy of life trying to find his place in the cosmic order.

The supervisor should help his co-workers to test accepted social customs by universal standards, to cultivate a desire to live in accordance with God's will, to consider how personality can make its most satisfactory growth. Such habits of thinking give a person a basis of right living that is more dependable than the approval of one's group. A religious person is expected to criticize accepted ways, continually revising his manner of life in the light of the higher conceptions. In religious education a systematic attempt is made to develop appreciation of the highest values, to generalize rather than to follow narrow prejudices, to build up ideals and to make definite efforts to realize them. The way of Jesus is used as an illustration of how one may rise above the ordinary and transform life because of faith in God and man. His ways are idealized and described as the God-ways of life, for he seems to reveal the most satisfying potentialities of life.

The religious way cannot be discovered apart from the moral, and it should be understood and taught in relation to it. The commandment of Jesus that one should love his neighbor as himself was a corollary to the one to love God with the apparent implication that devotion to the Supreme Good is proved in loyalty to the immediate obligations of life. "No man can love God and hate his brother." The supervisor should train himself and his co-workers to analyze the moral principles involved in everyday duties and problems and to generalize upon these to discover what universal principles can be stated and related to typical situations. There is a tendency to call almost any kind of behavior which rises above the average in social quality Christian. Many are content with their standards and practices who should be disturbed by searching questions. All are inspired and quickened by illustrations of conduct which go beyond the ordinary conventionalities and show ideals, faith, and courage. Pupils must be so stimulated and guided that they will not be content with low ideals or with "what everybody else does," but will see the larger and better meanings of life and will strive to realize them. The convictions of the religious person as to the desirable growth of personality, the underlying cooperation and urge of the divine spirit, the responsibility for living the abundant life and helping others to share in it make them sensitive to places where human needs are acute and where largest life ought to be expressed. It should never be said that religious folk are less ethical than the non-religious, that church members are no different or worse than non-church-goers. Training in ethical choices, in moral acts, and in unselfish service must be made in everyday situations. Religious education must point out the typical places and through the supervising technique help teachers to condition boys and girls, youth, and adults so that moral and religious living becomes habitual.

GUARD AGAINST PLATITUDES

Persons who are distinctly religious, as well as those who are only nominally so, get into the habit of using terms and phrases without considering their meaning. The supervisor should be watchful for such expressions and help his co-workers to speak thoughtfully and with choice of words so that they will be ready at any time to give adequate explanation for the faith that is in them. If any religious leader has the habit of speaking in pious platitudes the members of his group will tend to do the same thing. The supervisor may at any time check a leader by asking him what he means by a certain statement, or whether he feels his group will understand him, or whether he has ever tested his group to see how far they are capable of following such discussion and what this concept means to them.

Suppose, for instance, that a leader says, "We want to do as

Jesus would in every instance." The supervisor might ask the leader if he could illustrate what he would do in a certain economic, political, domestic, or personal situation. Or if he should exhort his class with such a phrase as "I hope we will come here each Sunday and get fine lessons from the Word of God," the supervisor might ask the teacher what he thought had been learned in the given period and then how much the Word of God had influenced the outcomes. Perhaps the phrase "Word of God" needs to be given a right content, for teachers as well as pupils might gain a new spiritual appreciation of the Bible by examining the reasons for calling it the Word of God. Conscience is frequently referred to as if in each person there were a dependable judge of right and wrong, and yet a simple question or an apt illustration will cause a teacher to admit that conscience grows and changes and is different in the child from what it is in the adult. Hence when a teacher says "Conscience is a compass" or "God speaks to you in your conscience" he needs help in more exact psychological analysis of behavior.

The supervisor must remember, however, that some of his teachers have treasured religious experiences in language that may not appear very meaningful to him. Thus the teacher who said "I seek to teach Jesus Christ every Sunday" had a genuine desire to make Jesus real to her class of pupils and to a certain degree was succeeding. Yet that same teacher had failed to show the finest religious qualities of Jesus to her group and was assuming that they had entered into the deep experiences of his life when as a matter of fact they had never felt such experiences. The critic who asked "I wonder how much of Jesus Christ was taught?" needed to be asked how she would present Jesus or some part of his teaching to the junior group she had just been observing. A class of sixth-grade boys were making drawings of the furniture of the tabernacle in a series of lessons on the Old Testament. A visitor watching them said to one boy, "What is that you are drawing?" He replied at once, "The Ark of the Covenant." "What is that?" asked the visitor, and the boy replied without hesitation, "That is the place Jesus lived." Another boy when questioned said, "Yes, that is the place the people used to think that Jesus lived." These boys had evidently never had such a knowledge of Jesus that they could visualize him in Nazareth or in Jerusalem, but had him confused with an indistinct idea of God. While teachers may have good intentions in their words and teachings they may not be causing their pupils to get intelligent ideas of religion, and the teacher should be caused to see the danger of misleading or confusing his pupils.

It is in prayer that most leaders err in platitudinous expressions. Thus the principle of an elementary department who prayed in the following words would have had great difficulty in explaining how she expected God to answer her prayer: "Heavenly Father, we ask that thou guard with thy care those who devote their lives to thee in the mission field. Cheer them in loneliness, be near them in fever and sickness, comfort them in sorrow and weariness, and fill them with joy amidst all their work. For the sake of Jesus Christ thy Son. AMEN." When most people pray they have difficulty in closing the prayer without some formal appendage such as "in Jesus' name" or "for Jesus' sake" or something of the kind. They seldom stop to think what these last words mean, but they do not know how to stop without the customary ending. Religious workers should be asked such questions as these: What is prayer supposed to do? Is a prayer supposed to make God do something that he would not do otherwise? Is it religious to ask God to do things? Should we feel our duty is done and our Christian spirit has been adequately shown by praying to God to do something for someone else? How do our pupils know that we mean anything more than shifting the responsibility to God? What do we mean when we say "in Jesus' name"? Is this a good ending or are there others better for most occasions?

Hymns have many words and phrases that are not understood or that are misunderstood by children. Adults repeat words with pious sentiment, not thinking half the time what they are saying. Scripture is read as if it had magical power in its very utterance, and no expectation is shown that the hearers will enter into the situations and share the experiences that are described. Too much religious education has been words, pious platitudes, meaningless repetitions, and the supervisor's task is to cause more careful thinking and exact speaking.

It is not strange that children tire of hearing insipid repetitions, that youth laughs at idle pretenses, that older people ignore conventionalities in religion. And yet teachers and leaders are sometimes afraid to let go old forms and phrases and give their own personal experiences of religion and their reasoned convictions as to the realities and goals of life. If attendance in our church schools shrinks as the age groups mature, and if many parents are indifferent as to whether or not their children get religious training, perhaps religious educators have failed to get beyond platitudes to cause an appreciation of age-old racial values.

EXAMPLES OF FAILURES TO REACH SATISFACTORY RELIGIOUS LEVELS

If anywhere it would seem that a situation should be lifted to a religious level in prayer. Many teachers use prayer as their chief technique for raising their teaching or other activities to a religious level. They assume apparently that the idea of God will cause more serious thinking and bring religious standards to function in the group. It is impossible to say how much this method motivates children, but perhaps most often the children will fail to see the relationship of God to the problem. An illustration of the almost magical type of prayer comes from a vacation school. The primary teacher could not maintain discipline and was continually bothered by the talking of the boys. At last she stopped them for a moment saying, "This is quite a big problem for a lot of us, and we do not seem able to solve it; let us ask God to give us wisdom and strength to behave right." All bowed their heads and the teacher led in a simple, earnest prayer asking God to help each one to behave better. No recognition was given to the ordinary laws of learning and discipline, but God was apparently expected to give direct answer to this particular situation of an untrained teacher. Surely these children would come to question how the God of the great universe could be expected to give personal attention to this little problem that a group should be able to work out themselves.

Devout intentions are not enough as any thinking person will admit, but when a senior high school teacher says to her class of girls, "I think God likes to hear 'Now I lay me down to sleep' from a girl eighteen years old as well as he likes to hear it from a child eighteen months old" and goes on to say "When you are in trouble just close your eyes and pray wherever you are and you will feel a comforting feeling come over you so that the next time you will understand that God is there," there would seem to be need of a supervisor. A high-school group has a right to be taught a different conception of prayer and a much more intelligent attitude in religion than this pious *naïveté*.

The time when attitudes in prayer and value of prayer should be most carefully guided is in the early years, for later ideas and attitudes are very much conditioned by the first instruction. Yet kindergarten and primary teachers are often permitted to follow any simple line of teaching without question as to the significance of what is said or done. Here, for example, is the kind of talk that surely would not help children to think rightly of prayer. It is the prayer talk of a primary principle anxious to keep children quiet while an adult prayed for them: "We are going to talk to God now and we shall have no use for our hands; let us fold them together. Let us show respect to God by bowing our heads and keeping them bowed. We cannot use our feet while talking to God so let us place them quietly together. We will not want to look at anything around us while we are talking to God so let us close our eyes, etc., etc." Prayer was not associated with the activities of life but with unnatural restrictions on ordinary conduct, a feeling that often persists into adolescence and adult life.

Another illustration of failure in early prayer-teaching is the common repetition of the words "We thank Thee, loving Father" or something of this type. Gratitude is put into words but no suggestion is made of responsibility for showing gratitude in actions. For instance, a primary group was taught to sing this little song:

> Can a little child like me
> Thank the Father fittingly?
> Yes, oh yes, be good and true,
> Patient, kind in all you do,
> Love the Lord and do your part,
> Learn to say within your heart:
> Father, we thank thee; Father, we thank thee;
> Father in heaven, we thank thee.

The second line names some abstract virtues that are intended to prove the spirit of gratitude but how this ought to work out in life was nowhere taught. The teacher followed this song one Sunday with this appeal, "Let us each think of something we want to be thankful for this week." The children at once responded "food," "chicken dinner," "sunshine," "Jesus," etc., and the teacher said, "Let us bow our heads and thank God for these." There was no connection made between saying thanks and living thankfully, nor was there any reason given for thanking God for these things that came in the ordinary course of events. As far as the teaching on prayer went religion was exhausted in words.

The mistake of supposing that religion can be taught by using abstract terms is made at all age levels. Teachers use vague general terms and pupils repeat them without any concrete behavior problems in mind. It is futile to expect that there can be any carry-over into life by such discussions. A group of sixth-grade boys was being taught by a young business man, a university graduate, and the course was on the life of Jesus. Here are a few excerpts from a verbatim report of a class conversation:

TEACHER: We will try to discover the kind of person Jesus was and see how we can follow him. . . . . At twelve he was beginning an important career and developing into manhood. Let us think of the things we like and dislike in fellows you go with and then we will see how Jesus' life was a criterion for us to follow. What qualities do you like in boys you go with?

1: Good, honest.[2]

2: Clean sports.

T.: What do you mean by that? You might develop that.

3: Clean-cut fellow.

4: Doesn't cheat. Doesn't get mad when left out of a game.

7: Unselfish.

8: Courteous.

9: Clean in thought.

10: Courageous.

15: Doesn't swear.

16: Doesn't disobey his parents.

T.: Here we have a picture of qualities we like in others. Jesus came down to give us an example. Think how Jesus lived. The shadow you cast should be as much like Jesus as possible. What is lack of courage?

3: Being a sissy.

The teacher made a few pious comments but nowhere analyzed the meaning of these virtues, or called for an illustration from Jesus' life of any of these traits. No readiness to behave was developed, no desirable behavior patterns were outlined, no motivation to Christian living was stirred, and although the lesson was on the life of Jesus the religious level was not reached.

When teachers are cautioned against trying to teach religion by mere words and exhorted to give the child a chance to do something, because he learns to do by doing, it is natural to assume that handwork and projects of various kinds will give the desired experience. Some teachers capitalize the opportunities given in the free activity situations but some fail to make them religiously significant. An observer of a kindergarten group classed the period of handwork as one of "contented busyness." The teacher frankly said, "Our aim is to teach the children to live happily together and I know nothing more religious than that." A recent critic in a popular article says of his children, "They can learn anything but religion in the Sunday school."[3] A vacation-school teacher had interested her group in a service project for a hospital, but no meaning was brought into the project except that the children responded sympathetically to the proposal to do something for sick people and liked the busy work. The teacher explained to the observer, "We have the religious part in the last twenty minutes. The school goes upstairs into the church and one of the ministers of the community gives a talk to the children." The teacher had not realized the opportunity she had in the project but a good supervisor might have helped to make such a situation more effective religiously than any upstairs service.

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[2] Numbers refer to the pupils according to the place in the class.

Another illustration of missing a chance to use a situation rich in religous meaning is that of a teacher who took her class to the park to study weeds. The children were enthusiastic over the outing and brought many weeds which the teacher readily named, afterward drilling the pupils on the names. Several very unsocial struggles took place among the children but the teacher did not know how to correct these unsocial tendencies or to use this experience in God's out-of-doors. If there had been a supervisor to help plan for this outing and to anticipate the probable adjustments a good teaching situation might have been developed and religious principles made meaningful.

Preachers are supposed to be experts in raising situations to a religious level, but whether they inspire adults or not most of them fail to relate their children's talks to actual life-situations of their boys and girls. They tell interesting stories and add general principles with biblical quotations to make them impressive but in most cases fail to reach any religious level and do not provide for transfer. Nearly all books of children's sermons show these faults. Because the children are interested in the story and the speaker reads into it a religious lesson he assumes the children will remember the story and use the principle in a like situation. They may remember the story for a while, but there is no reason to expect that children under twelve, at least, will recall the principle when needed and will feel any religious motivation.

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[3] A. C. Diffenbach, "Anything but religion," *North American Review*, February, 1929.

Bible stories may not carry religious truth even in dramatization. A sixth-grade group of girls was presenting the story of the ten bridesmaids but did not seem interested in it and quarreled over their parts. One girl said, "The parable means we should be ready for every opportunity," but their lack of response showed this opportunity did not mean much to them. Their behavior was really that of the five wise virgins who said, "We are afraid we shall not have enough for ourselves and cannot share with you."

Pictures do not mean the same thing to children as to adults, but teachers often fail to realize this. A primary teacher had brought a fine colored picture of an autumn scene by Corot. There was a wagon filled with sheaves, a farmer going home, a tree ablaze with color, and a wonderful cloudy sky. On questioning her children as to what they saw in the picture she was surprised to find that they did not find the things that she saw. In a teachers' meeting later the supervisor asked whether the things she saw were in the picture or in her imagination. The children could only see the things they were ready to see. The question was put to the group of teachers, "What religious value ought this picture to have for primary children?" There were several suggestions—"work well done," "harvest," "beauty," "a sense of God and a feeling of worship"—but no one could tell just how the children might be expected to associate religious ideas or feelings with this scene. They might be helped to an experience of appreciation and to think of God in relation to the harvest, the wonderful colors, and the beautiful cloudy sky. The teacher should seek to build up such associations, but unless there has been previous help of this kind it is probable that the values will not be present in the child's mind when the picture is presented.

IMPROVING THE RELIGIOUS VALUES IN TEACHING

Whenever a teacher succeeds in causing his class to discover religious meanings, to share in religious enterprises, or to take the religious point of view in a critical situation a supervisor should commend him for his skill and help him to press this further until religious habits of thinking and acting are developed. Some illustrations of where religious level may be reached are now given, although satisfactory examples are difficult to find and harder still to describe apart from the situations in which they were experienced. These are given more to suggest the manner in which religious concepts, religious motivation, and religious experiences may arise.

1. The first example is taken from a summer-camp situation and is described by Dimock and Hendry in their book *Camping and Character*.[4] They tell how in Camp Ahmek a constant endeavor is made to develop in the boys an appreciation of persons as the supreme value in life, and to motivate them with a desire to further the happiness and welfare of persons. They do not depend upon programs weighted with "religious" activities but try to "intensify into occasions of earnestness and social importance the normal everyday experiences and incidents" in the camp life, and to make explicit and operative meanings and values hitherto implicit but not affecting conduct. The most significant concerns of the camp life are emotionalized by the counselors in the tent and cabin groups and by the chief in short specific talks. Sunday morning the chief reviews the experiences of the week informally but in an intimate way, and then in the chapel the highest aspirations and deepest needs of the group find common expression. A definite attempt is made to sensitize the group to spiritual ideals and the modern meaning of religion.

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[4] P. 128.

The total camp experience is intended to give a practical demonstration of religious living as a co-operative quest for the most satisfying and significant life for themselves and others, and many proofs are given, directly and indirectly, that these ends are being achieved.

2. The question was raised in a teachers' meeting as to how the lesson on Abraham and Lot could be raised to a religious level. It was felt that it ought to be a good story to use but there was no definite idea as to how to relate it to the children's lives. The supervisor suggested that if the teacher knew his group well enough to know the things about which they often quarreled he might help them to see that in this biblical story the question of division of property was at issue and the generosity of Abraham permitted these families to live happily together. They should recognize the fact that the generosity of Abraham has been remembered all these years as superior to the selfishness of Lot, and they should be stimulated to furnish illustrations of similar generosity and like solutions to tense situations from incidents of their home, school, and play life. Then the teacher should help them to lift out the principles, or laws of life, and help them to see that these might be regarded as universal or God laws for human happiness. They should be helped to feel the mutual character of the law of love, and to understand that selfishness spoils the capacity to be happy even with generous persons. They should see the generosity of God in the abundant resources of life as an invitation to us to be generous and to show the spirit of love in all we do. The meaning of the law of love should come naturally from an appreciation of the principle that makes for happiness, and God should be associated with this principle in such a way that the reality of God might be a most reasonable conclusion. Likewise, in other lessons other laws of human welfare might be analyzed and a satisfactory concept of God and God's will gradually developed.

3. In their book *Exploring Religion with Eight-Year-Olds*[5] H. F.

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[5] H. Holt & Co., 1930.

Sweet and S. L. Fahs give several illustrations of how children of even primary age can be helped to a working idea of God with an appreciation of the fact that people have had quite different understandings of him. In the chapter on "Cavemen and Moderns" we hear a little child say, "We think of God in a different way than those early people because we know more," and another pupil says, "It just seems to us that always if you go back far enough you come to God," and another child adds, "Yes, and not only in seeds and things that have life but everywhere in the universe you see that God is working." In another chapter, "From Lowly Things to God," a child asks the question, "How do you know God started all this?" The teacher explains that people have come to use the term God for the one who is back of all this wonderful universe. She said that though no one is sure just what he is like most people believe there must be some good power that puts life into the world and men have come to call that power God.

4. A good example of a well-worked-out worship service, where the religious significance is related to a project of considerable length of time, and large social meaning, is given by Miss Adelaide T. Case in the series of experiments presented in *Teaching without Textbooks* by F. W. Danielson and J. E. Perkins.[6] A class of eleven girls ranging from the second to the fifth grade undertook as a project in the Union School of Religion (N.Y.) a study of "Problems of Living in New York City." For fifteen weeks they planned their studies, made visits to different places, discussed what they saw, listened to stories of places and people they couldn't go to see, and talked over the meaning of it all. Then they were invited to conduct a worship service for the rest of the school and to tell what they had learned about New York and how it could be improved. The service was carefully planned and presented with the following items:

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[6] Pilgrim Press, 1930

CALL TO WORSHIP: "In New York City some people are happy and some are not happy." Let us sing "The Fathers Built This City"
HYMN
BIBLE READING: The Commandments [taken from *Book of Worship* by Hartshorne]
HYMN: "This Is My Father's World"
TALK: "Some Things Seen and Learned"
PRAYERS: Several original prayers expressed by the children. Concluding prayer was "Help us to make New York City a better place for everybody to live in. AMEN."
HYMN: "We March, We March to Victory"

Summing up the results of the project, Miss Case says, "The children became a group of friends working on a team, they had a good time, and they really did grow in a religious interest in New York City."

5. One more illustration will suffice. This represents the more ordinary situation where the teacher follows fairly closely to the suggestions of a text. The group were eighth-grade girls, and the course was M. Neuberg's *Right Living*.[7] It shows what a skilful teacher is likely to do and where improvement might easily be made to definite religious advantage. Two incidents taken from the text were discussed rather freely by the girls, and the teacher guided their thinking. In beginning the teacher said, "We have been trying to see people from another side. We find most are interesting when we get acquainted. We will try to look at others always from more than one point of view." The first incident was about a boy who stole a sweater to buy bread because his father was sick. Everything that was missed around the school was blamed on him and none of the boys wanted to associate with him. The class talked over the motives that probably caused the boy to steal and then turned to the second story, "The Girl Who Cheated." The report is abbreviated but what is given is verbatim:

TEACHER: Who wants to tell the story of the girl who cheated?
5: [Tells story of the dislike of a group of girls for Virginia who cheats

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[7] University of Chicago Press, 1927.

in school. One of the girls' mothers says that she found Virginia's father and mother are very strict and scold her if she doesn't make good grades.]

[Several volunteer examples of "kids" in school who cheat, with special reference to one called George.]

T.: Do you know why George cheats?

5: Perhaps he hasn't good training at home.

9: He's horrid.

6: I'm not going to say, "O Georgie dear, why do you do that when he biffs me on the ear as he goes by my seat?"

T.: Is there anything in the fact that people expect them to do a thing? Judge Arnold wouldn't let the newspapers publish stories about his boys who got into trouble. He said it is bad if a boy gets a bad name.

[Several make brief comments about Judge Arnold.]

T.: Let us put on the board some of the steps we need to keep in mind.

[Different suggestions are offered and the three principles are put on the board:

1. Recognize what is wrong. You cannot make wrong right by motives.
2. Find out why.
3. Try to remedy the cause.]

T.: What do you think of the girls' attitude toward Virginia in the story?

7: Perfectly right.

8: Rachel might [girl numbered 5].

[Several laughing comments on Rachel's good qualities; apparently a popular girl.]

T.: Rachel is kind-hearted, isn't she? And there wouldn't be any danger of her being influenced by such company. People are judged by their companions.

9: I've seen people with sticky fingers.

7: It's the fault of fathers and mothers who have not trained them.

T.: Children need to be corrected when they are young, don't they?

1: Some parents do not give their children enough. They have real temptations to steal. Their parents ought to give them more.

T.: I want to get to your assignments. We were talking of associations. What about Jesus? Lillian, you were to tell us about Jesus and Zaccheus.

[Story told with several comments.]

T.: Jesus changed him by associating with him, didn't he? We do not know just what he did but Zaccheus was different.

9: The same things happened to Mary Magdalene. Jesus looked at her and her sins vanished.

5: What are the seven great sins?

T.: Did you see them portrayed in a recent play?

[General conversation immediately on the play, discussion centering on the sins of envy and jealousy.]

T.: How would it do to look up the difference between envy and jealousy in the dictionary?

6: I do not see why you can't like a boy and not be teased about it. My mother says boys and girls should play together without any difference.

1: Sure, we all play baseball together.

T.: Is it wrong to tease?

5: It depends upon the spirit of the teasing.

6: It is worse if it is in a bunch.

[Personal accusations made across the class about being bad teasers.]

T.: What is the best way to do?

8: Pay no attention; laugh and don't care.

T.: Let us look at our three principles on the board. We must try to understand even teasers, and find their best side.

[Discussion at once and continues until the bell rings. The teacher announces the next problem as "getting even," saying that the next lesson will continue the discussion they have had.]

T.: Let us read together the Bible verses on the board.

ALL: Finally, be ye all of one mind, love the brethren, be pitiful, be courteous.

This teacher tried to lift out general principles and to keep the group thinking of the need of taking the point of view of another person and not judging anyone harshly. In the matter of associations the story of Jesus and Zaccheus was an opportunity to develop the religious principle of stimulating a personality to do his best by showing faith in him, and though not labeled was a better religious situation than the attempt at the end to sum up the lesson by a biblical quotation. If a biblical setting had been desired further to emphasize the principle the girls might have been asked to examine the story of Ezekiel when the prophet took time to get a clear understanding of the situation he was sent to correct before he said anything. The marginal reading of the Revised Version says, "I sat where they sat." The girls would readily take this phrase as a good way of remembering the principle of taking the point of view of others, and feel the prophet's sense of God.

Other examples might be given, but the reader should, however, seek to get verbatim reports of the most favorable situations and think them through to discover their religious opportunities. The best he can get will be none too good, but if principles are lifted out they will serve to clarify the meaning of raising teaching to a religious level.

CRITICAL REVIEWS

PAGAN INFLUENCE ON JUDAISM

The Jewish festival of Hanukkah, the latest in the religious calendar, is a challenge to the student of Jewish history. While the Apocrypha gives considerable material as to its origin, the rabbinic literature itself is sparse in its references to it. Although it seems clearly based upon a definite event in Jewish history, yet the date (near the winter solstice) and the mode of celebration (the kindling of lights) seem to point to a pagan origin.

Dr. Rankin devotes his book[1] to a discussion of the origins of Hanukkah. His conclusions are that the eighteenth of November was the Syrian Kronos-Helios festival—the sun-god's birthday. The sun-god was identified with the Aion-god, the lord of the new age, and thus plays a part in all eschatological speculations. This festival was observed, under Hellenizing influence, in Palestine before the Maccabean era. After the Maccabean victory the Hasmoneans were believed to be the precursors of a new era, and therefore the Syrian (Jewish) festival was Judaized into a dedication (Hanukkah) festival in reference to the rededication of the Temple.

During the Antiochan persecutions the Temple was defiled and altars set up in every town at street corners, at the doors of the houses. After the victory the fire burning at these altars was transformed into the Hanukkah light which was kindled at every door during the festival.

The era in which Hanukkah was instituted was one of great religious confusion all over the Hellenistic world. Mystery religions spread from land to land, competed with each other and often merged. Any theory dealing with the origin of a festival in this era must necessarily be highly speculative. In spite of this inherent difficulty Dr. Rankin has handled the vast mass of correlative material in a competent fashion. He discusses all preceding theories and then plausibly builds up his own explanation. The book is particularly interesting for the picture it gives of the widespread religious confusion during Hellenistic times.

Solomon B. Freehof

Chicago, Ill.

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[1] *Origins of the Festival of Hanukkah—the Jewish New-Age Festival.* By Oliver Shaw Rankin. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1931. xx+284 pages. $4.50.

JESUS' RELATION TO JUDAISM

The oblique approach to the Gospels is both necessary and fruitful. Scientific method demands every possible angle of investigation since the positive, face evaluation of these documents has been abandoned as unsatisfactory.

The compositeness of each of the Synoptic Gospels is axiomatic, if the details of composition still furnish subject for scholarly debate. Is the message of the Gospels, then, composite? If so, which elements of their teaching possess the highest degree of genuineness? Or to what extent, if to any extent, can the actual teaching of Jesus be isolated?

Bound up with such queries is the important investigation into the nature of Judaism, its religion, its laws, its ritual, its parties, and their distinctions, in the period of Jesus' activity and, as well, in the period when each gospel reached its present literary form. The question, for instance, whether Jewish practice in Jesus' time corresponded to Jewish practice in the period that gave rise to the rabbinical writings becomes highly important to the understanding of the Gospels.[1]

Professor Branscomb has undertaken the study of Jesus' attitude toward and interpretation of the *Torah*, not of all the Scriptures used by Jesus and other contemporary Jews.

The fundamental assumption appears clearly enough that in the Gospels one finds the message of Jesus used by the evangelist for some purpose of his own. Original context is seldom, if ever, at hand. Perhaps the evangelist himself did not know the original context. Thus the investigation is hampered at the outset, since it is probable that some animus, some personal bias, some doctrinal leaning of the writer will even unconsciously modify the atmosphere, if not the real meaning, of a passage. Take, for example, the twenty-third chapter of Matthew, where he who runs may read the anti-Pharisaic mind of the evangelist.

The heart of Branscomb's book is his treatment of the controversies, especially in Mark. This is, no doubt, the best phase of the gospel to consider when attempting to discover the historical attitude of Jesus to legal requirements, to institutional loyalty, to ceremonial ritual. For it is likely that, apart from original context as the sayings in these controversies may be (note especially Mark 2:13–17, 18–20, 23–28; 3:1–6; 7:1–23; and 10:1–12), these pivotal sayings represent attitudes that correspond to other teaching of Jesus found in Mark and elsewhere in which personal values are exalted above institutional or ritual traditions.

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[1] *Jesus and the Law of Moses.* By Bennett Harvie Branscomb. New York: Richard R. Smith, Inc., 1930. xii+296 pages. $2.50.

Professor Branscomb's findings appear to be fairly well established upon his exhibit of the documentary facts. He places Jesus in the "main stream of Jewish religious life" (p. 256) and considers that he enforced "the ethical aspects of Judaism to the neglect of its ceremonial and its formal or impersonal elements" (p. 266). This does not make Jesus an orthodox Jew, but it does permit him to be genuinely Jewish. "He prepared the way," says Branscomb, "for the religion of Israel to become universal and international in character" (p. 271).

The volume is heavily documented, well indexed, and provided with extensive quotations in Greek. As Greek fares, on the whole, at the hands of the compositor, the proportion of missing breathing marks and misplaced accents is not high. An excellent example of book-making, this volume may be counted also a real contribution to the study of the Gospels.

ERNEST W. BURCH

GARRETT BIBLICAL INSTITUTE

THE JESUS OF THE GOSPELS

Even after a century of critical method in the gospel field, a mature scholar hesitates to offer as an initial series of lectures on Jesus either a life, as such, or an appraisal of Jesus' teaching.[1] In his four lectures now published essentially as delivered at Yale Divinity School in 1930 on the newly created John C. Shaffer Foundation, Professor Bacon voices the need of sifting what we have rather than adding to the mass. "Not production [of more lives of Jesus] but assimilation is now the problem" (p. 8).

The work as a whole is a critical, constructive appraisal of the sources for our information about Jesus. The result is not at all in support of the pessimistic statement of a recent writer—not, however, trained in the biblical field—who claimed that dependable material about Jesus would scarcely provide a normal newspaper obituary notice. On the other hand, Professor Bacon rightly stresses the view that as gospel criticism has been carried on it becomes more and more apparent that in our progress toward Jesus we meet certain writers (the evangelists) who in turn are indebted to predecessors who, either orally or in writing, have transmitted both what they "received" and what they offer as their interpretation of the tradition about Jesus. But we do not reach Jesus himself.

Since no primary source for the deeds and words of Jesus is at hand,

[1] *Jesus the Son of God.* By Benjamin Wisner Bacon. New York: Henry Holt & Co., 1930. x+152 pages. $1.50.

the task of today seems clearly pointed out, namely, to undertake the kind of criticism developed in the Yale lectures, not new, of course, but emphasized opportunely, and seek to discover the mind of each one of these sympathetic handlers of the tradition. Professor Bacon's own analysis of all the gospel material here offered is broadly threefold. First comes the Petrine gospel, Mark, in which the figure of Jesus stands out as heroic. A fine literary parallelism with the story of Joan of Arc adds peculiar interest to the analysis of the Markan narrative. Second, one finds the parallel sections of Matthew and Luke treated as evidence that back of the two gospels lay a written source, called S by Bacon, since he reserves the conventional symbol Q for the actual parallels in the canonical gospels. The third element or stratum in the tradition is the youngest of all, the Fourth Gospel.

The subjects of the lectures are interestingly devised, with the characteristics of these three strata in mind. After the introductory lecture on "Why and How We Study the Life of Christ," the Markan narrative is captioned "What the Eye Saw," the teaching source as "What the Ear Heard," the Ephesian gospel as "What Entered into the Heart of Man," paraphrasing affirmatively I Cor. 2:9, quoted from Isa. 64:4. These titles are perhaps more popular than true, after all, for at least a fifth of the Markan gospel consists of words placed on Jesus' lips and by the findings of Bacon himself in his *Studies in Matthew* (1930) much of Q was editorially created, thus not "heard" but read. Few will take exception to the descriptive title of the lecture on the Fourth Gospel, for it may at the same time be in words that did not originate with Jesus and also constitute the truest gospel. It is likely that even quite conservative students of the gospels will take comfort in the findings of the last lecture. Professor Bacon applauds "its emancipation from the sinister influence of late-Jewish apocalypse" (p. 135). He approves its chronology and delights in its improved Christian tone, departing as it does from the themes of Jewish rage and despair, with its substitution of the Paraclete and a fine God mysticism.

The little volume will stimulate discussion and probably is to stand as a contribution to the American type of form history, when there can be said to exist such a school.

ERNEST W. BURCH

GARRETT BIBLICAL INSTITUTE

CHRIST IN THE GOSPELS

The Hale lectureship, offered since 1908 under the auspices of the Western Theological Seminary of Evanston, included the lectures of

Professor Easton under the classification "Contemporaneous Church History," the subtitle being "The Progress and Results of Gospel Research."

The eight chapters contained in the published form[1] of the course survey not only the field of source criticism but also that of "pre-synoptic tradition," and non-synoptic tradition (the Fourth Gospel). The lectures proceed to the Jewish background of Pharisaic practice as compared with latter Talmudic prescription, and then, after examining certain aspects of Jesus' teaching (the Law, the Father, the Kingdom), conclude with a sketch of Jesus as he is found in the gospels.

During the course of his exposition Dr. Easton draws somewhat upon his earlier work, *The Gospel before the Gospels* (1928), and notably justifies his reputation as a leading American representative of this newer method of approach to the gospels.

A contribution of the volume is found in the chapter on "Background," in which the conclusion is well supported that Pharisaic teaching and usage in the early part of the first Christian century were other than those found later in the rabbinical writings. For example, the attitude of later rabbis toward apocalypticism was not the same as that of Jesus' contemporary scribes of the Pharisees. But modern Jews are prone to view Jesus against a background of later rabbinical attitudes. Easton feels confident that one may trace the influence of Jesus himself, through Jewish Christian faith and practice, on the development of later rabbinism. Although plausible, this should not be counted as a conclusion of the study.

The attitude taken toward the non-synoptic tradition seems extreme. Oskar Holtzmann, e.g., can offer good reasons for finding historical data in the Fourth Gospel, even if didactically used. And Stanton's monumental work cannot be disregarded. Form history itself distinguishes between the form itself and the use made of it. For example, in connection with the feeding of the five thousand, John introduces a reason for the hurried dispatch of the disciples into the boat, namely, the attempt to crown Jesus, a datum not found in Mark, where the hurry is unexplained. Easton does not seem to sense this supplementation, here and elsewhere.

The treatment of Jesus' apocalypticism is conciliatory. Jesus is an apocalyptist, but his ethic is not interim ethic. No social element is found in Jesus' teaching, since the Kingdom cannot be on earth. A tendency is noted throughout the book toward extreme statements and arbitrary conclusions, probably due to the genuine enthusiasm of the lecturer for his subject.

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[1] *Christ in the Gospels.* By Burton Scott Easton. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1930. x+210 pages. $1.75.

The volume must stand as still another achievement toward that distant goal, full understanding of the documents for Jesus' life and teaching.

ERNEST W. BURCH

GARRETT BIBLICAL INSTITUTE

JESUS AND HIS TIMES

In this volume[1] Professor Robinson presents a study of the sayings of Jesus which is original and unique in method, even though it lays no claim to any new conclusions or results. His method is to present the historical background of Jesus' work in some detail and then in large degree to let the sayings speak for themselves. Such a method avoids two of the most common errors in presentations of the teachings of Jesus, that of discussing the sayings in isolation from their age and time and therefore robbed of their concrete meaning, and the opposite error of never presenting the sayings at all but rather discoursing at great length about them. In contrast to the latter method Professor Robinson, being wise enough to know that the average reader does not look up references, has made the sayings a major feature of his text.

The first part of the book is devoted to the history of the Jews from the time of Alexander the Great until A.D. 70. The story of the Maccabees, of Herod and his successors, and of the final uprising against the Romans is told with considerable detail, after which comes a chapter on legalism and the apocalyptic hope. Chapters on the external form of the teachings in the gospels and on the early years of Jesus' life serve as an introduction to the discussion of his sayings. In this section the plan is to quote the sayings in vigorous modern translation, arranging them under such topics as "Righteousness of the Heart," "Entering the Kingdom," "God's Care for the Individual," "Self-Denial," and to follow most of these groups with a section of comment and interpretation. To each chapter is added a list of supplementary readings, and at the end of the book there is a very useful list of about fifty titles under the heading "A Reference Library." This bibliographical material is confined to works in English.

The volume is thus planned for readers who have not made extensive ventures into theological literature. For such it is well planned and executed. The sayings as presented in the text stand out in all their vigor and beauty, and the discussions which follow emphasize the primacy of the ethical and religious aspects of Jesus' thought. At times one feels that major topics have been treated inadequately, but such impressions are due to the author's desire to bring the sayings themselves before the attention of the reader and the consequent necessity of sharply limiting his own discussion of them.

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[1] *The Sayings of Jesus—Their Background and Interpretation.* By Benjamin Willard Robinson. New York: Harper & Bros., 1930. 277 pages. $3.00.

One criticism might be leveled perhaps at the introductory section. This occupies virtually a third of the book. It deals almost entirely with the political events and court affairs of the two centuries preceding and contemporary with Jesus. One could wish that the author had devoted more space to the complex social conditions and religious movements of Jesus' own day. With politics and the courts his teaching had little to do. As a background to his sayings some of the space thus used could have been given more effectively to the economic conditions, the social cleavages in Palestinian society, the mixture of races and languages, the nature of the Pharisaic movement, the diverse religious tendencies of the day, the relation of Galilee to Jerusalem, etc. These things surely throw more light on Jesus' teachings than the exploits of John Hyrcanus and Alexander Jannaeus. This, however, is but to express a regret that the author has not carried out even more thoroughly his useful and interesting plan of providing in one volume both the historical introduction to and the content of Jesus' teachings.

The publishers have done their work in a particularly attractive way, and the book can be commended to those who wish a clearer conception of Jesus' teachings than the gospel compilations provide.

Harvie Branscomb

Duke University

JESUS' VIEWS ON THE KINGDOM OF GOD

Dr. Scott's characteristic ripe scholarship, mature convictions, balanced judgment, and clear style are fully apparent in this brief "popular" treatise on the teaching of Jesus.[1] One point he makes, beyond refutation: the "twofold" character of the hope of the kingdom (as present and as future) is as real in the Old Testament, and also in the Rabbinic literature, as it is in the Gospels. Apocalyptic eschatology is viewed as an inheritance of Jesus, not the essential substance of his message. His teaching was definitely spiritual, and concerned primarily a renewal of the human will here and now, not a divine catastrophe at the end of the age.

A few problems remain unsolved, the more conspicuous by contrast with Scott's usual dexterity and ease in handling them. The significance of Jesus himself for the kingdom, i.e., his messiahship, is not satisfactorily explained. (Query: Do the New Testament documents, as they now stand, permit an adequate answer to the question?) Further, it is surely wrong to assume that early Gentile Christianity, in the New Testament period and later, "sought to express in new language what appeared . . . . the essential meaning of Jesus' own message" (p. 131). Per contra, was it not an experience rather than a message which required to be interpreted? And is not this a fundamental distinction, to be drawn at every step of the way—from the Easter experience of the disciples, through Paul's teaching, through the pre-Pauline gospel of the "Hellenists," and likewise the quasi-Judaic teaching of the Palestinian church, down to and including later Gentile and early Catholic Christianity?

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[1] *The Kingdom of God in the New Testament.* By Ernest F. Scott. New York: Macmillan Co., 1931. 197 pages. $1.75.

FREDERICK C. GRANT

WESTERN THEOLOGICAL SEMINARY

A NEW CHURCH HISTORY

Since the death of Cardinal Hergenröther in 1890 the successive editions of his well-known church history have been issued under the editorship of J. P. Kirsch, a professor in the University of Freiburg and director of the papal institute for archaeology at Rome. Up to 1925 six editions of the work, now grown to four volumes, had appeared, the last three having been sponsored by Kirsch. Now he and three helpers—A. Bigelmair, J. Greven, and A. Veit—are bringing out under their own names, but along the same general lines, a series of new volumes designed to cover the history of the church from its rise to the present day. Volume I of this new *Kirchengeschichte* treats the history of the church within its Graeco-Roman cultural environment, that is, down to the end of the seventh century.[1]

The main body of the text closely reproduces the content, form and arrangement of the first volume, of which Professor Kirsch was really the author, in the sixth edition of Hergenröther. But the change of type from Gothic to Roman, and the extensive bibliographical supplements, are a great improvement. The new edition is especially rich in its citations of the modern literature of the subject. In addition to the extensive book lists incorporated from time to time in the body of the text and in the footnotes, almost a hundred pages at the end of the volume are given over entirely to citations of editions of sources and current literature, with indications of the specific pages and topics in the earlier discussion on which these references have a direct bearing. These features alone are sufficient to make the book indispensable for all students, whether Roman Catholic or Protestant, who are especially concerned with the history of the church. In a work bearing the *imprimatur* of Rome one expects to find a specific view of the nature of the church as an institution, just as orthodox Protestant historians are disposed to be antipapal and to emphasize history of doctrine in telling the story of Christianity's past. But the volume before us is not a polemical work, although the author is entirely loyal to his ecclesiastical institutions, with which he has a thorough historical familiarity. And the scope of church history is conceived in a broad and masterly way. As a presentation of information, assembled in readable form with due regard to proportion in the various parts, this *Kirchengeschichte* will command universal respect, although it enters the lists with some notable rivals both Catholic and Protestant.

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[1] *Kirchengeschichte:* Band I, *Die Kirche in der antiken griechisch-römischen Kulturwelt.* By Johann Peter Kirsch. St. Louis: B. Herder & Co., 1930. xix+875 pages. $8.50.

SHIRLEY JACKSON CASE

UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO

TWO STORMY CENTURIES OF CHURCH HISTORY

Many historians, since the appearance of Volume V, Part II, of Schaff's *Church History*, have treated in detail limited sections of the period 1300–1500; but Dr. Flick's is the first attempt since made to present in one work an adequate treatment of these two stormy centuries.[1] The work has been developed on a plan that admirably puts the significant data in their proper proportion. Volume I is divided between the Avignon papacy (Part I) and the schism (Part II), and closes with an exposition of the arguments which were exchanged about the end of the fourteenth century regarding conciliar and papal authority. Volume II narrates the history of the councils, with parallel events, from Pisa to Florence (Part III), and describes the Renaissance in its bearing on church institutions (Part IV). Summaries are provided at suitable intervals, and the final chapter, which is numbered xxviii, reviews the negative and positive forces that led to the decline of the medieval church and necessitated a new order. There is a fair supply of footnotes; usually these are simple references to the works consulted. A classified Bibliography is placed at the end of each volume, and a complete Index by E. M. White, covering forty-eight pages, is appended to Volume II.

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[1] *The Decline of the Medieval Church.* By Alexander Clarence Flick. 2 vols. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1930. xiv+398 and xiv+543 pages. $12.50 for both volumes.

The task which the author has set himself is vast, and could perhaps be accomplished in a perfectly satisfactory way only by a historian who would give to it a lifetime of research. The extent of the source literature is itself great, and the authorities to be consulted offer an imposing array. When we ask ourselves whether Dr. Flick has mastered these materials, the reply must be in the negative. A considerable portion of the literature has escaped his search; and the claim of the publishers that the work is based upon full source studies is, to say the least, an exaggeration. Dr. Flick dismisses Occam's *Dialogue* as "a vast mass of almost unreadable disputation," although it contains a more radical treatment of the constitutional question than the *De imperatorum et pontificum potestate* which he summarizes. For the latter he uses the Scholz edition and quite neglects the later and more fully annotated edition of Brampton. It is likewise characteristic of his neglect of editions in English that he derives his knowledge of the early English version of the anonymous *Disputatio inter clericum et militem* from Scholz, instead of consulting A. J. Perry's scholarly edition of this tract published by the Early English Text Society (1925). The citations of Marsilius are still more unsatisfactory. It is impossible to learn from the footnotes whether he has used for the *Defensor* Goldast's edition in the *Monarchia*, or the excerpts provided by Scholz, or the English translation of Marshall (1535) which omits some chapters. All these works are mentioned, but not in connection with the citations. The definitive critical edition of the whole work by Previté-Orton seems quite unknown to Dr. Flick, although it appeared two years before his own work. Nor does he show familiarity with the more recent studies on Marsilius, especially those written in English. The articles by Brampton and Previté-Orton in the *English Historical Review* for 1921 and 1922, respectively, and the brilliant analysis by Emerton in *Harvard Theological Studies*, Volume VIII (1920), are important contributions to which the reader's attention ought at least to have been called.

The two most important recent contributions to our knowledge of Wyclif and his influence are Miss Deansley's *Lollard Bible* (1920) and Workman's admirable *John Wyclif* (1926). Neither of these has apparently come to Dr. Flick's notice, and his treatment of Wyclif is accordingly antiquated. This is particularly marked in the statement of the events and chronology of the reformer's life. There is no compensating familiarity with his works. For a statement regarding his doctrinal opinions the author resorts to a convenient but misleading list of charges framed by the Council of Constance in condemning his teachings.

In Volume I, Dr. Flick leans heavily upon Haller (*Papsttum und Kirchenreform* [1903]), even going to him for references to English parliamentary legislation (I, 229.) Other German scholars have of course been extensively used. Their labors have provided materials for most phases of the history. But his reading here too is incomplete. There is a curious blunder over Gregory of Heimburg, sometimes known among his contemporaries as George Heimburg. Dr. Flick makes of him two different persons, Gregory of Heimberg (*sic*) (II, 404) and George Heimburg (II, 477). But he tells us nothing substantial about the writings and struggles of this tenacious conciliarist, nor does he seem aware that Brockhaus and Joachimsen have devoted biographies to him.

The volumes have a fine appearance but proof errors are not infrequent. In the Table of Contents "Jack Cade" appears as "Jack Code"; and we find old friends disguised as "Duchene" (I, 23), "Baluz" (I, 81), "Pool" (I, 352), and "Scaff" (II, 235).

But it would be both unfair and ungrateful to Dr. Flick to give the impression that because of such defects as have been noted the work is valueless or negligible. It has indeed much to commend it to the historical student, and if critically read will render a much-needed service. The exposition of papal finances (chap. iv and v) and the extensive and proportioned treatment of the councils in Part III are sections good enough to replace all previous discussions that have appeared in other than special works. The whole work is written with exemplary impartiality. It is not a particularly attractive task to examine the declining stage of an institution that has long held the world in awe; and Dr. Flick witnesses the distress of the papal church, and records its scandalous corruptions, with no unbecoming glee. If scathing judgments are sometimes made, they are not dictated by ecclesiastical prejudice. While we may dissent from some of his minor statements, and criticize his emphases here and there, we must recognize the work of a mature judge of historical forces who has seen the whole movement of the age in perspective, and will not mislead us far. It is the merit of the work that in it we witness the constant and involved struggles not merely as the battles of ambitious and greedy men, but as conflicts of loyalties and of principles, and as battles of the mind in which the ideas that have received expression in modern thought and institutions were painfully coming to birth.

UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO JOHN T. MCNEILL

PROTESTANT SOLIDARITY

Professor McNeill's very title throws down a welcome challenge to an ancient charge against Protestantism which has been too much acquiesced in, and indeed too much supported by actions of Protestants—to wit, that it is essentially divisive, fissiparous.[1] With this idea there has come to some power a forecast of the future of Protestantism as destined by force of nature to accelerating division and final dissolution. Furthermore, it has become something of a commonplace that Protestantism is not only itself divisive, but also a cause of social disruption. All this Professor McNeill effectively repels in a book which constitutes a first-class contribution to the history of the Reformation and the interpretation of Protestantism, and to the literature of church union as well. So much does he contribute, and with such ample support from sources thoroughly commanded, that the best way to review his book is to recite something of what he gives us, after saying that his work has additional value by its wealth of reference to originals and secondary writings and of apposite quotation from them.

Luther's understanding of the Christian religion is not individualistic but essentially communal. "Nowhere . . . . is communion conceived of with more vital activity than by Luther." In this light only is his principle of the priesthood of believers, "the soul of the Reformation," rightly discerned. " 'Every man his own priest' is not for a moment the thought of Luther; on the contrary, it is every man his neighbor's priest." "The priesthood of believers is a doctrine fundamentally unitive. . . . . It is a phase of communion, and the way of realizing it." The doctrine has a high ethical content; it obligates believers to mutual love and service. Here is enough to require a change of emphasis in teaching about the Reformation. To a few writers—Strohl, Holl, and Kattenbusch, for example—Professor McNeill can refer in support of his view; but, as he says, for a long time the accepted interpretation has regarded the Reformation as chiefly an expression of religious individualism. He proceeds to show Luther's interest in the church, and the visible church, as the necessary manifestation of the Christian communion which is the church invisible. Calvin shows equal interest in the idea of communion, and gives a more developed expression of it in plans for church organization.

Emphasis is laid on the fact, largely forgotten, that the reformers would not surrender the word "catholic" to their opponents. A main objection of theirs to the Roman church was just the narrowness of its "alleged catholicity." They all claimed to belong to the church catholic, and in varying degrees they sought realization of its corporate unity. The proper principle of this realization they all held to be—here is one of the author's chief interests—that of "conciliarism," or representative government, over against that of monarchy. The development of this principle in the late Middle Ages is sketched, and a continuity is established with the reformers. Luther and his followers are shown to have called repeatedly for a free general council. This Calvin also desired, even after two sessions of Trent. Following this subject into later history, Professor McNeill maintains that "in the Protestant communions . . . . conciliarism has been the normal principle of government." This needs no argument in the case of Calvinism. In Lutheranism and Anglicanism, it is contended, conciliar polity has been modified by state encroachment. The action of Lutheranism in America, in freedom from the state, is cited in support of this, and that of Anglicanism in America might have been cited.

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[1] *Unitive Protestantism*. By John T. McNeill. New York: Abingdon Press, 1930. 345 pages. $3.00.

The second part of the book describes fully early Protestant efforts for union. A surprising abundance of detail bears out the author's assertion that the leaders of the Reformation were predominantly desirous of Christian concord, and that the sources of discord are to be found mainly not in their opinions or wishes but in politics. Luther's ruling spirit here appears far more conciliatory than he was at Marburg. Through the exhibition of his large-minded enduring zeal for union Bucer gains stature. The union activities of Calvin, followed by Beza, are shown to have looked toward a "Europe-wide religious communion," in which civil power would doubtless have had a place. Another sign of cohesiveness is Cranmer's persistent endeavor after a general Protestant conference. One result of all this is to disprove the oft-repeated judgment that early Protestantism was wholly nationalistic in its sympathies and workings. Here it appears as persistently international. The unitive tendencies displayed in the Reformation are followed as they manifested themselves in the too-little-known endeavors of Calixtus, Dury, Comenius, Leibnitz, and others in the seventeenth century. In this time the great preventive of union was not the theological differences of the churches but state control. Erastianism Professor McNeill considers in general a force against unity. The splittings of Scottish Presbyterianism, often cited as a proof of the divisiveness of Protestantism, almost all occurred, he says, "over some question of submission or resistance to state interference." Even in the eighteenth century, when church life was generally weak, he finds signs of the spirit of unity.

The modern revival of union activity is seen as beginning obscurely about a century ago. From the Reformation to this point Professor McNeill has traced a continuous stream of Protestant striving for union. In the modern period events in this field are too familiar to call for full treatment in this book. The Chicago-Lambeth Quadrilateral receives consideration, and with it the obstacle to union presented by the question of orders. Professor McNeill thinks that any attempt at union without mutual recognition of ministries would be a mistake, but also that a "representative episcopate" is congenial to Protestantism. Three achievements are chosen for special mention: those in Canada, Scotland, and South India.

The union movement has now so far broadened, Professor McNeill says, that its future depends upon the leaders and the people of all churches. Union will come when they desire it. He pleads that in efforts to this end there shall not be neglect of the principles revealed in the history which he has expounded, and of the resources bequeathed through it. "The most enduring elements" in Protestantism, in his view, lie in the idea of the church as the fellowship of Christians, exercising "a mutual priesthood," carrying the ethical values of their communion into the environing society, practicing a catholicity covering the whole range of truth, and organized in representative fashion. "In an age which craves a religion that will integrate the social order, these elements should be of the highest value."

The tragic record of Protestant sectarianism is not annulled by this book, but it is powerfully counterbalanced. No one can read it without thinking more nobly of Protestantism. Perhaps it has some remoteness from American church problems. American Protestants in general have little realizing sense of religious history, and are overwhelmingly practical. They will be moved to union and affected in work for it by modern practical considerations more than by history. Furthermore, there are considerable areas of our Protestantism where ideas will not be strongly recommended because they have been drawn from the Lutheran, Reformed, and Anglican past. But what Professor McNeill says ought to be known widely, because he brings not only much increase of historical intelligence, but also stores of power for unity.

ROBERT HASTINGS NICHOLS

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RELIGION IN THE CONQUEST OF MEXICO

That religion played an important part in the Spanish conquest of America has been recognized by many writers, but no one has made it a special subject of research until the present undertaking. In bringing together materials, many of them for the first time appearing in English, relating to this most interesting and important aspect of the conquest of the New World, Mr. Braden has rendered a most useful service,[1] not alone to students of the history of Hispanic America, but also to those whose special interest is in the study of religions.

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[1] *Religious Aspects of the Conquest of Mexico*. By Charles S. Braden. Durham: Duke University Press, 1930. xv+344 pages. $3.50.

To appreciate the religious zeal with which the Spanish conquerors were imbued it is necessary to gain an understanding of fifteenth-century Spanish religion. This Mr. Braden supplies in an early chapter on "Religion in Spain at the Time of the Conquest." The long struggle with the Moors had created a crusading spirit, and the Spanish conquerors came to America armed with royal commissions in which the duty of the propagation of the faith is made most important. The principal object of King Philip II was to preserve the purity of the faith and to spread it beyond the seas. Cortes considered himself a providential agent in spreading the true faith and thought of his Mexican expedition as a holy crusade. The Spaniards who conquered Mexico were the children of the generation which had expelled the last of the Moors from Spain, and they came to the New World, peopled by barbarians, with a burning zeal to extend the Catholic faith and to rescue countless souls from idolatry and cannibalism. Indeed, the same battle-cries which had been heard on the battlefields of Spain in the wars with the Moors were now heard on the battlefields of the New World where the Spaniards were engaged in fighting the American infidels. The Spanish treatment of the American natives can be understood only in the light of the Moorish background.

In chapter iii the religion of the Aztecs at the time of the conquest is described. This part of the study contains little that has not been made familiar to us through the classic account of Prescott in his *Conquest of Mexico* (Vol. I, Book I), though Mr. Braden is by no means dependent upon Prescott's researches for his treatment. The high character and devotion of the early missionaries are interestingly set forth in chapter v, together with an enlightening description of the methods used in the conversion of the natives. The early priests were particularly skilful in making use of existing native habits and practices in accomplishing their ends, and the success of the early Franciscan missionaries is most astonishing. The study ends with an account of the organization of the native church and an appraisal of the results of the efforts of the missionaries, and of the influences exerted upon Roman Catholic Christianity in Mexico by the native religion. This excellent study is rounded out with a critical essay on sources and an imposing ten-page Bibliography in which Spanish titles abound.

WILLIAM WARREN SWEET

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A NEW TEXTBOOK ON THEOLOGY

The Doctrine of God is that unique and unusual book, a textbook that is interesting. Better still, it is a textbook on theology.[1] It certainly belongs in a class with Patrick's introduction to philosophy, *The World and Its Meaning*. Higher praise cannot be given to any book of this sort. By the same token, any limited review is bound to be inadequate.

The book is divided into two equal parts. The first half deals with the province of theology, the last part with the doctrine of God. Throughout one feels constantly a deep satisfaction at the calm presentation of conflicting views, the scope of the literature surveyed, and the range of scholarship displayed. This book does not so much settle problems as teach us to ask the right questions. The student who wants a Baedeker for the interesting land of theological speculation can do no better than to equip himself with *The Doctrine of God*, since it is the long-needed modern substitute for William Newton Clarke's *Outline of Christian Theology.*

Samples of the writer's positive attitudes indicate the direction his thinking has taken. "To attempt to save religion at the expense of its truth is a hopeless endeavor. Religion without 'faith' is a contradiction in terms. There is and can be no such thing as a purely scientific or *this*-worldly religion. Belief in a super-world is essential to religion" (pp. 37–38). The various humanisms of our time are "an effort to get the ethical benefits of religion without religion" (p. 44). "Philosophic naturalism ends in a vacuous ejaculation of wonder" (p. 60). Since Montague's plea in *Belief Unbound* for "a sanctionless morality" and Huxley's insistence on "a religion without revelation," Knudson's pronounced beliefs will win careful reading.

One appreciates the frank candor with which Knudson acknowledges the difficulties science has put in the way of religion.

> The scientific world-view is capable of a religious interpretation, but it has inherent in it a naturalistic prejudice which it is not easy to overcome. Then, too, when purged of this prejudice, it does not lend itself so readily to a Christian interpretation as did the older geocentric and creationist view. We have here, consequently, a persistent source of difficulty between religion and science. This difficulty, however, is psychological rather than logical [p. 144].
>
> The faith that underlies scientific knowledge is not, it is true, religious faith. But from the epistemological point of view the two kinds of faith are in principle alike, since both consist in assuming the objective reality of ideals whose existence cannot be demonstrated. The ideal in one case is cognitive and in the other ethical. But both are assumed to be real [p. 82].

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[1] *The Doctrine of God*. By Albert C. Knudson. New York: Abingdon Press, 1930. 434 pages. $3.50.

One wonders whether enough has been made, at this point, of the trend to pan-illusionism as it is brought to focus in Vaihinger's *The Philosophy of "as if"* and De Gaultier's *Le fiction universelle.*

In the second half of the book the author turns to his specific problem. In the history of Christian theology there are three main problems with reference to God that have been discussed. They are: the existence of God, his attributes, the Trinity. The Trinity, of course, is a specifically Christian problem. The attributes have undergone a process of progressive reduction so that our main interest now centers in three: absoluteness, personality, and goodness. God's existence is of universal concern. Such is the outline.

Very consistently Knudson tests the validity of our beliefs by their power to satisfy our needs. His test is psychological rather than logical. Again, an example of his reasoning must suffice.

"Under the influence of this positivistic view of reality efforts have been made to redefine God in such a way as to eliminate the older metaphysical implications of the term and yet to retain the idea of his real existence." He is, for instance, said to be real in the same sense as alma mater, Uncle Sam, and humanity, though in a "greater" degree. He is "reality idealized"; he is "experienced reality taken in a socialized way"; he is "the Spirit of the world of living beings, taken in their associated and ideal experience." Or from a slightly different point of view he is identified with a part or aspect of nature. He is said to be that "most subtle and intimate complexity of environmental nature which yields the greatest good when right adjustment is made."

In this redefinition of God it is evident that he is not regarded as real in the same sense as is that larger nature of which he forms a part. It is, indeed, stated that "his reality is as demonstrable as the world itself," but the world or nature is manifestly thought of as the more inclusive and original reality. It is real in the metaphysical sense of the term, while God is real only in a secondary sense as a part or product of nature. No individuality or independent activity is ascribed to him. He may be spoken of as "the Power which makes for righteousness," but this is only in an accommodated sense. He is, rather, a law or process, and is real only in the sense in which a law or social group is real. If a deeper reality is attributed to him, it is in a pantheistic sense. The system under consideration, however—if it may be called a system—is far from being a consistent pantheism. It is a compound of positivism, naturalism, pantheism, and sociology, together with a dash of platonic idealism and a persistent profession of empiricism. In such a fusion—if not confusion—

of different points of view it is not always easy to determine exactly what is meant by the various statements concerning God. But it is clear that he is not to be regarded as the ultimate ground of the universe. He is a part or aspect or expression of it.

In so far as he is identified with a social process, or a social group, or a social ideal, or some observable phase of nature, it may perhaps be justly claimed that he is as demonstrably real as the world about us, but he is not real in the only sense in which religion is interested in his reality. What religion is alone concerned about is a righteous and loving will upon which the world is dependent. No social process, no phase of the natural order, no vague universal can fill out the religious idea of Deity. For religion God must be an individual, absolute, and personal being. At least such is the Christian view. And the fundamental question of religion is whether such a being exists. Existence as applied to him means, therefore, metaphysical existence, an independent, dynamic, and spiritual mode of being" (pp. 210–12).

Ultimately, of course, Knudson's theism is in the tradition of Schleiermacher, Troeltsch, and Otto. He finds in the structure of human personality, of the human mind, the verification of religious faith. He contends, repeatedly, for a status for religious faith as independent as the faith that underlies all the ideal interests of mankind, science, art, morality, and religion.

> Our knowledge of ultimate reality is subjectively conditioned. Volitional and moral factors enter into it so that it would more properly be called faith than knowledge. Faith, it is true, may become so vivid as to take on a perceptual form; but this holds true only of the more extreme type of mysticism. As a rule, it moves on a different plane, and confusion may result from assimilating it too closely to sense-perception and scientific knowledge. Certainly, our perception or knowledge of God is quite different from our perception or knowledge of the phenomenal order. The former is volitionally and morally conditioned in a way that the latter is not. That faith has an object is emphatically true, and from this point of view we may speak of it as religious perception or religious experience or religious knowledge. But we need to be on our guard against being led astray by these terms. They by no means guarantee the validity of our faith. By whatever name or terms faith may be known or described, it is still faith, and as such differentiates itself from mere perception. It does not become more objective, nor more certain, nor more immediate because of the partial analogy that exists between it and sense-experience [pp. 226–27].

MILES H. KRUMBINE

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THE THEOLOGY OF DR. TENNANT

With the appearance of Dr. Tennant's second volume,[1] a notable addition to the literature of philosophical theism is completed. The purpose of the book is to present a compendious critical discussion of "those tracts of philosophy which have bearing on the cognitive basis of religion" (I, v). Starting from a vigorous and acute examination of the facts and principles of psychology, the author proceeds to examine the processes of human dealings with the world in the way of valuation, knowledge, and belief; to show why the world thus envisaged seems to call for a teleological reading; and to define, as the most reasonable completion thereof, a sharply drawn theistic view.

Among the avowedly theological books with which I am acquainted, this one stands out by reason of a quite unusual degree of clarity and "tough-mindedness." The author declares from the outset his sole allegiance to "empiricism" and "phenomenalism"; and to what can be known, on these terms, about human selves and the physical world, as the sole basis for reasonable belief in God. Any direct inference from moral imperatives or "religious experience" he renounces, along with all a priori proofs. Though "empiricism" and "phenomenalism" are both used in special senses, which he defines with some care, they indicate fairly enough the line he actually follows; and the discussion maintains a level of critical vigor and sobriety the more refreshing because it is certainly not most familiar in theological writing. To say that I find his conclusions, in general, as satisfactory as his attitude and method is bracing, is, perhaps, not to the point, but the fact is so; and since I shall notice later a number of what seem to be weaknesses in the discussion, I desire to record as emphatically as possible my appreciation of its conspicuous clarity, strength, and persuasiveness.

In the psychological section, and indeed throughout the discussion, the influence of James Ward is strongly marked and repeatedly avowed. The analysis of cognition is a revised version of Kant's: a version which has much in common with Dewey's more recent expressions (though Dewey is nowhere mentioned), but which goes with Kant, not Dewey, in the capital matter of distinguishing noümena from phenomena, and differs from both in affirming that, through the latter, the former can to an important degree be known. The noümenal or "ontal" ("actual," "real") world thus known is interpreted in the evolutionary manner of such discussions as Hobhouse's *Development and Purpose*, with glimpses of an underlying pampsychism like Ward's; while the theism in which this view issues, for Dr. Tennant, is developed by way of comment on the familiar problems as to the creatorhood, personality, and attributes of God, the significance of evil, and the basic relations of God to the world and men. These hints are enough, perhaps, to suggest that the chief interest of the book lies, not in any attempt to expound a theory novel in content, but rather in its unusually well-sustained effort to synthesize a richly varied body of ideas, most of them familiar in diverse contexts, into one consistent, critical, thoroughly modern view. It is surely needless to add that just now, few more useful services than this could be rendered to theological theory.

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[1] *Philosophical Theology*. Vol. I, *The Soul and Its Faculties*, Vol. II, *The World, the Soul, and God*. By F. R. Tennant. New York: Macmillan Co., 1928, 1930. xvi+422 and xiv+276 pages. Vol. I, $6.50; Vol. II, $5.00.

The argument is closely woven and cumulative enough to make any summary unfair, and its general character has been indicated, perhaps sufficiently, in the preceding paragraphs. I venture to notice, therefore, without any pretense at a résumé, certain leading ideas the treatment of which seems inconclusive. In each instance there is, I think, a lapse from the author's special sort of empiricism, which seems to me in somewhat unstable equilibrium between the two positions which in scholastic slang would be called "conceptualism" and "moderate realism." And these lapses seem to point, in each instance, the need for revision toward a view that would do fuller justice to both the data of experience and the demands of logic than "conceptualism" can do. It seems to me not impossible to be at once more scrupulously empirical and more dialectically exacting—though no doubt that is much easier to say than to do! At any rate, here are my queries.

1. The knowability of the human self. It is a bold and welcome feature of Dr. Tennant's argument that he meets without compromise the various attempts to dispense with the "soul," in the sense of a unitary and enduring subject of conscious experience, without which experience as actually forthcoming is not interpretable. But, like Kant and Ward, he denies that the "pure ego," though known, is directly apprehended. He has not their reasons for the denial, however, for (*a*) he holds that "subjective states and acts" (I, 78 n.) are directly apprehended (which seems to require that his term "attention" be extended to cover instances of non-sensory as well as of sensory "acquaintance" [cf. I, 28, 42–43]), and (*b*) he does not hold consistently that no specific qualitative character (*quale*) can be ascribed to the ego (cf. I, 77, "qualitylessness, or transparency, of the ego," with I, 79 n., "having *fewer* empirical qualities" [italics mine], and with I, 96 and 105, "idiosyncrasy"). Moreover, he himself derives knowledge of the ego—which, after all, is just the enduring

subject of consciousness—from the proposition that "consciousness involves a subject" (I, 77), though he denies that there is "presentation *of* the subject." But one must inquire, then, by what right it is affirmed that consciousness involves a subject. Whence comes the basic idea "subject" in the first place, if not from an actual experience in which an actual subject is presented? And if not thence, what is the warrant, on the author's own principles (I, 65–66), for supposing that the idea "subject" is veritably applicable to actuality at all? Both more unhesitant empiricism and more drastic analysis seem needed here.

2. The origin and significance of ideas. The instance just referred to indicates a sort of inconclusiveness that marks the whole treatment of ideas, fresh and suggestive as that often is. I cannot go into the matter here, further than to say that (*a*) the account of ideas as originating, without exception, through simple abstraction from percepts in which they are discoverable, seems to me not to cover all cases—e.g., straight lines, perfect circles, etc., which seem rather suggested by than simply isolable from perceptual experience, and that (*b*) if these be called merely "thought-given fictions" (I, 65), none the less their origin, their logical interrelations whereby they may form "systems" (cf. I, 203, 210), and their relations to the actual or perceptible world, whereby they may prove useful for prediction and control (cf. I. 213, etc.), require much more precise examination than they here receive.

3. The relation of God and the world. When, having vindicated the reasonableness of theistic theory by approach from the side of the humanly perceptible world, Dr. Tennant returns upon the world in an effort to define the relations which God may be thought to hold thereto, he shows the same keen sense for probabilities and human values as in the earlier sections. But I cannot escape the impression that, moved, it would seem, by some conviction not strictly derived from the facts examined, he does less than full justice, now and then, both to probabilities and to his own empirical principles. Again, unfortunately, I can only point, without argument this time, to his insistence on the unconditioned creatorhood of God. Hereby, as it seems to me, (*a*) an idea—absolute creation—is employed which is admittedly not derivable from experience (II, 125, yet cf. p. 143), and which I cannot see to be necessarily "implied in the teleological interpretation of the world" (p. 124), unless it were held that the world is teleologically ordered *throughout*, which his earlier argument (pp. 78–113) by no means requires; and (*b*) the problem of physical evil is made so acute that in trying to deal with it, the author is driven to invoke "the inexorability of logic, the compatibility of things" (II, 201), in the midst of an argument which seeks definitely both to deny limitations,

other than self-appointed limitations, of God's sovereignty, and to disparage the metaphysical importance of "logic."

These lapses seem to me significant just because they are not mere inadvertences: they are organic to the course of the argument, and bear witness, in part, to Dr. Tennant's own "reasonableness," which has proved too strong for his a priori commitment to a particular sort of empiricism! My strong persuasion is that the empiricism needed is one freed from distrust of the insights that *have* been won by "rationalists." One may be permitted to wish, for example, that Dr. Tennant's distrust had not prevented him from reading with more sympathy such theories as original Platonism, to which he refers frequently, disparagingly, and, if I may say so, inexactly, and at last (II, 151–52) with really grievous unfairness, though his own debt to Plato clearly is large. For myself, it is neither surprising nor disappointing to find in the work of a vigorous, hard-headed empiricist like Tennant or Dewey what seems to me unwilling need for and unsought kinship with the Platonic line. It may conceivably promise a time when clannish polemics can be adjourned in favor of co-operative attack on the persisting problems that seem to be fairly common.

R. L. CALHOUN

YALE UNIVERSITY

THE PROGRESS OF BUCHMANISM

This book[1] is a series of autobiographical, but anonymous, statements, comparable to Begbie's *Twice-Born Men.* After the converts have told their stories, the editor adds his own; includes an account of the recent visits of Buchman to India and South Africa; and concludes with a sketch of the origin and the basic philosophy of the movement.

As the title indicates, the principle of "guidance," so central in the movement, is stressed in each of the thirteen cases reported. If these cases were somewhat fuller, they would furnish the psychologist of religion some valuable materials on conversion under modern conditions. As it is, they remain unimpressive except to those who are already convinced. Since the volume is obviously for propagandist purposes (a flier is inserted containing an appeal to the reader), this is a serious defect. However, to the person interested in knowing further what this recent religious movement is about, the last sixteen pages will give a useful summary. English readers can, however, get this from the American publications of the movement, which had its inception here before it became the Oxford Group in England.

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[1] *Unter Gottes Führung.* By J. F. Laun. Gotha: Leopold Klotz, 1931. 220 pages. M. 4.50 and 3.00.

It is another reminder that intelligent people's religion may have little to do with their intellect.

EDWIN EWART AUBREY

UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO

TAGORE'S HIBBERT LECTURES

This is a book for everyone: a book whose human interest and pervading charm assure it a wide appeal and lasting value.[1] It is not a philosophical work, as its author repeatedly warns us; in fact, its one semiphilosophical chapter (the first) may well be omitted. Its value is religious and poetical: like the essays of Emerson it is primarily a document of the spiritual life.

To some readers the title may be a little misleading: for "the religion of man" which Tagore presents to us is very far indeed from the "religion" of our American "humanists." It is essentially cosmic in its nature, and the name, which the poet has given it, is apparently intended to distinguish it from the impersonal pantheism of much of Indian thought. He is, of course, far from dogmatic in his attitude, and is willing to believe that other views of divinity may be nearer right than his: but whether right or wrong his idea of the divine essence is of "the Eternal Person manifested in all persons. It may be one of the numerous manifestations of God, the one in which is comprehended Man and his Universe. But we can never know or imagine Him as revealed in any other conceivable universe so long as we remain human beings."

Among the most interesting parts of the book are the three chapters in which Tagore describes his own religious development, and his ideal for the school he has founded at Santiniketan. Education, he insists, should find a place for the noncivilized parts of human nature as well as for the civilized and tamed. "For our perfection we have to be vitally savage and mentally civilized: we should have the gift to be natural with nature and human with human society." The plea of the book throughout is for a fairer balance in our lives, for a richness that does not surrender simplicity, a humanism that has its large place for the cosmic. Nowhere is this union of different, but by no means incompatible, ideals more needed than in the relations between East and West. In one of his chapters Tagore describes the glowing admiration for the Western spirit of efficiency which filled his heart on his first youthful visit to Europe, and his earnest wish "that the introspective vision of the universal soul, which an Eastern devotee realizes in the solitude of his mind, could be united with this spirit of its outward expression in service, the exercise of will in unfolding the wealth of beauty and well-being from its shy obscurity to the light."

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[1] *The Religion of Man* (The Hibbert Lectures for 1930). By Rabindranath Tagore. New York: Macmillan Co., 1931. 244 pages. $2.50.

James Bissett Pratt

Williams College

RELIGION FOR SOPHISTICATED PARENTS

Every year multitudes of young people, soon to be parents, graduate from our colleges and universities in a state of religious unsettlement. For themselves, they would be content to drift through life in a state of "benevolent agnosticism," indifferent to organized religion and too busy to work out a philosophy of life of their own; but when children come, they are obliged to take responsibility, either for withholding religious instruction, or for giving it. In either case, they are perplexed; and it is rather striking to note how many of them (as part of the adult education movement) are getting together in groups to talk over their difficulties. As a textbook for parents' classes of this kind, it would be hard to improve upon Professor Aubrey's new book.[1]

The author wisely makes no attempt to work out a complete religious philosophy, nor to give specific educational directions. He knows his sophisticates too well. What he does attempt to do, and what he succeeds in doing with admirable clarity and simplicity, is to present a "minimum" conception of religion which puts so little strain upon faith that anyone can accept it, while at the same time opening the way to larger and more adventurous conceptions.

The book falls roughly into two divisions: a psychological section (origin and nature of religion, religious infantilism and maturity, meaning of God, and function of prayer) and a historical section (significance of Jesus, and development of Christianity), leading up to the final problem of "What the Intellectual Can Do with Institutional Religion." The more successful part is the psychological section, where the challenge of a rational and mature, but emotionally satisfying, religion is put in terms that can hardly fail to be convincing to a generation fed upon mental hygiene and psychoanalysis. Intellectuals will find their own psychological shortcomings sympathetically understood, clearly diagnosed, and wisely prescribed for. The historical part of the book is by comparison somewhat "thin," and deficient in appreciative sensibility. The chapter on "Where Our Religion Came From" is a miracle of compression (from primitive man to liberal Protestantism in thirty-five pages!), but one fears lest such cavalier treatment of the past may tend to confirm our sophisticated parents in their attitude of "pure contemporaneity."

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[1] *Religion and the Next Generation.* By Edwin Ewart Aubrey. New York: Harper & Bros., 1931. xi+188 pages. $2.00.

WALTER M. HORTON

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THE PARADOX OF PESSIMISM

Rarely does one find such broad scholarship in this age of specialization as Professor Radoslav A. Tsanoff reveals in his treatment of the great pessimists of history.[1] He begins with the great religions, every one of which has painted in blackest colors the evils of existence. Present-day liberalism is unique among the great religions (if we can call it a great religion) in its insistence on optimism concerning the observable world. Zoroastrianism, Buddhism, Judaism, Christianity, have all given full recognition to the misery and futilities of life. Recurring references to Job run throughout the entire book.

Fine studies are made of the life and teachings of Leopardi, Vigny, Pascal, Schopenhauer, Von Hartmann, Mainlander, and others. There is thorough examination of the pessimistic statements of Rousseau, Voltaire, St. Augustine, Pierre Bayle, Goethe, Shakespeare, Christian-Medieval writers. The whole of European civilization is sifted to find its notes of pessimism. Always there seems to be sympathetic understanding of the individuals studied. Also, humor is not lacking, and Mr. Tsanoff finds it among the pessimists. "A pessimist is one who fears that this is the best of all possible worlds." "God's only excuse is that he really does not exist." "Our religion . . . . is unquestionably divine, since seventeen centuries of imposture and imbecility have not destroyed it."

The Promethean note of defiance is also recorded. In the face of God's cold indifference to human suffering, even to Jesus in the Garden of Gethsemane, Vigny writes:

> ". . . . and silence cold will be my one reply
> To God's eternal silence and to God's disdain."
>
> "I love the majesty of man's unyielding pain."

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[1] *The Nature of Evil*. By Radoslav A. Tsanoff. New York: Macmillan Co., 1931. 447 pages. $3.00.

Leopardi writes:

> . . . . Now scorn thyself, scorn Nature,
> Scorn the brute power whose reign
> We know but by our woes, which are its pastime;
> Scorn all that is, for all is vain, vain, vain.
> Lord and creator of all things, unfathomed
> Iniquity, consummate power and consummate
> Intelligence, eternal
> Fountain of woes, director of all motion. . . . .

Again the words of James Thompson are noted:

> Who is most wretched in this dolorous place?
> I think myself; yet I would rather be
> My miserable self than He, than He
> Who formed such creatures to His own disgrace.

Byron's pessimism is described, especially as it is portrayed in the poem *Cain*, where Cain is represented as horrified at the pleasure God seems to take in the suffering and blood of animals when a sacrifice of fruit and vegetables could be made without the suffering of innocent creatures. He rushes up to Abel to protest against the outrage and in the struggle Abel is killed. Thus Cain becomes typical of all mankind. His highest and noblest aspirations bring on the greatest horror. The supreme evil of life lies in the fact that men can imagine and aspire to heights which their powers of achievement cannot attain.

The conclusion that Mr. Tsanoff reaches is that pessimism, like scepticism, involves a self-contradiction. We cannot justify scepticism without using the very reason which scepticism claims cannot be used. So also the pessimist, in his very defiance, scorn, and condemnation of the evils of existence, displays a nobility which is precious. It is only when men become complacent and optimistic in the midst of conditions as they are, accepting with contentment evil conditions as though they were good, that we have a truly hopeless state of affairs. "Few things are as depressing and disgusting as men's actual toleration and even enjoyment of ignoble conditions and ways of life. . . . . 'The dog returning to his vomit again; and the sow that had washed, to wallowing in the mire.' "

When Tolstoy sought out the masses submerged in the slums of Moscow, trying to save them from poverty and filth of body and soul, their condition made him more miserable than it made them. Indeed, they displayed a dull contentment or even frivolous gaiety in their wretched estate. It is the man who has the sensitivity, insight, and idealistic imagination to be miserable and pessimistic in the world as it is, who gives to the world its greatest value. This outreach after the good in the midst of what is not good, and the consequent condemnation of the world as it is, is what gives to the world its supreme worth. This is the paradox of pessimism. "Man's glory is his misery" said Pascal, one of the most miserable and noble of men. In this sense it is suffering which alone makes the world precious, beautiful, and good. The vulture of Prometheus, the cross of Christ, the aspiration which is the source of all anguish—these alone make the world worthy of our love and service. The pessimism and misery of human life are what give to it all the nobility and grandeur that it has.

Henry N. Wieman

University of Chicago

THE FAMILY AND CHRISTIANITY

In a study of the family, which is one of the Century Company's series of Catholic College textbooks,[1] Dr. Schmiedeler, who is professor of sociology at St. Benedict's College, has brought together the results of wide reading, independent investigation, and mature thought. The chapters are well arranged, and the material is wisely chosen. Doubtless it is to be expected that some points in a treatment of family problems by a member of the Catholic clergy would not be fully convincing to some who are outside that fellowship. For example, the idealization of the family as it existed in the Middle Ages, serving as the basis of his treatment of the "Integrated Family" in Part I, seemed to be overdrawn. At that time, from the author's point of view, society was wholly Christian, and romantic love was at its best. The colonial situation in America was recognized as somewhat comparable, in that it provided a setting very favorable to family life. In contrast with these earlier times, the modern day, with its pleasure philosophy, its distortion of romantic love, its evils such as abortion and birth control, and other modern trends, seems almost wholly undesirable. The happiest places remaining are the little islands of medieval or rural simplicity which remain in the midst of the modern world.

In the second part of the book, when the author has dropped the homiletical tone and the idealization of the past which mark his early treatment, he gives a very good picture of the present situation as it is affected by such factors as the industrial revolution, the machinofacturing culture, urbanization, the entrance of woman into industry, and the new leisure. The treatment of family tensions and of the causes and effects of broken homes is a valuable part of the book. As might be expected, divorce is looked upon as an evil to which not even the slightest entering wedge ought to be accorded.

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[1] *An Introductory Study of the Family*. By Edgar Schmiedeler. New York: Century Co., 1930. xi+384 pages. $2.50.

Part III, dealing with "Reintegration," provides a wealth of wisdom on such matters as preparation for marriage and the qualifications to be looked for in a mate. All this is sure to be of practical value to the students who follow this course. Very interesting is the setting-forth of the essential points in the laws of the church on marriage, and the diversity of laws of the states on the same matters. So also is the presentation of the writer as to the way in which the confessional helps to socialize the individual for marriage, and to deal helpfully with rising points of misunderstanding or tension in family experience. The problem of education for family-building, both in general terms, and in specific matters of adjustment of personality and of sex experience, is rightly stressed.

Looking at the book as a whole, one thinks of it as providing a large amount of useful material on the family, treated with sociological insight, and with a good knowledge of literature and research in this field. At the end of each chapter is a short list of thought-provoking questions and a bibliographical section. It ought to provide the basis for a valuable course in Catholic colleges, and it will be useful as a reference work in any others. Its significance for American thought is that it sets forth the stable, though perhaps somewhat static, philosophy of marriage which is held by a large portion of our population, and which is being imparted to its leaders of tomorrow.

L. Foster Wood

Colgate-Rochester Divinity School

THE EDUCATIONAL SIGNIFICANCE OF JESUS

The International Missionary Council at Jerusalem, with its emphasis upon the central place of Jesus in the Christian message, offers the stimulus for an excellent discussion of the place of Jesus in the educative process.[1] The author deals with the failure of traditional methods in religious education, the place of religion in the total education of the growing person, and the content, method, and scope of religious education. The author accepts the modern trends in religious education and believes them to be in keeping with the basic procedures employed by the Great Teacher. For him the objective of all education is the development of personality. Inasmuch as religion, particularly the Christian religion, places its supreme emphasis upon personal values, it has for him a functional value in all education. He insists that religion should be interpreted as having relation, not only to all the subjects in the school curriculum, but to every aspect of practical life.

In the specific procedure of religious education the author holds that religious education should seek its center in worship and practical activities rather than in instruction. He would find its content in the basic teachings of Jesus, which, as he shows from the gospel memoirs, are directly related to the situations, the problems, and the needs which the persons whom Jesus taught faced. These basic teachings are to him, notwithstanding the superficial differences among Christian sects, the substantial operative ideas and beliefs of Christianity.

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[1] *Christ and Modern Education.* By Charles E. Raven. New York: Henry Holt & Co., 1930. 223 pages. $1.75.

Taking the oldest gospel tradition, he analyzes the teaching methods of Jesus and finds them in striking agreement with the more recent trends in modern educational theory and practice. Since his method was used primarily with adults, the author suggests that its basic method needs to be modified for children and adolescents, and suggests specifically how this should be done.

One of the most valuable contributions of the book grows out of the insight into the place of the educational procedure in the operations of the total parish, including preaching, the care of souls, and the missionary approach as well as in the more specifically specialized procedures of the church school. This is in keeping with a recent and rapidly growing trend of thought in American theory and practice.

The book is modern in its theological positions and sound in its educational assumptions. While it will not add anything new to the thinking of the professional religious educator, it will be of great value for the general reader, and will be particularly helpful and stimulating to teachers and pastors as well as to missionaries who are increasingly becoming aware of the implications of the educational approach for their work.

William Clayton Bower

University of Chicago

THE AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF A PREACHER

My Own Yesterdays by Dean Emeritus Charles R. Brown of the Yale Divinity School[1] will appeal particularly to his world-wide circle of friends, but it has a genuine message for our age as well. The young person who is tempted to think that the opportunity for the rise of a self-made man has passed should read the opening chapters on "Boyhood," "College," "Business," and "Divinity School." Again we see set forth the truth we are most likely to forget, viz., that character and industry form the basis for a successful career. His early reading, his use of tools, and his command of shorthand are more than interesting; they reveal both the spirit and the means by which he rose to power. Every young minister who has heard this prince of preachers and has marveled at his easy flow of words and his mastery of ideas should read what he has to say about his early attempts at preaching and see the obstacles this master had to overcome as well as the pains he had to endure while he was serving his apprenticeship.

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[1] *My Own Yesterdays.* By Charles Reynolds Brown. New York: Century Co., 1931. ix+332 pages. $2.00.

Charles R. Brown is more than a great preacher, teacher, and administrator. He has been truly a prophet. The trends which we see today toward humanizing industry he saw as by divine intuition forty years ago. He championed that cause while it was generally unpopular and often dangerous. Yet he modestly refrains from saying what he could truthfully say—"I told you so."

One follows through the record of his experience with the feeling that he is observing no meteor but a comet whose power is to awaken wonder and admiration. In reading the story of his education the friendships he formed, the positions he held, the work he achieved—all of which make him the unique figure in the American church—one keeps asking what is the explanation of such a life. Analysis is futile but it is the best we have in searching for an answer. The secret lies somewhere in this direction: good family stock, high home ideals, a sparkling humor, a sound mind, a poetic imagination, a love for folks, and a simple trust in the reality and the presence of God.

With a fine mixture of faith and humility he asserts that he would enter the ministry if he had the choice to make again, hoping to profit by the mistakes and blunders which, by the way, no one but himself realizes. Only a man in love with his work and filled with a high and legitimate sense of victory can make such an affirmation.

He observes many changes that have taken place during his active life, some for the better others for the worse. He regrets the widespread cynicism of our generation; its tendency toward wholesale condemnation of youth and the craze for amusement. But, on the other hand, he is hopeful, for there is less sectarianism than formerly; there is a finer quality in worship and there is greater spiritual liberty in seeing and declaring the truth.

There are not a few of Dr. Brown's admirers who have considered his *Quest of Life* as his best work. The new volume could have been named, as supplementary to the other, *The Discovery of Life* or *The Attainment of Life.* For it proves that his quest has been successful and the results abundantly satisfying. It will have a wide circulation and a genuine welcome.

ROBERT E. BROWN

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RECENT BOOKS

HISTORY OF RELIGION

GUNKEL, H., and ZSCHARNACK, L. (eds.) *Die Religion in Geschichte und Gegenwart.* 2. Aufl. Band IV, Bogen 54–69 (89–93 Lieferungen), Cols. 1697–2184, M. 9; and Band V, Bogen 1–12 (94–97 Lieferungen), Cols. 1–384, M. 7.20. Tübingen: Mohr, 1930–31.

The fifth (and final) volume of this new edition is now well started, and users of the encyclopedia will eagerly anticipate its completion. The same thorough revision that has marked the earlier parts continues in evidence. The *Lieferungen* listed above include the entries "Ramsauer–Seelensorge." Here one will find condensed but adequate information, with bibliographical references, on topics of wide interest, such as justification, the kingdom of God, and the sacraments; the historical, philosophical, and social study of religion; the history of movements and persons important in shaping religious thinking, like Scholasticism, Rationalism, the Renaissance, the Reformation, Modernism (Catholic), Schleiermacher, Ritschl; and many other items of similar importance. The range of vision employed in the selection of subjects and the care exercised in the apportionment of space have to be highly commended, even though one sometimes finds less detail than will be desired by specialists in specific fields. For example, the student of early Christianity usually finds articles on the New Testament and its Jewish background so satisfactory and complete that he is quite unprepared, even in an encyclopedia that professes only to treat religions in general, to see the entry "Sanhedrin" dismissed with only eight lines and two references to literature now a quarter of a century old. But such an occurrence is the exception rather than the rule.

HAMILTON, CLARENCE H. *Buddhism in India, Ceylon, China and Japan—A Reading Guide.* Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1931. viii+107 pages. $1.00.

With this tool in his possession the student may readily find his way about in the various sections of Buddhistic history and at the same time experience the joy of discovery for himself. The outline is designed to guide one's reading, not to furnish a predigested summary of information. Thus it may be used to save time and render one's reading more systematic and profitable. On the other hand, persons who have no zest for discovery may obtain a tolerably complete view of the subject by merely reading the outline here presented.

MEYER, C. H. *Fontes historiae religionis slavicae.* Berlin: W. de Gruyter, 1931. 112 pages. M. 8.00.

The series of source materials for the history of religions collected from Greek and Latin authors, under the general editorship of Carl Clemen, has already met a hearty welcome. Persian, Egyptian, and Germanic religions have been considered in earlier numbers of this series, and the present *fasciculus* covers pre-Christian Slavic religion. To the quotations from Greek and Latin authors a few passages from Germanic and

Arabic (in German translation) have been appended. Detailed indexes add further to the value of the collection, which is an indispensable tool for the student of the history of religion as well as early Slavic history and culture.

Saxl, Fritz. *Vorträge der Bibliothek Warburg* (1928–29). Leipzig: Teubner, 1930. 283 pages, xliv plates. M. 20.

For several years past, the Warburg Library has from time to time brought out a series of valuable lectures under the editorship of Fritz Saxl. The volume for 1928–29 contains six papers supplemented by an elaborate Index and forty-four splendid plates presenting sixty-nine illustrations relating to two of the essays. In a work of this sort one does not look so much for unity in subject matter as for scientific value in each piece of research. But this issue of the *Vorträge* has a larger measure of unity than usual, centering around ideas about the soul's ascent to heaven. The following topics are treated: "The Heavenly Journey of the Soul in the Egyptian Belief in Immortality," by H. Kees; "Sacred Acts, Particularly That of Baptism in Relation to Mandean Practice," by R. Reitzenstein; "The Heavenly Journey of Mohammed and Its Significance in the Religion of Islam," by R. Hartmann; "Iconography of Christ's Ascent to Heaven," by H. Schrade; "The Ascent of the Soul According to Dante," by A. Farinelli; and "A Study of Stylistic Development in Italian Painting at the Beginning of the Sixteenth Century and Its Relation to the Appreciation of Supersensible Realities," by Walter Friedländer. The last two papers are extensively illustrated, and each of them is abundantly documented.

HEBREW AND JEWISH RELIGION

Barton, G. A. *A History of the Hebrew People*. New York: Century Co., 1930. 464 pages. $3.50.

The author's purpose in preparing this volume has been to allow the Old Testament to tell its own story with a minimum of necessary assistance from him. In the very nature of the case, therefore, a large percentage of the bulk of the volume is comprised of biblical text. Since the text employed is that of the revised version of 1885, the fruits of much of the textual and exegetical research of the last half century are not offered to the student.

Of necessity the book is opened by two brief introductory chapters in the first of which it is sought to present the Near Eastern background of the Hebrew experiment with life. The brevity which the plan of the work imposes upon this section is highly regrettable since, in the nature of the case, all that can be offered is the merest sketch of the author's own views on questions which are emphatically still open. For example, the highly debatable question of Assyrian origins is dismissed, on page 6, with a few lines which ignore entirely the different views of some outstanding writers on that subject. One willingly admits that Doctor Barton could do no more in the space available. But one would respectfully raise the question whether any work, planned as this one is, can contribute much to the field of history. Teachers in schools and colleges will doubtless find this volume valuable as a help in the analysis of biblical sources and the correlation therewith of some archaeological data. One could wish again, however, that much of the space devoted to the reproduction of a text cheaply and easily available to all could have been devoted to the enrichment of the volume on the archaeological side. These criticisms are not offered in any carping spirit and are directed at the plan of the book rather than at its execution. One could wish that Doctor Barton had had more scope for the expression of the wealth of knowledge which years of study have brought to him.

EWEN, DAVID. *Hebrew Music. A Study and an Interpretation.* New York: Bloch Publishing Co., 1931. 65 pages. $1.25.

Mostly republished essays that have appeared in various Jewish periodicals. The subject is rapidly surveyed over its whole history. The writer thinks that Hebrew music "is rapidly becoming faded and obsolescent," and urges that Hebrew composers give more attention to compositions for use in the synagogue.

GINZBURG, SIMON. *The Life and Works of Moses Hayyim Luzzatto.* Philadelphia: Dropsie College, 1931. vii+189 pages. $2.50.

Moses Hayyim Luzzatto, the eighteenth-century Italian-Jewish Cabbalist, poet, and dramatist, has always been a character of absorbing interest to students of Jewish history and literature. Living at a time when Hebrew style was debased and artificial, he wrote with a surprising lyric beauty. Although a Kabbalist and therefore absorbed in worlds of unreality, he composed charming pastoral poetry and vivid biblical drama.

Much has been written about him. Every history and sketch of Hebrew literature gives him a prominent place. Dr. Ginzburg is privileged to add something new to the large Luzzato literature. He obtained access to 103 hitherto unpublished letters written by Luzzato and his contemporaries (the manuscripts are in the library of the Jewish Theological Seminary, New York). As an Appendix to this volume he publishes some of the more important letters.

It is to be hoped that Dr. Ginzburg will soon have the opportunity of publishing all the Luzzatto letters and thus throw still more light upon this fascinating, versatile, transition-personality.

GRIBETZ, LOUIS J. *The Case for the Jews.* New York: Bloch Publishing Co., 1930. xiv+126 pages. $1.50.

A Zionist interprets the Balfour Declaration and the rights of the Jews under the British mandate for Palestine.

JUNG, LEO. *The Jewish Library.* New York: Bloch Publishing Co., 1930. xii+295 pages. $2.50.

This series by various authors constitutes an interesting miscellany of essays written chiefly from the Orthodox Jewish point of view. The series begins with a fascinating causerie on the Hebrew alphabet by the learned Dr. M. Gaster of London, and contains articles of Dr. M. Isaac ("Faith and Science"); the Chief Rabbi Dr. Joseph Hertz ("Fundamental Ideals of Judaism"); Edwin Collins ("Worship as a Mode of Study"); Dr. Jung ("What Is Orthodox Judaism?"); Dr. De Sola Pool ("The Centrality of Palestine in Jewish Life"); S. Lieben, M.D. ("Shehitah"); Edwin Collins ("Bahya's *Duties of the Heart*); David Macht, M.D. ("Scientific Aspects of the Jewish Dietary Laws"); Professor Nathan Isaacs ("A Re-reading of Genesis"); Rabbi S. Daiches ("Dogma in Judaism"); and Dr. Cecil Roth ("The Jews at the Close of the Middle Ages").

MOORE, GEORGE FOOT. *Judaism in the First Centuries of the Christian Era—The Age of the Tannaim.* Vol. III. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1930. 205 pages. $4.00.

In his great two-volume work on *Judaism in the First Centuries of the Christian Era,* George Foot Moore had magnificently fulfilled his purpose to "exhibit the religious conceptions and moral principles of Judaism . . . . in the form in which, by the end of the second century, they had attained general acceptance and authority." Now a third volume has been added.

This volume contains notes to the two preceding ones. These notes however are much more than references. They deal with some of the controversial questions which Dr. Moore was compelled to decide in a rather summary fashion in the body of the book. In this volume of notes he resumes discussion of such questions and marshals the various opposing opinions. For example, on pages 17–22, the author takes up the question of the continuity in the religious teachings of Judaism. He summarizes all the opinions of the scholars who believe that there was a break in the tradition due to the destruction of the Temple. There is a large number of these detailed discussions and, because of them, what might have been merely a list of references becomes a readable (and of course important) volume.

PHILIPSON, RABBI DAVID. *The Reform Movement in Judaism.* New York: Macmillan Co., 1931. 503 pages. $4.50.

The Reform Movement in Judaism first published twenty-three years ago was and still is the only exhaustive history of Liberal Judaism. In this new edition the veteran scholar and rabbi has brought his work up to date by adding new material on the development of reform in America and especially in England. The book is all the more indispensable to the student of the modernist trend in Judaism.

SCHECHTER, MRS. ABRAHAM I. *Symbols and Ceremonies of the Jewish Home.* New York: Bloch Publishing Co., 1930. 32 pages. $0.50.

Brief remarks on the Mezuzah, Sabbath, Passover, Feast of Weeks, Tabernacles, New Year, Day of Atonement, Hanukah, Purim, Erub Tabshilin.

WALTER, H. *Moses Mendelssohn.* New York: Bloch Publishing Co., 1930. 220 pages. $2.00.

This biography of Moses Mendelssohn by Dr. H. Walter, of the German department of McGill University, was evidently written in honor of the two hundredth anniversary of Mendelssohn's birth (1729). It is doubtful whether the author knows the Talmud at first hand, else he would not have permitted himself to exaggerate the sterility of Talmudic studies. There is, after all, much that is philosophic, folkloristic, and literary in the Talmud. To appreciate the varied contents of the Talmud one needs a much greater mental and spiritual equipment than "The ever-ready low cunning such as one wants for finding the solution of charades" (p. 14).

Aside from this exaggeration and his positive aversion to Polish teachers of the Talmud, the author is just in his estimate of Mendelssohn. He is neither a panegyrist nor a polemist. He frankly discloses the weakness of Mendelssohn's philosophic arguments but indicates his great contributions to German literature and criticism. The book is well written. The narrative is lively. The style is clear, and the evaluation of Mendelssohn balanced and just.

NEW TESTAMENT

Burgess, Isaac Bronson. *The Life of Christ.* Rev. ed. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1930. xxii+282 pages. $2.00.

Every teacher of biblical literature and religion knows the recurring problem of adequate textbooks, and "few there be that find" precisely the test that will interest the student, treat the subject matter assigned systematically and fairly, offer a supply of problems and projects for class work and at the same time represent first-grade scholarship. In the field even of the life and teaching of Jesus such textbooks do not abound.

It is, therefore, ground for satisfaction that the well-proved *Life of Christ,* by Isaac Bronson Burgess, first adapted from the earlier edition of the text of a similar title, brought out by Professors Burton and Mathews, now appears in a revised edition, in the "Constructive Studies" series of the University of Chicago Press. The book is for the use of students of high-school age.

The work meets many of the exacting requirements of modern religious education. Its size is not forbidding to the student, yet its scope is such that any trained teacher will find the right leads for supplementary material. The list of special assignments and projects is a highly important part of the text.

Based as it is on the *American Translation* by Professor Goodspeed, the handy harmony of the Synoptic Gospels, with the text of the Fourth Gospel, known as *The Student's Gospels* (Shailer Mathews, University of Chicago Press, 1927), makes an admirable supplement to this text. The text of the gospels in the textbook under review is that of the Goodspeed translation.

Dibelius, Martin. *Die Pastoralbriefe* ("Handbuch zum Neuen Testament.") 2d ed., rev. Tübingen: Mohr, 1931. ii+101 pages. Unbound, M. 4.50; bound, M. 6.00.

Dibelius herewith presents a thoroughly revised edition of the pastoral Epistles in the familiar style of the Lietzmann *Handbuch* series. The work is brought strictly to date, not only in its use and citation of literature, but even more important, in point of view. To be sure, the author's position with reference to the pastorals has not radically changed; there is much in the book which is familiar. But there is a distinctive point of view, and a treatment which, based upon a new point of view, is equally distinctive. The essential contribution is the author's treatment of the pastorals as examples of Christian paranese, especially in his concrete application to them of Karl Weidinger's *Haustafeln* theory. This makes it possible, not only to regard the pastorals as pseudonymous, but to develop a rational explanation for their appearance as well as for their pseudonymity; they are articulations as norms of customs which have grown up in the Christian communities; the discussions about church officials are attempts to secure the adoption of certain conceptions of the offices which had for some time been current in the movement; the polemic against heretics is the advocacy of the viewpoint of the majority against that of minority groups. Second Timothy is regarded as of a more personal nature than First Timothy or Titus, and the difference is explained by the hypothesis that the emphasis upon Paul's suffering is for the purpose of inciting a willingness similarly to suffer. There are numerous valuable excursi on special points. Altogether, Dibelius' revised edition of the pastorals is a work which does credit to the leading German New Testament scholar, and one which must be taken into account in any scientific study of that section of the New Testament—a section, it may be said in passing, which is more interesting and worthy of study than is generally supposed.

ENELOW, H. G. *A Jewish View of Jesus.* New York: Bloch Publishing Co., 1931. 181 pages. $1.00.

This valuable little book, first published in 1920, and now reprinted, exhibits a very keen appreciation of Jesus from a liberal Jewish point of approach. It is free from polemic, and can be read with pleasure and profit by liberal thinkers of any communion.

GRIBBLE, LEONARD R. (ed.). *The Jesus of the Poets.* New York: Richard R. Smith, Inc., 1930. 157 pages. $1.25.

A miscellaneous assemblage of poetic compositions concerned with various phases of interest in Jesus as an object of reverence and worship. The anthology professes to exhibit the influence of Jesus on the poets, but perhaps its greatest significance lies in its revelation of what poets, or near-poets, have done to Jesus.

HUCK, D. ALBERT. *Synopse der drei ersten Evangelien.* Aufl. 8. Tübingen: Mohr, 1931. xlvi+247 pages. Unbound, M. 6.60; bound, M. 8.80.

It is pleasant that another printing of Huck's well-known harmony (of the Synoptic Gospels; the Fourth Gospel parallels printed in an Appendix) is called for. But it is not clear why the publishers offer it as a revised and corrected edition, especially when the editor's Preface disclaims this. There is no change from the seventh edition except for the correction of a few misprints.

JONES, RUFUS M. *The Boy Jesus and His Companions.* New York: Macmillan Co., 1930. xi+189 pages. $1.00.

The "Little Library Series" is enriched by the addition of Professor Jones's contribution for eight- to ten-year-olds. In a legitimate framework of gospel outline there have been drawn vivid word-pictures, to which the illustrations, done in the style of the old woodcuts, add interest, increasing the teaching value of the text. The book is evidence that exact scholarship and the historical imagination are true yoke-fellows in this field. A religious education text of unusual value.

LAVERGNE, THE REVEREND FATHER. *L'Apocalypse.* Abridged ed. (with a prefatory letter by The Reverend Father Allo). Paris: Librairie Lecoffre—J. Gabalda et Fils, 1930. 169 pages. Fr. 10.

A brief commentary on the Apocalypse by a Catholic scholar, who is well acquainted with recent critical literature, and who takes positions as modern as is consistent with the pronouncements of his church.

LIETZMANN, HANS. *Ein Beitrag zur Mandäerfrage.* Berlin: Der Akademie der Wissenschaften in Kommission bei Walter de Gruyter U. Co., 1930. 15 pages. M. 1.

This is a reprint from the *Sitzungsberichten der Preussischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, phil.-hist. Klasse* (Vol. XXVII, 1930). After a careful examination of data the writer concludes that the Mandeans exerted no influence upon the disciples of John the Baptist in the early days of Christianity, but that the Christian tradition about John was taken up by the Mandeans not earlier than the seventh century.

Rattenbury, J. Ernest. *The Religious Experience of St. Paul.* Nashville: Cokesbury Press, 1931. 313 pages. $2.50.

The outstanding feature of this latest contribution to the stream of books about Paul is the fact that it is written entirely from the point of view of modern evangelical experience in the Protestant section of the Christian movement. The author is both ignorant and contemptuous of historical methodology and documentary criticism. He admits he "has no light to throw on such questions as mystery religions, Apocalyptic Textual Criticism (*sic.*), or the Koine and their relation to St. Paul." His distrust of "mere scholarship" is frankly avowed and he is ready to maintain that religious faith is a better guide to the understanding of Jesus and Paul than disciplined historical-mindedness can possibly be. For this writer "the groanings of a Luther are a more valuable introduction to the inner life of Paul than the brilliant scholarship of Wrede."

The author's own equipment for the task of interpreting the religious experience of Paul includes three main items: a vivid and highly emotional conversion experience; many years of activity as Superintendent of the West End Mission in London; and five years of comparative leisure spent in part in reading secondary literature about Paul. The result is a book that mirrors well enough the writer's own religious convictions, but yields a completely distorted portrait of Paul, set in the background of a vacuum. A student who is at all conscientious about the use of his time should neglect this book.

Thielscher, Paul. *Unser Wissen um Jesus.* Gotha: Leopold Klotz, 1930. 442 pages. M. 12.

The new approaches to the Gospels and to Jesus which are being made in Germany give rise to anticipations when a book with this title appears. But such hope, and the promise of the subtitle, "a new way to source investigation," are disappointed; the book is merely another erratic attempt to isolate the literary basis of the gospel traditions.

HISTORY OF CHRISTIANITY

Barrett, E. Boyd. *The Magnificent Illusion.* New York: Ives Washburn, 1930. 321 pages. $3.00.

In this book the psychoanalyst has, one might say, operated on himself. It presents a survey of the author's personal experience in training for the priesthood, in active service within the Jesuit order, and in the period of reconstructing his new way of life after his withdrawal from the society. The story is told without bitterness and with a very high appreciation of the religious values conserved and cherished by the Catholic church. The illusion is still "magnificent" in many of its phases, even though the subject has been somewhat rudely awakened from his dream. Naturally, a spiritual autobiography—one's *apologia pro vita sua*—if written with sincerity and conviction, may seem, to those who have never passed through like experiences of misunderstanding and mistreatment, to betray signs of self-pity and warped judgments. But it ought to be remarked with emphasis that this volume is not overzealous either in sympathy for the injured author or in condemnation of the institution by which he certainly must feel that he had been victimized. He tells as objectively as possible the story of his relations with the Roman Catholic church, with all the fascination it exercised upon his mystical nature, even though he has finally discovered that temperamentally he was never able to subordinate his own spiritual will to its authority. Evidently suspicion awakened in his superiors was aroused, not by any open and deliberate acts of disobedience on his part, but by his quite unconscious display of an individualistic idealism that, in the nature of the case, cannot find free expression within the limits of any strict religious order, where the sanctity of the institution is always superior to that of the individual. Thus this book is a highly important piece of source material for all students of religious institutionalism on the one hand and of individual religious self-expression on the other. Moreover, as a very human document charmingly composed, it makes exceedingly interesting reading.

Birch, T. Bruce (ed.). *The De Sacramento Altaris of William of Ockham* (translation). Burlington, Iowa: Lutheran Literary Board, 1930. xlii+275 pages. $3.50.

This volume contains the English translation only, although the publishers announce another volume containing both the Latin text and the translation. The Introduction is very elementary; and many of the references and quotations from authorities which it contains are given without indication of the title and page. The list of Ockham's works in America contains the titles of Latin and English versions of the *Disputatio inter clericum et militem*, which is certainly not Ockham's and has been ascribed, though probably mistakenly, by Riegler to Pierre Dubois. The author has apparently not seen Scholz's edition of the Latin or Perry's of the fourteenth-century English version of this tract. Dr. Birch's translation is given without notes. He deserves our gratitude for having labored through a singularly involved piece of scholastic thought and having turned it into comprehensible English. An extensive Bibliography is appended.

Campenhausen, Hans Frhr. v. *Die asketische Heimatlosigkeit im altkirchlichen und frühmittelalterlichen Mönchtum.* Tübingen: Mohr, 1930. 31 pages. M. 1.50.

This brief study takes its point of departure from the earlier investigations of Reitzenstein and Bousset in the area of oriental monasticism. The ideal of the homelessness of the wandering monk, prominent in the East, is also discovered in the West, where it is thought to have exerted a significant influence in the fourth and fifth centuries. This ideal is seen exemplified in the movements of Irish and Anglo-Saxon monks, and from this source affected the work of Boniface and the missionary activities of the church. One regrets that the thesis has not been treated with greater fulness.

Frölich, Karlfried. *Gottesreich Welt und Kirche bei Calvin.* (*Aus der Welt christlicher Frömmigkeit*, Band II.) Munich: Ernst Reinhardt, 1930. 120 pages. Bound M. 6.50, unbound M. 4.80.

This is a scholarly and sympathetic study of Calvin's concept of the kingdom of God in its relation to the church and secular society. While the author has utilized a number of earlier studies, he has worked with close and constant reference to the writings of Calvin, and the notes (pp. 94–115) consist mainly of quotations from the *Corpus Reformatorum.* Particularly valuable is the section entitled "Gottesreich und Kirche" (pp. 48–75). Herr Frölich holds that: "Faith in the *ecclesia catholica* is, in combination with faith in Christ, the focus in Calvin's piety." The conception of the visible church is marked by attention to organization and to the cultus and the word of God, emphasis on teaching and pedagogy, and constant concern for the unity of the church. A compressed exposition of these topics is followed by an excursus in which the Calvinist and Roman churches, and their leaders Calvin and Loyola, are contrasted. In his review of Calvin's socio-political ideal (*Gottesreich, Weltliche Gewalt und Politik*) the author indicates the political value of Calvin's emphasis on calling, and on public order and the corporate life. He presents Calvin and Calvinism as, like the early Christians and the prophets, critical of the social and cultural environment. Calvin's conception of progress, unlike that of the rationalists, was that of the mysterious advance of the purposes of God against the evil of the world; but this inevitably led the way to modern non-eschatological conceptions of progress. This book deserves the attention of all students of the Reformation.

GATES, SUSA YOUNG, in collaboration with Leah D. Widtsoe. *The Life Story of Brigham Young*. New York: Macmillan Co., 1930. xviii+388 pages. $5.00.

This reviewer took up the *Life Story of Brigham Young* with keen expectation, for there are few personalities of the nineteenth century which so pique the curiosity, or arouse so lively an interest, as does the sturdy figure of the Mormon leader and empire-builder, Brigham Young. But from first to last the book was a disappointment. Parson Weems's *Life of Washington* seems to have been the author's model, for she has, most unfortunately, made of her father a faultless prig. Senator Reed Smoot who writes the Foreword says that "Brigham Young's life was a romance; the subduing of the Great American Desert is an epic of empire building." This is not an overstatement. But this book by "a gifted daughter of the Pioneer, in collaboration with her daughter" extracts most, if not all, the romance from that life, and the story she produces comes far short of being an epic. One wonders whether the busy Senator read the manuscript before he wrote his Foreword.

Of course it must be remembered that Mrs. Gates sees her father from a different angle than does a biographer who writes from the standpoint of his public career. She has undoubtedly made some valuable contributions to the store of known facts, especially in regard to Brigham Young's attitude toward women and the home life as carried on in his two Salt Lake City houses—the Bee Hive House and the Lion House. Aside from this, the book contains little that has not been better presented in other biographies. To the reader who shares my disappointment in this book, I would recommend the reading of Werner's *Brigham Young* (London: Jonathan Cape, 1925).

GEYER, B., and ZELLINGER, J. (eds.). *Florilegium Patristicum tam veteris quam medii aevi auctores complectens*. Bonn: Peter Hanstein. Fasc. XXV: *Magistri Echardi quaestiones et sermo Parisienses*. Edidit et notis illustravit B. Geyer (1931). 34 pages. M. 1.50. Fasc. XXVI: *De causalitate sacramentorum iuxta scholam franciscanam*. Edidit W. Lampen (1931). 60 pages. M. 2.80. Fasc. XXVII: *S. Aurelii Augustini Episcopi Hipponensis de beata vita liber*. Edidit M. Schmaus (1931). 23 pages. M. 1. Fasc. XXVIII: *S. Anselmi Cantuariensis Archiepiscopi epistola de incarnatione verbi. Accedit prior eiusdem opusculi recensio nunc primum edita*. Recensuit F. S. Schmitt (1931). 40 pages. M. 1.80.

Four new numbers are now added to this rapidly growing and useful series already noticed at greater length in this *Journal* for January, 1931 (Vol. XI, pp. 150 f.). Fasc. XXVI contains selections from Alexander Halensis, S. Bonaventura, Richardus de Mediavilla, Guilelmus de Ware, B. Joannes Duns Scotus. The contents of the other numbers are sufficiently indicated by the titles. Every student who would acquire some discipline in reading his sources in the original will welcome these convenient, inexpensive, and well-printed aids.

GRABMANN, MARTIN. *Introduction to the Theological Summa of St. Thomas.* (Translated by John S. Zybura.) St. Louis: B. Herder & Co., 1930. 220 pages. $2.00.

Professor Zybura's translation is from the second German edition of Grabmann's searching study of Aquinas. Grabmann carries lightly his vast learning in the field of scholasticism, and his lucid and vigorous style has been captured by the translator. The "Angelic Doctor" becomes here not merely angelic but almost divine. The author's admiration is not merely that of an obedient son of the church but that of a zealous disciple. In his last sentence he quotes a Spanish manuscript in which Thomas is described as "*ecclesiae lumen, orbis decus, theologorum gemma.*" Incidentally he tells us much about the modern literature in interpretation of the *Summa.*

GRANT, HELEN HARDIE. *Peter Cartwright: Pioneer.* New York: Abingdon Press, 1931. 222 pages. $2.00.

It is passing strange that, in this period of growing interest in biography, someone has not long before attempted to portray in modern fashion the life and career of the most interesting of the circuit-riders, Peter Cartwright. Mrs. Grant has written a most entertaining story about Peter Cartwright—hardly a biography. Her chief contribution is in filling in the years from 1856 to 1872, the period from the close of his *Autobiography* to his death. For the early years of Cartwright's life no biography could be as interesting as is his *Autobiography.* One might wish that Mrs. Grant had indicated, either through a bibliography or footnotes, her sources for these later years of Cartwright's life.

INMAN, SAMUEL G. *Trailing the Conquistadores.* New York: Friendship Press, 1930. 236 pages. Cloth, $1.00; paper, $0.60.

This little book, describing present-day conditions in the West Indies, has grown out of numerous visits which the author has made in recent years to Cuba, Santo Domingo and Porto Rico, in carrying on his work as secretary of the Committee on Co-operation in Latin America. The first four chapters relate the story of the Spanish *conquistadores* and the beginning of the Caribbean interests of the United States. The next three chapters deal with the outstanding problems facing these little republics, among them being political unrest and the United States occupation; the race question; and overpopulation and underfeeding. In the last chapter, entitled "Conquistadores of Today," the author makes a strong appeal for a more Christian attitude on the part of the government of the United States and the American investors toward these Caribbean peoples, at the same time giving praise to the Christian forces at work, frail as they are, for confronting the problems presented.

JÜSSEN, KLAUDIUS. *Die dogmatischen Anschauungen des Hesychius von Jerusalem.* Heft 17 of *Münsterische Beiträge zur Theologie.* Münster in Westfalen: Aschendorff'sche Verlag, 1931. xii+184 pages. M. 9.80.

This doctoral dissertation by a Roman Catholic scholar is an effort to lift the veil of obscurity that has long enshrouded the figure of the oriental exegete and theologian of the early fifth century, Hesychius, the presbyter of Jerusalem. First, data regarding his career and literary activity are critically evaluated, with the result that ten of the writings sometimes credited to him are thought to be genuine, two others are still in doubt, and six are found to be unauthentic. From this critical estimate of the sources the author proceeds to expound two aspects of Hesychius' teaching, namely, his theory of theological knowledge and his Christology. The latter, as the more important, is treated at greater length. More than one-half of the monograph is devoted to this subject, which is handled with much insight and precision. The result is a better understanding of the obscure status of theological thinking among Palestinians at this time. Hesychius is found to have been under the influence of both Antioch and Alexandria, yet he steered a tolerably safe course over the troubled theological waters. He succeeded in avoiding the extremes of Apollinarianism, Nestorianism, and Monophysitism, and is entitled to be reckoned among the orthodox theologians of the church. Yet he was fundamentally an exegete rather than a theologian.

LIETZMANN, HANS. *Gedächtnisrede auf Adolf von Harnack.* Berlin: Akademie der Wissenschaften in Kommission bei Walter de Gruyter U. Co., 1931. 12 pages. M. 1.

A critical but sympathetic evaluation of the career and work of this distinguished German theologian who, perhaps, better than anyone else, summed up in his career the historical and theological attainments of the liberal German Protestantism of the nineteenth century.

Lutherana VI: Sechtes Lutherheft der "Theologischen Studien und Kritiken." Gotha: Leopold Klotz, 1930. 210 pages. M. 11

This monograph is composed of the first and second numbers of the periodical *Theologische Studien und Kritiken* (Vol. CII, 1930). Six different writers contribute interpretations of various phases of Luther's activity and interest, including his exegetical work, his conception of the fellowship of the saints, and the development of his Christology as disclosed in his lectures on the Psalms and Romans. This last topic, discussed by F. Huck (pp. 61–142), is a particularly timely one, in view of questions recently raised by Hall and Vogelsang regarding the antecedents of Luther's christological thinking.

MACDONALD, A. J. *Berengar and the Reform of Sacramental Doctrine.* London: Longmans, Green & Co., 1930. xii+444 pages. 21*s.*

Dr. MacDonald follows a successful book on Lanfranc by a work of perhaps still more significance on Berengar. Part I is primarily biographical and contains eleven chapters dealing with the career of Berengar in relation to eleventh-century movements and persons. Naturally his relations with Hildebrand are of interest here; and the author has stated these with clarity: Hildebrand befriended the suspected heretic until it became impossible to protect him, and then acquiesced in his condemnation. This meant, MacDonald believes, that "the day of opportunity for the medieval Papacy to become the inaugurator of spiritual as well as practical reform was allowed to pass" (p. 224). Part II analyzes the thought of Berengar in relation to traditional and contemporary theology. The final chapter (xxiii) on "Berengar and the Church of England," sheds valuable light on the influence, not only of Berengar, but also of Rotramnus, on Wyclif and the English reformers.

MARITAIN, JACQUES. *The Angelic Doctor.* New York: Dial Press, 1931. xviii+300 pages. $2.50.

This is mainly a panegyric upon Aquinas designed to correct the error of those within and without the Roman church who venture to question his enduring supremacy. Considerable biographical material is provided. The appendixes include the text in English of the principal papal documents on Thomas and Thomism.

PHELAN, M. *New Handbook of all Denominations* (rewritten and revised). 6th ed. Nashville: Cokesbury Press, 1930. 314 pages. $1.75.

This useful handbook made its first appearance in 1915 and each successive edition has been an improvement on the previous one. The present edition is just one hundred pages larger than the fifth edition which appeared in 1927. The object of the compiler as expressed in his Preface is "to make the too numerous denominations of this country better acquainted with one another" so that a better understanding and a closer fellowship may result. Besides giving the most recent statistics of all the churches, each of the denominations is introduced with a brief explanation of its origin and later development.

REYNOLDS, BEATRICE. *Proponents of Limited Monarchy in Sixteenth-Century France: Francis Hotman and Jean Bodin.* New York: Columbia University Press, 1931. 210 pages. $3.50.

This is a worth-while contribution to the now considerable literature on the political ideas of the sixteenth century. The writer provides us with sufficient biographical material on both publicists to explain the development of their political views. A number of unpublished letters have aided in the clarification of the story. The exposition of Bodin's little known *Methodus ad facilem historiarum cognitionem* enables the author to place Bodin among the advocates of the limitation of royal power. The study of Hotman shows his close relations with Calvin and the Geneva movement, and seems to warrant the conclusion that his German family origin was a factor in determining his political attitudes. Though the work is in parts rather scantily annotated, it is evidently based upon solid research throughout.

SIMPSON, W. DOUGLAS. *Julian the Apostate.* Aberdeen: Milne & Hutchison, 1930. xi+127 pages. 7/6 net.

This is a deliberate and worthy effort to do justice to the much maligned Julian. Without entering into controversy with previous interpreters of the "apostate" emperor, Simpson, who is the librarian of the University of Aberdeen, concerns himself mainly with original sources in an attempt to present in compact form the true historical personality of his character. He concludes that Julian's outlook on the situation of his day "was in itself a reasonable and, indeed, an inevitable one for a man of his upbringing, prepossessions and sympathies." The volume will commend itself to every serious student of this period of history.

SIMPSON, W. J. SPARROW. *St. Augustine's Conversion.* New York: Macmillan Co., 1930. ix+276 pages. $3.50.

The fifteen-hundredth anniversary of Augustine's death, which fell on August 28, 1930, called forth a number of studies, of which this is one of the more significant. The author has undertaken to describe the course of Augustine's development up to the time of his ordination. Recognizing that the *Confessions*, upon which students have usually drawn rather exclusively for information, were a later product of Augustine's pen, Simpson has concentrated his attention on the earlier writings, taken in chronological order, and has sought to follow the evolution of his subject's attitudes and interests as portrayed in these documents. He takes account of the multiple factors that contributed toward the shaping of the youth's intellectual and emotional history and the forces that were operative, throughout the years, on his early manhood, leading him on step by step into the church. These matters are set forth chapter by chapter in a very instructive and interesting manner. But through all of this there runs an apologetic thread, not always conspicuous, but readily perceived. Students of Augustine are nowadays forced to ask just how fully he was, particularly in the earlier period of his Christian career, a true son of the church. There are elements in his thought that sometimes seem more neo-Platonic than Catholic, and one wonders whether, if tested by the phrases of the creed, Augustine might not have been found seriously lacking. This problem is answered in the negative. We are told again and again that when read understandingly even the earliest of Augustine's writings attest that from the day of his conversion he gave implicit assent to the authority of the church and to the full contents of its faith, although "time and reflection were needed to enable that wonderfully powerful mind to realize in any full degree what the implications of these contents actually were." A writer, who does not set out to defend this thesis, might issue from this course of investigation with a more vital view of the making of the famous bishop of Hippo and his significance for the history of early Christianity.

CHRISTIAN DOCTRINE

HUTCHEON, ROBERT J. *Humanism in Religion Examined*. Chicago: Meadville Theological School, 1931. 89 pages. $0.75.

A useful survey and evaluation. The main topics treated are "Historical Background," "Humanistic Interpretation of Religion," "Reaction against Humanism," "Values Overlooked by Humanism," "Humanism Coming of Age," "Facing the Future."

LE ROY, EDOUARD. *La Pensée intuitive*, II: *Invention et Vérification*. Paris: Boivin et Cie., 1930. 296 pages. Fr. 20.

This is the second of a series of volumes upon the subject of intuition in human thought. M. Edouard Le Roy is a devoted follower of Bergson and all his writing has been given over to exposition and development of the philosophy of his master. Intuition is here represented as the source of all invention. There is attempt to show how creative intuition may be fostered, how it functions, and how the innovating idea is verified. The book ends with discussion of how we attain to a consciousness of absolute reality.

MACFIE, RONALD C. *Science Rediscovers God*. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1930. vii+275 pages. $3.00.

A popular textbook on physiology with the addition of a chapter in which the author draws from the demonstrated intricacy of the human body the inference that it can only be explained by the assumption of a "creative heart and mind" of the universe.

REESE, CURTIS W. *Humanist Religion.* New York: Macmillan Co., 1931. 95 pages. $1.00.

The humanist position is here tersely and sympathetically stated by one of its well-known representatives. The basic materials in religion are said to be the characteristics and needs of human nature, and the first duty of religion is to discover what these characteristics are and how their harmonious development can be effected.

SELBIE, W. B. *Religion and Life.* Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1930. vii+135 pages. $1.50.

The principal of Mansfield College, Oxford, here gives a series of very general lectures on such problems as the relation of religion to history, psychology, and ethics; and the place in religion of theism, Christ, and immortality. The essays contain nothing that is new to the well-informed student of theology.

SHEEN, FULTON J. *The Divine Romance.* New York: Century Co., 1930. 142 pages. $1.50.

A popular presentation of the principal dogmas of Roman Catholicism. The topics discussed are "Man's Quest for God," the "Trinity," "Love's Overflow," "God's Quest for Man," the "Divine Equation," the "Pulpit of the Cross," and "Dying and Behold We Live."

SIMPSON, P. CARNEGIE. *Essentials.* New York: Richard R. Smith, Inc., 1930. 251 pages. $1.50.

This is a series of simple and sincere essays on such matters as the place in life of love, work, morals, experience, belief in God, and the facing of old age and death. The very simplicity of the essays gives them a certain penetrating quality that makes them worth reading, despite the bromidic title.

PREACHING AND MISSIONS

BERGER, JULIUS. *The Weekly Sermon.* New York: Bloch Publishing Co., 1931. 295 pages. $2.50.

The author is a Jewish rabbi who here publishes sixty sermons covering every portion of the week as well as each festival and holy day of the Jewish year. The volume is a valuable addition to Jewish homiletical literature in English, and it contains many stimulating thoughts that ought to prove suggestive to preachers in general.

BLACK, JAMES. *The Unlocked Door.* New York: Harper & Bros., 1931. viii+232 pages. $2.00.

Stories told by the author in the service for children in his church. The stories are charmingly simple and the moral of each is well pointed.

BRADLEY, DWIGHT. *The Recovery of Religion.* New York: Doubleday, Doran & Co., 1929. 235 pages. $2.00.

A stimulating and creative book by a brilliant young minister who is saturated with modern science and philosophy and at the same time driven by an inner urge of mysticism. No wonder that he takes as his formula the dilemma: "Man must live in two worlds. . . . . He must dream his dreams and watch their destruction. He must watch his dreams being destroyed and go on dreaming. He must live in the spirit and die on the cross." A less imperious and logic-driven mind may often ask, however, if the dilemma is always as clear or unescapable as Mr. Bradley believes. The book has much to stimulate the preacher, especially in the two masterly chapters on "Religious Survivals in a Scientific Period."

BUNDY, WALTER E. *The Passion Week.* Chicago: Willett, Clark & Colby, 1930. 235 pages. $2.00.

Every working pastor, as Easter approaches, looks for some fresh scholarly book to reinterpret the gospel narratives of the closing week of Jesus' life and stimulate his thinking as he prepares his sermons for that crowning period of the Christian year. Many books dealing with this subject are either wooden and traditional or sentimental and overstrained. Here at last is a book of sound scholarship combined with helpful constructive insight into what really happened day by day from Palm Sunday to Easter. The first step toward sound and helpful preaching on the themes of Holy Week is to know the facts themselves as analyzed and interpreted by modern New Testament scholarship. Against the background of such a book as this the preacher will turn with new assurance and illumination to his task of sermon preparation.

COFFIN, HENRY SLOANE. *The Meaning of the Cross.* New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1931. 164 pages. $1.50.

Addresses, that have been delivered to groups of ministers and theological students, asking four questions: What crucified Christ? Why did he have himself crucified? How shall we interpret the cross? What must we do because of it? The answers are stimulating when read as a contribution toward religious attitudes among men today; as critical solutions of perplexing historical issues they are less significant.

DEVARANNE, THEODORE. *Christus an Torii und Pagode.* Gotha: Leopold Klotz, 1931. viii+267 pages. M. 8.

This book from the pen of Missionsinspektor Pastor Devaranne is a handbook intended primarily for use by the friends and supporters of the German Evangelical Protestant Missionary Union (*Ostasien-Mission*), whose mission fields are located in Japan and the Province of Shantung, China, and whose support is drawn from evangelical Christians in Germany, Alsace, and German-speaking Switzerland.

The brief introductory chapter is an apologetic for Christian missions, following rather conventional lines. The second and third chapters, which form three-fourths of the book, are devoted to conditions in Japan and China, particularly as these bear upon the missionary enterprise. The material ranges widely and is by no means confined to the missions of the particular body for whom the manual was prepared. The concluding chapter embodies material particularly adapted to the interest of young people. The book, as a whole, is very concrete and is packed with pertinent and interesting information compiled from many authentic sources.

FLEMING, DANIEL J. *Helping People Grow: An Application of Educational Principles to Christian Work Abroad.* New York: Association Press, 1931. x+236 pages. $1.25.

One anticipates from the pen of Professor Fleming that combination of theory and practice which has instant appeal to the reading public concerned; and in this instance the anticipation is most happily met. This is the type of book which should be placed by missionary agencies in the hands of every missionary on the field as well as of all candidates for missionary service under appointment. Dr. Fleming makes appeal, as the chapter headings instantly reveal, to educational principles as formulated by leading authorities in contemporary educational practice, emphasizing the creative function of active sharing, of responsible participation, in the growth of Christian personalities capable of expressing in themselves and extending through their activities the sway of the Christian way of life.

The peculiar appeal of the book lies, however, not in the statement of these principles, which one may find in various educational manuals, but in the very definite fashion in which the author has illustrated both their use and the failure to employ them in instance after instance drawn from the living practice of missionaries. The book fairly teems with concrete instances. In fact, the thronging of concrete illustration makes the treatment a bit choppy. At the same time, it leaves every reader, charged with similar responsibilities, in a mood to test his own practice by these recognized principles.

HARRISON, LEON. *The Religion of a Modern Liberal.* New York: Bloch, 1931. xvii+282 pages. $2.50.

The volume is a collection of thirty sermons preached by the late rabbi of Temple Israel in St. Louis at different times during his thirty-five years in the Jewish ministry. These discourses are thoughtful, sometimes brilliant, often very suggestive, and still capable of furnishing much stimulation for any preacher.

HEILER, FRIEDRICH. *Die Mission des Christentums in Indien.* Gotha: Leopold Klotz, 1931. 53 pages. M. 2.60.

This is No. 5 in the new series of "Marburger theologische Studien." The well-known author is in hearty sympathy with the proposition to allow Indian Christians to develop a form of Christianity in accordance with their own temperament and genius rather than to force upon them an occidental interpretation of religion. In fact he believes that westerners have clothed Christ with garments far less appropriate to his person than are the forms in which the Indian mysticism and meditative temper are wont to portray the religious figure of Christ. One might say that he believes Sadhu Sundar Singh to have had a truer understanding of Christ than had Paul, Athanasius, Anselm, Luther, and Western theologians in general. Irrespective of one's willingness to accept Heiler's conclusions, his essay is certainly stimulating reading.

LARSEN, J. ANKER. *With the Door Open.* Translated from the German by Erwin and Pleasaunce von Gaisberg. New York: Macmillan Co., 1931. 112 pages. $1.50.

The confession of a mystic who would release religion from its imprisonment in theology. Theologians and priests will still rejoice in Jesus' death; the mystics alone "will release him from the stranglehold of theology and give the world's Redeemer back to life."

NORWOOD, ROBERT. *His Glorious Body.* New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1930. xx+229 pages. $2.00.

This book is a study of passages in the Epistles of St. Paul bearing on the resurrection and the mystical Christ. Based on a series of noon-day addresses delivered at St. Bartholomew's Church, New York, during Lent, it clearly bears the marks of its homiletic origin. The point of view it presents will be helpful and stimulating to the preacher, not only because of its deeply mystical tone, but all the more because the author evidently understands the modern critical approach to the Bible.

SIMPSON, HUBERT L. *The Nameless Longing*. New York: Harper & Bros., 1931. 305 pages. $2.00.

Twenty-four sermons, displaying charming literary skill, keen spiritual insights, and much dramatic effectiveness, by the minister of the Westminster Church in London.

STORER, J. *The Spirit of Reality*. Buffalo: Humboldt Publishing Co., 1931. 207 pages. $1.00.

A collection of edifying excerpts from a variety of sources grouped according to each day of the year.

WHITE, J. GUSTAV. *Present Day Psalms*. New York: Association Press, 1930. 62 pages. $1.00.

Some aspects of modern religious experience and interests expressed in the form of psalms. However much the sincerity of the modern minstrel may be appreciated, one cannot fail to lament the lack of music in his soul—and in his verse.

MISCELLANEOUS

Abstracts of Theses, Humanistic Series. Vol. VII, 1928–1929. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1930. xiii+712 pages. $3.00.

This volume contains the abstracts of theses presented in the schools of Arts and Literature, Divinity, Commerce and Administration, and Social Service Administration, at the University of Chicago. The results of research in these various schools are here made available in convenient epitomized form sufficient for the needs of the scholar and often instructive for, and even interesting to, the layman.

BALLANTINE, WILLIAM G. *The Basis of Belief*. New York: Crowell, 1930. 230 pages. $2.00.

An attempt to state in understandable form for popular consumption the principles of inductive logic.

JORET, F. D. *L'enfance spirituelle*. Juvisy, France: Les Editions du Cerf, 1930. 1930. 206 pages.

A work of Roman Catholic edification suitable especially for reading and meditation at the season of Christmas.

KALCKREUTH, DUNBAR VON. *Three Thousand Years of Rome*. Translated from the German by Caroline Fredrick. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1930. xii+340 pages. $5.00.

This account of Rome's history is well suited to the tastes of general readers, although it is by no means lacking in ample evidences of technical scholarship. But these more recondite aspects of the subject are happily submerged beneath the smoothly flowing surface of a pleasant narrative, or are hidden away in a series of footnotes printed at the end of the volume. In a style half poetic, interspersed with paragraphs of fiction, yet almost cruelly true to life, the narrative moves on easily from one high point to another in the progress of the story. Churchmen, princes, artists, and scholars appear on the stage as the drama unfolds itself from the grey dawn of antiquity down to the present, when the modern traveler may wend his way to the Palatine and today "sit down on a stone from the wall of Romulus." This book would make excellent reading for one contemplating a visit to Rome, and will also be enjoyed by those who have already seen the "Eternal City."

MOORE, WILLIAM H. *Frequent Fallacies.* Boston: Christopher Publishing House, 1931. 77 pages. $1.50.

The author of this little book hopes, by encouraging people to cultivate discrimination in their thinking, to eliminate the causes and consequence of much mental confusion that he thinks prevails at present in the field of religion. His suggestions are both sensible and helpful.

Schlesisches Jahrbuch für deutsche Kulturarbeit im gesamtschlesischen Raume. 2. Jahrgang, 1929–30. Edited by Ausschuss der Schlesischen Kulturwochen. Breslau: W. G. Korn, 1929. 127 pages.

Contains general cultural information of interest to persons contemplating a visit to Breslau and vicinity.

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